Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Pattern-chaser]

If you start --- as you must -- with a Creator...

Why do you think that we "must" start with a Creator? It is not obvious to me that we must do this, although I can see it as one of a number of starting points that lead into this subject...?

[Pattern-chaser]

Nobody except bullies and political dictators worship power.

I suspect that quite a lot of people worship power to some degree.

Yes, and if "quite a lot of people" should be "bullies" or "political dictators", then you are both correct, yes? I rather suspect that this might be the case.

[Leontiskos]

So when you see someone who is to all appearances an atheist in good faith… Or do you entertain the possibility that this person was telling the truth...

You are repeating the same errors you made earlier. Can a math student be telling the truth when they claim that they believe the answer to the problem to be 42, while at the same time being culpably wrong? Of course they can, and we’ve covered this. Can the math student be acting in good faith? Again, you haven’t explained what you mean by ‘good faith,’ and the force of your argument depends precisely on the ambiguity of this term. If ‘good faith’ precludes culpability then no, the math student could not have been acting in good faith. If ‘good faith’ is compatible with culpability, then they could be acting in good faith.

If someone is invincibly ignorant then by definition they are not at fault. But if atheists are invincibly ignorant then (1) or (2) must be sacrificed, which places us outside of Christian theism (and outside of the “religious viewpoint” of this thread, as far as I’m concerned). So the general way that Christians address such appearances is by either positing differing levels of culpability (different levels of Hell or limbo), or else by positing some sort of implicit belief in God, such that the innocent atheist is not an atheist after all. Such approaches are quite common, and are not precluded by the answers I have given. The atheists will still be culpable, even if to differing extents. But I’m not convinced that this sort of hair-splitting is helpful in a thread like this, where someone is attempting to understand the basic rationale behind a religious perspective. The argument I have given throughout is a much better way of providing that rationale.

[Good_Egg]

Hi Leontiskos, not seen you around for a while.

I see that another thread you're replying to Astro Cat about whether the Fall was the fault of Adam and Eve if they were truly deceived by the serpent. Which strikes me as a similar point to that at issue here. I suspect both would be clarified by an adequate understanding of degrees of responsibility. Which I'm not currently able to provide. But I hope I'll know it when I see it.

You're right that we've already been through the point about learning. It should be obvious that there are failures of learning for which the student is more culpable (e.g. through lack of diligence) and failures of learning for which the student is less culpable (e.g lack of innate ability to comprehend what is being taught, or lack of access to the tools needed to make sense of it).

But there's a further aspect. We can perhaps distinguish between the type of getting one's sums wrong that involves knowing that one doesn't know the answer, and the type which involves getting an answer one thinks is correct when in fact it isn't.

So we can ask the question whether these two types of failure correspond to culpable and non-culpable. Is it the case that a student who has some level of confidence in their wrong answer is always culpable ? Is your fallback position that inability to see a solution at all is not necessarily a culpable failure, but arriving at the wrong solution is ?

I suggest that that's not true. We all know the saying that "practice makes perfect". As one practices doing sums, the proportion of right answers rises. For both the diligent and the careless student. As with any skill. Is this not common experience ? If we remember back that far ?

Your view seems to be that the analogy between arithmetic and theology is flawed. That regardless of what emerges from philosophical consideration of the process of learning maths, your belief in the culpability of atheists rests upon the doctrines that God desires people to know that He exists and has the ability to infuse this awareness. You're happy to deny apparent reality for the sake of preserving those doctrines. And this is what you're putting forward as the religious perspective.

There are undoubtedly religious people like that.

But the preference for doctrinal conformity over engagement with reality is a wrong turning in religion. Doctrine is not truth, and drawing closer to God is supposed to make us care more about truth than about doctrine.

[Leontiskos]

But there's a further aspect. We can perhaps distinguish between the type of getting one's sums wrong that involves knowing that one doesn't know the answer, and the type which involves getting an answer one thinks is correct when in fact it isn't.

So we can ask the question whether these two types of failure correspond to culpable and non-culpable. Is it the case that a student who has some level of confidence in their wrong answer is always culpable ? Is your fallback position that inability to see a solution at all is not necessarily a culpable failure, but arriving at the wrong solution is ?

No, of course not. Either student could be culpable.

I suggest that that's not true.

But who are you arguing against? You consistently make up silly positions that I don't hold and then try to disprove them. It's called a strawman. Why would you think I hold this new position you've made up? Is there something I've said, some quote, that led you to believe that? And if not, why are you arguing against this position?

Your view seems to be that the analogy between arithmetic and theology is flawed.

No, my view is that culpability with regard to religion is analogous to culpability with respect to arithmetic. That's why I brought up arithmetic in the first place. Your opposition to religious culpability is shown to be absurd once we try to apply it to something like arithmetic, where it also fails.

You're happy to deny apparent reality for the sake of preserving those doctrines.

All of your arguments have failed miserably, you have constantly misrepresented me, you don't seem to even remember the conversation at all, and you have nothing but strawmen to offer. Now, desperate and grasping at straws, you simply claim victory in the midst of the shambles of your failed position.

But the preference for doctrinal conformity over engagement with reality is a wrong turning in religion.

If you think you are able to engage reality then try to address the arguments and have a try at being rational instead of making silly assertions to support your dogmas.

[Good_Egg]

You said

Can a math student be telling the truth when they claim that they believe the answer to the problem to be 42, while at the same time being culpably wrong? Of course they can,...

So I asked whether a student who mistakenly believes they have the right answer can be non-culpably wrong.

And you seem to agree with me that the distinction of mistaken belief vs sheer bafflement does not correspond to that of culpable vs non-culpable.

You seemed to agree earlier that not all failings are culpable.

And then, having agreed that putting forward the wrong answer is not necessarily a culpable failure, you say that

my view is that culpability with regard to religion is analogous to culpability with respect to arithmetic. That's why I brought up arithmetic in the first place.

That seems like an admission that not all atheism is culpable.

(The difference between an atheist and a don't-know being analogous to the difference between a wrong answer and a failure to reach an answer to the sum at all).

As to straw men, I seem to recall that Aquinas puts forward arguments that he does not believe and then argues against them, with a form of words such as "some say that...". And you don't appear to have any problem with him...

[Leontiskos]

You said

Can a math student be telling the truth when they claim that they believe the answer to the problem to be 42, while at the same time being culpably wrong? Of course they can,...

So I asked whether a student who mistakenly believes they have the right answer can be non-culpably wrong.

And you seem to agree with me that the distinction of mistaken belief vs sheer bafflement does not correspond to that of culpable vs non-culpable.

You seemed to agree earlier that not all failings are culpable.

And then, having agreed that putting forward the wrong answer is not necessarily a culpable failure, you say that

my view is that culpability with regard to religion is analogous to culpability with respect to arithmetic. That's why I brought up arithmetic in the first place.

That seems like an admission that not all atheism is culpable.

(The difference between an atheist and a don't-know being analogous to the difference between a wrong answer and a failure to reach an answer to the sum at all).

You claim that it cannot be the case that all atheists are culpable and you defended this by saying that <beliefs are not choices>. I then brought up the math student to show that beliefs are voluntary and can involve culpability. Formally, this was your argument:

1. No beliefs are choices.
2. Religious opinions are beliefs.
3. Therefore, religious opinions are not choices (and therefore cannot involve culpability).

My counterargument against (1) was as follows:

4. The math student who gets an answer wrong uses their volition to arrive at their mistaken belief.
5. Therefore it is possible to hold math students responsible for their answers, including their wrong answers.
6. Therefore, some beliefs are "choices" (or are the result of volition).

(1) is dead in the water. Your argument failed. Now you are trying a new tactic:

7. Religion is like mathematics.
8. In mathematics some wrong answers cannot be culpably imputed to the student.
9. Therefore, in religion some atheism cannot be culpably imputed.

You are trying to apply an analogy as a definition, such that religion and mathematics must be identical in every way. That's a rather silly premise. I have spoken about various complexities of the atheist case, such as the age of reason or personal responsibility, as well as the idea that it is the point of death which is the crucial point. But the most obvious difference between religion and mathematics is conclusion (3) from the argument I have provided <here>. In mathematics there is no guarantee of sufficient means, for there is no omnipotent god of mathematics who provides everyone with sufficient means to arrive at the correct mathematical answer before they die. You're again ignoring the central premises of my argument, and in this case stretching an analogy in a really weird way.

As to straw men, I seem to recall that Aquinas puts forward arguments that he does not believe and then argues against them, with a form of words such as "some say that...". And you don't appear to have any problem with him...

Ah, but his opponents believed the arguments. Do you understand the difference?

-----------------

The only thing you have offered in this thread is an anecdote: <I have met atheists who seem to be sincere, therefore not all atheists are culpable>. That's very interesting and all, but anecdotes are one of the weakest forms of argument since they rely on private, singular experiences.

The other problem is that you have consistently kicked against the goad of the premise of the OP, "From a religious viewpoint..." Everything you say assumes a non-religious viewpoint. Everything you say presupposes ignoring the religious viewpoint. Obviously you are in the wrong thread.

Now you might start a new thread, "From a Non-Religious Viewpoint, are Atheists at Fault?" In such a thread you could present all of the anecdotes you like and no one will respond by pointing out how you are ignoring the entire premise of the thread. I would not engage you on such a topic, though. It's fairly obvious to me that you do not have the minimum proficiency in logic required for philosophical argument. If you want to engage in philosophical argument you really need at least a basic understanding of logic, and thus I would suggest buying an introduction to logic and working through the whole book before attempting philosophical argument. This is also a helpful thing to do in general, because it teaches one how to think and deliberate.

[Good_Egg]

Formally, this was your argument:

1. No beliefs are choices.
2. Religious opinions are beliefs.
3. Therefore, religious opinions are not choices (and therefore cannot involve culpability).

Classical logic has its uses. It's great for cases that are all-or-nothing. If all Cretans are liars, or no Cretans are liars, much may follow logically from that premise.

(Noting that a single counterexample suffices to disprove such all-or-nothing statements. Meeting one truthful Cretan should be sufficient basis for discarding the idea that all Cretans are liars).

But reality is complex. Much more likely in practice is that Cretans have a culture which places a little less emphasis on truth than some other cultures do. So people make use of working simplifications ("gotta watch out when dealing with those Cretans").

What I think is happening here is that the psychology of belief is complex. And that your working simplification treats beliefs as volitional, and mine treats them as non-volitional, as being dictated by experience without an act of will being involved.

I wouldn't and didn't say that my working simplification applies universally to every case of belief. And I don't think you'd claim that for yours.

But you seem to think that all you have to do is to discredit the extreme "All beliefs..." version in order to portray your working simplification as the truth.

My counterargument against (1) was as follows:

4. The math student who gets an answer wrong uses their volition to arrive at their mistaken belief.
5. Therefore it is possible to hold math students responsible for their answers, including their wrong answers.
6. Therefore, some beliefs are "choices" (or are the result of volition).

You're arguing in terms of "some" and "it is possible". Which in general I'll happily agree to. Life is complex, and all sorts of possibilities exist and sometimes occur.

7. Religion is like mathematics.
8. In mathematics some wrong answers cannot be culpably imputed to the student.
9. Therefore, in religion some atheism cannot be culpably imputed.

7 is your premise. I've argued for 8, going into the process of learning in more detail than you seem to wish to consider. And yes, 9 seems to me to both be true and to follow logically - inasmuch as 7 is true, 9 is true. Which is rather confirmed by your relying (as I understand it) on the difference:

In mathematics there is no guarantee of sufficient means, for there is no omnipotent god of mathematics who provides everyone with sufficient means to arrive at the correct mathematical answer before they die.

In religion, there is no logical guarantee of sufficient means. Omnipotence, and the desire of God that all should know Hom before they die, are dogmas. Unfalsifiable statements.

Your argument is characterised by an insistence of the primacy of dogma over experience. And you seem to be asserting that this is an inescapable or characteristic element of "the religious viewpoint".

The other problem is that you have consistently kicked against the goad of the premise of the OP, "From a religious viewpoint..." Everything you say assumes a non-religious viewpoint. Everything you say presupposes ignoring the religious viewpoint. Obviously you are in the wrong thread.

There are undoubtedly religious people who insist on treating dogma as truth. The reason that Galileo is lionised by the non-religious is because he insisted on the primacy of observable reality over dogma. (Regardless of the details of his falling-out with the Pope - let's not go there).

You've probably met evangelical Christians who insist that God wouldn't let any untruth find it's way into the Bible. Or Catholics who insist that God wouldn't let His Church (i.e. their church) be wrong. I have. (Yes, anecdote/experience again).

What I'm suggesting to you is that not all religion is of that dogmatic kind. That there is no contradiction in a worldview which believes in God, which holds Him as the heart and meaning of life, but which denies the infallibility of dogma about Him. And that too is religion.

[Leontiskos]

Formally, this was your argument:

1. No beliefs are choices.
2. Religious opinions are beliefs.
3. Therefore, religious opinions are not choices (and therefore cannot involve culpability).

Classical logic has its uses. It's great for cases that are all-or-nothing. If all Cretans are liars, or no Cretans are liars, much may follow logically from that premise.

(Noting that a single counterexample suffices to disprove such all-or-nothing statements. Meeting one truthful Cretan should be sufficient basis for discarding the idea that all Cretans are liars).

But reality is complex. Much more likely in practice is that Cretans have a culture which places a little less emphasis on truth than some other cultures do. So people make use of working simplifications ("gotta watch out when dealing with those Cretans").

What I think is happening here is that the psychology of belief is complex. And that your working simplification treats beliefs as volitional, and mine treats them as non-volitional, as being dictated by experience without an act of will being involved.

I wouldn't and didn't say that my working simplification applies universally to every case of belief. And I don't think you'd claim that for yours.

But you seem to think that all you have to do is to discredit the extreme "All beliefs..." version in order to portray your working simplification as the truth.

No, this is just another failure on your part to comprehend logic. When you say that atheists can't be culpable for a belief because beliefs are not choices, you are involved in a categorical premise. If (1) is not categorical, and only some beliefs are not choices, then your argument is invalid and your conclusion unsound. Which it is. Obfuscation can't help you here.

My counterargument against (1) was as follows:

4. The math student who gets an answer wrong uses their volition to arrive at their mistaken belief.
5. Therefore it is possible to hold math students responsible for their answers, including their wrong answers.
6. Therefore, some beliefs are "choices" (or are the result of volition).

You're arguing in terms of "some" and "it is possible". Which in general I'll happily agree to. Life is complex, and all sorts of possibilities exist and sometimes occur.

Yes, (1) is false because some beliefs are choices, and therefore your argument fails.

7. Religion is like mathematics.
8. In mathematics some wrong answers cannot be culpably imputed to the student.
9. Therefore, in religion some atheism cannot be culpably imputed.

7 is your premise. I've argued for 8, going into the process of learning in more detail than you seem to wish to consider. And yes, 9 seems to me to both be true and to follow logically - inasmuch as 7 is true, 9 is true. Which is rather confirmed by your relying (as I understand it) on the difference:

(7) is the premise that you have now adopted in your new argument. When you impute to me the idea that <"the analogy between arithmetic and theology is flawed"> you are yourself embracing (7) ad arguendo, just as you did here ("9 seems to me to both be true and to follow logically - inasmuch as 7 is true, 9 is true").

In mathematics there is no guarantee of sufficient means, for there is no omnipotent god of mathematics who provides everyone with sufficient means to arrive at the correct mathematical answer before they die.

In religion, there is no logical guarantee of sufficient means.

Of course there isn't a logical guarantee. You're again arguing contrary to the presupposition of the OP. You're confusing a religious viewpoint with a logical argument from necessity. There is a guarantee given the premises of religion, which this thread takes for granted ("From a religious viewpoint...").

Omnipotence, and the desire of God that all should know Hom before they die, are dogmas.

They are simply widely accepted religious premises. You can't seem to accept the premise of the thread.

Your argument is characterised by an insistence of the primacy of dogma over experience.

Child, get over your anecdote. It's silly and weak.

Again:

The only thing you have offered in this thread is an anecdote: <I have met atheists who seem to be sincere, therefore not all atheists are culpable>. That's very interesting and all, but anecdotes are one of the weakest forms of argument since they rely on private, singular experiences.

The other problem is that you have consistently kicked against the goad of the premise of the OP, "From a religious viewpoint..." Everything you say assumes a non-religious viewpoint. Everything you say presupposes ignoring the religious viewpoint. Obviously you are in the wrong thread.

Now you might start a new thread, "From a Non-Religious Viewpoint, are Atheists at Fault?" In such a thread you could present all of the anecdotes you like and no one will respond by pointing out how you are ignoring the entire premise of the thread. I would not engage you on such a topic, though. It's fairly obvious to me that you do not have the minimum proficiency in logic required for philosophical argument. If you want to engage in philosophical argument you really need at least a basic understanding of logic, and thus I would suggest buying an introduction to logic and working through the whole book before attempting philosophical argument. This is also a helpful thing to do in general, because it teaches one how to think and deliberate.

[Leontiskos]

Good_Egg, you are being a pest. If there were a thread on the relativity of time, this is what you would be doing:

• OP: From the viewpoint of Einsteinian physics, is time relative?
• Scientist: Yes, if we wish to understand the viewpoint of Einstein, then time is relative because...
• Good_Egg: This can't be right! My pre-critical belief says that time is not relative!
• (Yes, of course the pre-critical belief is that time is not relative. That is why the OP asked the question in the first place. Re-stating the pre-critical belief does nothing to address the OP.)

If there were a thread on homosexuality, this is what you would be doing:

• OP: From a religious viewpoint, is homosexuality wrong?
• Religious Person: Yes it is wrong because...
• Good_Egg: This can't be right! My pre-critical cultural belief says that homosexuality is just fine!
• (Yes, of course the pre-critical cultural belief is that homosexuality is innocuous. That is why the OP asked the question in the first place. Re-stating the pre-critical belief does nothing to address the OP.)

[Ecurb]

I'm out of my depth here both philosphically and theologically. Nonetheless, I have two stories which may or may not be relevant.

One of the best sermons I've heard (there haven't been many; I'm not a church-goer) was in Compestelo. Those familiar with European history or Northern Spanish tourism may be familiar with the town: it is the end point of the Camino de Santiago, the most famous of all the Medieval European Pilgrimages. The pilgrimage honors St. James (Santiago is Spanish), the apostle who, legend has it, preached the gospel to Spain. As the Moslem armies pushed the Christians into the Northwest corner of Spain in the late 6th century, they bore with them a charm -- the arm of Mohammed -- which served as an amulet which never knew defeat. Fortunately, the Christian general unearthed the bones of the martyred St. James near Compestelo -- and their magic powers negated those of Mohammed's arm, and Christianity survived in Iberia.

Perhaps you have seen pictures of the Mass at the Cathedral in Compestelo. A great pendulun swings from the lofty ceiling, smoking with incense, which, at least in medieval times, must have served to hide the odor of the unwashed pilgrims.

When I attended the mass, some potentate gave the sermon. I'm not sure if he was a bishop or some other Catholic figure, but he wore a funny hat. He spoke in Spanish, which I will translate as best I can:

"I'd like to welcome the pilgrims," he said. "You are doubtless a diverse lot, and have many different reasons for making this pilgrimage. Some of you wanted the exercise (the "way" is more than 1000 km. long). Others may have wanted to lose weight. Perhaps some of you thought you would meet interesting people along the way. Some wanted to take in the beauty of Northern Spain. And some few, maybe, just maybe, went on this journey in the hope that you could find God. I'm here to tell you that you cannot find God. He must find you."

It was a great sermon, and I have no idea if the theology is approved by the Catholic church. It seems almost Calvinistic. My imperfect memory recalls that Calvinists believe that God calls only the Elect who, with his perfect foresight, he recognizes.

Here's my question: Does God look to "find" everyone, and can only succeed with those who are not hiding from Him?

Obviously, ignorance is a fault. We believe what we believe (as Goodegg said), but as we educate ourselves our beliefs change. We learn our multiplication tables, for one. Our beliefs can be correct or incorrect. So from a theological perspective, is belief in God a virtue because, like a mathematical proof, we can reason our way to it? Or is it a virtue because God calls to us, and we hear him if we open our ears? Or both? Or neither?

[Leontiskos]

I'm out of my depth here both philosphically and theologically. Nonetheless, I have two stories which may or may not be relevant.

One of the best sermons I've heard (there haven't been many; I'm not a church-goer) was in Compestelo. Those familiar with European history or Northern Spanish tourism may be familiar with the town: it is the end point of the Camino de Santiago, the most famous of all the Medieval European Pilgrimages. The pilgrimage honors St. James (Santiago is Spanish), the apostle who, legend has it, preached the gospel to Spain. As the Moslem armies pushed the Christians into the Northwest corner of Spain in the late 6th century, they bore with them a charm -- the arm of Mohammed -- which served as an amulet which never knew defeat. Fortunately, the Christian general unearthed the bones of the martyred St. James near Compestelo -- and their magic powers negated those of Mohammed's arm, and Christianity survived in Iberia.

Perhaps you have seen pictures of the Mass at the Cathedral in Compestelo. A great pendulun swings from the lofty ceiling, smoking with incense, which, at least in medieval times, must have served to hide the odor of the unwashed pilgrims.

When I attended the mass, some potentate gave the sermon. I'm not sure if he was a bishop or some other Catholic figure, but he wore a funny hat. He spoke in Spanish, which I will translate as best I can:

"I'd like to welcome the pilgrims," he said. "You are doubtless a diverse lot, and have many different reasons for making this pilgrimage. Some of you wanted the exercise (the "way" is more than 1000 km. long). Others may have wanted to lose weight. Perhaps some of you thought you would meet interesting people along the way. Some wanted to take in the beauty of Northern Spain. And some few, maybe, just maybe, went on this journey in the hope that you could find God. I'm here to tell you that you cannot find God. He must find you."

Interesting. I am familiar with Compestelo and the Camino de Santiago, but I have never been myself. Did you walk the Camino!?

It was a great sermon, and I have no idea if the theology is approved by the Catholic church. It seems almost Calvinistic. My imperfect memory recalls that Calvinists believe that God calls only the Elect who, with his perfect foresight, he recognizes.

C.S. Lewis talks about this theme in various places, and I think he is right to see it as especially true with respect to Christianity. For example, in Surprised by Joy he says, "People who are naturally religious find difficulty in understanding the horror of such a revelation. Amiable agnostics will talk cheerfully about 'man's search for God.' To me, as I then was, they might as well have talked about the mouse's search for the cat" (link).

Catholics do believe that God's initiative always comes first, preceding our own, but there is a sense in which Calvinism would lay more stress on this theme. Yet for traditional Calvinists God does not seek out all, but only some ("the elect").

Here's my question: Does God look to "find" everyone, and can only succeed with those who are not hiding from Him?

I am comfortable with that way of phrasing it, sure. For the vast majority of Christians God seeks each and every person, not just some of them. What exactly it looks like to reject God's approach is hard to say, and surely differs from case to case.

Obviously, ignorance is a fault. We believe what we believe (as Goodegg said), but as we educate ourselves our beliefs change. We learn our multiplication tables, for one. Our beliefs can be correct or incorrect. So from a theological perspective, is belief in God a virtue because, like a mathematical proof, we can reason our way to it? Or is it a virtue because God calls to us, and we hear him if we open our ears? Or both? Or neither?

I would say the latter. It's tricky because "belief in God" can mean so many different things. Catholics believe that natural reason really can get us to God's existence, but this may be nothing more than a first cause, or an unmoved mover, or a moral judge, etc. Belief in that sense is not virtuous, at least not any more than believing any other truth is a virtue. Belief in the latter sense really is a virtue, though. To have an ear attuned to God's voice is a virtue.

For the basic level with which this thread is concerned, a central religious premise to remember is that the interaction between God and man is an interaction between two persons, between two agents. God is not acting on an inert object, and man is not acting on an inert object. There is inter-action. Both parties have a role to play in the dance. Usually when atheists defend their atheism they do so with the presupposition that God is a sort of inert object which one either knows or does not know, much like the answer to a math problem. If God were an inert object then the religious position I have defended in this thread would certainly fail, for one is not necessarily culpable for failing to know an inert object.

[LuckyR]

Here's my question: Does God look to "find" everyone, and can only succeed with those who are not hiding from Him?

Obviously, ignorance is a fault. We believe what we believe (as Goodegg said), but as we educate ourselves our beliefs change. We learn our multiplication tables, for one. Our beliefs can be correct or incorrect. So from a theological perspective, is belief in God a virtue because, like a mathematical proof, we can reason our way to it? Or is it a virtue because God calls to us, and we hear him if we open our ears? Or both? Or neither?

Well as you know, everyone has an opinion (that is, a belief) but no one knows (despite declarations of knowledge by some).

To my mind, the absence of proof of gods is not a barrier to belief (faith). In fact as you alluded to, belief in the absence of proof is true belief (as opposed to acknowledgment in the case of evidence and proof).

[Viswa_01210]

Is atheism closest to a choice, a rebellion or something more like color-blindness.

I've always been an atheist so sometimes it's hard for me to understand to understand the impact my atheism has on others.

I feel like I take religion and religious people seriously, but sometimes that seems like it might be worse - might appear cynical or insulting in some way.

Thanks.

There are two Viewpoints. One is Viewpoint of those Compassionate Sages, Buddha, Jesus, Mohammed, etc., Another View point is those who took the power of "Ideology/Religion" allegedly for Fame, Dominance, Cruelty, etc.,

My Viewpoint is only how those "Compassionate Sages, etc." Be, and not how those Fake Uncompassionate Egoistic Cruelty Kings/Queen do.

Why Really The Religion says in First View point is, "You are open to be anyone for any of your desires. But, you cannot live in a Theistic Cultural Based Cities/Areas, as your Ideology shall impact others for Unethical Fun. So, You should be Banned from those Regions, not a hatred upon you as Atheist, but providing Freedom for you to create a Society for yourself in somewhere else. If you not willing to go out from such place, and not aware that your desires might give Opportunity to Thief, Drug Dealers, etc., to roam Free, then there is no more option left and just Punish you.

Either choose to abandon Theistic Society and roam Free and create own Society for yourself, or if hold-up there then have to be Punished to create Fear upon those Thiefs, Drug Dealers, Unethical Fun seekers".

The Uncompassionate Kings/Queens who called themselves "Theist" has not acted as above. Without giving opportunity, they just Punished for "Ego, Conditioned, Greed, Power, Dominance, etc."

Truly, those first-view point Compassionate People, won't Punish others, as they not stuck with "Theistic Conditions" as they don't desire Life and Pleasures of World but only Peace and Bliss.

It's Fate that, because of those Uncompassionate Egoistic Greedy People who didn't followed "Religions" Rightly as a "King"/"Monks", brought Disgrace to True Intentions of "Religions, Sages, etc." and hatred upon People.

[Viswa_01210]

Truly, those first-view point Compassionate People, won't Punish others, as they not stuck with "Theistic Conditions" as they don't desire Life and Pleasures of World but only Peace and Bliss.

"Truly, those first-view point Compassionate People, won't Punish others without opportunity of being heard and choose as they not stuck with "Theistic Conditions" as they don't desire Life and Pleasures of World but only Peace and Bliss.