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GE Morton wrote: ↑November 12th, 2022, 2:06 pmThe denoted ability is a philosophical ability.value wrote: ↑November 11th, 2022, 7:20 pmIn ontological realism the assumption is made that the quality 'be definite/determinate' (i.e. that it exists) is able to be denoted meaningfully which means that one is obligated to explain the origin of that ability.Biochemistry and organic evolution explain that ability pretty well.
GE Morton wrote: ↑November 12th, 2022, 2:06 pmIt is correct that good and value denote relations and what is argued is that those concepts are applicable - philosophically - to any relation in general (any pattern in the cosmos).It is nonsensical to presuppose that an external world would stand meaningless and independent from a mind that is to 'find' meaning in that world.It will be "meaningless" is there are no sentient creatures to whom it has meaning. "Meaning," like "good," and "value" are relative terms --- they denote relations between some thing and some sentient creature. There is nothing "nonsensical" about a universe which harbors no sentient creatures. In such a universe "good," "value," "meaning," etc. would have no application; they'd denote nothing.
GE Morton wrote: ↑November 12th, 2022, 2:06 pmWe assume there to be an external world, postulate one, in order to supply a cause for the experiences we have, for our own existence. Though we have no direct knowledge of that world (only the indirect knowledge we gain via sensory experiences), we construct a conceptual model of that world. We consider that model to be the "real world" as long as it enables us to predict, modify and manipulate future experiences.How can it be said that that external world exists intrinsically and causally produces mind (experience)?
GE Morton wrote: ↑November 12th, 2022, 2:06 pmConsidering that experience is to be causally produced by the external world that would make no difference.With 'reality' I meant 'the external world' that supposedly posseses the nature intrinsic existence without mind."Reality" (per common usages of "real") embraces both the phenomena of experience AND the postulated external world.
GE Morton wrote: ↑November 12th, 2022, 2:06 pmAgain, "meaning" and "value" are relative terms, which relate things to persons (or other sentient creatures). And, no, "anything that can be seen" is not "value." That is a misuse of that term. Anything may HAVE value to some person or other, but without the valuer there is no "value."The idea is that for there to be a relation of any kind - a pattern - it implies value that indeed requires a valuer which therefore must be a priori to the cosmos. That valuer cannot be valued itself since that would be absurd.
GE Morton wrote: ↑November 12th, 2022, 2:06 pmThat reasoning is a fallacy. At question would be how a philosophical 'option' (magically always existed or magically have sprung into existence) is possible in the first place. It is then seen that for any option to be possible an aspect is required that is not of a nature that allows a choice.The idea that value (e.g. an intrinsic existing external world) can be the origin of itself is absurd.There is no need for it to have an origin. It may well be eternal:
"Something cannot come from nothing. Therefore something has always existed."
---Robert Nozick (which argument he attributes to his 9-year old daughter)
Terrapin Station wrote: ↑April 28th, 2021, 5:01 pmFor any given initial existent, either it "spontaneously appeared" or it always existed. Those are the only two options, and they're both counterintuitive. Nevertheless, there's no other choice.Do you agree with TP that there would be just two options to 'choose' from? If so, how would that reasoning potentially explain that choice?
Logical options. Either we're exhausting the logical possibilities or we're not. Again, if you can think of a third option, that's great, but you'd need to present what the third option would be.
GE Morton wrote: ↑November 12th, 2022, 2:06 pmThe denoted 'a priori meaning' does not 'exist' since it precedes existence (i.e. the external world).You do not agree with my use of the term meaning. The basis is the idea that meaning is only applicable from within a subjective perspective relative to an intrinsic existing external world.Meanings, of the external world, or things in it, or of anything else, are indeed subjective (different things will have different meanings to different people). What I denied above are "a priori meanings," which you seem to be using to denote a "meaning" which exists in the absence of any sentient creatures.
GE Morton wrote: ↑November 12th, 2022, 2:06 pmAnything in the cosmos is meaningfully relevant and requires a value-explanation. It is the 'why' question of the cosmos.My primary argument has been that the idea of value - all of which it can be said to exist or to be empirically evident - to fundamentally be the origin of itself is absurd. Value requires the assignment of meaning (signification) and without that an 'external world' cannot be meaningfully relevant.Well, that argument is simply a non sequitur. The term "value" does not denote "all of which it can be said to exist or to be empirically evident." It denotes a relation between something and some valuer. That something X exists does not entail that it has any value, and it will have none unless some valuer assigns one to it. And there certainly need not be a valuer to assign a value to some X in order for X to exist.
Therefore there must be a 'meaning' that is relevant a priori to existence.
Dlaw wrote: ↑November 26th, 2022, 10:55 pm Am I wrong in thinking that the Universe can be locally "unreal" or uncertain at the micro level but perfectly factual at the macro level? Just because an apple can't be "red" without our perceiving it has no effect on the apple. Likewise, just because physicists perceive a collider result statistically doesn't mean it's true. It might mean it's predictive but that might be baked in to the observation process.Perhaps it depends the type of certainty that one aspires. Fundamental certainty or 'determinism' might not be valid while within a complex of meaningful relations one can retro-perspectively find a level of certainty with 'the facts of science' (repeatability) being an example.
value wrote: ↑November 28th, 2022, 2:05 pmI'm sorry. What is a "philosophical ability"? Whatever it may be, all human (and other animal) abilities are adequately explained via biochemistry and evolution.GE Morton wrote: ↑November 12th, 2022, 2:06 pmThe denoted ability is a philosophical ability.value wrote: ↑November 11th, 2022, 7:20 pmIn ontological realism the assumption is made that the quality 'be definite/determinate' (i.e. that it exists) is able to be denoted meaningfully which means that one is obligated to explain the origin of that ability.Biochemistry and organic evolution explain that ability pretty well.
In ontological realism one poses that an external world exists intrinsically without mind. You confirmed to have a similar belief (as part of physicalism) with the following statement as quoted in the OP:Sorry, but that is circular, and thus meaningless. It seems to amount to, "The ability to conjure up an external world is directly derived from the idea of an external world." I.e., that "idea" is derived from itself. Which is nonsensical.
'Explaining the existence of the "sensory facility per se" is precisely the purpose of "physicalist theory." It postulates an external world with mechanisms for producing conscious creatures. And it does a pretty good job of it.'
It would be invalid to pose that conscious creatures would conjure up the intrinsic existing quality of the external world subjectively because the ability to meaningfully denote anything at all is directly derived from the idea 'intrinsic existence without mind'.
Well, no they're not. They are only applicable to particular relations between sentient creatures and various other things, namely, things some sentient creature finds desirable or worth pursuing or protecting. The terms are not applicable to "patterns" not desired or even noticed by some sentient creature.GE Morton wrote: ↑November 12th, 2022, 2:06 pmIt is correct that good and value denote relations and what is argued is that those concepts are applicable - philosophically - to any relation in general (any pattern in the cosmos).
It will be "meaningless" is there are no sentient creatures to whom it has meaning. "Meaning," like "good," and "value" are relative terms --- they denote relations between some thing and some sentient creature. There is nothing "nonsensical" about a universe which harbors no sentient creatures. In such a universe "good," "value," "meaning," etc. would have no application; they'd denote nothing.
Good is a relation that involves an unforeseen future. Good precedes value as a concept that refers to the aspect that makes value possible (the origin of existence turned around as the purpose or 'goal' of existence would be 'good').Exactly wrong. "Good" is a pseudo-property applied by sentient creatures to things they desire, to which they assign some value, or of which they approve. It is not a real property of anything. Nor does it exist in the absence of valuer who applies it to something. Calling something "good" is merely placing a personal "stamp of approval" upon it. What stamps of approval are applied to which things are entirely subjective and idiosyncratic, varying from person to person. Nor does "good" involve any "unforeseen future." Normally one "stamps" something "good" just because he foresees deriving some benefit or satisfaction from it.
Value would denote anything of empirical nature - anything that can be 'seen' in the world - as a simple term to denote 'beholder of a meaningful relation'.Also incorrect. Many things may have "meaningful relations" with someone without being deemed valuable by them. "Value" denotes a particular relation between a person and thing, namely, the relation of the thing being desired or sought by the person.
How can it be said that that external world exists intrinsically and causally produces mind (experience)?I'm not sure what you mean by "exists intrinsically," but an external world is postulated to exist prior to and independently from minds. How that external world produces minds is explained by the laws of physics, biochemistry, and neurophysiology. Minds are products of physical processes.
The idea is that for there to be a relation of any kind - a pattern - it implies value that indeed requires a valuer which therefore must be a priori to the cosmos. That valuer cannot be valued itself since that would be absurd.No, it doesn't. "For there to be a relation of any kind - a pattern - it implies value" is simply false. There are all kinds of relations that have nothing to do with value. Value is a particular relation between a person (or other sentient creature) and a particular thing, as described above.
Valuing is signification - the act of assigning meaning.No, it isn't. You're inventing your own definition of that term. Nor are all things someone deems "meaningful" also deemed "valuable" by him. To be deemed valuable the thing must be desirable to someone, not merely meaningful. Things can be "meaningful" for all kinds of reasons.
Not sure to what "philosophical option" you refer. What is postulated to exist is some sort of external world, not any "philosophical option." Nor is any "magic" required to explain an eternal universe. Eternal entities require NO explanation; only things with definite beginnings or ends do.GE Morton wrote: ↑November 12th, 2022, 2:06 pmThat reasoning is a fallacy. At question would be how a philosophical 'option' (magically always existed or magically have sprung into existence) is possible in the first place. It is then seen that for any option to be possible an aspect is required that is not of a nature that allows a choice.
"Something cannot come from nothing. Therefore something has always existed."
---Robert Nozick (which argument he attributes to his 9-year old daughter)
Yes, I agree (in substance, though it isn't true for "any existent." Most existents have causal explanations). Do you mean "explain the absence of other choices"? If so, it is our inability to conceive any further options. As TP says, if you have one, please set it forth.Terrapin Station wrote: ↑April 28th, 2021, 5:01 pmFor any given initial existent, either it "spontaneously appeared" or it always existed. Those are the only two options, and they're both counterintuitive. Nevertheless, there's no other choice.Do you agree with TP that there would be just two options to 'choose' from? If so, how would that reasoning potentially explain that choice?
Logical options. Either we're exhausting the logical possibilities or we're not. Again, if you can think of a third option, that's great, but you'd need to present what the third option would be.
"Meaningfully relevant" to whom? "Relevant" in what way?GE Morton wrote: ↑November 12th, 2022, 2:06 pmAnything in the cosmos is meaningfully relevant and requires a value-explanation. It is the 'why' question of the cosmos.
Well, that argument is simply a non sequitur. The term "value" does not denote "all of which it can be said to exist or to be empirically evident." It denotes a relation between something and some valuer. That something X exists does not entail that it has any value, and it will have none unless some valuer assigns one to it. And there certainly need not be a valuer to assign a value to some X in order for X to exist.
Why does force X have a value of Y?Good question. Why the physical constants have the values they do is an unanswerable question (this is a different meaning of "value," BTW, from that discussed above).
It turns out that, for life to be possible, the numbers in basic physics – for example, the strength of gravity, or the mass of the electron – must have values falling in a certain range. And that range is an incredibly narrow slice of all the possible values those numbers can have. It is therefore incredibly unlikely that a universe like ours would have the kind of numbers compatible with the existence of life. But, against all the odds, our Universe does.Yep. But unlikely events nonetheless occur regularly. Every time you deal a hand of Solitaire the probability of getting that particular deal is ~ 1/ 8 x 10^67 --- a number roughly equal to the number of atoms in the Milky Way galaxy. Yet it occurred. If you play another game it will occur again.
When you believe in physicalist theory and intrinsic existence without mind those values will require a causal explanation.No, they don't. Or rather, I've just given one --- improbable events nonetheless occur regularly. In an eternal, cyclic universe the number of cycles will far exceed that large number above. One in a while the right combination of physical constants will turn up.
GE Morton wrote: ↑December 2nd, 2022, 9:43 pmI'm sorry. What is a "philosophical ability"? Whatever it may be, all human (and other animal) abilities are adequately explained via biochemistry and evolution.A philosophical ability has an explorative nature. It involves a search for something 'beyond' what is already there - with already there logically implying all of which is causal in nature because what is pre-determined causally it wouldn't need to be discovered because it would fundamentally be enclosed in the event (the discovery process of the conscious explorer).
GE Morton wrote: ↑December 2nd, 2022, 9:43 pmIt is the magical belief in the form of Kant's apodictical certainty (apodiktische Gewißheit) - the belief in the realness (non-disputableness) of space and time - that you have adopted as ground for your reasoning.In ontological realism one poses that an external world exists intrinsically without mind. You confirmed to have a similar belief (as part of physicalism) with the following statement as quoted in the OP:Sorry, but that is circular, and thus meaningless. It seems to amount to, "The ability to conjure up an external world is directly derived from the idea of an external world." I.e., that "idea" is derived from itself. Which is nonsensical.
'Explaining the existence of the "sensory facility per se" is precisely the purpose of "physicalist theory." It postulates an external world with mechanisms for producing conscious creatures. And it does a pretty good job of it.'
It would be invalid to pose that conscious creatures would conjure up the intrinsic existing quality of the external world subjectively because the ability to meaningfully denote anything at all is directly derived from the idea 'intrinsic existence without mind'.
GE Morton wrote: ↑November 8th, 2022, 1:15 pmI'm basically a Kantian.Kant's self-proclaimed achievement is the second main step in his effort to answer the question: “How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” The first step was the argument offered in the Transcendental Aesthetic, to the effect that space and time are a priori forms of intuition. As such, Kant argued, they make possible judgments (propositions) whose claim to truth is justified a priori by the universal features of our intuitions. Such propositions are thus both synthetic and a priori.
value wrote: ↑December 29th, 2022, 9:00 amWhat is the "it" which you're calling a "magical belief"?GE Morton wrote: ↑December 2nd, 2022, 9:43 pmIt is the magical belief in the form of Kant's apodictical certainty (apodiktische Gewißheit) - the belief in the realness (non-disputableness) of space and time - that you have adopted as ground for your reasoning.In ontological realism one poses that an external world exists intrinsically without mind. You confirmed to have a similar belief (as part of physicalism) with the following statement as quoted in the OP:Sorry, but that is circular, and thus meaningless. It seems to amount to, "The ability to conjure up an external world is directly derived from the idea of an external world." I.e., that "idea" is derived from itself. Which is nonsensical.
'Explaining the existence of the "sensory facility per se" is precisely the purpose of "physicalist theory." It postulates an external world with mechanisms for producing conscious creatures. And it does a pretty good job of it.'
It would be invalid to pose that conscious creatures would conjure up the intrinsic existing quality of the external world subjectively because the ability to meaningfully denote anything at all is directly derived from the idea 'intrinsic existence without mind'.
Kant's self-proclaimed achievement is the second main step in his effort to answer the question: “How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?” The first step was the argument offered in the Transcendental Aesthetic, to the effect that space and time are a priori forms of intuition. As such, Kant argued, they make possible judgments (propositions) whose claim to truth is justified a priori by the universal features of our intuitions. Such propositions are thus both synthetic and a priori. Kant's definition of apodictical certainty (apodiktische Gewißheit) is the certainty of a knowledge (Erkenntnis) in connection with the consciousness of its necessity.Correct.
The idea seems to be intended solely to provide a foundation for certainty for causality. The idea followed as a reply to David Hume's criticism of causality in an attempt to save causality.No. Causality is a separate category, or "intuition," also built-in to our cognitive apparatus. Explanation of anything consists in finding causes for (observable) effects, for the phenomena of experience.
With apodictical certainty (intuition within experience) based reasoning it is seen that the intrinsic existing quality of the external world is presupposed to be meaningful before a mind supposedly existed to assign meaning to the idea.Er, no. There is no "presupposition" that a (postulated) external world is (intrinsically) "meaningful." Being "meaningful" has no application if there are no minds to whom it has meaning. "Meaning" and "meaningfulness" are relational terms, relating some thing to some person (some mind). And what does this have to do with Kant's analysis of cause and effect?
My primary argument is: how can the concept 'meaningfulness' stand independent from an observer?It can't. You are the one who has been suggesting that it is.
Perhaps it would be best to start with the question: what is the origin of the intuition that you use to base your reasoning on?The origin of all of Kant's categories is wiring patterns --- evolved innate programming --- in human and other animal brains. They are analogous to BIOS parameters in a computer operating system. (Though Kant never delved into the physical basis for those patterns).
Kant's theory of intuition is assumptuously based on the concept reason and he never went into depth about the nature of reason.Reason is the process of drawing conclusions from premises (analytic), or inferring causes from observable effects (synthetic a priori, with the a priori supplied by innate cognitive programming). What do you think Kant overlooked?
Because it is self-evident. What other "arbiter" can you imagine, or would you suggest?The first thing to note is Kant’s bold claim that reason is the arbiter of truth in all judgments—empirical as well as metaphysical. Unfortunately, he barely develops this thought, and the issue has attracted surprisingly little attention in the literature.https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-reason
I actually searched for Kant's view on (the origin of) reason myself and the reference that I noticed in the Critique of Pure Reason was that reason is 'given' by nature to serve a purpose."Thus"? You dismiss Kant's account of the source of reason (a natural faculty or ability) as inadequate, and then conclude that the "belief" that reason is the arbiter of truth is "magical"? Did you not employ reasoning there (very poor reasoning) to draw that conclusion?
Kant: "Nevertheless, reason is given to us as a practical faculty, that is, one that is meant to have an influence on the will."
Not more is said about reason and thus your Kantian 'intuition within experience' is a magical belief in my opinion which also doesn't make much sense.
In my opinion, what underlays intuition fundamentally must be beginning-less (true Infinite) of nature and that which is beginning-less of nature cannot be a foundation for the idea 'intrinsic realness' or 'certainty of space and time'.Well, what are the grounds for that opinion? What is the connection between "beginning-less of nature" (whatever that is), and intuitions (or any other cognitive or "mental" phenomena? What evidence can you offer for that connection or relationship? Is "underlays" there a euphemism for "cause"? How can we test that claim?
Quantum retrocausality provides a clue that causality and space and time are not 'really real' and that the use of an intuition about its realness is not justified.No, it doesn't. Retrocausality is just one hypothesis put forward to explain some QM phenomena, and a speculative one. But more importantly, the question of what is "really real," and the "transcendental" assumption that underlies it, is vacuous. What is "real" is whatever we experience, and whatever we postulate to explain that experience --- provided it actually does explain it --- i.e., it allows us to predict, manipulate, and control future experience. Any proffered "realities" which don't confer those abilities are vacuous and useless.
What do you think of the concept Otherwise than Being that would describe a concept that is meaningfully relevant as origin of existence and not 'nothing' in the sense of the idea of existing turned around into an opposite?I think it is just another excursion into metaphysical nonsense, of which most of metaphysics consists, with no explantory power or utility.
value wrote: ↑November 6th, 2022, 1:40 pmSlightly off-topic thing that I need to self-clarify. I believe that the external world to the brain does indeed have a role in producing consciousness "within" the brain, but so does the subjective reality of the brain (something that creates and decides the properties of the brain to exist they way they do) have as much of a role in doing so. Because if there is an "external" to begin with, then there has to be an "internal".
My experience has been that many users on this forum today are of the opinion that reality is really real and that consciousness is causally produced by 'the external world'.
value wrote: ↑November 6th, 2022, 1:40 pm My experience has been that many users on this forum today are of the opinion that reality is really real and that consciousness is causally produced by 'the external world'.That is one opinion, certainly, and it is held widely. But not by everyone, nor by everyone here.
GrayArea wrote: ↑January 20th, 2023, 10:46 pmSlightly off-topic thing that I need to self-clarify. I believe that the external world to the brain does indeed have a role in producing consciousness "within" the brain, but so does the subjective reality of the brain (something that creates and decides the properties of the brain to exist they way they do) have as much of a role in doing so. Because if there is an "external" to begin with, then there has to be an "internal".Can you please explain what you mean with 'subjective reality' and how that factor 'decides' and 'creates' the properties (quality) of the brain 'to exist'?
I apologize if I wasn't clear about this in our past discussions.
Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑January 22nd, 2023, 1:59 pmThat is one opinion, certainly, and it is held widely. But not by everyone, nor by everyone here.I have been following your posts with great interest especially considering that you seem to be a nature lover as a self-proclaimed Gaian-Daoist (if it's not just about theory for you).
Offering myself as an example, I would not be surprised to find that "reality is really real", as we know it could be so. But equally, the Objective Truth could be something quite different; we have no way of telling, and no way even to estimate the likelihood of any possible explanation.
Others have different views again.
Plato wrote:According to Plato, an individual dog, Fido, for example, since he is not 'dog as such', but only a dog, is not fully real. To be fully real, Fido would need to be the universal essence, "Dog in himself", existing in a separate world of universal Essences (subsisting forms, or Ideas).When 'kind' is applicable to mind it would justify the idea of a Universal mind.
Since Fido is merely a dog, he is not fully real; its reality is merely a participation in the reality of the universal essence. Hence, he is merely a shadow (albeit a real shadow) of the "really" Real, the separated Form, or Idea, existing in the World of Ideas.
Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑January 22nd, 2023, 1:59 pmThat is one opinion, certainly, and it is held widely. But not by everyone, nor by everyone here.
Offering myself as an example, I would not be surprised to find that "reality is really real", as we know it could be so. But equally, the Objective Truth could be something quite different; we have no way of telling, and no way even to estimate the likelihood of any possible explanation.
Others have different views again.
value wrote: ↑January 27th, 2023, 7:30 pm I have been following your posts with great interest especially considering that you seem to be a nature lover as a self-proclaimed Gaian-DaoistThank you.
value wrote: ↑January 27th, 2023, 7:30 pm (if it's not just about theory for you).Anyone who leaves their philosophy behind in the forum when they return to RL is wasting their life, IMO.
value wrote: ↑January 27th, 2023, 7:30 pm 1) What would legitimize the idea that it 'could be so' that reality is really real (which the study of the OP has indicated that it isn't)?Anything that has not been shown to be impossible is/remains a possibility, yes? That's what "legitimises" any idea, I think?
value wrote: ↑January 27th, 2023, 7:27 pmSubjective reality is the way in which any objects decide the way they react to external impulses, seen from the object's perspective.GrayArea wrote: ↑January 20th, 2023, 10:46 pmSlightly off-topic thing that I need to self-clarify. I believe that the external world to the brain does indeed have a role in producing consciousness "within" the brain, but so does the subjective reality of the brain (something that creates and decides the properties of the brain to exist they way they do) have as much of a role in doing so. Because if there is an "external" to begin with, then there has to be an "internal".Can you please explain what you mean with 'subjective reality' and how that factor 'decides' and 'creates' the properties (quality) of the brain 'to exist'?
I apologize if I wasn't clear about this in our past discussions.
Does that factor originate from the external world causally?
If so, would the mind be 100% caused by the external world?
If so, why would the mind exist?
With a 100% causal mind the observer is to perceive that which is fundamentally already known to it. The observing mind would be given a part of that which underlays itself, which is a nonsensical situation in my opinion. It would be as if an eye is placed on top of a fountain to look back at the water that is being pushed up - the eye itself being causally produced by that water. Why...?
Terrapin Station wrote: ↑January 27th, 2022, 8:45 am2) it means that all particles in the cosmos are entangled.Greta wrote: ↑April 10th, 2014, 10:02 amThere are no truly unique processes;We don't at all agree on this. Oh my view, every process, every bit of matter, every relation, and thus every property as well is truly unique. None of it is literally the same as any other process, any other bit of matter, any other relation, any other property.
That makes everything truly unique--every bit of matter, every relation, every process, every property is literally, in terms of its extramental existence, the only one of its "kind."
Considering numerically distinct things the same, or the same kind is only a mental abstraction--it's a fiction of sorts, gained by glossing over details and pretending that two or more unique things are instead two instances of just one thing.
So no. There is no property that obtains in one entity that literally also obtains in another.
GE Morton wrote: ↑December 30th, 2022, 3:40 pmDid Kant address the 'why' question of reason?Kant's theory of intuition is assumptuously based on the concept reason and he never went into depth about the nature of reason.Reason is the process of drawing conclusions from premises (analytic), or inferring causes from observable effects (synthetic a priori, with the a priori supplied by innate cognitive programming). What do you think Kant overlooked?
GE Morton wrote: ↑December 30th, 2022, 3:40 pmWhen the 'why' question of reason isn't answered, it cannot be said that reason is fundamentally the arbiter of truth.Because it is self-evident. What other "arbiter" can you imagine, or would you suggest?The first thing to note is Kant’s bold claim that reason is the arbiter of truth in all judgments—empirical as well as metaphysical. Unfortunately, he barely develops this thought, and the issue has attracted surprisingly little attention in the literature.https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/kant-reason
GE Morton wrote: ↑December 30th, 2022, 3:40 pmThe quote that reason is the arbiter of truth originated from plato.stanford.edu. I didn't argue that it was magical.I actually searched for Kant's view on (the origin of) reason myself and the reference that I noticed in the Critique of Pure Reason was that reason is 'given' by nature to serve a purpose."Thus"? You dismiss Kant's account of the source of reason (a natural faculty or ability) as inadequate, and then conclude that the "belief" that reason is the arbiter of truth is "magical"? Did you not employ reasoning there (very poor reasoning) to draw that conclusion?
Kant: "Nevertheless, reason is given to us as a practical faculty, that is, one that is meant to have an influence on the will."
Not more is said about reason and thus your Kantian 'intuition within experience' is a magical belief in my opinion which also doesn't make much sense.
Emmanuel Kant wrote:Everything in nature works according to laws. Only a rational being has a will - which is the ability to act according to the thought of laws, i.e. to act on principle.Reason is to produce an absolutely good will without qualification.
To derive actions from laws you need reason, so that's what will is - practical reason.
Emmanuel Kant wrote:If the question means 'What is there objectively, i.e. distinct from himself, that determines his will in this case?' the only possible answer is law.This would be where the magic comes in.
So we have a law the thought of which can settle the will without reference to any expected result, and must do so if the will is to be called absolutely good without qualification; what kind of law can this be? Since I have robbed the will of any impulses that could come to it from obeying any law, nothing remains to serve as a guiding principle of the will except conduct's universally conforming to law as such. That is, I ought never to act in such a way that I couldn't also will that the maxim on which I act should be a universal law.
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