Lagayscienza wrote
Can I ask exactly what you mean when you say that causality is in no way epistemic? I'm not sure, but I take it to mean that the way we find out about stuff has no bearing on what stuff actually is. I can see this may be true, up to a point. I mean, I can look at the cup, pick it up etc, be aware of its colour, shape, weight, and learn all I can about it in that way, yet not have any idea of its history or about all the atoms and subatomic particles of which it is made. But I can delve deeper. I could find out about its history, and with technology get a better physical understanding of it. Are you saying that if I were to learn the history of this cup, an all I can from my senses (and technological extensions thereof) about the cup, and that even if I could zoom down to the indivisible subatomic particles and fields from which the cup is made and could even know its wave function, that there would still be something important to know about the cup? If so, would you explain what that might be?
I suppose I don't really disagree with what Cheybrain wrote, only I keep the matter closer to the original intuition: I get the question from Rorty, in an interview he did, when he flatly said, I don't see how anything out there could get in here. Why is this statement so powerful? The long anser is, take a look at a pragmatist's theory of knowledge: what is known is simply what works! So when you say, there is a cat! we make the analytic move away from the cat-thing over there, and toward the relation between me and the cat. This is expressed in what is essentially the scientific method, the simple conditional statement expressed in a forward looking equation, as in, If I encounter an object of such and such appearance, THEN it is a cat. What is nitro glycerin?: IF it impacts a surface at a certain velocity, THEN is will explode; and you can add all the technical details you like, but the point is that the object before you is a temporal entity,
an event, and nitro is really "nitroING" when I see it and use it, and though this is the essence of the scientific method, it is certainly not the scientist's world (Neil DeGrasse Tyson's). This is Heraclitus' world.
One can look up the hypothetical deductive method which describes this. One does not go into setting in which nitro glycerin is in play (as Derrida put it) without already knowing about what to expect, and this expectation IS the knowledge of the nitro! That is the point. To know is not about some object over there, rather, the over thereness and everything else is part of an anticipatory temporal structure that that is essentially of this IF....THEN...anticipation of what will happen in various approaches and pov's. Reality is a forward looking body of possible events. There simply is NO talk about the object independent of the pragmatic knowing, and so no dualism at the level of ontology. No dualism, no mind/body. All there is, is reduced to a time dynamic. Subjective time, which goes back to Augustine's Confessions, through Kant and his Transcendental Aesthetic, and then the whole tradition.
Anyway, that is the long way to go, and it is as long as one has the time to sit and read. The easy route, and most effective, for me, is simple as can be: first ask how I know the cat is on the couch, and the typical answer can be that I see the cat there, and this moves to an account of the electromagnetic spectrum, how some wavelengths are absorbed while others reflected, and how the totality of these that reach the eye are brought into a matrix of neuronal systems which create an image of what is out there, and this is coupled with other systems that construct the cognition for recognition, a nd so on, and most think this sort of thing is adequate for understanding that there is a cat there. And they are right, if one is to stay in the sane and stable world of science. But if philosophy is asking the question, one has to explain how, that out there is in even the remotest way the neuronal manifestation. And if the game turns to some physicalist view of brains and res extensa things in the world, then it gets much, much worse. For now the question is, how is it that these neuronal systems "are" the very thoughts I am thinking to conceive of them as neuronal systems? Why doesn't the entire worlds collapse into this impossible reduction? You know, it does!
This actually gets very interesting. Rorty revels in this. For now we face the analytic philosopher's premise that the reason we have to think as the scienctist and naturalist does, and affirm some kind of physicalism, materialism (differences here hardly matter) is that this is the only wheel that rolls. This is all.
But they have made not one scintilla of progress to explaining how anything out there gets in here. Causality, any model you can imagine, does not deliver my cat into the brain thing, and they are entirely and irrevocably separate. I like Rorty on this: I no more know this cat is on the couch than an offending guard rail knows the dent in my fender! Causality has absolutely nothing epistemic about it.
This si why phenomenology is the only recourse in basic question like this.