Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Sy Borg]

I can't disagree with him more strongly. Many species have language and it's not their fault that we are unable to pick up the nuances.

It's like a return to Descartes, who used to cut dogs open in public demonstrations to show that they don't actually feel anything - they just whimper, whine and howl out of automatic reflexes, not suffering.

Humans have a unique abstract sense of things, but the idea that humans alone are sentient is retrograde thinking, long disproved by nervous system studies. Might as well posit that humans are the only ones with souls.

Dennett basically says - "if you believe other animals are sentient - then go ahead and prove it".

Dennett appears to believe that sentience is the ability to understand that one is a subject.. and that there are other subjects with whom one is communicating. And the reason that humans have this sentience is because of human culture. So it looks to me like Dennett is saying "humans are sentient because of human culture... no other animal has sentience because no other animal has human culture - if you really think that any other animal is sentient, then prove it". A virtual impossibility, because we don't have access to any other minds besides our own. It could be the case that other animals do understand they are a subject (in some rudimentary way) - it's just that they can't communicate it to us. There does appear to be at least some evidence that other animals are sentient. What of the mirror test? And didn't Koko demonstrate that she understood herself to be a subject?

Dennett has his moments - either way. Sometimes he's brilliant, sometimes he says stupid things to raise debates.

I spend a fair bit of time with dogs and, unlike ChatGPT, they are obviously sentient. Obviously, as social animals, they must be able to communicate with other dogs. This, language. Instead of inventing abstractions to describe things, they use existing abstractions - usually a combination of body language and smell, with some coded sounds. Posture, positioning, direction of orientation, tempo of movement - these all provide clear messages.

What is a growl but a part of a proto-language that is ultimately no different to sharing harsh words with someone. When humans interact, there is seemingly added nuance and detail, although there's no doubt we miss some dog nuance. For instance, while humans read body language well, dogs read it with more focus and detail.

[anonymous66]

I can't disagree with him more strongly. Many species have language and it's not their fault that we are unable to pick up the nuances.

It's like a return to Descartes, who used to cut dogs open in public demonstrations to show that they don't actually feel anything - they just whimper, whine and howl out of automatic reflexes, not suffering.

Humans have a unique abstract sense of things, but the idea that humans alone are sentient is retrograde thinking, long disproved by nervous system studies. Might as well posit that humans are the only ones with souls.

Dennett basically says - "if you believe other animals are sentient - then go ahead and prove it".

Dennett appears to believe that sentience is the ability to understand that one is a subject.. and that there are other subjects with whom one is communicating. And the reason that humans have this sentience is because of human culture. So it looks to me like Dennett is saying "humans are sentient because of human culture... no other animal has sentience because no other animal has human culture - if you really think that any other animal is sentient, then prove it". A virtual impossibility, because we don't have access to any other minds besides our own. It could be the case that other animals do understand they are a subject (in some rudimentary way) - it's just that they can't communicate it to us. There does appear to be at least some evidence that other animals are sentient. What of the mirror test? And didn't Koko demonstrate that she understood herself to be a subject?

Dennett has his moments - either way. Sometimes he's brilliant, sometimes he says stupid things to raise debates.

I spend a fair bit of time with dogs and, unlike ChatGPT, they are obviously sentient. Obviously, as social animals, they must be able to communicate with other dogs. This, language. Instead of inventing abstractions to describe things, they use existing abstractions - usually a combination of body language and smell, with some coded sounds. Posture, positioning, direction of orientation, tempo of movement - these all provide clear messages.

What is a growl but a part of a proto-language that is ultimately no different to sharing harsh words with someone. When humans interact, there is seemingly added nuance and detail, although there's no doubt we miss some dog nuance. For instance, while humans read body language well, dogs read it with more focus and detail.

Dennett has a different way of looking at it. He makes a compelling case for "competence without comprehension" - if he's right, then animals look like they're communicating, but they have no awareness that they are doing so (they're not sentient) The evidence you mention fits within his theory of consciousness.

What he is promoting - the idea that only humans are sentient - is controversial. Isn't it more likely a continuum with humans at the top? vs the idea that only humans are sentient?

[anonymous66]

Dennett appears to believe that sentience is the ability to understand that one is a subject.. and that there are other subjects with whom one is communicating. And the reason that humans have this sentience is because of human culture. So it looks to me like Dennett is saying "humans are sentient because of human culture... no other animal has sentience because no other animal has human culture - if you really think that any other animal is sentient, then prove it". A virtual impossibility, because we don't have access to any other minds besides our own. It could be the case that other animals do understand they are a subject (in some rudimentary way) - it's just that they can't communicate it to us. There does appear to be at least some evidence that other animals are sentient. What of the mirror test? And didn't Koko demonstrate that she understood herself to be a subject?

Now that I've thought about it - the mirror test and Koko's communication do fit into Dennett's theory. They would just be further examples of "competence without comprehension". If Dennett is right, then it looks like evidence of self-awareness, but in reality there is no awareness. It's just another trick of evolution. Termites are great engineers - but they don't actually think about what they are doing. Birds respond when one of their eggs is missing, but they can't actually count - they don't comprehend what they are doing when they appear to be counting their eggs.

[Sy Borg]

I can't disagree with him more strongly. Many species have language and it's not their fault that we are unable to pick up the nuances.

It's like a return to Descartes, who used to cut dogs open in public demonstrations to show that they don't actually feel anything - they just whimper, whine and howl out of automatic reflexes, not suffering.

Humans have a unique abstract sense of things, but the idea that humans alone are sentient is retrograde thinking, long disproved by nervous system studies. Might as well posit that humans are the only ones with souls.

Dennett basically says - "if you believe other animals are sentient - then go ahead and prove it".

Dennett appears to believe that sentience is the ability to understand that one is a subject.. and that there are other subjects with whom one is communicating. And the reason that humans have this sentience is because of human culture. So it looks to me like Dennett is saying "humans are sentient because of human culture... no other animal has sentience because no other animal has human culture - if you really think that any other animal is sentient, then prove it". A virtual impossibility, because we don't have access to any other minds besides our own. It could be the case that other animals do understand they are a subject (in some rudimentary way) - it's just that they can't communicate it to us. There does appear to be at least some evidence that other animals are sentient. What of the mirror test? And didn't Koko demonstrate that she understood herself to be a subject?

Dennett has his moments - either way. Sometimes he's brilliant, sometimes he says stupid things to raise debates.

I spend a fair bit of time with dogs and, unlike ChatGPT, they are obviously sentient. Obviously, as social animals, they must be able to communicate with other dogs. This, language. Instead of inventing abstractions to describe things, they use existing abstractions - usually a combination of body language and smell, with some coded sounds. Posture, positioning, direction of orientation, tempo of movement - these all provide clear messages.

What is a growl but a part of a proto-language that is ultimately no different to sharing harsh words with someone. When humans interact, there is seemingly added nuance and detail, although there's no doubt we miss some dog nuance. For instance, while humans read body language well, dogs read it with more focus and detail.

Dennett has a different way of looking at it. He makes a compelling case for "competence without comprehension" - if he's right, then animals look like they're communicating, but they have no awareness that they are doing so (they're not sentient) The evidence you mention fits within his theory of consciousness.

What he is promoting - the idea that only humans are sentient - is controversial. Isn't it more likely a continuum with humans at the top? vs the idea that only humans are sentient?

I think old DD likes to stir the pot. Of course other species know they are communicating, albeit in varying degrees. As you said, it's a continuum. The difference is that humans have an extra "sense", or rather, an enhanced sense - a sense of time passing. Humans can reflect on the past or project the future without stimuli, and we can peer far further into time than other species. In terms of time perception, most species are like young human children, before enhanced time perception has developed.

I think of this advantage as analogous to the evolution of sight. Cambrian predators were the first animals that could clearly visually render their environment. The advantage was immense, as is the human advantage.

If the theorists are right, we still have general AI to look forward to, then self-aware AI, transcendent AI and cosmic AI.

[anonymous66]

Dennett basically says - "if you believe other animals are sentient - then go ahead and prove it".

Dennett appears to believe that sentience is the ability to understand that one is a subject.. and that there are other subjects with whom one is communicating. And the reason that humans have this sentience is because of human culture. So it looks to me like Dennett is saying "humans are sentient because of human culture... no other animal has sentience because no other animal has human culture - if you really think that any other animal is sentient, then prove it". A virtual impossibility, because we don't have access to any other minds besides our own. It could be the case that other animals do understand they are a subject (in some rudimentary way) - it's just that they can't communicate it to us. There does appear to be at least some evidence that other animals are sentient. What of the mirror test? And didn't Koko demonstrate that she understood herself to be a subject?

Dennett has his moments - either way. Sometimes he's brilliant, sometimes he says stupid things to raise debates.

I spend a fair bit of time with dogs and, unlike ChatGPT, they are obviously sentient. Obviously, as social animals, they must be able to communicate with other dogs. This, language. Instead of inventing abstractions to describe things, they use existing abstractions - usually a combination of body language and smell, with some coded sounds. Posture, positioning, direction of orientation, tempo of movement - these all provide clear messages.

What is a growl but a part of a proto-language that is ultimately no different to sharing harsh words with someone. When humans interact, there is seemingly added nuance and detail, although there's no doubt we miss some dog nuance. For instance, while humans read body language well, dogs read it with more focus and detail.

Dennett has a different way of looking at it. He makes a compelling case for "competence without comprehension" - if he's right, then animals look like they're communicating, but they have no awareness that they are doing so (they're not sentient) The evidence you mention fits within his theory of consciousness.

What he is promoting - the idea that only humans are sentient - is controversial. Isn't it more likely a continuum with humans at the top? vs the idea that only humans are sentient?

I think old DD likes to stir the pot. Of course other species know they are communicating, albeit in varying degrees. As you said, it's a continuum. The difference is that humans have an extra "sense", or rather, an enhanced sense - a sense of time passing. Humans can reflect on the past or project the future without stimuli, and we can peer far further into time than other species. In terms of time perception, most species are like young human children, before enhanced time perception has developed.

I think of this advantage as analogous to the evolution of sight. Cambrian predators were the first animals that could clearly visually render their environment. The advantage was immense, as is the human advantage.

If the theorists are right, we still have general AI to look forward to, then self-aware AI, transcendent AI and cosmic AI.

I'd like to see (maybe I'll create one myself) an argument that deals squarely with Dennett's arguments (it would have to address evolution, memes and "competence without comprehension") - showing why Dennett is wrong - and/or an alternate theory that explains consciousness and sentience. I like arguments for property dualism, but I haven't come across one that incorporates evolution into the theory.

[Sy Borg]

Dennett has his moments - either way. Sometimes he's brilliant, sometimes he says stupid things to raise debates.

I spend a fair bit of time with dogs and, unlike ChatGPT, they are obviously sentient. Obviously, as social animals, they must be able to communicate with other dogs. This, language. Instead of inventing abstractions to describe things, they use existing abstractions - usually a combination of body language and smell, with some coded sounds. Posture, positioning, direction of orientation, tempo of movement - these all provide clear messages.

What is a growl but a part of a proto-language that is ultimately no different to sharing harsh words with someone. When humans interact, there is seemingly added nuance and detail, although there's no doubt we miss some dog nuance. For instance, while humans read body language well, dogs read it with more focus and detail.

Dennett has a different way of looking at it. He makes a compelling case for "competence without comprehension" - if he's right, then animals look like they're communicating, but they have no awareness that they are doing so (they're not sentient) The evidence you mention fits within his theory of consciousness.

What he is promoting - the idea that only humans are sentient - is controversial. Isn't it more likely a continuum with humans at the top? vs the idea that only humans are sentient?

I think old DD likes to stir the pot. Of course other species know they are communicating, albeit in varying degrees. As you said, it's a continuum. The difference is that humans have an extra "sense", or rather, an enhanced sense - a sense of time passing. Humans can reflect on the past or project the future without stimuli, and we can peer far further into time than other species. In terms of time perception, most species are like young human children, before enhanced time perception has developed.

I think of this advantage as analogous to the evolution of sight. Cambrian predators were the first animals that could clearly visually render their environment. The advantage was immense, as is the human advantage.

If the theorists are right, we still have general AI to look forward to, then self-aware AI, transcendent AI and cosmic AI.

I'd like to see (maybe I'll create one myself) an argument that deals squarely with Dennett's arguments (it would have to address evolution, memes and "competence without comprehension") - showing why Dennett is wrong - and/or an alternate theory that explains consciousness and sentience. I like arguments for property dualism, but I haven't come across one that incorporates evolution into the theory.

The time perception difference between humans and other species entirely covers Dennett's concerns. It is hard to overstate this advantage. It allows for reflection, learning and strategy.

Also note that animals do not just display competence, but they display obvious sentience. They feel their existence. They are not "biological machines" (which is a backwards and, thus, inappropriate idea). Further, the degrees of sapience or comprehension displayed by other species will vary between species and individuals. Animals very often comprehend their situations, not so differently to how we comprehended our circumstances as children.

Various species display theory of mind - awareness of what others might be thinking - as has been shown in a number of experiments with various primates, parrots, ravens, dogs, pigs and goats. No doubt there are many others.

[anonymous66]

Dennett has a different way of looking at it. He makes a compelling case for "competence without comprehension" - if he's right, then animals look like they're communicating, but they have no awareness that they are doing so (they're not sentient) The evidence you mention fits within his theory of consciousness.

What he is promoting - the idea that only humans are sentient - is controversial. Isn't it more likely a continuum with humans at the top? vs the idea that only humans are sentient?

I think old DD likes to stir the pot. Of course other species know they are communicating, albeit in varying degrees. As you said, it's a continuum. The difference is that humans have an extra "sense", or rather, an enhanced sense - a sense of time passing. Humans can reflect on the past or project the future without stimuli, and we can peer far further into time than other species. In terms of time perception, most species are like young human children, before enhanced time perception has developed.

I think of this advantage as analogous to the evolution of sight. Cambrian predators were the first animals that could clearly visually render their environment. The advantage was immense, as is the human advantage.

If the theorists are right, we still have general AI to look forward to, then self-aware AI, transcendent AI and cosmic AI.

I'd like to see (maybe I'll create one myself) an argument that deals squarely with Dennett's arguments (it would have to address evolution, memes and "competence without comprehension") - showing why Dennett is wrong - and/or an alternate theory that explains consciousness and sentience. I like arguments for property dualism, but I haven't come across one that incorporates evolution into the theory.

The time perception difference between humans and other species entirely covers Dennett's concerns. It is hard to overstate this advantage. It allows for reflection, learning and strategy.

Also note that animals do not just display competence, but they display obvious sentience. They feel their existence. They are not "biological machines" (which is a backwards and, thus, inappropriate idea). Further, the degrees of sapience or comprehension displayed by other species will vary between species and individuals. Animals very often comprehend their situations, not so differently to how we comprehended our circumstances as children.

Various species display theory of mind - awareness of what others might be thinking - as has been shown in a number of experiments with various primates, parrots, ravens, dogs, pigs and goats. No doubt there are many others.

I tend to agree with the notion that animals probably have a "what it is likeness" - but to a lesser degree than that of humans. I agree with Dennet that consciousness has been affected by evolution. And if evolution caused "what it is likeness" in humans why not in animals as well? From whence came the original "what is it likeness" in humans (or protohumans)? How would one explain the emergence of the first "what it is likeness"? And how to explain why it would emerge in humans but not other animals?

[Sy Borg]

I think old DD likes to stir the pot. Of course other species know they are communicating, albeit in varying degrees. As you said, it's a continuum. The difference is that humans have an extra "sense", or rather, an enhanced sense - a sense of time passing. Humans can reflect on the past or project the future without stimuli, and we can peer far further into time than other species. In terms of time perception, most species are like young human children, before enhanced time perception has developed.

I think of this advantage as analogous to the evolution of sight. Cambrian predators were the first animals that could clearly visually render their environment. The advantage was immense, as is the human advantage.

If the theorists are right, we still have general AI to look forward to, then self-aware AI, transcendent AI and cosmic AI.

I'd like to see (maybe I'll create one myself) an argument that deals squarely with Dennett's arguments (it would have to address evolution, memes and "competence without comprehension") - showing why Dennett is wrong - and/or an alternate theory that explains consciousness and sentience. I like arguments for property dualism, but I haven't come across one that incorporates evolution into the theory.

The time perception difference between humans and other species entirely covers Dennett's concerns. It is hard to overstate this advantage. It allows for reflection, learning and strategy.

Also note that animals do not just display competence, but they display obvious sentience. They feel their existence. They are not "biological machines" (which is a backwards and, thus, inappropriate idea). Further, the degrees of sapience or comprehension displayed by other species will vary between species and individuals. Animals very often comprehend their situations, not so differently to how we comprehended our circumstances as children.

Various species display theory of mind - awareness of what others might be thinking - as has been shown in a number of experiments with various primates, parrots, ravens, dogs, pigs and goats. No doubt there are many others.

I tend to agree with the notion that animals probably have a "what it is likeness" - but to a lesser degree than that of humans. I agree with Dennet that consciousness has been affected by evolution. And if evolution caused "what it is likeness" in humans why not in animals as well? From whence came the original "what is it likeness" in humans (or protohumans)? How would one explain the emergence of the first "what it is likeness"? And how to explain why it would emerge in humans but not other animals?

I guess one can only answer that question speculatively. Over deep time, organisms developed a range of useful reflexes that aided in survival and reproduction. However, these bundles of sensations and responses were not coordinated. One side of the body could be under siege while the other side feels normal. The brain effectively allows an organism to "call in reinforcements" to help when one part of the body is under attack. So a central hub developed that allowed for a whole body response. For example, if one tentacle is under attack, instead of leaving that tentacle to fend for itself, the organism can move its whole body to a safer place.

I suspect that centralised sensory systems form the basis of "what it is likeness". I think it's very common rather than exclusive to humans, but our greater ability to perceive the passing of time enhances the intensity of our "what it is likeness". Without the human capacity to reflect on the past and project into the future, our sense of being would be much less vivid.

[anonymous66]

I'd like to see (maybe I'll create one myself) an argument that deals squarely with Dennett's arguments (it would have to address evolution, memes and "competence without comprehension") - showing why Dennett is wrong - and/or an alternate theory that explains consciousness and sentience. I like arguments for property dualism, but I haven't come across one that incorporates evolution into the theory.

The time perception difference between humans and other species entirely covers Dennett's concerns. It is hard to overstate this advantage. It allows for reflection, learning and strategy.

Also note that animals do not just display competence, but they display obvious sentience. They feel their existence. They are not "biological machines" (which is a backwards and, thus, inappropriate idea). Further, the degrees of sapience or comprehension displayed by other species will vary between species and individuals. Animals very often comprehend their situations, not so differently to how we comprehended our circumstances as children.

Various species display theory of mind - awareness of what others might be thinking - as has been shown in a number of experiments with various primates, parrots, ravens, dogs, pigs and goats. No doubt there are many others.

I tend to agree with the notion that animals probably have a "what it is likeness" - but to a lesser degree than that of humans. I agree with Dennet that consciousness has been affected by evolution. And if evolution caused "what it is likeness" in humans why not in animals as well? From whence came the original "what is it likeness" in humans (or protohumans)? How would one explain the emergence of the first "what it is likeness"? And how to explain why it would emerge in humans but not other animals?

I guess one can only answer that question speculatively. Over deep time, organisms developed a range of useful reflexes that aided in survival and reproduction. However, these bundles of sensations and responses were not coordinated. One side of the body could be under siege while the other side feels normal. The brain effectively allows an organism to "call in reinforcements" to help when one part of the body is under attack. So a central hub developed that allowed for a whole body response. For example, if one tentacle is under attack, instead of leaving that tentacle to fend for itself, the organism can move its whole body to a safer place.

I suspect that centralised sensory systems form the basis of "what it is likeness". I think it's very common rather than exclusive to humans, but our greater ability to perceive the passing of time enhances the intensity of our "what it is likeness". Without the human capacity to reflect on the past and project into the future, our sense of being would be much less vivid.

The above is definitely possible.

To answer my own question - I looked at the flyleaf again (I quoted it in my OP) - from it we can see that Dennet believes that it is our ability to use language that has resulted in our "having minds" (which I suppose to be synonymous with having "what it is likeness" and sentience). But as you pointed out - other animals appear to communicate in, if not a language, then a proto-language. And again, one must deal with the "chicken and egg" problem. Which came first? "What it is likeness" or the ability to communicate that "what it is likeness"? It seems to me to be more likely that the "what it is likeness" came first - that it existed before language, and language merely gave us the ability to communicate that "what it is likeness" to others.

[Sy Borg]

The time perception difference between humans and other species entirely covers Dennett's concerns. It is hard to overstate this advantage. It allows for reflection, learning and strategy.

Also note that animals do not just display competence, but they display obvious sentience. They feel their existence. They are not "biological machines" (which is a backwards and, thus, inappropriate idea). Further, the degrees of sapience or comprehension displayed by other species will vary between species and individuals. Animals very often comprehend their situations, not so differently to how we comprehended our circumstances as children.

Various species display theory of mind - awareness of what others might be thinking - as has been shown in a number of experiments with various primates, parrots, ravens, dogs, pigs and goats. No doubt there are many others.

I tend to agree with the notion that animals probably have a "what it is likeness" - but to a lesser degree than that of humans. I agree with Dennet that consciousness has been affected by evolution. And if evolution caused "what it is likeness" in humans why not in animals as well? From whence came the original "what is it likeness" in humans (or protohumans)? How would one explain the emergence of the first "what it is likeness"? And how to explain why it would emerge in humans but not other animals?

I guess one can only answer that question speculatively. Over deep time, organisms developed a range of useful reflexes that aided in survival and reproduction. However, these bundles of sensations and responses were not coordinated. One side of the body could be under siege while the other side feels normal. The brain effectively allows an organism to "call in reinforcements" to help when one part of the body is under attack. So a central hub developed that allowed for a whole body response. For example, if one tentacle is under attack, instead of leaving that tentacle to fend for itself, the organism can move its whole body to a safer place.

I suspect that centralised sensory systems form the basis of "what it is likeness". I think it's very common rather than exclusive to humans, but our greater ability to perceive the passing of time enhances the intensity of our "what it is likeness". Without the human capacity to reflect on the past and project into the future, our sense of being would be much less vivid.

The above is definitely possible.

To answer my own question - I looked at the flyleaf again (I quoted it in my OP) - from it we can see that Dennet believes that it is our ability to use language that has resulted in our "having minds" (which I suppose to be synonymous with having "what it is likeness" and sentience). But as you pointed out - other animals appear to communicate in, if not a language, then a proto-language. And again, one must deal with the "chicken and egg" problem. Which came first? "What it is likeness" or the ability to communicate that "what it is likeness"? It seems to me to be more likely that the "what it is likeness" came first - that it existed before language, and language merely gave us the ability to communicate that "what it is likeness" to others.

Yes, there's been plenty of communication going on with other species, especially the social species, although there's considerable interspecies communication too, for example, threat displays or cooperation to hunt a common prey animal.

Proto-language, as you suggest, is very common. I agree that "what it is likeness" would have long preceded human languages. I have my own little hypothesis that emotion itself is a language - the means by which the brain and body can communicate. How does the brain get the body to react? Via emotions. How does the body communicate its issues to the brain? Via sensations that are strong enough to elicit emotions.

[Lagayascienza]

I've been meaning to buy this book. I've read quite a bit of Dennett already, for example, Consciousness Explained, Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, as well as lot of his published papers. I agree with a lot of what he says but I disagree with his claim that other animals don't have "What-it's-likeness". Other animals can have language of a sort, we could call it proto-language (although in Cetaceans it might be more than just proto). Some animals also exhibit proto-morality. And some have a sense of self that is separate from the outside world they experience. And animals can have rich emotional lives. I know my dogs do. And they understand the different meanings of some of my utterances. They know, for example, that "sit" does not mean "heal" or "come" or any of the other sounds I make. They pine for me if I leave them at home alone and are excited when I return. They may not have any notion of the future - everything is just "now" - but they have memories of the past. So I don't think sentience can be confined to humans as if we are a special case in the tree of life, somehow removed from all other complex animals with whom we share close evolutionary links. I think Dennett needs to rethink this.

[anonymous66]

I've been meaning to buy this book. I've read quite a bit of Dennett already, for example, Consciousness Explained, Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon, as well as lot of his published papers. I agree with a lot of what he says but I disagree with his claim that other animals don't have "What-it's-likeness". Other animals can have language of a sort, we could call it proto-language (although in Cetaceans it might be more than just proto). Some animals also exhibit proto-morality. And some have a sense of self that is separate from the outside world they experience. And animals can have rich emotional lives. I know my dogs do. And they understand the different meanings of some of my utterances. They know, for example, that "sit" does not mean "heal" or "come" or any of the other sounds I make. They pine for me if I leave them at home alone and are excited when I return. They may not have any notion of the future - everything is just "now" - but they have memories of the past. So I don't think sentience can be confined to humans as if we are a special case in the tree of life, somehow removed from all other complex animals with whom we share close evolutionary links. I think Dennett needs to rethink this.

I have my own problems with Dennett, but to give him the benefit of the doubt - I believe he does acknowledge everything you mention above - and it fits within his theory about consciousness as described in his book (From Bacteria to Bach The evolution of minds). It's not as if he isn't aware that animals appear to communicate, appear to have rich emotional lives, appear to have a proto-morality, appear to understand some of our language, appear to understand that they have a sense of itself that is separate from the outside world (the red dot test, for example) etc.. It's just that he believes that all those things are happening without the same "what it is likeness" that we as humans experience.

[Lagayascienza]

Well, I'm looking forward to reading it. I've just finished his "I've Been Thinking" (basically an autobiography with snippets of his philosophy) which I found very readable. I'll be interested to read how/why he thinks other animals cannot be sentient if they have all those other abilities. And I'll be interested to see if/why he thinks sentience is either present or not. I don't see why there cannot be degrees of sentience and "What-it's-likeness" just as there can be degrees of conscious awareness. I haven't looked at the book yet but suspect I he'll be saying something to the effect that animals cannot engage in metacognition - that they can't think about their thinking and communicate thoughts about it to others of their species. But, even if that is so, I'm not sure that would necessarily rule out a degree of sentience.

When I'm finished the book I'll post on whether I agree with him or not and why.

[anonymous66]

Lagayscienza
Well - Dennett is looking at it from a different angle. He suggests that the reason we believe that other animals have that "what it is likeness" is because we have a long history of accepting substance dualism - and we tend to assume that other beings and even inanimate objects have some sort of soul/personality/ "what it is likeness" (he mentions that some people are fooled by obvious simple robots that are programmed to act as if they are human - some people believe that if something looks and acts as if it is sentient, then it is sentient - even if it is just a simple computer program, some electric motors, and some simulated skin). And he believes that the reason we humans have a "what it is likeness" is because our language allows us to communicate our perceptions (including our sense of self) with other humans. I take it that he believes that if one has no language that allows one to communicate the qualities of "what it is likeness" then one has no "what it is likeness".

He spends quite a bit of time explaining why he thinks that substance dualism is untenable... and just how ingrained he thinks the belief is.

[anonymous66]

Dennett also believes that memes played a huge role in the development of human language and culture. In his view - memes came first, and slowly developed into language. Charles A. Rathkopf, in his review of Dennett's book had this to say, "Our ability to represent our own thoughts developed in response to selection pressures associated with communication, and in particular, in response to the payoffs of persuasion. To persuade others, we must offer them a coherent narrative in which inconsistency is either removed or made obscure. That narrative becomes a perspective on the world; a reflective variety of self-awareness that no other animal has."