arjand wrote: ↑January 19th, 2021, 6:46 pm
Can you provide a simplified argument that would lock any opposing view into an automated exploration of those applicable arguments, so that by the strength of those arguments, objective morality can be made evident?
I have no idea what might "lock any opposing view into an automated exploration" of those arguments. The best I can do is reprise them.
First, by "morality," I refer to a set of rules governing interactions between moral agents in a social setting. I further take the aim of those rules to be enabling all agents in that setting (the "moral field") to maximize their welfare, insofar as the well-being of any given agent can be affected by the actions of other agents. In other words, the rules aim to restrain actions of agents which reduce the welfare of other agents, or prevent them from improving it, and encourage actions which improve others' welfare, to the extent that can be accomplished without reducing anyone else's.
To be sure, the term has been understood with a broader meaning by many moral philosophers, as embracing all kinds of conduct whether or not it affects other agents or occurs in a social setting. For many, "morality" refers to rules for "living the good life," or for complying with the Will of God. If one takes "morality" in one of those senses, then there can be no objective morality: what counts as as "good life" is intrinsically subjective, as is what is God's Will (the latter, BTW, raises a moral question in itself, i.e., the question of why one should endeavor to obey God's will, even if it could be known).
I distinguish morality as defined above from these other conceptions with the term "public morality." Agents constrained by the rules of the public morality remain free to further bind themselves with a private morality, such as a religious morality or by rules they believe assure living "the good life," as long as the latter rules don't conflict with the rules of the public morality.
Since the aim of a public morality is bringing about an empirical state of affairs, its rules will be objective. It is empirically determinable whether or not an act by an agent reduces or increases the well-being of another agent, or does neither. Thus it's "oughts" are instrumental "oughts" --- one "ought" to do X because doing X will improve someone's welfare; one ought not do Y because doing Y will reduce someone's welfare. Both of which outcomes are, in most cases, empirically determinable (in the instrumental sense "you ought to do X" simply means that doing X will further a given goal, e.g, "If one wishes to drive a nail one ought to get a hammer").
Some have argued that because what should count as well-being or welfare, like what counts as a "good life," is inherently subjective, so will be any rules proffered for achieving it. But while welfare or well-being is indeed idiosyncratic and subjective, what any agent
counts as contributing to or detracting from his well-being is quite objective --- we can determine that by observing his behavior. We can see how he invests his time, efforts, money; what goods he seeks to acquire, what goals he pursues, and what evils he seeks to avoid. So we take Alfie's welfare to consist in satisfying whatever interests he has, as revealed by his actions.
I've elsewhere analogized the rules of a public morality to a set of traffic rules. The aim of the latter is to enable all users of the highway system to get where they wish to go, as quickly and safely as possible. They don't presume to set anyone's destinations, itineraries, or routes; they are indifferent to the purposes of the travel. They only constrain actions by drivers which interfere with others' travel or increase their risks.
So that's the gist of it.