- August 21st, 2021, 6:54 pm
#392610
Quoting the conclusions of the article:
'English history made two things clear to the American revolutionaries: force of arms was the only effective check on government, and standing armies threatened liberty. Recognition of these premises meant that the force of arms necessary to check government had to be placed in the hands of citizens.
Because the public purpose of the right to keep arms was to check government, the right necessarily belonged to the individual and, as a matter of theory, was thought to be absolute in that it could not be abrogated by the prevailing rulers.
These views were adopted by the framers [of the Constitution], both Federalists and Antifederalists. Neither group trusted government. Both believed the greatest danger to the new republic was tyrannical government and that the ultimate check on tyranny was an armed population.
The check on all government, not simply the federal government, was the armed population, the militia. Government would not be accorded the power to create a select militia since such a body would become the government's instrument. The whole of the population would comprise the militia. As the constitutional debates prove, the framers recognized that the common public purpose of preserving freedom would be served by protecting each individual's right to arms, thus empowering the people to resist tyranny and preserve the republic. The intent was not to create a right for other governments, the individual states; it was to preserve the people's right to a free state, just as it says.'
It is hard to deny the prevailing logic, given the (woeful) English history as described in the article, and the context. Also influential were the words of de Montesquieu, as summarised by Vandercoy:
'The Antifederalists relied extensively on the works of Baron de Montesquieu to support the proposition that the geographic size of an area strongly influenced its form of government. Montesquieu had written that democracy could survive only in a small-sized state, small enough to permit the actual participation of the people in government and small enough so that each citizen understands that promoting the public good directly promotes the individual. A middle-sized territory, as Montesquieu terms it, would inevitably become a monarchy; to an extensive territory, a despotic form of government was best adapted. In large republics, the public good is sacrificed to a multiplicity of views and the citizens do not perceive the nexus between promoting the public good and their individual welfare. According to Montesquieu, a middle-sized territory would tend to become a monarchy because ambitious persons who do not perceive the public good as beneficial to them seek grandeur by imposing their will on others. One person eventually prevails and assumes the role as prince. The monarchy then exists through a system of honor established by giving perks and titles. If the territory is too large, one person cannot command sufficient allegiance on honor of enough of the populace to control the territory. Ruling a large territory requires more than a system of titles and perks. Order can be maintained only by immediate, passive obedience to the rules; passive obedience can be achieved only by an instilling fear. The multiplicity of views, the dissents, are stifled by fear. According to Montesquieu, rule by fear, despotism, was a logical incident of the government of a large territory. Montesquieu's theory continued that while a small republic could internally maintain its republican character, it would be destroyed by foreign forces. The dilemma could be resolved only by a confederate republic, a form of government in which small states become individual members of an association which is able to provide security for the whole body.'
Looking at modern China, or the Soviet Union and now Russia, it would seem de Montesquieu made a fair argument. But history also provides counter-arguments. When the Constitution was being argued and framed, the population of the now US was below 4 million, and a militia of about 500,000 was being discussed. The current situation, of a nation armed with about 400 million guns, presents problems (eg mass shootings, black citizens killed by white police) which warrant a rethink.
What needs to be thought about and discussed is precisely the premise which Vandercoy explains so well, and which forms the basis of the people's relationship to government - namely a lack of trust. And just as the framers of the Constitution had no idea of the extent to which the people would one day be armed, they also neglected a positive force which has brought about successful large democracies throughout the modern world - the will of the people, as expressed at the ballot box. 'Force of arms' is actually NOT the only effective check on government, and instead of promoting the possession of arms based on fear and mistrust of government, it is possible to foster a successful representative democracy which can yield government which need not always be feared or not trusted.
-TheLastAmerican wrote: ↑August 19th, 2021, 1:48 pm If you are interested in a good read on the origins and basis of The Second Amendment, this would be a good start: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol28/iss3/5/It is a good read. Thanks for the link.
The article really is a good read.
Quoting the conclusions of the article:
'English history made two things clear to the American revolutionaries: force of arms was the only effective check on government, and standing armies threatened liberty. Recognition of these premises meant that the force of arms necessary to check government had to be placed in the hands of citizens.
Because the public purpose of the right to keep arms was to check government, the right necessarily belonged to the individual and, as a matter of theory, was thought to be absolute in that it could not be abrogated by the prevailing rulers.
These views were adopted by the framers [of the Constitution], both Federalists and Antifederalists. Neither group trusted government. Both believed the greatest danger to the new republic was tyrannical government and that the ultimate check on tyranny was an armed population.
The check on all government, not simply the federal government, was the armed population, the militia. Government would not be accorded the power to create a select militia since such a body would become the government's instrument. The whole of the population would comprise the militia. As the constitutional debates prove, the framers recognized that the common public purpose of preserving freedom would be served by protecting each individual's right to arms, thus empowering the people to resist tyranny and preserve the republic. The intent was not to create a right for other governments, the individual states; it was to preserve the people's right to a free state, just as it says.'
It is hard to deny the prevailing logic, given the (woeful) English history as described in the article, and the context. Also influential were the words of de Montesquieu, as summarised by Vandercoy:
'The Antifederalists relied extensively on the works of Baron de Montesquieu to support the proposition that the geographic size of an area strongly influenced its form of government. Montesquieu had written that democracy could survive only in a small-sized state, small enough to permit the actual participation of the people in government and small enough so that each citizen understands that promoting the public good directly promotes the individual. A middle-sized territory, as Montesquieu terms it, would inevitably become a monarchy; to an extensive territory, a despotic form of government was best adapted. In large republics, the public good is sacrificed to a multiplicity of views and the citizens do not perceive the nexus between promoting the public good and their individual welfare. According to Montesquieu, a middle-sized territory would tend to become a monarchy because ambitious persons who do not perceive the public good as beneficial to them seek grandeur by imposing their will on others. One person eventually prevails and assumes the role as prince. The monarchy then exists through a system of honor established by giving perks and titles. If the territory is too large, one person cannot command sufficient allegiance on honor of enough of the populace to control the territory. Ruling a large territory requires more than a system of titles and perks. Order can be maintained only by immediate, passive obedience to the rules; passive obedience can be achieved only by an instilling fear. The multiplicity of views, the dissents, are stifled by fear. According to Montesquieu, rule by fear, despotism, was a logical incident of the government of a large territory. Montesquieu's theory continued that while a small republic could internally maintain its republican character, it would be destroyed by foreign forces. The dilemma could be resolved only by a confederate republic, a form of government in which small states become individual members of an association which is able to provide security for the whole body.'
Looking at modern China, or the Soviet Union and now Russia, it would seem de Montesquieu made a fair argument. But history also provides counter-arguments. When the Constitution was being argued and framed, the population of the now US was below 4 million, and a militia of about 500,000 was being discussed. The current situation, of a nation armed with about 400 million guns, presents problems (eg mass shootings, black citizens killed by white police) which warrant a rethink.
What needs to be thought about and discussed is precisely the premise which Vandercoy explains so well, and which forms the basis of the people's relationship to government - namely a lack of trust. And just as the framers of the Constitution had no idea of the extent to which the people would one day be armed, they also neglected a positive force which has brought about successful large democracies throughout the modern world - the will of the people, as expressed at the ballot box. 'Force of arms' is actually NOT the only effective check on government, and instead of promoting the possession of arms based on fear and mistrust of government, it is possible to foster a successful representative democracy which can yield government which need not always be feared or not trusted.
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