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[value]

William James: "Truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it. The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons."

I see that what Mr. James believes that his opinion on what truth is applies only on himself and not necessarily on anyone else, otherwise that would make his proposition objectively true, defeating the notion that philosophy is subjective. Do you agree with him?

It is the concept good that makes his statement special. It is an example of how philosophy is capable of transcending the declaration of objectivity.

Good (in itself) cannot be objectively determined, otherwise it wouldn't be good. In the same time, philosophy, by its fundamental nature, makes the applicability of good self-evident, otherwise philosophy or science wouldn't be possible.

[Mercury]

I'm trying to come to terms with an argument I've been having with a friend of mine.

I take the position that science is fundamentally objective. I don't think that scientists themselves are necessarily objective, but that science as a whole is objective. I also don't think that science necessarily arrives at the absolute truth, if such a term has any meaning at all. I make the claim, though, that science can reach objective truth.

My friend takes a different position. He claims that science cannot be objective as there is always inherent bias. He thinks that science is at least to some degree subjective, that science isn't done in a vacuum so to speak, it's done by people -- people who are laden with social, political, and economic baggage -- and that science is done within an historical context.

I've been trying to read up on each side of this debate and it seems quite involved.

Can anyone suggest some good arguments from both sides? I want to do this as "objectively" as I can.

Could you also suggest some names of people to read, or of the various movements that have grown up on either side of this debate. I'm familiar only with Foucault who said something akin to "all knowledge is power." Anything helpful would be great.

Descartes doubts the existence of an external world; the objective world. He employs a method of radical scepticism, doubting everything that can be doubted. But why? It's unreasonable to discard the world on a whim, to count as nothing the evidence of the senses, to disbelieve even that your own physical body exists - in order to discover, it is indisputable that 'I think...therefore I am!'

Okay, but so what? You cannot know anything else! You've painted yourself into a corner - called solipsism. What now?

Assuming the world exists is all science need do to qualify as 'objective' in Descartes terms. Conflating objectivity with some idea of absolute truth is a misconception. This idea of objectivity you aspire to, is defined from a subjective standpoint - a standpoint only achieved by a method of radical skepticism underlying the concept of subjectivity. So what you're actually doing, when making these demands upon science is not subjectivism per se - but radical skepticism. You hold science to a false expectation that can never be satisfied!

[Count Lucanor]

William James: "Truth is one species of good, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it. The true is the name of whatever proves itself to be good in the way of belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable reasons."

I see that what Mr. James believes that his opinion on what truth is applies only on himself and not necessarily on anyone else, otherwise that would make his proposition objectively true, defeating the notion that philosophy is subjective. Do you agree with him?

It is the concept good that makes his statement special. It is an example of how philosophy is capable of transcending the declaration of objectivity.

Good (in itself) cannot be objectively determined, otherwise it wouldn't be good. In the same time, philosophy, by its fundamental nature, makes the applicability of good self-evident, otherwise philosophy or science wouldn't be possible.

All of these statements are philosophical statements attempting to justify those concepts as necessarily true for everyone, not just the person who holds such beliefs. It is therefore an attempt to make them objective, defeating the proposition right where it started. If good in itself cannot be objectively determined, then your ‘good’ is only good for you, and it stays within you. The rest would have nothing to do with it, so why should we care? The funny thing is that you cannot answer: “…because it is good for you”, since you just confessed you cannot determine that.

[value]

The idea that when an aspect isn't subjective, it must be objective, is a fallacy.

Philosophy can make a case for "the why of existence (e.g. 'the philosophical God', Schopenhauer's Will or Robert Pirsig's Quality) and that means that philosophy can transcend objectivity without losing touch with an aspect that is fundamental to reality. That ability does not spring from existence itself, but from something that is more fundamental than existence itself, and that means that the potential for philosophy is evidence for applicability of a good that is not subjective, and neither objective.

To give an example of philosophy's special transcendental ability:

Robert Pirsig argued that his concept Quality cannot be objectively determined by science and transcends the traditional subjective/objective dichotomy. Pirsig believed that Quality is the fundamental force in the Universe.

Gottfried Leibniz his Monadology is based on ancient Greek cosmic philosophy and does the same. Nietzsche did the same with his Will to Power of which he argued that it is a fundamental force that underlays the Universe.

Are those philosophical cases subjective or objective? One might find plausibility in their reasoning, but all one would have is their words, and the utility that one intends to derive from such philosophical reason, resides in the scope of the moral 'ought', which is relative to an undetermined, and thus in-objective, future.

Does it render philosophy fundamentally meaningless, or ...?

Philosophers themselves might not always be on the frontier of the purpose of their own work, and fall victim to self-deception. When purpose would be fulfilled beforehand intellectually, what purpose would be left? To even start philosophising about the fundamental nature of reality, one might say that one could be required to fool one's self of the need, as it were.

The wise is silent, is a common wisdom. Wittgenstein concluded ""Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent". Heidegger called it the Nothing.

User thrasymachus provided the following beautiful insight:

I think Jean luc Marion is right regarding what is "there" that defies assimilation into the representative "totality" (Levinas borrows this from Heidegger) that holds a grip on our existence implicitly, with every spontaneous thought of engagement. Marion asks, what is there, then, that is there, that "overflows"--there is a thesis here, constructed by Sartre, see his Nausea and the Chestnut tree, that tries to illustrate this "radical contingency" of existence-- representation? Wittgenstein calls for silence. So does Heidegger. Marion writes:

... in passing from Wittgenstein to Heidegger, in speaking from the starting point of philosophy (or almost) and not from that of logic (or almost): “Someone who has experienced theology in his own roots, both the theology of the Christian faith and that of philosophy, would today rather remain silent about God [von Gott zu schweigen] when he is speaking in the realm of thinking.”

This is a major argument in this French theological turn, so called. It plays off of Husserl's epoche, which reduces the world to it pure presence(s). The "realm of thinking" does not permit this. The question is, what does this Wittgenstienian "silence" (Heidegger called it the Nothing and the anxiety of taking thought to its death, its terminal point of meaningful application) actually "say"? What is intimated at this precipice of "authenticity" in which one has ascended, in the reduction (epoche) to a great height where all that is average and familiar has fallen away?

This philosophical reasoning transcends objectivity, or in Robert Pirsig his words, transcends the subjective/objective dichotomy.

A user on this forum that might be a pseudonym of Robert Pirsig, author of the most sold philosophy book ever, said the following:

I think there are serious problems with the whole... subjective/objective idea. It does not allow for a wide enough range of possibility, it is an either or system. It shouldn't be a either or system.

[popeye1945]

We cannot know if there is an objective physical world out there, our world is entirely subjective. The physical world as its energies alter our biological natures, our biological consciousness, we project our experiences/meanings onto the outside. Our everyday reality/apparent reality, is a biological readout of these alterations as experiences/meanings. The fact that we so quickly forget our own projections onto an otherwise meaningless world gives us the belief that apparent reality is the ultimate reality. Science is subjective, as all things are, one can never escape one's subjectivity. All meaning is subjective, so how could science be anything else? All experiences, all knowledge, all meanings are the property of a subjective consciousness which then bestows those aspects upon a meaningless world.

[Lagayascienza]

It is, I think, unquestionably true that all we have to go on are phenomena as they present to our consciousness, and the inferences we can draw therefrom.. Whether we are looking through a telescope or down a microscope or at a dataset from the LHC, all we have are phenomena that are given in consciousness. Those scientists who are honest admit this. We cannot even prove that the axioms underpinning mathematics, so fundamental to science, are true. I tend towards a mind-independent materialism myself, but there is no denying that Idealism is still a live option. That is because, as limited beings, we have no way of seeing the full picture, we cannot see the whole show from outside our own consciousness wherein phenomena are experienced. There is no view from nowhere. Maybe, when/if reductive materialist science explains consciousness, that will change, but we are nowhere near there yet.

[popeye1945]

Color and sound are the effects of frequencies of vibrations on the eye and eardrum. All is said to be frequencies and vibrations, or in other words energy in motion. One needs to ask oneself what makes the other frequencies and vibrations in our world of objects any different? Color and sound are biological effects, alteration to our biological nature, and objects are not? This is how we come to know the world of objects as Spinoza pointed out, not talking of energy but of substance in his time, well substance is object to our biology. Yes, to me our everyday life, our apparent reality is just that, apparent. We do not experience reality, we experience its alteration to our biological nature and project our reality experience. This which is an emergent quality involving subject and object, the object being the energies that surround us and we as subjects are the measure and meaning of all things. Subjectively of course, but that is all we know is a subjective world, where apparent reality is a biological readout of our sensations, our experiences, knowledge, and acquired meanings, we then attribute these to a meaningless world. I would be interested in how you come to the belief of a mind-independent world or independent materialism. I am all ears!

[Lagayascienza]

It's not really a belief, popeye. I just tend towards a mind-independent materialism. Mine is just a naive sort of realism based on the fact that when I stub my tow on a rock I get the feeling that the rock and my toe are real physical entities even though I admit that, if they exist at all, it is most indubitably in my consciousness. But this naive realism has stopped me from repeatedly kicking rocks and injuring myself just to assure myself that it really does hurt my toes. There's a correlation between the pain in my toes and the rock. I don't need to keep kicking that rock. And then there is the fact that reductive, materialist science seems to work. If I were a fully-fledged Idealist I would find it hard to account for the efficacy of science which allows as to instantly communicate even though we are half a world away. I'm not saying Idealists can't believe in science. And I do acknowledge that because of the problems mentioned in my post above, I cannot know that Idealism is not true. And I would say that those who would dismiss Idealism out of hand have not really understood it. Consciousness seems to be foundational and I cannot imagine that will change unless/until reductive materialist science can explain consciousness.

[Mercury]

I disagree. We do not have only mental representations to go on. One reality is implied by another, and the grand scheme of objective realities overall. I didn't experience the invention of penicillin say, or the agricultural revolution - but I am able to tell them apart from, say flat earth theory, or Star Trek, because the former are consistent with other objective realities, and fit within the grand scheme of objective realities. I do not need to have direct experience of an objective reality to know it exists in a world external to my mental representations. And in the sense of Zaphod in the total perspective vortex, I can infer the existence of an objective reality from the grain of sand that is the I, in 'I think therefore I am.'

[popeye1945]

You and the rock is what is called relativity. Naive realism just states things are just what they seem to be, if that were true there would be no need for the discipline of science. Idealism, at least my interpretation thereof, does not deny the rock or my foot, it's just that both are not quite what they seem. Obviously, energy forms relate to one another, though conscious biology is the only form we know of that is cognizant of the energy forms around them, in the form of a world of objects. As I said, we do not experience ultimate reality but that of apparent reality, and that is a biological readout of the alterations affected by the energies around us. As old Albert said, "Reality is an illusion, be it a persistent one." Besides it is much more interesting than the concept of dead matter not doing much of anything. Of course, Einstein did say that he believed the moon was there even when he wasn't observing it. I believe there is an energy there which to us is the moon and is an object to us.

[Lagayascienza]

Yes, Transcendental Idealism[/] does not deny the existence of material objects. it just says that we do not experience them as they are in themselves. That may be true. All we have are phenomena as they are given in consciousness and the inferences we can make therefrom. I leave the door slightly open for Idealism but my naive realism works for every day purposes.

[Sy Borg]

Yes, Transcendental Idealism[/] does not deny the existence of material objects. it just says that we do not experience them as they are in themselves. That may be true. All we have are phenomena as they are given in consciousness and the inferences we can make therefrom. I leave the door slightly open for Idealism but my naive realism works for every day purposes.

Generally, my impression is that idealists place greater importance on epistemology than ontology. By contrast, science works around epistemological challenges to be closer to the ontic reality.

I figured that rational idealists only treat the ontic as illusory insofar as our impressions of ontic reality can probably never be entirely accurate due to our simian limits, and perhaps intrinsic limits to how consciousness and environment interact.

[Count Lucanor]

The idea that when an aspect isn't subjective, it must be objective, is a fallacy.

For the blood of Christ, the “grey area” fallacy, again!!! Now, you tell me, what is called something that is neither objective nor subjective? Your statement has to be something, it has to have some relation with objectivity. I mean, why is it not a fallacy that if something isn’t objective, it must be subjective?

Philosophy can make a case for "the why of existence (e.g. 'the philosophical God', Schopenhauer's Will or Robert Pirsig's Quality) and that means that philosophy can transcend objectivity without losing touch with an aspect that is fundamental to reality.

A case for the why doesn’t make a good case for the what, it merely presupposes it. I can make the case that the Flying Spaghetti Monster and the Flying Teapot are the deities more worthy of worship, but that says nothing of what is fundamental to reality, not even of why they are fundamental to reality.

That ability does not spring from existence itself, but from something that is more fundamental than existence itself, and that means that the potential for philosophy is evidence for applicability of a good that is not subjective, and neither objective.

You cannot put “evidence” and “not objective” in the same sentence. It’s pure incoherence.

To give an example of philosophy's special transcendental ability:

Robert Pirsig argued that his concept Quality cannot be objectively determined by science and transcends the traditional subjective/objective dichotomy. Pirsig believed that Quality is the fundamental force in the Universe.

He could have said my uncle’s prostate is the source of all wisdom in the universe. So what? It’s still nonsense and it is still more nonsense that the statement transcends anything. This stuff is what makes Idealism insufferable.

[Count Lucanor]

We cannot know if there is an objective physical world out there, our world is entirely subjective.

You mean your subjective world is the only thing you believe
you can know that there is. Does that mean that it is the only thing that there is, in other words, that solipsism is true? Or do you mean by “our world” that there is a subjective world out there? If that can mean something.

[Lagayascienza]

People sometimes try to make Idealism do more work than it is capable of doing. But by doing so, they needlessly call into question an otherwise defensible philosophical position. Idealists don't need to play on the subjective/objective dichotomy or hitch their star to Chopra's "quantum consciousness" and other such "New Age" nonsense. That just puts Idealism in a bad light. In terms of figuring out how the universe works, science is the best we can do. It leaves a door slightly open for idealism. Calling sound science into question and proposing outlandish hypotheses won't open that door any wider. Idealists must make their case on the fact that it provides philosophically plausible answers to questions that science currently cannot answer and which may turn out to be unanswerable by the scientific method as currently conceived. That is the best Idealism can hope for. Whether that is enough to save Idealism, well, time will tell.