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[GE Morton]

You say "( "Ought" statements-----------relate to some goal----" . I agree. Goal and criterion whether stated or implied are similar as goal is a variety of criterion. For instance " If you want to be a doctor you will have to study very hard": "You need to practise handling a car before you can drive on the road". "Pass the ball to the left winger!" " Good! You understand linear perspective." " You sure can make good soup!" Are goal directed and all explicitly or implicitly imply criteria.

I agree, though with the soup case, the criterion is subjective, not objective.

"I love you" "I am a human being" and "That's a pony not a horse" are not goal directed but refer to fixed states which are not in transition towards goals. A very subjective feeling of pain may be commented on as "Ouch!" or "On the scale of one to ten my pain was nine". In all cases of a subjective utterance the goal is implied by the social situation which may be a doctor's consulting room to children at play.The goal is to let the other know how one feels and this is either a) purposive or b) it's unconsidered reaction.The goal may be b)to refer to fellowship in experience of pain, or it may a) refer to an implicit cultural belief that the doctor at that time and place exists to help the patient.
If your untrained puppy nips you you should squeal or say a sharp "Ouch!" so the puppy learns biting hurts you . Dogs and very young children know this in the form of reactions(biologically) and we know this in the form of acquired knowledge(culturally).

No quarrel with any of that, but anxious to see if it leads to anything relevant to this thread.

No utterance is value neutral except when it's about the measurement itself e.g. "Haemoglobin carries oxygen" which has empirical and cultural criteria , and "1+1=2" which is universal but is deductive and tautological.

Well, not sure what point you're trying to make there. Many utterances are value-neutral, and they don't all involve measurements. E.g., "Paris is the capital of France" is value-neutral, and involves no measurement. Can you amplify?

All inductively based propositions are goal or criteria laden.

??? "It is likely to rain tomorrow" is an inductive proposition. What goal or criteria do you read in it? Some examples would be helpful, Belindi.

The only objective propositions are deductive as for mathematical or logical tautologies.

Well, I agree those propositions are objective, but they're not the only ones. Unless your definition of "objective" differs from the one I mentioned earlier.

There are only two ways out of this dilemma. 1. God, or cosmic order. Pythagoras conflated logical tautologies and empirical facts such as musical harmonies.
2. Nature which unlike God implies no element of supernatural order of being but is otherwise like God as it's cause of itself.

I don't know what dilemma you mean. Nothing you've said (insofar as I can understand it) presents any dilemma.

[Sy Borg]

How about five examples, just to give us something concrete to work with?

The use of examples to help clarify points being made is a perfectly valid approach in addressing abstract problems. After fifty pages without examples and far too much rationalising gobbledegook, it's clear that concrete examples are needed to prevent the thread sinking into ever more arcane abstractions.

Just five examples of objective morals that you are prepared to talk around and about for fifty plus pages. It's not a lot to ask.

[Belindi]

The following relates to my suggestion for a frame for objective ethics.

GEMorton wrote:

No utterance is value neutral except when it's about the measurement itself e.g. "Haemoglobin carries oxygen" which has empirical and cultural criteria , and "1+1=2" which is universal but is deductive and tautological.

Well, not sure what point you're trying to make there. Many utterances are value-neutral, and they don't all involve measurements. E.g., "Paris is the capital of France" is value-neutral, and involves no measurement. Can you amplify?

If the social context is such that the speaker want to locate Paris in relation to other places on a map then it's a measurement according to 'measurement' meaning how something relates in time and space to somethings else.

However if the social context of the utterance is the general gaiety of life in France "Paris is the capital of France" is sort of empirical evidence if the particpants believe in Gay Paree. Far fetched!

All inductively based propositions are goal or criteria laden.

??? "It is likely to rain tomorrow" is an inductive proposition. What goal or criteria do you read in it? Some examples would be helpful, Belindi.

The social usefulness of predicting weather is peculiarly well known in the British Isles. The criteria for saying it vary according to the elided intention of the speaker.E.g. "It is likely to rain tomorrow "(so we'd better arrange for a taxi not the pony and trap for her wedding), " "It is likely to rain tomorrow ", said Eeyore the depressive donkey", "It is likely to rain tomorrow" (and the frogs will be happy again). "It is likely to rain tomorrow"(is the sort of thing you can say to a friendly stranger).

The social situations that seem to necessitate "It is likely to rain tomorrow" are endless. If "it is likely to rain tomorrow" were deductive/objective it would take the form of a syllogism perhaps with the speaker omitting to speak the logical conclusion. However I can't think of any true premises where the social use of the proposition is redundant.

The only objective propositions are deductive as for mathematical or logical tautologies.

Well, I agree those propositions are objective, but they're not the only ones. Unless your definition of "objective" differs from the one I mentioned earlier.

Two thought frames.
1. objective: deductive: analytic: logical- mathematical.

2. subjective: inductive: synthetic: empirical.

Kuhn demonstrated how a prevailing paradigm is social, despite the best efforts of scientists to overcome their subjectiveness.

There are only two ways out of this dilemma. 1. God, or cosmic order. Pythagoras conflated logical tautologies and empirical facts such as musical harmonies.
2. Nature which unlike God implies no element of supernatural order of being but is otherwise like God as it's cause of itself.

I don't know what dilemma you mean. Nothing you've said (insofar as I can understand it) presents any dilemma.

The dilemma is a) accepting existential angst or b) trying to avoid existential angst.

Nature owes nothing to humans in the way of providing explanations, unlike God Who does explain after a fashion. So the authentic human being accepts their existential angst and tries to make sense of nature, and the world as an aspect of nature, as their own responsibility.

[Terrapin Station]

People believe their moral judgments are grounded in some larger truth.

Make that delusional people believe that.

Plenty of people realize that their moral judgments are statements of preferences.

[Sy Borg]

People believe their moral judgments are grounded in some larger truth.

Make that delusional people believe that.

Plenty of people realize that their moral judgments are statements of preferences.

And we still need to know the specifics. What moral judgements are these? What are these universal morals? If it is possible for morals to be objective, then we need to know what these are.

[GE Morton]

If the social context is such that the speaker want to locate Paris in relation to other places on a map then it's a measurement according to 'measurement' meaning how something relates in time and space to somethings else.

Well, the proposition in question --- "Paris is the capital of France" --- says nothing about Paris's location, or anything about how it relates in time and space to anything else. Those questions have no bearing on whether that proposition is true and objective.

??? "It is likely to rain tomorrow" is an inductive proposition. What goal or criteria do you read in it? Some examples would be helpful, Belindi.

The social usefulness of predicting weather is peculiarly well known in the British Isles. The criteria for saying it vary according to the elided intention of the speaker.E.g. "It is likely to rain tomorrow "(so we'd better arrange for a taxi not the pony and trap for her wedding), " "It is likely to rain tomorrow ", said Eeyore the depressive donkey", "It is likely to rain tomorrow" (and the frogs will be happy again). "It is likely to rain tomorrow"(is the sort of thing you can say to a friendly stranger).

The question (I thought) was whether "It is likely to rain tomorrow" implies some goal. That people who hear that statement may have various goals is not the same thing. "Ought" and "should" statements imply a specific goal. The above statement does not.

Well, I agree those propositions are objective, but they're not the only ones. Unless your definition of "objective" differs from the one I mentioned earlier.

Two thought frames.
1. objective: deductive: analytic: logical- mathematical.

2. subjective: inductive: synthetic: empirical.

Ah, so you are using a different definition of "objective" and "subjective" than the ones I gave. Limiting "objective" to analytic propositions is wildly at odds with the common usages of that term; most of the claims acknowledged as "objective" are synthetic (such as, "Paris is the capital of France"). Here is that dictionary definition again:
-----------
Definition of objective (Entry 1 of 2)
1a: expressing or dealing with facts or conditions as perceived without distortion by personal feelings, prejudices, or interpretations
objective art

2a: of, relating to, or being an object, phenomenon, or condition in the realm of sensible experience independent of individual thought and perceptible by all observers : having reality independent of the mind
-----------
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/objective

Kuhn demonstrated how a prevailing paradigm is social, despite the best efforts of scientists to overcome their subjectiveness.

You seem to be equating "subjectiveness" with "social." Scientific paradigms are indeed social --- all theories are social, being formulated in a public language --- but that doesn't make them "subjective." And I'd have to check, but I don't recall Kuhn saying anything like "scientists must overcome their subjectiveness." They are reluctant to give up accepted paradigms, not because of "subjectivity" on their part, but because those paradigms have proven explanatory power. But of course, they do give them up when a new paradigm comes along that can explain phenomena the old one cannot, yet still explains the what the old one did.

The dilemma is a) accepting existential angst or b) trying to avoid existential angst.

Yikes. I have no idea what existential angst has to do with the subject of this thread, or even whether anyone other than some characters in Camus and Sartre suffer from it.

So the authentic human being accepts their existential angst and tries to make sense of nature, and the world as an aspect of nature, as their own responsibility.

Well, I agree that making sense of the world is up to us.

[Peter Holmes]

GE Morton says that claims about moral rightness and wrongness are about about consistency with goals derived from axioms requiring no justification.

Axiom: Homosexuals are vermin.
Goal: Rid ourselves of vermin.
Advisory assertion.: If we want to rid ourselves of vermin, then we [should/ought to/need to/must] kill homosexuals.

This assertion is objective, because it has public truth conditions. And because it's about morality, then it's a 'moral assertion'.

Thus, GEM has demosntrated what makes moral assertions, and therefore morality, objective. I concede.

[Terrapin Station]

Well, the proposition in question --- "Paris is the capital of France" --- says nothing about Paris's location

?? It certainly says something about Paris' location re how I interpret it. France, among other things, picks out a location. Given what capitals are, they're always located in what they're a capital of (they wouldn't necessarily be, but this is contingently the case). So the sentence tells me that rather than being in Laos, say, or Greenland, say, which are different locations, Paris is in France.

You, or course, could interpret the sentence quite differently. And this would underscore that interpretation can vary a lot, in a conspicuous manner. Interpretational variation wouldn't be limited to inconspicuous or hidden aspects.

[Peter Holmes]

Just to tidy up and clarify my previous post.

It has been argued that claims about moral rightness and wrongness are about consistency with goals derived from axioms requiring no justification.

Axiom: Homosexuals are vermin.
Goal: Rid ourselves of vermin.
Advisory assertion: If we want to rid ourselves of vermin, then we [should/ought to/need to/must] rid ourselves of homosexuals.

This assertion is objective, because it has public truth conditions. And because it's about morality, then supposedly it's a 'moral assertion'.

Our thinking the axiom is morally wrong and repulsive (as I do) has no bearing on the nominal objectivity of the advisory assertion.

Our choice of a moral axiom, how ever we justify it, is subjective - a matter of opinion. And that single fact demolishes the argument for moral objectivity, ab initio.

[Belindi]

Regarding GEMorton's example "Paris is the capital of France" whether or not the speaker intends the claim as a sort of geographical location in time and space, or whatever other motive she has for voicing the claim, her language behaviour is social.Or socio-cultural.

Even maths and logic are grounded in cultural needs for cognitive ease during increasingly complex economic and logistical social situations.

Kuhn has shown science is a social activity. Pure objectivity is impossible and must remain an ideal to aspire to but never to be realised in this world.The best we can do in the direction of objectivity is relative true knowledge and relatively true judgements.Those are founded on the true nature of events as if there be such as state as over arching order in the universe.This over arching order is what I call Nature. Some call it God, I call it Nature.

Since we are inescapably subjective we suffer from a feeling of existential angst having no authority but our own. Any man who lacks an element of neuroticism in his psyche cannot live for long.It is neuroticism that makes GEMorton and any authentic person here able to think responsibly.

[Belindi]

I agree with Terrapin about the primacy of interpretation. I would like Terrapin to expand on the role of interpretation in historiography.

[creation]

The answer to the question is: Agreement and acceptance by all.

[Terrapin Station]

I agree with Terrapin about the primacy of interpretation. I would like Terrapin to expand on the role of interpretation in historiography.

Historiography? Where did we start talking about that? (I don't typically read all of every post in a long thread, so I'm just genuinely surprised that that became a topic somewhere in a thread about morality.)

In any event, yeah, I'd definitely agree with needing to emphasize interpretation in historiography. Although I don't actually agree with most of Gadamer's views (if you had him in mind at all). We at least come to some similar conclusions, at least superficially, if not for the same reasons. My views are more rooted in subjectivism (the subjectivity of meaning, etc.) and relativism (including a thoroughgoing, objective, property relativism on my view).

[Terrapin Station]

The answer to the question is: Agreement and acceptance by all.

In what way does that make anything objective? What work does "objectivity" do if what we mean by "objective" is "everyone agrees"?

[Belindi]

Terrapin, that was me who mentioned historiography for the first time in this thread.My reason was that if you take an interpretive view of historiography you will also support subjectivism in ethics. And Yes, I had Gadamer in mind and I especially like Gadamer for his view that the subjective is not only inevitable but is also the mechanism for change and learning new stuff. (Not quoted! My own words.)