Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Sculptor1]

As all such claims must be.

That is a dogmatic statement, itself unfounded.

No it is a rejection of the sort of foolish dogmatism that is characteristic of people claiming that morality is objective, which it so clearly cannot be.

[Terrapin Station]

I don't know what "absolutely" means in this context. A proposition is true if its truth conditions are confirmable in the current context. It is objective if those truth conditions are publicly confirmable or disconfirmable.

You are conflating true and objective; this is the cause of much anguish and is most usually exactly why people argue.

He's also confusing mind-independent objects, processes etc. that are considered in confirming something with the idea of the confirmation being public. He's basically using "objective" re propositions to refer to propositions about objective things, which is another confusion. The proposition itself isn't objective. And the confirmation (or judgment as to whether it's true) isn't objective. I've explained all of this to him a number of times now, but it's never going to stick.

[Terrapin Station]

Well, and moral utterances aren't propositions in the first place, even, because moral utterances can't be true or false.

"It is wrong to murder" isn't the sort of thing that can be true or false. It's noncognitive.

Propositions are sentences that can be true or false. So moral utterances are not propositions.

[Sculptor1]

Well, and moral utterances aren't propositions in the first place, even, because moral utterances can't be true or false.

"It is wrong to murder" isn't the sort of thing that can be true or false. It's noncognitive.

Propositions are sentences that can be true or false. So moral utterances are not propositions.

Well, since murder can be defined as wrong killing, then it is ipso facto wrong to murder. The big question is then, when you kill someone, does it constitute murder of something else, say, assassination or justifiable killing such as euthanasia, or self defence.
This does not necessarily invalidate your thinking, but clarifies what "it is wrong to murder" means - its not a moral statement, just a definition.

[Terrapin Station]

Well, and moral utterances aren't propositions in the first place, even, because moral utterances can't be true or false.

"It is wrong to murder" isn't the sort of thing that can be true or false. It's noncognitive.

Propositions are sentences that can be true or false. So moral utterances are not propositions.

Well, since murder can be defined as wrong killing, then it is ipso facto wrong to murder. The big question is then, when you kill someone, does it constitute murder of something else, say, assassination or justifiable killing such as euthanasia, or self defence.
This does not necessarily invalidate your thinking, but clarifies what "it is wrong to murder" means - its not a moral statement, just a definition.

Murder is conventionally defined as illegal killing, not immoral. But even if defined as immoral killed, that wouldn't make it true that murder is immoral. It would make it true that people have decided to define murder as immoral killing, but that's different than saying that "It's true that murder is immoral killing." The latter has a broader scope, where it wouldn't hinge on conventions. (Especially since conventions aren't true in the first place simply by virtue of being conventions. It's only true that they're a convention where/when they are.)

[Sculptor1]

Well, since murder can be defined as wrong killing, then it is ipso facto wrong to murder. The big question is then, when you kill someone, does it constitute murder of something else, say, assassination or justifiable killing such as euthanasia, or self defence.
This does not necessarily invalidate your thinking, but clarifies what "it is wrong to murder" means - its not a moral statement, just a definition.

Murder is conventionally defined as illegal killing, not immoral.

No. It is seen as immoral. Breaking the law is seen as immoral, and so is then is murder.

But even if defined as immoral killed, that wouldn't make it true that murder is immoral. It would make it true that people have decided to define murder as immoral killing, but that's different than saying that "It's true that murder is immoral killing." The latter has a broader scope, where it wouldn't hinge on conventions. (Especially since conventions aren't true in the first place simply by virtue of being conventions. It's only true that they're a convention where/when they are.)

Eh?

[GE Morton]

That is a dogmatic statement, itself unfounded.

No it is a rejection of the sort of foolish dogmatism that is characteristic of people claiming that morality is objective, which it so clearly cannot be.

A dogmatic statement is one unsupported by evidence or argument, such as your "As all such claims must be." My claim that morality can be objective, on the other hand, has been supported by extensive argument. You might wish to read the back thread and rebut those arguments.

[GE Morton]

I don't know what "absolutely" means in this context. A proposition is true if its truth conditions are confirmable in the current context. It is objective if those truth conditions are publicly confirmable or disconfirmable.

You are conflating true and objective; this is the cause of much anguish and is most usually exactly why people argue.

Er, no. Both terms are clearly defined above. Those definitions are not the same, and so the terms are not "conflated."

[GE Morton]

We don't know or care what they're thinking about, or what their intentions are. But we can observe what they do. That is all we need to form an association between a word, "rock," and a rocks.

"Our attention" is a matter of thinking about something, and insofar as reference goes, it's a matter of thinking about it in an intentional (an "aboutness") way. The word "rock" on its own, as text, or a sound, etc. does nothing.

And you can't observe anyone else's thinking.

You are shuffling between subjects, TP, between the person pointing and the observer. Yes, when WE, the observers, attend to something or form an association between a word and a thing, some thinking, a mental activity, is occurring (of which we have first-hand knowledge). Some such activity is presumably also occurring in the person doing the pointing. We have no knowledge of that, but we don't need to know anything about that to see at what he is pointing and form our own association between the word he utters and the thing to which he points. I.e., we don't need to know anything about any one else's mental processes --- thoughts, intentions, etc. --- to learn the meanings of words.

[GE Morton]

He's also confusing mind-independent objects, processes etc. that are considered in confirming something with the idea of the confirmation being public.

Er, no. Confirmations are not "public." A proposition is confirmable if any suitably situated observer can observe the state of affairs asserted by the proposition. That observation, confirmation, is a private event, for each observer.

He's basically using "objective" re propositions to refer to propositions about objective things, which is another confusion.

The confusion is yours. "Things" are not "objective" (or subjective). Propositions are. You're mis-using the term.

The proposition itself isn't objective. And the confirmation (or judgment as to whether it's true) isn't objective.

LOL. You're now asserting that no propositions are objective, and all judgments of whether a proposition is true are subjective? The word "objective" has no application, no meaning?

You just wander from one reductio ad absurdum to the next, TP.

[GE Morton]

Well, and moral utterances aren't propositions in the first place, even, because moral utterances can't be true or false.

Ah, following in Sculptor's footsteps with dogmatic assertions, eh?

Propositions are sentences that can be true or false. So moral utterances are not propositions.

Wrong again. Propositions are statements which assert some state of affairs. They may be true, false, or undecidable. One reason why they may be undecidable is because some of the terms are undefined, or not defined clearly enough to convey what the truth conditions for the proposition are. A proposition is non-cognitive when its truth conditions are unclear --- i.e., we can't tell what must be done to confirm or disconfirm it.

[Terrapin Station]

Ah, following in Sculptor's footsteps with dogmatic assertions, eh?

They cant be true or false because there's nothing to match or fail to match. Nothing to get right or wrong in terms of correspondence between a proposition and a state of affairs.

Wrong again. Propositions are statements which assert some state of affairs. They may be true, false, or undecidable.

lol--that you don't know whether a proposition is true or false has nothing to do with the fact that they're sentences which CAN BE true or false.

If you want to learn something, here are some statements of the conventional definition:

https://www.math.fsu.edu/~pkirby/mad210 ... w/s2_1.pdf
https://www.cs.odu.edu/~toida/nerzic/co ... ition.html
http://faculty.uncfsu.edu/jyoung/claims.htm

I can give you hundreds more.

Not that you'll ever actually learn anything. We'll just keep telling you the same stuff over and over here.

[Sculptor1]

No it is a rejection of the sort of foolish dogmatism that is characteristic of people claiming that morality is objective, which it so clearly cannot be.

A dogmatic statement is one unsupported by evidence or argument, such as your "As all such claims must be." My claim that morality can be objective, on the other hand, has been supported by extensive argument. You might wish to read the back thread and rebut those arguments.

Pure projection.

[Sculptor1]

You are conflating true and objective; this is the cause of much anguish and is most usually exactly why people argue.

Er, no. Both terms are clearly defined above. Those definitions are not the same, and so the terms are not "conflated."

Your so called "supported argument" has been wrung out, stipped apart and hung up to dry. And just one of the tools used, amongst others, is the reflection that you are incapable of making the most basic distinction such as the one I pointed out here.
A statement can only be relatively objective, not absolutely so. THink about it, embrace it and come back when you know what the word "absolute" means.

[Sy Borg]

Ninety-nine pages will do for this one.