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[Lagayascienza]

Accusation of “scientism” are often tossed about by people who think science gets above itself. How do people here feel about scientism? Does science over-reach as some accuse it of doing? Does it intrude into areas where it is inapplicable and has no business? Or does science have a universal applicability? If it does have universal applicability, does that make scientism the most reasonable basis for understanding the universe?

[Thomyum2]

Accusation of “scientism” are often tossed about by people who think science gets above itself. How do people here feel about scientism? Does science over-reach as some accuse it of doing? Does it intrude into areas where it is inapplicable and has no business? Or does science have a universal applicability? If it does have universal applicability, does that make scientism the most reasonable basis for understanding the universe?

I think this is an interesting question for discussion and that could be taken down a lot of different paths - I'm surprised no one has taken you up on it yet. Of course there are different definitions for scientism, and I think there are different types and degrees of it as well. But I’ll just begin by attempting to summarize my own initial thoughts.

To start with, though, I think it's important to clarify that ‘science’ is just a method, and as such it cannot ‘get above itself’ or ‘over-reach’ or ‘intrude’. I think when you say ‘science’, you’re meaning what might be better described as ‘human scientific endeavors’. Science doesn’t really ‘do’ anything, It is only people who can apply the findings from scientific efforts correctly or incorrectly or draw conclusions from it that are or are not implied by the results.

At the fundamental level, the role of science is to just observe and make predictions based on those observations, and then validate whether or not those predictions hold true in subsequent observations. Any truth claims made by science are always limited to the existing body of observational evidence, which is necessarily finite. What we commonly refer to as ‘scientific truths’ take the form of a ‘working hypothesis’ – something that we can safely assume is true, and act on that basis of that assumption because it’s always been found to be the case. But all scientific claims are provisional and are only held to be true for as long as new evidence does not arise that shows otherwise. I think that to assert universality is to make a logical error and to fall into scientism.

Some examples of statements that I would call scientism take the form:

• X has always been observed to occur (e.g. physical laws); therefore, X will always occur.

• All existing evidence supports the Big Bang theory; therefore, the Big Bang really happened.

• Science has progressively been able to explain more and more things, therefore anything yet unexplained will eventually be explained by science.

These statements are inductive generalizations and are fallacious in the manner of the statement that ‘all swans we’ve seen are white; therefore, all swans are white’. Of course, many people have great confidence in science and believe statements such as these, and I’ve no argument against that. But when they’re asserted as universal or proven truths, I think it’s important to point out that the reasoning just isn’t there to support that.

Moreover, universal claims aren’t just unsupported by reason but are also beyond the scope of science because they are unfalsifiable and unprovable. It isn’t within the scope of science to validate that results will or will not always remain the same in every case that will or could conceivably occur for all perpetuity. Human observational ability simply does not have the capacity to investigate the entire universe in the present, let alone all future and past states of the universe.

All that said, though, there certainly is some practical utility to taking many of these basic findings of science to be universal – if we were to question everything every moment, we likely would be afraid to even step out of our house. Much of the world we experience does unfold reliably according to laws, and because we have the confidence to rely on them to repeatedly occur as predicted, it seems like just common sense to believe that they are universal laws. Perhaps one could call that a ‘practical’ or ‘common sense’ scientism. But there is a very big gap between what is universal for purposes of the conduct of human daily life at a given moment in history, and what is universal in the full sense of that word.

Lots more that could be said here, but I'll leave it at that to avoid going on to long and end by saying that good science is science that always leaves itself open to revision based on new observations. Here’s a favorite quote from one of the essays of Umberto Eco:

So we would be wise to keep an open, fresh mind against the moment when the community of scientists decrees that the idea of the universe has been an illusion, just like the flat earth and the Rosicrucians. After all, the cultivated person’s first duty is to be always prepared to rewrite the encyclopedia.

[Lagayascienza]

Thanks for your response, Thomyum2. I think that what you say above answers the question comprehensively and I agree with all the points you made.

[Pattern-chaser]

Some examples of statements that I would call scientism take the form:

• X has always been observed to occur (e.g. physical laws); therefore, X will always occur.

• All existing evidence supports the Big Bang theory; therefore, the Big Bang really happened.

• Science has progressively been able to explain more and more things, therefore anything yet unexplained will eventually be explained by science.

They look more like simple (albeit unjustified) assumptions to me, not scientism. I have always thought Scientism is the misapplication of science, of using science outside its bailiwick. Perhaps this is not the generally-accepted meaning of the term?

[Fried Egg]

Moreover, universal claims aren’t just unsupported by reason but are also beyond the scope of science because they are unfalsifiable and unprovable. It isn’t within the scope of science to validate that results will or will not always remain the same in every case that will or could conceivably occur for all perpetuity. Human observational ability simply does not have the capacity to investigate the entire universe in the present, let alone all future and past states of the universe.

Perhaps I'm misunderstand exactly what you're saying here, but I think the purpose of science is precisely this; generating theories that are universally applicable. i.e. a theory of gravity which will predict observations for both me in the UK and someone in Australia (and for that matter, someone on Pluto).

Furthermore, it is their universality that makes them testable. If I assert a theory of gravity that is only true for the surrounding area in which I live and for the next hour, you (who might live in Australia) could not possibly test my theory because it doesn't apply in your locality and time frame. The more universal it is, the more testable it becomes and the better reason for adopting it in favour of less universal theories. For example, one of the reasons why Einstein's theory of gravitation replaced Newtons was it's increased universality. Einstein's theory predicted everything Newton's did plus additional stuff in situations where Newton's didn't hold.

That said, I'm open to the idea that there are certain things that are outside of the scope of science (such as why we are here) but in it's own realm, as a tool for helping us how reality works, it is unsurpassed.

I think we do have a bit of a problem these days with scientists going beyond what they should be doing (coming up with theories that best explain reality) to things they shouldn't be (such as making policy prescriptions). We all to often hear the phrase "we must follow the science", used by politicians or scientists advocating political change, as if there is an unquestionable line of reasoning that leads from one to the other. I don't think science and activism should mix.

[Pattern-chaser]

Moreover, universal claims aren’t just unsupported by reason but are also beyond the scope of science because they are unfalsifiable and unprovable. It isn’t within the scope of science to validate that results will or will not always remain the same in every case that will or could conceivably occur for all perpetuity. Human observational ability simply does not have the capacity to investigate the entire universe in the present, let alone all future and past states of the universe.

Perhaps I'm misunderstand exactly what you're saying here, but I think the purpose of science is precisely this; generating theories that are universally applicable. i.e. a theory of gravity which will predict observations for both me in the UK and someone in Australia (and for that matter, someone on Pluto).

Furthermore, it is their universality that makes them testable. If I assert a theory of gravity that is only true for the surrounding area in which I live and for the next hour, you (who might live in Australia) could not possibly test my theory because it doesn't apply in your locality and time frame. The more universal it is, the more testable it becomes and the better reason for adopting it in favour of less universal theories. For example, one of the reasons why Einstein's theory of gravitation replaced Newtons was it's increased universality. Einstein's theory predicted everything Newton's did plus additional stuff in situations where Newton's didn't hold.

There are some (theoretical) scientists who wonder if gravity works as we think gazillions of light-years away, at the other end of the universe. And they, and ThomYum, might be right to wonder so. These things have not yet been shown to be truly universal, and there is little likelihood that they ever will be, yes?

My view is that, for humans, certainty of any sort is pretty much unattainable -> no "universality" -> no (universal) testability.

That said, I'm open to the idea that there are certain things that are outside of the scope of science (such as why we are here) but in it's own realm, as a tool for helping us how reality works, it is unsurpassed.

Yes! To oppose sciencism is pro-science!

I think we do have a bit of a problem these days with scientists going beyond what they should be doing (coming up with theories that best explain reality) to things they shouldn't be (such as making policy prescriptions). We all to often hear the phrase "we must follow the science", used by politicians or scientists advocating political change, as if there is an unquestionable line of reasoning that leads from one to the other. I don't think science and activism should mix.

Agreed. Some of us use science as an excuse, nothing more. Even when science is inappropriate. And I would call that unknowing sciencism. Those who try to apply science to (say) the existence of God are perhaps knowing sciencists?

[Thomyum2]

Some examples of statements that I would call scientism take the form:

• X has always been observed to occur (e.g. physical laws); therefore, X will always occur.

• All existing evidence supports the Big Bang theory; therefore, the Big Bang really happened.

• Science has progressively been able to explain more and more things, therefore anything yet unexplained will eventually be explained by science.

They look more like simple (albeit unjustified) assumptions to me, not scientism. I have always thought Scientism is the misapplication of science, of using science outside its bailiwick. Perhaps this is not the generally-accepted meaning of the term?

My examples probably aren't the best - I just took the first three that came to mind.

As far as defining 'scientism', I think the most common definition that you'll come across is something to the effect that it is the belief that science is the 'best or the only means for understanding reality'. I find this definition a little problematic for multiple reason, and in part because it's actually two definitions, but primarily because the way the term is commonly used isn't captured by this. By my thinking, attaching '-ism' to a term implies subscribing to a belief in that term (e.g. capitalism, Marxism, materialism, etc.), placing a degree of faith in a particular idea or form of thinking. So yes, misapplication of science - which I'd take to mean belief in unfounded assumptions about what science has said or what it is capable of - I would also take to be a form of scientism.

[Thomyum2]

Moreover, universal claims aren’t just unsupported by reason but are also beyond the scope of science because they are unfalsifiable and unprovable. It isn’t within the scope of science to validate that results will or will not always remain the same in every case that will or could conceivably occur for all perpetuity. Human observational ability simply does not have the capacity to investigate the entire universe in the present, let alone all future and past states of the universe.

Perhaps I'm misunderstand exactly what you're saying here, but I think the purpose of science is precisely this; generating theories that are universally applicable. i.e. a theory of gravity which will predict observations for both me in the UK and someone in Australia (and for that matter, someone on Pluto).

Furthermore, it is their universality that makes them testable. If I assert a theory of gravity that is only true for the surrounding area in which I live and for the next hour, you (who might live in Australia) could not possibly test my theory because it doesn't apply in your locality and time frame. The more universal it is, the more testable it becomes and the better reason for adopting it in favour of less universal theories. For example, one of the reasons why Einstein's theory of gravitation replaced Newtons was it's increased universality. Einstein's theory predicted everything Newton's did plus additional stuff in situations where Newton's didn't hold.

I think you're using term 'universal' a little differently than I am. My definition of 'universal', for purposes of this discussion, would be that the finding is true everywhere, at all times, under all conditions. You're speaking of different degrees of universality - i.e. that one particular theory has a greater scope of applicability than another. As I think I explained above, there's a difference between universal in a given context and truly universal. A while I think you're correct that science (or scientists, more accurately) aim for and would like their findings to be universally true in my sense, that's just not the case because not every possible scenario can be tested.

That said, I'm open to the idea that there are certain things that are outside of the scope of science (such as why we are here) but in it's own realm, as a tool for helping us how reality works, it is unsurpassed.

So your statement here, under the generic definition that I just shared in my response to Pattern-chaser just above (i.e. that science is the 'best means for understanding reality') would be classified as 'scientism'. And that many people in today's world accept that statement as true, without really even questioning it, support calling it 'scientism'. It's almost like the Credo of the time we live in, isn't it?

Not that I want to get into arguing the point as I think it kind of leads down a rabbit hole - and I don't necessarily hold a strong opinion one way or the other about it, I'm more of a sceptic. But maybe think about some of the assumptions underlying that statement and the additional questions these raise. Does science really tell us 'how reality works'? Or does it just speak to a particular subset of reality? How we answer that question will depend on what worldview we hold and what we consider reality to be in the first place. And to assert that it is the 'best' means to understand reality is making a value judgment. By what criteria is it best?

[Fried Egg]

Moreover, universal claims aren’t just unsupported by reason but are also beyond the scope of science because they are unfalsifiable and unprovable. It isn’t within the scope of science to validate that results will or will not always remain the same in every case that will or could conceivably occur for all perpetuity. Human observational ability simply does not have the capacity to investigate the entire universe in the present, let alone all future and past states of the universe.

Perhaps I'm misunderstand exactly what you're saying here, but I think the purpose of science is precisely this; generating theories that are universally applicable. i.e. a theory of gravity which will predict observations for both me in the UK and someone in Australia (and for that matter, someone on Pluto).

Furthermore, it is their universality that makes them testable. If I assert a theory of gravity that is only true for the surrounding area in which I live and for the next hour, you (who might live in Australia) could not possibly test my theory because it doesn't apply in your locality and time frame. The more universal it is, the more testable it becomes and the better reason for adopting it in favour of less universal theories. For example, one of the reasons why Einstein's theory of gravitation replaced Newtons was it's increased universality. Einstein's theory predicted everything Newton's did plus additional stuff in situations where Newton's didn't hold.

I think you're using term 'universal' a little differently than I am. My definition of 'universal', for purposes of this discussion, would be that the finding is true everywhere, at all times, under all conditions. You're speaking of different degrees of universality - i.e. that one particular theory has a greater scope of applicability than another. As I think I explained above, there's a difference between universal in a given context and truly universal. A while I think you're correct that science (or scientists, more accurately) aim for and would like their findings to be universally true in my sense, that's just not the case because not every possible scenario can be tested.

Hmmm...not sure that points to us using the term any differently. All scientific theories are generalisations that are provisionally held at best. That is, they may be consistent with all the observations we've made so far but some new data might come in that the theory cannot easily explain and does not predict...that's a problem that will drive scientists to come up with a better theory that can incorporate all the old data and the new data. i.e. a more universal theory.

So yes, we will never arrive at a theory that is "proven", not tentative, and therefore not fully universal. But it is not "beyond the scope of science" to posit universal theorems, only to go beyond tentatively believing in them to absolute certainty.

That said, I'm open to the idea that there are certain things that are outside of the scope of science (such as why we are here) but in it's own realm, as a tool for helping us how reality works, it is unsurpassed.

So your statement here, under the generic definition that I just shared in my response to Pattern-chaser just above (i.e. that science is the 'best means for understanding reality') would be classified as 'scientism'. And that many people in today's world accept that statement as true, without really even questioning it, support calling it 'scientism'. It's almost like the Credo of the time we live in, isn't it?

Not that I want to get into arguing the point as I think it kind of leads down a rabbit hole - and I don't necessarily hold a strong opinion one way or the other about it, I'm more of a sceptic. But maybe think about some of the assumptions underlying that statement and the additional questions these raise. Does science really tell us 'how reality works'? Or does it just speak to a particular subset of reality? How we answer that question will depend on what worldview we hold and what we consider reality to be in the first place. And to assert that it is the 'best' means to understand reality is making a value judgment. By what criteria is it best?

I only claimed that the scientific method has been unsurpassed as a tool for understanding reality (as least many aspects of it), in that we have yet to find a better method. I am not precluding that a better method might one day be devised that will improve upon it. But it has been provably better at solving problems in so many fields.

But yes, I accept that there may be some realms of human knowledge and understanding for which the scientific method is not appropriate (which I think disqualifies me from being described as adhering to scientism). But in many fields it has been provably better at solving problems and getting results. Which suggests that it delivers theorems that correspond more closely with reality than other methodologies.

[Thomyum2]

I think you're using term 'universal' a little differently than I am. My definition of 'universal', for purposes of this discussion, would be that the finding is true everywhere, at all times, under all conditions. You're speaking of different degrees of universality - i.e. that one particular theory has a greater scope of applicability than another. As I think I explained above, there's a difference between universal in a given context and truly universal. A while I think you're correct that science (or scientists, more accurately) aim for and would like their findings to be universally true in my sense, that's just not the case because not every possible scenario can be tested.

Hmmm...not sure that points to us using the term any differently. All scientific theories are generalisations that are provisionally held at best. That is, they may be consistent with all the observations we've made so far but some new data might come in that the theory cannot easily explain and does not predict...that's a problem that will drive scientists to come up with a better theory that can incorporate all the old data and the new data. i.e. a more universal theory.

So yes, we will never arrive at a theory that is "proven", not tentative, and therefore not fully universal. But it is not "beyond the scope of science" to posit universal theorems, only to go beyond tentatively believing in them to absolute certainty.

We're using the term 'universal' differently in that by my definition there's no such thing as 'more universal' - something is either universal or it's not (i.e. it applies to everything in the universe, or it doesn't) - there is no middle ground. But I think other than that we're pretty much in agreement here. I consider science to not be universal because it has not been (and cannot be) tested universally. Your use of the word seems to mean that it's been test over a specific 'universe of existing observations', which is growing as additional observations are added, making science 'more universal'. Just a slightly different sense to the word than mine.

I only claimed that the scientific method has been unsurpassed as a tool for understanding reality (as least many aspects of it), in that we have yet to find a better method. I am not precluding that a better method might one day be devised that will improve upon it. But it has been provably better at solving problems in so many fields.

But yes, I accept that there may be some realms of human knowledge and understanding for which the scientific method is not appropriate (which I think disqualifies me from being described as adhering to scientism). But in many fields it has been provably better at solving problems and getting results. Which suggests that it delivers theorems that correspond more closely with reality than other methodologies.

I agree that science is a powerful tool and very useful in matters of manipulated the material world, especially in physicians, chemistry and engineering. But I am very skeptical as to whether is the 'best' by any particular measure.

Regarding the term 'scientism', like any '-ism', it is a rather vague term that results in overly broad generalizations. For example, you can say that a person is a communist - but each individual's beliefs are unique to that person and there isn't one specific set of beliefs that definitely makes a person a communist or not, so saying that doesn't usually tell you very much about what a person really does or does not believe. The same is true with 'scientism'. It's not a very useful concept, in my opinion, because it's too general and it often unnecessarily takes on negative connotations just by the way it's used by some people.