Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[GE Morton]

Which is the whole gist of pointing out that when x is distressing to S and not-x is distressing to R, we have a problem for "maximizing well-being."

No problem at all. Because "well-being" does not consist in, and is not measured by, feelings, moods, emotions, or anything else "in people's heads." It is measured by the extent to which someone is able to secure the things he values, as evidenced by his observable behavior --- the things he invests his time, energy, other resources to secure.

I agree there is a broader sense of "well-being" which takes those affective states into account. Most people would be unwilling to claim that a person suffering from depression is in a high state of well-being. But those responses and states are idiosyncratic, unpredictable, beyond the control of other agents, and no moral principle or rule addressing them could be universalized. Moral philosophy can only be concerned with "material well-being," because those are the only aspects of well-being that can be objectively identified and measured.

Moral principles and rules are concerned with human actions ---- not with what people think or feel, but with what they do.

[GE Morton]

It depends on how you define morality.

Indeed it does. Any one setting out to develop a moral theory, or propose moral principles, must first decide what "morality" is, what that theory, those principles and rules, aim to accomplish.

[GE Morton]

Your criterion for what you incorrectly call the objectivity of a moral theory is the consistency of its moral assertions. But that means any moral theory can be objective. So your claim that 'vernacular' moral theories are subjective - unlike your supposedly 'sound' theory - is flatly false, by your own definition - and merely an expression of your prejudice passed off as a fact. Moral objectivism in a nutshell, come to think about it.

Yes, a vernacular moral theory could be objective. But none of them existing are (that I know of). They are amalgams of religious dogmas, conditioned responses, cultural tropes, and personal emotional response patterns, jumbled together with no thought of consistency.

[Terrapin Station]

It is measured by the extent to which someone is able to secure the things he values, as evidenced by his observable behavior

Valuing something isn't an observable behavior. It's a mental state. Observable behavior is taken as indirect evidence of the mental state.

Nevertheless, people usually value not being distressed, and you can see indirect evidence of this via observable behavior. This is often in conflict with other people, because S will be distressed by x while R is distressed by not-x.

[GE Morton]

Valuing something isn't an observable behavior. It's a mental state.

Oh, but it is. The only thing that justifies my claim that "Alfie values X" is his observable efforts to secure X. That behavior is the direct evidence for the truth of that proposition. I may infer or hypothesize that he has some mental state that accompanies or provokes that behavior, but that hypothesis is not necessary to confirm that "Alfie values X."

That claim of yours leads to the same reductio ad absurdum to which your claim that meanings are mental events leads. If meanings and values are "things in people's heads," then verbal communication is impossible, and no value statements are cognitive, because no one can know what is in someone's head except the person whose head it is.

Observable behavior is taken as indirect evidence of the mental state.

Yes, it is. But it is DIRECT, and definitive, evidence that Alfie values X.

[Terrapin Station]

Valuing something isn't an observable behavior. It's a mental state.

Oh, but it is.

No, it's not. It's a mental state.

The only thing that justifies my claim that "Alfie values X" is his observable efforts to secure X.

How is he trying secure X behaviorally sans your interpretation of that, even?

[Kaz_1983]

It depends on how you define morality.

Indeed it does. Any one setting out to develop a moral theory, or propose moral principles, must first decide what "morality" is, what that theory, those principles and rules, aim to accomplish.

See I believe that "morality" is independent of our wants and desires and in my opinion for "morality" to make sense it must be intrinsically action-guiding.

I don't believe morality is true-apt. Now I'm not rejecting "morality", I'm just holding the position of an agnostic on whether God exists or not.. replace God with "morality"

[GE Morton]

How is he trying secure X behaviorally sans your interpretation of that, even?

Whether Alfie values X has nothing to do with any "interpreting" on my part. That is not among the truth conditions for "Alfie values X," which consist of behaviors on Alfie's part. I am not the subject of the proposition.

[Belindi]

Objective morality is the same as morality that is necessarily so. 'Objective' means 'necessary'.

Well, that would be an eclectic definition of "objective."

"Objective" and "subjective" are properties of propositions, like "true" and "false." A proposition is objective if its truth conditions are public; subjective if they are private.

Moral propositions, e.g., "One ought to do (or ought not do) X" are objective if their truth conditions are public, verifiable by any suitably situated observer. "Ought" statements, whether in moral propositions or elsewhere, are instrumental, they relate to some goal, acknowledged or implied. "You ought to do X" means, "X is an effective or necessary means of accomplishing Y," with Y being the goal. Whether a given X is or is not effective or necessary for accomplishing a given Y is usually objective.

You say "( "Ought" statements-----------relate to some goal----" . I agree. Goal and criterion whether stated or implied are similar as goal is a variety of criterion. For instance " If you want to be a doctor you will have to study very hard": "You need to practise handling a car before you can drive on the road". "Pass the ball to the left winger!" " Good! You understand linear perspective." " You sure can make good soup!" Are goal directed and all explicitly or implicitly imply criteria.

"I love you" "I am a human being" and "That's a pony not a horse" are not goal directed but refer to fixed states which are not in transition towards goals. A very subjective feeling of pain may be commented on as "Ouch!" or "On the scale of one to ten my pain was nine". In all cases of a subjective utterance the goal is implied by the social situation which may be a doctor's consulting room to children at play.The goal is to let the other know how one feels and this is either a) purposive or b) it's unconsidered reaction.The goal may be b)to refer to fellowship in experience of pain, or it may a) refer to an implicit cultural belief that the doctor at that time and place exists to help the patient.
If your untrained puppy nips you you should squeal or say a sharp "Ouch!" so the puppy learns biting hurts you . Dogs and very young children know this in the form of reactions(biologically) and we know this in the form of acquired knowledge(culturally).

No utterance is value neutral except when it's about the measurement itself e.g. "Haemoglobin carries oxygen" which has empirical and cultural criteria , and "1+1=2" which is universal but is deductive and tautological.

All inductively based propositions are goal or criteria laden . The goal may be immediate or mediated by a criterion. The only objective propositions are deductive as for mathematical or logical tautologies.

There are only two ways out of this dilemma. 1. God, or cosmic order. Pythagoras conflated logical tautologies and empirical facts such as musical harmonies.
2. Nature which unlike God implies no element of supernatural order of being but is otherwise like God as it's cause of itself.

[Terrapin Station]

How is he trying secure X behaviorally sans your interpretation of that, even?

Whether Alfie values X has nothing to do with any "interpreting" on my part. That is not among the truth conditions for "Alfie values X," which consist of behaviors on Alfie's part. I am not the subject of the proposition.

So that's how he's trying to secure x behaviorally sans your interpretation? Three claims about what's not the case?

[Peter Holmes]

Whether we're talking about moral theories, principles, axioms, goals , codes or rules, the only things that can be objective or subjective are assertions. And assertions that express moral opinions - it is right to maximise the well-being of all agents - slavery is wrong - are subjective.

Adopting any moral theory, principle, axiom, goal, code or rule - sound or otherwise - is a choice, and is therefore subjective.

We've covered this, and I agree with respect to axioms and goals. Axioms are deemed true a priori. If a goal is set forth as the axiom of a theory, then it is accepted a priori. One may accept or reject the axioms of any theory. One may reject the axioms of Euclid's geometry. But then you'll face the task of finding other means of solving the thousands of daily problems that geometry allows us to solve.

The codes, rules, and principles that may be derived from a set of axioms, however, are objective --- they either do or do not advance the goal, either are or are not consistent with the axiom.

You can't seem to grasp that an "ought" statement can be objective whether or not the goal is objective. It can be, because the "ought" statement references the goal; it is a conditional --- "If you wish to do X, you must (or should) do Y." Propositions of that form can be true and objective.

Let's be precise: a goal Y is never objective, so that isn't the issue. And wanting goal Y is always subjective. The claim that action X leads to goal Y may be true and objective. But that doesn't establish the objectivity of a moral assertion, such as 'slavery is wrong', or 'it's right to maximise the well-being of all agents'.

"Objective" doesn't mean, "Agreed to by everyone," or, "true of 'external reality'," or, "From God's point of view," or anything with any metaphysical/ontological implications.

I agree that consensus and divine perspective have nothing to do with objectivity. But what does your definition of an objective assertion - 'with public truth conditions' - mean, if it isn't something to do with 'external reality'? (I may have misunderstood your point here.)

The real issue here is, "What is the aim, goal, of moral theories, moral codes, moral rules?" If you profess to interested in "morality" you have to answer that question somehow.

No, that's not the issue here at all. We're discussing what could make morality objective. That moral theories, codes and rules have one aim or goal is a matter of opinion - as is the claim that we should have such an aim or goal at all, let alone a particular aim or goal. And none of these confers objectivity on moral aims, goals, codes or rules.

I am interested in morality, which is why I'm concerned to demolish the delusion and expose the lie that morality - more precisely moral assertions - are or can be objective. That lie has encouraged and justified a great deal of human wickedness.

[Belindi]

If nature is taken to be what is the case then people who know most about nature, including the human sciences, natural sciences, and humanities are more likely to live well.

[GE Morton]

You can't seem to grasp that an "ought" statement can be objective whether or not the goal is objective. It can be, because the "ought" statement references the goal; it is a conditional --- "If you wish to do X, you must (or should) do Y." Propositions of that form can be true and objective.

Let's be precise: a goal Y is never objective, so that isn't the issue. And wanting goal Y is always subjective. The claim that action X leads to goal Y may be true and objective. But that doesn't establish the objectivity of a moral assertion, such as 'slavery is wrong' . . ."

"Slavery is wrong," as a stand-alone proposition, may be subjective, because it means no more than, "I don't approve of slavery." If the utterer intends it to mean anything more than that, if he believes it has some "objective" truth value --- a truth value independent of his personal opinion --- then he will be assuming some criterion of "rightness" and "wrongness."

When people pronounce some act morally wrong they usually believe they are saying something more defensible, and more objective, than merely uttering a personal preference. They have some underlying moral principle --- some moral axiom --- in mind. If you ask someone who declares, "Slavery is wrong," WHY it is wrong, he'll try to give some answer:

"It is against God's will."

"It is illegal."

"It conflicts with the principle that all men are created equal."

"It causes suffering, and one should not make others suffer."

Etc. What he is not likely to answer is, "Because I don't like it."

People believe their moral judgments are grounded in some larger truth. When that is the case, then the proposition is actually a conditional, "If X is the case, or if you believe X, then slavery is wrong."

Just like "should" and "ought," moral rightness and wrongness are instrumental. To call any action "wrong" is to say it conflicts with, is inconsistent with, some standard, some rule accepted as valid or sound, or with the attainment of some adopted goal. Enslaving someone is wrong for the same reason that driving on the left side of the road (in the US) is wrong, or connecting the black wire to the neutral bus in an electrical panel is wrong --- they are all acts which conflict with some accepted standard, are inconsistent with some accepted principle, or will not advance one toward some chosen goal. Whether they are or are not compatible or consistent with that standard or goal is usually objective.

Upshot: if you declare some act to be morally wrong, and you mean something more substantive than that you don't like it, then you will have some broader goal or principle in mind, and you are declaring the act in question to be inconsistent with it. Whether the act in question is or is not consistent with that goal or principle is usually objective. Whether the larger principle is sound, or the goal worth pursuing, is a separate question. The reasons for adopting any principle or goal are always pragmatic, including the moral "Fundamental Principle" I gave earlier.

"Objective" doesn't mean, "Agreed to by everyone," or, "true of 'external reality'," or, "From God's point of view," or anything with any metaphysical/ontological implications.

I agree that consensus and divine perspective have nothing to do with objectivity. But what does your definition of an objective assertion - 'with public truth conditions' - mean, if it isn't something to do with 'external reality'? (I may have misunderstood your point here.)

It means that the state of affairs asserted in the proposition can be confirmed or disconfirmed by any suitably situated observer. "It is raining outside" is objective. That means that anyone in that area can confirm it by looking out the window or stepping outside. That criterion, BTW, makes no assumptions about any "external reality." The speaker and observers may all be solipsists, but they'll still be able to confirm or disconfirm that proposition. If they experience the percepts the proposition predicts, it is objective, even if they all consider it (and each other) parts of a hallucination.

The real issue here is, "What is the aim, goal, of moral theories, moral codes, moral rules?" If you profess to interested in "morality" you have to answer that question somehow.

No, that's not the issue here at all. We're discussing what could make morality objective. That moral theories, codes and rules have one aim or goal is a matter of opinion - as is the claim that we should have such an aim or goal at all, let alone a particular aim or goal. And none of these confers objectivity on moral aims, goals, codes or rules.

As I said above, if you make any sort of declaration that doing X is wrong, you will probably have some goal or broader principle in mind, and you will probably be claiming that X is incompatible with that goal or principle. Whether it is or not is (usually) objective. If you don't, then you will merely be declaring that you don't like X --- a fact that will interest no one, and certainly not persuade anyone to change their own opinion of X. If we want moral discussions, arguments, to be meaningful and persuasive we need to set forth, and justify, those proffered goals or principles.

I am interested in morality, which is why I'm concerned to demolish the delusion and expose the lie that morality - more precisely moral assertions - are or can be objective. That lie has encouraged and justified a great deal of human wickedness.

It is not the claim that a moral judgment or rule is objective that results in the wickedness. It is the fact that the underlying goal of that rule or judgment is wicked.

[Sy Borg]

So vague, GE. it's easy to keep people arguing for fifty pages about just about any topic if you stick to generalities. So we have fifty pages of not much.

How about you set out the exact objective morals to be critiqued by the forum? All you need to do is set out this "objective" moral theory in detail so others can provide decisive challenges to your ideas. At this stage you have shielded your ideas by sticking to generalities that can always be moulded and framed to give the impression of honest debate.

Where is this objective moral theory that applies to all cultures in all places (certainly not to all species)? In your imagination.

[GE Morton]

How about you set out the exact objective morals to be critiqued by the forum?

Well, that would be the subject of another thread. The subject of this thread is, "What could make morality objective?" That entails a discussion of what objectivity is, what morality is, and what moral propositions assert. Which is what this thread, for the most part, has covered. Before those issues are settled there is no point in setting out a moral theory and claiming it is objective.