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[Peter Holmes]

Not so. My 'system', as you call it, rests on the existence of features of reality that are or were the case, whose existence and nature are independent from anyone's opinion or description of them. In short, I'm a (at least methodological) realist. If you want to argue about ontology, we can certainly do so. But I assume that, if you think there's no way to distinguish between what we call facts and what we call opinions, you at least understand what the things we call facts and opinions are.

So you still haven't given any justification for your claim that facts are different from opinions. After asking you three times, the absence of an answer is disconcerting. Apparently you don't have any way to differentiate them.

I've explained that what we call facts are features of reality that are or were the case - for example, water is H2O. And opinions or beliefs are attitudes that people have - for example the opinion or belief that water is H20. So facts and opinions are two different things. If you reject that standard distinction in the use of those terms, perhaps you can explain how you use them.

I'm clear on your ontology. What's at issue here is epistemology. Your claim is that objective moral "oughts" are epistemically impossible. I say that your system has the exact same problems, and that your "facts" are epistemically impossible. Once enough opinions agree on one thing do we call it a fact? Because if that is so, then there are moral facts, too, for some moral opinions converge. Or is there some other way to differentiate an opinion from a fact? You seem to think we can't get to moral facts from moral opinions. I am wondering how we get to natural facts from natural opinions?

Epistemology (theory of knowledge) is a complete - though, for some of us, entertaining - waste of time. What we call knowledge isn't a thing of some kind that exists somewhere, somehow, and that can therefore be described. That's an ancient metaphysical delusion. Knowledge and 'knowing things' are what we say they are. How could they be anything else?

I make a sharp distinction between features of reality (facts) and what we believe and know about them. Do you think the chemical constitution of water is a matter of opinion? Do we think there can be rational disagreement about the fact that water is H2O? The impossibility of objective moral oughts has nothing to do with knowledge. It's a matter of their non-existence as features of reality.

You don't think that other people ought to believe that water has two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom? When they claim that water has three hydrogen atoms they aren't doing anything wrong? That's a strange idea.

What I think people ought to do in response to a factual assertion is irrelevant. The assertion itself has no intrinsic 'ought' component. You've made that up.

I didn't say a single word about an assertion. You say people have no obligation to believe that water is made up of H2O. I say they do. I say they ought to believe that water is made up of H2O.

The reason the obligation arises could be several: investigation, arguments from authority, accepting the common opinion, etc.

Those constitute reasons justifying the factual assertion that water is H2O. But your idea that the assertion itself implies an obligation to agree with it is simply false. Nobody is obliged to agree with any assertion, factual or non-factual. You've made that up.

So now you're admitting that it is an "ought," but claiming that it is a different kind of "ought." Yet to say that it is different because it is about a tangerine begs the question. My whole purpose in introducing the tangerine was to show that it is not different. They are both "oughts." And you deferred your opportunity to define what you mean by "ought," so my argument stands. You will have to give some reason or argument for your assertion that they are different.

Read more carefully. You imagine an ought attaches to a falsifiable factual assertion - but it doesn't. My point is that the assertion 'you ought to believe this is the case' - which contextually has a use - is completely different from the assertion 'you ought/ought not to do that'. So you've invented an implied obligation in a factual assertion, and conflated it with the obligation stated by a conventional moral assertion.

My challenge stands: what is the difference between the presumptive "ought" and the conventional moral "ought"? As noted, you are begging the question. You are giving no argument for your assertion that they are different.

Not so. I've given a clear argument for the functional difference between the falsifiable factual assertion 'this is a tangerine' and the unfalsifiable non-factual assertion (say) 'capital punishment is morally wrong'. And the evidence for the functional difference is that, given the way we use the words involved, 'this is a tangerine' is falsifiable - because, if it's an apple, the assertion is false. Whereas 'capital punishment is morally wrong' is unfalsifiable, which is why it's rationally possible to accept or reject that moral assertion. The moral rightness/wrongness of capital punishment is nothing like a tangerine. I wonder why this is so hard to grasp.

The basic inference is as follows, in a few different forms:

• If something is true, then it ought to be believed.
• If something is shown to be true, then it ought to be believed.
• If an argument is sound, then the conclusion ought to be believed (because it is true).

Obviously the claim, "This is a tangerine," is purported to be true, and therefore ought to be believed by the sister (at least as far as the brother is concerned).

Your three premises are false, or not shown to be true. Each contains an 'ought', which, obviously, begs the question as to entailment from an 'is'.{quote]

I want to focus on the third form, which is about argument and soundness. Above you claimed that truth and belief/acceptance are equivalent.

If I did say that, I apologise. Do you have the quotation?{quote]

I think they come apart a bit, and this is seen in formal arguments (but even if they don't the obligation still attaches to the conclusion). Take any argument:

• Premise 1
• Premise 2
• Conclusion

In an argument the conclusion is virtually but not formally contained in the premises. Or, the conclusion is implicitly but not explicitly contained in the premises. What an argument is actually doing is taking accepted premises and showing that they lead ineluctably to a previously unaccepted conclusion. A successful argument will make use of premises and inferential rules that are already accepted by the interlocutor (these are the "is" parts), and it will move to a conclusion that was previously rejected by the interlocutor, but that they will now be forced to accept due to the obligation placed upon them (the conclusion is the "ought" part).

This is just wrong. The conclusion of a valid and sound factual argument isn't an 'ought' in any way whatsoever. The claim that it ought to be accepted is entirely separate and unconnected.

The conclusion of a sound argument ought to be believed in virtue of its truth. For someone to accept the soundness of an argument and reject its conclusion would be for them to abandon their obligation to truth and logical consistency.

This description of deductive inference is correct. Well done. Now, please produce an example of a valid and sound argument with a factual (is) premise, or factual (is) premises, and a morally judgemental (ought) conclusion. That's all you have to do. (Whether the rest of us ought to accept the argument is an irrelevant and completely separate issue.)

No, whether "the rest of us ought to accept the argument" is precisely what is at stake, because if I give a concrete argument that need not be accepted you will immediately claim that it is not universally obligatory. This being the case, I already gave the argument, you're just uncomfortable with the level of abstraction. To repeat myself, "A successful argument will make use of premises and inferential rules that are already accepted by the interlocutor (these are the 'is' parts), and it will move to a conclusion that was previously rejected by the interlocutor, but that they will now be forced to accept due to the obligation placed upon them (the conclusion is the 'ought' part)."[/quote]
Nope, this analysis is wrong. And anyway, this supposed obligation to accept the conclusion of a valid and sound argument has nothing to do with a supposed moral obligation to do or not to do something.

Sound or obligatory arguments are always person-specific. If you are able to present an argument to your interlocutor that they believe to be sound, then they must accept the conclusion. That is, they are obliged to accept the conclusion. This is the relevance of the three conditionals I gave above. Each of them illustrate the nature of the obligatory inference. Again, the punch-line is that if you believe an argument is sound then you have an obligation to believe it.

So what's an example? What you are doing right now is an example. You are trying to convince me that morality is not objective. All you are trying to do is present an argument that I agree is sound. You are not trying to convince me that I must accept sound arguments. If we get to the end of this and I say, "Well, I accept that all of the premises of your argument are true, and I also accept that all of your inferential reasoning is valid, but I still reject your conclusion," what would you say? You certainly would not go on arguing. You might say that I am intellectually dishonest, or that I am engaging in bad faith, or that I am not a real philosopher, etc. At root I would be failing my obligation accept truth where it is found. To accept an argument as sound and to reject its conclusion is to fail one's obligation to truth, and the very fact that you are engaging with me presupposes this obligation. If you didn't think I had an obligation to accept sound arguments you would stop engaging immediately.

QED. You're free to accept or reject my argument. There's no obligation. And this is all a red herring anyway.

So we are at the hypothetical stage of my argument. I gave conditional inferences. If you admit that an argument is sound, then you are obliged to accept the conclusion. Obviously you think the hypothetical obligation is insufficient to prove my point, and hopefully you will tell us why, but are you at least willing to admit that this hypothetical obligation exists?

I may be confused - but I reject your earlier hypotheticals. And I don't see how they have anything to do with the claim of moral objectivity.

But there are two questions, and you keep shifting back and forth between them. The first question is whether there is an objective "ought." The second question is whether IOF is true. GEM was arguing against IOF, not in favor of objective obligation. Just because an "is" can be derived from an "ought" does not mean that there must be universally binding and knowable "oughts."

As I see it, the question is: are there moral facts? (Because only the existence of moral facts could make morality objective.) GEM's answer is yes, there are moral facts, because moral oughts are nothing more than instrumental deductions from goals - which is not what moral objectivists claim.

That's largely correct. Kantian moral objectivists believe that there are universally binding moral "oughts" that exist independent of desires and goals. GEM has argued that there are hypothetical instrumental "oughts" that are not universal and are dependent on desires and goals. I don't think he has claimed that there are "moral facts." Indeed, he even eschewed the adjective "moral."

As it happens, I think an ought can't entail an is, just as an is can't entail an ought. But that's a separate argument.

Sorry, that was just a typo on my part.

Ours is about whether a moral assertion (an ought) makes a falsifiable factual claim about reality. You say it does, but that knowing the answer is just a lot harder that knowing whether a claim about a tangerine is true or false. And I think your moral cognitivism is incoherent. We can never know if abortion is or isn't morally wrong - and claiming that we can is absurd - in effect, a category error.

Nothing in what you say here surprises me, but my conversations in this thread are separate. I am engaging you on exactly two points: 1) Whether your system can support scientific objectivity; and 2) Whether propositional truth involves obligation. I haven't raised the "moral" question with you at all. That is intentional given my reading of your exchanges with folks like CIN and GEM.

In our discussion the two questions happen to be converging, the the convergence isn't necessary.

Okay, stick to the existence of moral facts. Please produce one, and show why it's a fact (a feature of reality) and not a moral opinion about a feature of reality. It really is that simple. You could win the argument for moral objectivism at a stroke. Stop dodging.

Er, again, I am talking about propositional truth. That's all I've ever been talking to you about. The question of propositional truth is converging with regard to universality and IOF. I haven't engaged your "moral" argument at all, which I think is largely confused. The two issues that I have been pursuing with you will lend clarity to the "moral" question, but I have no need to beat the dead horse that GEM and CIN helped kill. We don't have to repeat that.

Oh, okay. 'Propositional truth'? Well, propositionas don't exist. They're misleading metaphysical fictions. So the expression 'propositional truth' is dead in the water, as is the expression 'propositional knowledge'. In this context, the only features of reality that have truth-value - can be true or false - are factual assertions, such as 'this is a tangerine' and 'water is H2O'. And those factual assertions have truth-value because they assert things about reality that may or may not be the case - which has nothing to do with language whatsoever.

Nothing in reality can verify or falsify an 'ought' assertion, such as a moral one, because it expresses a judgement, belief or opinion that I/people/all of us make or hold. For example, we can explain why we think people ought to be kind, but we can never show it's a fact that people ought to be kind. End of.

(Apologies for misascriptions. The quoting system here baffles me sometimes.)

[Sculptor1]

The problem here is that we live in a world replete with zero sum games, where one organism survives by killing another. And humans survive by displacing peers and by taking their stuff, directly or indirectly, as individuals and as groups.

Morality ultimately refers to rules of engagement within a group. Rules of engagement vary from species to species, nation to nation, culture to culture, even between neighbourhoods and families. There is no moral that runs across all. Not even killing and torturing.

Failing any kind of consensus, a looser approach is needed to find quasi-universal morals. There you would have the "old chestnuts":

- do not kill (x,y or z entities unless a, b or c is the case)
- do not torture (x,y or z entities unless a, b or c is the case)
- do not steal (unless you can have the theft ratified by law)
- do not destroy (x,y or z entities unless a, b or c is the case)

OR
- do kill (x,y or z entities unless a, b or c is the case)
- do torture (x,y or z entities unless a, b or c is the case)
- do steal (unless you can have the theft ratified by law)
- do destroy (x,y or z entities unless a, b or c is the case)

All of these, your list and mine apply across all cultures, yet they are opposites. It's down to cases, and cases are formed by often quite illogical and arbitrary cultural rules.


SO much for objectivity

[Gertie]

Sy Borg

The problem here is that we live in a world replete with zero sum games, where one organism survives by killing another. And humans survive by displacing peers and by taking their stuff, directly or indirectly, as individuals and as groups.

I think that's too broad, we're also a social species who also have caring and cooperative pre-dispositions. It's true we evolved to prioritise in terms of Me (my homeostasis/survival/desires), then when the social instincts evolved --> My Kin --> My Group-->The Other. But we can still feel care for strangers, and put ourselves in their shoes, as well as rationality understand the needs and concerns of others. I'm sure you do, unless you're a very convincing sociopath!

Morality ultimately refers to rules of engagement within a group. Rules of engagement vary from species to species, nation to nation, culture to culture, even between neighbourhoods and families. There is no moral that runs across all. Not even killing and torturing.

Re humans, there's been research done which does try to broadly identify how our shared/universal evolved social neurobiology plays out in different cultures, so while there are variations there are also broad similarities. There are problems trying to categorise this way, but see Moral Foundations Theory as a way it can be tried https://moralfoundations.org/

Failing any kind of consensus, a looser approach is needed to find quasi-universal morals. There you would have the "old chestnuts":

- do not kill (x,y or z entities unless a, b or c is the case)
- do not torture (x,y or z entities unless a, b or c is the case)
- do not steal (unless you can have the theft ratified by law)
- do not destroy (x,y or z entities unless a, b or c is the case)

Life forms are beings of order, the sum of an astonishingly integrated network of microbial entities. Very broadly speaking, life embraces order and growth and abhors chaos and entropy. However, entropy is necessary to avoid stagnation and to check parasitic growths. Thus, people disagree as to how to handle growth and entropy, either out of self-interest or the self-interest of a group with which they identify.

My view is that you can't Reason your way from the Is of the happenstance of our evolved human nature to moral Oughts. But what you can do is think afresh about what the appropriate role for morality is regardless. And it's the fact that sentient creatures can experience wellbeing and harm, have a quality of life, which makes our actions towards each other matter. That's the reason we ought to care for each other's wellbeing, and we ought not kill, torture, steal and destroy, as a foundational rule of thumb.

I think most people get this without thinking it through in this way, but don't see it as a philosophically sound position because it's not couched in terms like logic and reason and objective. But those simply aren't the appropriate criteria when we're considering Oughts, which are all about what it means to be an experiencing Subject. That's why Moraility and Oughts are irrelevant in a universe of dead rocks.

And people who say morality is Subjective and therefore there's no moral difference between hurting and harming are just missing the point.

[Leontiskos]

Leon I'll try to be succinct, but I'm struggling! We need to focus in now I think

Sure, I will try to pare it down too, but you are making a lot of the same points throughout so I will try to do the legwork at the beginning.

...What I mean when I say that the brother or the pro-lifer makes an "ought"-claim is that they intend their claim to be normative. In the first place I wanted to attend to the matter of intention.

OK, lets agree this is a scenario where Peter is intending his statement ''This fruit is a tangerine'' to place some sort of ought obligation on whoever is in his company (to agree with him presumably). So our issue is twofold - why is there such an obligation, what's the foundation? And if there is, is it the same type of obligation a moral ought confers?

Good, I agree.

There is also a second issue. In this post you claim at multiple points that you want to, "Forget stipulative and M1 stuff." That is, you want to concede my points about intersubjective agreement, stipulation, and M1. At the same time, a fair portion of your reply still engages this question about stipulative claims, and therefore I think the issue is still pertinent.

So the second issue has to do with stipulative claims vs. substantive claims. We are in agreement that they both exist and that they are different. A crucial further point is that scientific claims can be either and moral claims can be either. Regarding the scientific side, I gave the examples of helium and heliocentrism in my last post. Now when you talk about, "calling things objectively true," and "third-person falsification," and, "the fact that a hanging is happening in front of it," it seems to me that you are still working in the stipulative or intersubjective sphere. We can examine this claim with two different concepts: verification and adjudication.

Verification is what we do when we want to confirm or verify that what we believe to be true is in fact true. Your claim is that if there is a hanging happening in front of us, we might second-guess ourselves and turn to our neighbor, saying, "Are you seeing this too!?" Your claim is that scientific claims are objective because they are falsifiable and checkable in this way. Adjudication is similar, but it is about adjudicating a dispute between two parties who disagree. So you would say that if my neighbor disagrees and says there is no hanging occurring, we could always ask another person or the larger community since the hanging is, "third person observable/measurable."

But this whole concept you have presented is still stipulative, based on intersubjective agreement, for you are essentially taking a poll. How does a poll get us beyond intersubjective agreement? How could Copernicus' view have been objectively true if objective truth is based on a majority vote and he was contra mundum? Let's call this view that objective propositions are obtained by intersubjective agreement, "Knowledge by consensus." It is my guess that popular level arguments against objective morality, such as Peter's, are based on knowledge by consensus, where knowledge is reducible to consensus.

Knowledge by consensus could clearly support the idea that basketballs are round, for we seem to have a lot of intersubjective agreement regarding the visual experience of everyday objects. It would support to a large extent the idea that the Earth is round, for there is strong intersubjective agreement there, albeit less than the basketball. The intersubjective consensus surrounding moral claims is often weaker, so many moral claims wouldn't count as knowledge. Some probably would, though, such as slavery which possesses a strong consensus (perhaps stronger than the round Earth). Like I said earlier, moral knowledge is more obscure than empirical knowledge, but if you hold to knowledge by consensus then I don't see why moral propositions couldn't count as knowledge.

Do you hold to knowledge by consensus?

Let's look at your related claim that observable, or measurable, or checkable things are objective:

Fine, it's just getting this type of 'objective' agreement pinned down. Ie if something is observable/measurable we can check each other's claims and falsify them - by looking ourselves. This is the basis of the scientific method.

Throughout this discussion you talk about, "treating things as true/objective/factual/falsifiable." Clearly you're uncomfortable with the claim that they really are true/objective/factual/falsifiable. Let's try to get to an objective ought and to realism. (Note: Many today follow Hume and Kant in rejecting classical moral knowledge, but they don't see that these same premises, if followed consistently, require one to reject scientific knowledge as well.)

I'm making the distinction above re observable/measurable/falsifiable physical facts, and abstract concepts.

I disagree with your intended point! Substantive M2 claims are falsified by observation and measurement. Hard science deals with the physically observable/measurable, that which is third person accessible. Hence checkable by others who observe/measure it. That's what makes scientific claims falsifiable. A scientific claim is accepted as objectively true on the basis that anyone who observes/measures the claimed discovery will concur.

Substantive claims are about reality and therefore really do have the capacity to be objective and true.

This is reasonable, but firstly - remember your knowledge toolkit is your conscious experience. We can cross check our conscious experience of physical things like tangerines because they are third person observable/measurable.

The reason we can agree it's an objective fact that a hanging is happening in front of us is that it is observable/measurable/falsifiable, hence I can point to it and you can agree you see it too. As can any normally functioning human.

If it is observable/measurable/falsifiable we treat it as a fact, objective knowledge of reality, by comparing the content of our experience which is the source of our knowledge. This is the scientific method.

So this last quote of yours makes your point most concisely. You appear to be subscribing to knowledge by consensus. You think that the epitome of objective knowledge is rooted in empirical realities which are "observable/measurable/falsifiable." You say that we should compare our claims with others to see if they agree with us. If they do we can count it as objective knowledge or fact. Since the strongest agreement occurs with empirical claims, empirical knowledge is the epitome of 'objectivity'. Do you disagree that this is knowledge by consensus?

Now let's look at your claim that morality is fundamentally different from the scientific or empirical knowledge which you claim is observable/measurable/falsifiable:

...Note it can't be applied to abstract concepts like morality, which isn't third person falsifiable via observation/measurement.

...Morality is an abstract concept, it can't be observed/measured this way, and moral claims can't be falsified this way.

...But an abstract concept like morality isn't checkable in that way. It doesn't have a mind independent existence 'out there' we can observe.

...The morality of hanging isn't observable/measurable/falsifiable in that way. Is the distinction I'm making clear now?

...But a moral claim/opinion isn't falsifiable via observation/measurement. We'd need to use different criteria to establish the objectivity. I'm still unclear what yours are?

So to support the claim that morality is objective, you need a different method to the way scientific claims are falsiable.

First it should be noted that abstract concepts need not lack intersubjective agreement. An easy example is mathematical or geometrical truths, such as the theorems governing the properties of triangles. So it can't be right that morality lacks objectivity because it is abstract. Lots of abstract things possess objectivity.

Now you say that morality isn't observable/measurable/falsifiable "in that way." In what way? In the case of empirical claims you were taking a poll. You were asking others if they agreed with your belief. Why can't we do the same with morality? Why not take a poll and ask if they agree with our belief?

The initial difference seems to be that when we ask someone about an empirical claim they are going to consult their senses, whereas when we ask them about a moral claim they are going to consult their mind. Yet they would also consult their mind if we asked them about triangles, or algebra, or historical facts, or rules of grammar, etc. It seems to me that the distinction you have in mind isn't empirical vs. abstract, but rather consensus vs. non-consensus. That is, consensus obtains with regard to empirical claims and abstract mathematical claims, but not with abstract moral claims.

Let's now move to your epistemological claims:

So let's consider two different meanings of the predication, "This piece of fruit is a tangerine."

M1: English speakers ought to apply the label "tangerine" to this piece of fruit.
M2: This fruit is the kind of reality that the English word "tangerine" points to.


The difference is subtle but important. If you wanted to defend M1 you could go to a dictionary, or take a poll, or in some way attempt to discover common usage. If you wanted to defend M2 you would go to a pomologist, because they are the ones who best understand fruits. M1 is merely stipulative. "It is a tangerine because we English speakers decided that it is a tangerine." M2 is substantive. "It is a tangerine because it instantiates the objective concept that is represented by the word 'tangerine'." In the first case we have a semantic quibble; in the second case we have a disagreement over the nature of reality.

Yes I get the difference, I'd say they're really having a dispute over labelling or observation tho. It's the observation (the experiential representation of reality) which is known to them and can be faulty and not tally. Conscious experience is itself a limited and faulty basis for knowledge, but humans generally share the same limitations and faults, so what we can do is create consistent working models of reality. In M2 there is an inconsistency in observation we wouldn't expect from normally functioning humans, except for the fact tangerines and clementines are very similar, which just means more thorough observation/measurement is required.

I think our difference here is you're talking about reality, as if we have direct, complete, perfect access to it. I'm talking about knowledge of reality, which is gained through (limited, flawed) conscious experience, which we then compare notes about to create a model of reality which is comprehensible to us. Which is just how it is, I think. Within that model some things (physical things) are accessible to third person observation and checking, and we agree to treat these things as facts, which is generally good enough.

Here you are very Kantian and are talking about, "consistent working models of reality," and, "a model of reality which is comprehensible to us." This takes us right back to stipulation and intersubjective agreement. You have again moved away from the idea that we can make true claims about reality. Instead we are limited to making claims with regard to our intersubjective agreement, which must have the same "limitations and faults" of each individual member. So instead of looking for truth you settle for "consistent working models of reality." Again, this is consensus, not real objectivity. The object of your knowledge is a collection of converging opinions, not reality.

My initial claim to Peter was that, on his system, the nature of the claim about the fruit is no different than the nature of moral claims. What you say here seems to confirm that. Both would be based on consensus, and since most moral claims lack sufficient consensus they don't count as 'objective'.

...What I mean when I say that the brother or the pro-lifer makes an "ought"-claim is that they intend their claim to be normative. In the first place I wanted to attend to the matter of intention.

OK, lets agree this is a scenario where Peter is intending his statement ''This fruit is a tangerine'' to place some sort of ought obligation on whoever is in his company (to agree with him presumably). So our issue is twofold - why is there such an obligation, what's the foundation? And if there is, is it the same type of obligation a moral ought confers?

I don't know if you have been following my conversation with Peter, but I have fleshed out the obligation there. The basic idea is that we have an obligation to seek and believe truth. The argument I gave was that we have an obligation to believe the conclusions of sound arguments. That is, the conclusions of arguments we believe to be sound. One of our concrete disagreements was over H2O. He doesn't think we have an obligation to believe that the molecular makeup of water is H2O. I think we do.

But if facts and objectivity are nothing more than consensus and intersubjective agreement, then I don't see why we would have any obligation to believe them. Nor would it make sense for the brother to claim that his sister ought to believe that the fruit is a tangerine. Nor would it make sense to claim that we have an obligation to believe that water is made up of H2O. Nor would it make sense to say that we have an obligation to believe the conclusions of sound arguments. But that's absurd - reductio ad absurdum. Therefore facts and objectivity must be more than mere intersubjective agreement, stipulation, and "consistent working models."

Let's look at your claims about intention:

I think this is the same thing Kant referred to as the analytic/synthetic distinction, but I may be wrong and I don't want to misrepresent him so I will just call it the stipulative/substantive distinction. My point is that the brother's claim is a substantive "ought," and that this kind of "ought" is in accord with moral judgments.

But why? It can't just be intention, because I could say ''That fruit is a tangerine'' without the intention of putting an obligation of agreement on anyone. I could say it an empty room. The saying of it or intention doesn't look like enough to me. I'm still not seeing your underlying justification for this being an ought claim?

So now I've at least addressed the intentionality of the act at length.

Well you've addressed the labelling/substantive distinction, which I agree with. But I'm not sure how intention itself creates a basis for oughts, sorry. Can you summarise the argument?

That said, I hope we are sorting out intention properly. The ice cream preference has no intended objectivity. When I say there is no qualitative difference, I am talking about things that are intended objectively. I included a parenthetical remark with my initial comment to clarify this.

I still don't think intention is key. I might genuinely believe there's a pixie living in my attic, and when I tell you about it I intend you to believe it too. But we don't generally treat it as objectively true unless everyone who goes look in my attic observes the pixie too. What is relevant is that the ice cream itself is observable/measurable, we can treat it as a fact I'm eating an ice cream. My liking the taste is about my feelings regarding ice cream, it's not 'out there' to be observed/measured, and it's a subject specific individual preference. Hume talks about moral intuitions as feelings of approval/disapproval, and my feelings about the taste of ice cream are similarly approving, where-as yours might be disapproving. We can't falsify either claim, because it's not observable/measurable.

I'd say what you call adjudication is how we compare the content of our experience, our basis for knowledge. There are subject-specific truths only I can know about the content of my experience, such as whether the taste of ice cream is nice, or that I experience seeing a pixie living in my attic. So when I make such statements, I can intend you to agree, but if you can't third person falsify them, then we don't treat them with the status of objectively correct. They don't automatically enter the public canon of shared working knowledge of the world we can falsify.

Intention is just the first step. We have to first ask about intention when someone makes a statement, such as, "The best flavor ice cream is strawberry." Are they making a subjective or objective claim? Are they intending to make a claim that other people are obliged to agree with? Certainly not. How about a second claim, "Water is made up of H2O"? This claim involves a different intentionality. It is intended as an objective claim, and this means that the speaker expects other rational minds to agree with him. He believes that other rational minds have an obligation to agree with his assertion.

It's fairly obvious that objective claims exist, and that objective claims imply that others ought to agree, especially if they examined the relevant evidence. The second step is asking whether this very natural and very scientific act of making objective assertions--assertions about objective reality--can be grounded in our epistemology. If knowledge is consensus then I would contend that objective assertions are nonsensical. In that case we wouldn't be able to transcend stipulation and intersubjective agreement.

Let's peek at your own morality:

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the intersubjective "ought" claim that you recognize is essentially the claim that English speakers ought to label the fruit as a tangerine, and that "the purpose behind that is to maintain the useful consistency of our shared objective model of the world." More generally, it is the claim that language speakers should follow the stipulated vocabulary of the language. This is actually a relatively superficial claim.

Yes, according to my moral foundation, the welfare of conscious creatures, it's a good rule of thumb to share a consistent vocabulary to get **** done and avoid accidents. But the rule of thumb is there to serve the foundational principle, so it won't always apply.
But I don't claim that my moral foundation is rooted in objectivity, rather I claim it is the appropriate foundation for oughts.

These are important points you bring up. Like I said, I am not going to try to give a thorough answer to them here, for this post is already too long. However, I will give you the basic framework.

I actually want to look at slavery first, because you brought it up earlier in the thread and I think would be an easier moral prohibition for me to defend. Obviously the intersubjective agreement surrounding slavery has changed in the last few hundred years. Now we tend to view it as objectively wrong. What might that mean?

I didn't bring up slavery, but happy to use that. I wouldn't claim it's wrong on the basis of objective morality tho, I'd say it's wrong according my moral foundation of the welfare of conscious creatures. Which isn't justified as objective.

Sorry, it was Peter who mentioned slavery, not you. It is interesting that you claim that your moral foundation is the appropriate foundation for moral "oughts." Care to say more?

Just like the brother would make use of the nature of the fruit in order to argue that it is a tangerine, so would we appeal to the nature of the human being in order to argue against slavery.

Here we might find common ground

A common argument would be: Human beings have inherent dignity; Slavery is incompatible with that dignity; Therefore slavery is impermissible. The middle term, 'dignity', would surely be elaborated in terms of freedom. That is, our intellect and our will endow us with freedom, and that freedom cannot be arbitrarily denied. Similar "natural law" arguments would be applied to murder, or theft, or capital punishment, etc. We can talk more about this.

And here we might not

So you say we could find common ground in arguing against slavery on the basis of the nature of the human being, but you disliked my elaboration of that argument. What would your elaboration of an argument against slavery look like?

So if that isn't your basis for calling hanging objectively immoral, what is?

Lol - I don't think hanging is objectively immoral. But I think slavery is. As you know, I gave the beginning of an argument against slavery in my last. This post is too long.

There are problems trying to categorise this way, but see Moral Foundations Theory as a way it can be tried https://moralfoundations.org/

Is this your website? I do like Jonathan Haidt.

My view is that you can't Reason your way from the Is of the happenstance of our evolved human nature to moral Oughts. But what you can do is think afresh about what the appropriate role for morality is regardless. And it's the fact that sentient creatures can experience wellbeing and harm, have a quality of life, which makes our actions towards each other matter. That's the reason we ought to care for each other's wellbeing, and we ought not kill, torture, steal and destroy, as a foundational rule of thumb.

I think most people get this without thinking it through in this way, but don't see it as a philosophically sound position because it's not couched in terms like logic and reason and objective. But those simply aren't the appropriate criteria when we're considering Oughts, which are all about what it means to be an experiencing Subject. That's why Moraility and Oughts are irrelevant in a universe of dead rocks.

And people who say morality is Subjective and therefore there's no moral difference between hurting and harming are just missing the point.

It seems like you are proposing a hypothetical morality, such that if you dislike harm then you should be moral. ...because when a Humean says there is no moral difference between hurting and harming, they are saying that we have no intrinsic obligation to not-harm.

Best,
Leontiskos

[Gertie]

Leon

This shouldn't be this difficult and frustrating. Lets re-boot.


My position -

We collectively treat issues as objective if they are falsifiable via observation/measurement (maths). Like every case of shared knowledge this involves inter-subjective comparison of the content of our experience.

Morality and Oughts can't be observed measured/falsified this way.

Morality isn't objective in this sense.

(If someone can point out another way morality is objective which is meaningful I'm open to changing my mind, but wrangling terminology doesn't interest me).

The End.

That's easy enough to understand.


Your position is...?

[Gertie]

Gertie wrote: ↑Today, 4:24 pm
There are problems trying to categorise this way, but see Moral Foundations Theory as a way it can be tried https://moralfoundations.org/

Is this your website? I do like Jonathan Haidt.

It's the MFT's website lol

[Sy Borg]

Sy Borg

The problem here is that we live in a world replete with zero sum games, where one organism survives by killing another. And humans survive by displacing peers and by taking their stuff, directly or indirectly, as individuals and as groups.

I think that's too broad, we're also a social species who also have caring and cooperative pre-dispositions. It's true we evolved to prioritise in terms of Me (my homeostasis/survival/desires), then when the social instincts evolved --> My Kin --> My Group-->The Other. But we can still feel care for strangers, and put ourselves in their shoes, as well as rationality understand the needs and concerns of others. I'm sure you do, unless you're a very convincing sociopath!

While individuals can be caring, and even delightful, towards one other, as a group, they compete in a zero sum game. I can imagine many species being fearful of, and hostile towards, humans as they take over their territories - while being good to each other.

Morality ultimately refers to rules of engagement within a group. Rules of engagement vary from species to species, nation to nation, culture to culture, even between neighbourhoods and families. There is no moral that runs across all. Not even killing and torturing.

Re humans, there's been research done which does try to broadly identify how our shared/universal evolved social neurobiology plays out in different cultures, so while there are variations there are also broad similarities. There are problems trying to categorise this way, but see Moral Foundations Theory as a way it can be tried https://moralfoundations.org/

I like the list. These things are never perfect, but that would do me, with the usual provisos.

Failing any kind of consensus, a looser approach is needed to find quasi-universal morals. There you would have the "old chestnuts":

- do not kill (x,y or z entities unless a, b or c is the case)
- do not torture (x,y or z entities unless a, b or c is the case)
- do not steal (unless you can have the theft ratified by law)
- do not destroy (x,y or z entities unless a, b or c is the case)

Life forms are beings of order, the sum of an astonishingly integrated network of microbial entities. Very broadly speaking, life embraces order and growth and abhors chaos and entropy. However, entropy is necessary to avoid stagnation and to check parasitic growths. Thus, people disagree as to how to handle growth and entropy, either out of self-interest or the self-interest of a group with which they identify.

My view is that you can't Reason your way from the Is of the happenstance of our evolved human nature to moral Oughts. But what you can do is think afresh about what the appropriate role for morality is regardless. And it's the fact that sentient creatures can experience wellbeing and harm, have a quality of life, which makes our actions towards each other matter. That's the reason we ought to care for each other's wellbeing, and we ought not kill, torture, steal and destroy, as a foundational rule of thumb.

I think most people get this without thinking it through in this way, but don't see it as a philosophically sound position because it's not couched in terms like logic and reason and objective. But those simply aren't the appropriate criteria when we're considering Oughts, which are all about what it means to be an experiencing Subject. That's why Moraility and Oughts are irrelevant in a universe of dead rocks.

And people who say morality is Subjective and therefore there's no moral difference between hurting and harming are just missing the point.

I agree that regular morality emerges organically through repeated interactions. As with many, I personally never needed reasoning to do good. It was less a matter of "ought" than being bleeding obvious if one is considerate. As it has been for most, my journey has been more about noticing the inadvertent harms I cause through unexamined impulses than tweaking my morality.

"Oughts" are ultimately the stuff or law. Putting aside the usual corruption, vested interests, bigotry, short-sightedness, narrow-mindedness and occasional rank stupidity, governments have most of the most important "oughts" covered in their legislation.

[Gertie]

Gertie wrote: ↑Yesterday, 4:24 pm Sy Borg

The problem here is that we live in a world replete with zero sum games, where one organism survives by killing another. And humans survive by displacing peers and by taking their stuff, directly or indirectly, as individuals and as groups.

I think that's too broad, we're also a social species who also have caring and cooperative pre-dispositions. It's true we evolved to prioritise in terms of Me (my homeostasis/survival/desires), then when the social instincts evolved --> My Kin --> My Group-->The Other. But we can still feel care for strangers, and put ourselves in their shoes, as well as rationality understand the needs and concerns of others. I'm sure you do, unless you're a very convincing sociopath!

While individuals can be caring, and even delightful, towards one other, as a group, they compete in a zero sum game. I can imagine many species being fearful of, and hostile towards, humans as they take over their territories - while being good to each other.

In the Big Picture terms you're considering I agree, we live on a finite planet. And we're currently being forced to come to terms with acting like we don't. In terms of our particular species, which is capable of making reasoned and moral choices, global cooperation is now essential.

On a smaller scale as a social species we have benefitted from cooperation, from not treating all interactions as a zero sum game. There will be lots of factors going into how that plays out tho. In terms of group dynamics, and external factors like resource availability.

Re humans, there's been research done which does try to broadly identify how our shared/universal evolved social neurobiology plays out in different cultures, so while there are variations there are also broad similarities. There are problems trying to categorise this way, but see Moral Foundations Theory as a way it can be tried https://moralfoundations.org/

I like the list. These things are never perfect, but that would do me, with the usual provisos.

Yeah, it's basically how our social traits play out, the Is of that social aspect of our species' evolution, which is a sort of template for what we've come to conceptualise as Morality. Not all of it is a great fit for how we live now tho, like you said tribalism can be a big problem. Which is why I think we still need some sort of underlying foundation or touchstone for morality.

My view is that you can't Reason your way from the Is of the happenstance of our evolved human nature to moral Oughts. But what you can do is think afresh about what the appropriate role for morality is regardless. And it's the fact that sentient creatures can experience wellbeing and harm, have a quality of life, which makes our actions towards each other matter. That's the reason we ought to care for each other's wellbeing, and we ought not kill, torture, steal and destroy, as a foundational rule of thumb.

I think most people get this without thinking it through in this way, but don't see it as a philosophically sound position because it's not couched in terms like logic and reason and objective. But those simply aren't the appropriate criteria when we're considering Oughts, which are all about what it means to be an experiencing Subject. That's why Moraility and Oughts are irrelevant in a universe of dead rocks.

And people who say morality is Subjective and therefore there's no moral difference between hurting and harming are just missing the point.

I agree that regular morality emerges organically through repeated interactions. As with many, I personally never needed reasoning to do good. It was less a matter of "ought" than being bleeding obvious if one is considerate. As it has been for most, my journey has been more about noticing the inadvertent harms I cause through unexamined impulses than tweaking my morality.

"Oughts" are ultimately the stuff or law. Putting aside the usual corruption, vested interests, bigotry, short-sightedness, narrow-mindedness and occasional rank stupidity, governments have most of the most important "oughts" covered in their legislation.

Yep. We mostly naturally muddle through it. We have institutions, myths, cultural narratives, religions, education, etc which play their part too. Right now the authoriative power of some of those are waning as we're in this sort of globalist, post-modern relativistic limbo. Populism and demagoguery plays to that. The advent of Trump highlighted this fragility. We're due a re-think about morality imo, what it's for and how it's integrated into our cultural and political systems.

[Leontiskos]

This shouldn't be this difficult and frustrating. Lets re-boot.

Unfortunately issues that have baffled philosophers for 300 years are difficult. Our age has imbibed that confusion.

My position -

We collectively treat issues as objective if they are falsifiable via observation/measurement (maths). Like every case of shared knowledge this involves inter-subjective comparison of the content of our experience.

I answered this point in detail in this post, beginning with the words, "There is a second issue," and ending with the words, "Do you disagree that this is knowledge by consensus?" You made this assertion six different times in your previous post.

Morality and Oughts can't be observed measured/falsified this way.

Morality isn't objective in this sense.

I answered this point in this post, beginning with the words, "Now let's look at your claim that morality is fundamentally different," and ending with the words, "but not with abstract moral claims." You also made this assertion six different times in your previous post.

All you have done here is repeat your assertions one more time. So now you have asserted them each seven times instead of six. That doesn't get us anywhere.

(If someone can point out another way morality is objective which is meaningful I'm open to changing my mind, but wrangling terminology doesn't interest me).

Your "objectivity" is not objective. It it just an intersubjective consensus. Given that your science and empiricism is not objective, it is no different from morality.

This whole conversation began when I claimed that, on Peter's system, empirical and scientific claims are no different from moral claims. That is, they lack objectivity and they presuppose an "ought". You have tried to defend empirical and scientific claims as being objective and therefore different from morality. I have pointed out that your empirical and scientific claims are based on intersubjective consensus, not objective reality. That is what my last post was about.

If you want to concede that your empirical and scientific claims are not objective, that's fine, but then your argument for why science is different from morality vanishes. If you don't want to make that concession then you will have to attend to my previous post. My last post is significantly more organized than the rest of our conversation, and the topics are distinct. The sections are 1) Knowledge as consensus, 2) Scientific and empirical knowledge, 3) Moral knowledge, 4) The Kantian turn, 5) Non-moral obligation, 6) Intention, and then some miscellaneous responses at the end.

This is how I see our conversation:

• Peter: Science is objective; morality isn't. "Oughts" are not supportable, and this includes moral "oughts".
• Leontiskos: Given your premises, science is no more objective than morality, and science presupposes "oughts".
• Gertie: Science is objective; morality isn't. If science requires "oughts" then they are different from moral "oughts".
• Leontiskos: Intersubjective consensus is not objectivity. There is no qualitative epistemic difference between science and morality.

I have been trying to get you guys to look squarely at science/empiricism. Once you understand science I can show you how morality is equivalent. Currently you are equivocating. You are simultaneously claiming that science is objective and that it is based on intersubjective agreement. But it can't be both. Which is it? You have to make up your mind. Claiming that morality is not objective doesn't make any sense if you don't have a clear understanding of what you mean by objectivity.

Gertie, do you have any formal philosophical training? If so, have you studied the history of philosophy and Kant's "turn to the subject"? After being at Philosophy Discussion Forums for three weeks I am painfully aware that I have overestimated the philosophical education of many members here. It would be nice to know up-front where you are coming from, philosophically speaking. Depending on your answer we could re-assess whether the epistemological approach will be fruitful.

-Leontiskos

[Leontiskos]

So you still haven't given any justification for your claim that facts are different from opinions. After asking you three times, the absence of an answer is disconcerting. Apparently you don't have any way to differentiate them.

I've explained that what we call facts are features of reality that are or were the case - for example, water is H2O. And opinions or beliefs are attitudes that people have - for example the opinion or belief that water is H20. So facts and opinions are two different things. If you reject that standard distinction in the use of those terms, perhaps you can explain how you use them.

But I want to know how to tell whether some opinion is a fact. How do I figure it out? That's what I've been asking.

See, I could say the same thing about moral facts and moral opinions. "Moral facts are obligatory features of reality that are or were the case - for example, slavery is wrong. And moral opinions or beliefs are attitudes that people have - for example the opinion or belief that slavery is wrong." This whole discussion revolves around whether you possess a principled way to distinguish scientific/empirical knowledge from moral knowledge.

You say that moral facts don't exist. I say that, on your system, neither do natural facts. And if you can't support natural facts then it's no wonder that you can't support moral facts.

I'm clear on your ontology. What's at issue here is epistemology. Your claim is that objective moral "oughts" are epistemically impossible. I say that your system has the exact same problems, and that your "facts" are epistemically impossible. Once enough opinions agree on one thing do we call it a fact? Because if that is so, then there are moral facts, too, for some moral opinions converge. Or is there some other way to differentiate an opinion from a fact? You seem to think we can't get to moral facts from moral opinions. I am wondering how we get to natural facts from natural opinions?

Epistemology (theory of knowledge) is a complete - though, for some of us, entertaining - waste of time. What we call knowledge isn't a thing of some kind that exists somewhere, somehow, and that can therefore be described. That's an ancient metaphysical delusion. Knowledge and 'knowing things' are what we say they are. How could they be anything else?

So I skimmed your website and some of your other threads, such as the thread on objective and subjective morality, and the thread on the Gettier problem. It's very obvious that you haven't formally studied philosophy. That's fine, but I'm not sure these epistemological questions are going to bear fruit for someone who doesn't understand the basics of epistemology. That is, I am doubting whether this fact/opinion discussion is worthwhile. It may be better to simply focus on my "ought" claim about propositional truth.

I make a sharp distinction between features of reality (facts) and what we believe and know about them.

I realize that, but it doesn't make any sense to talk about reality apart from what we can believe and know about reality. We have no access to "facts" apart from what we believe and know about reality.

I didn't say a single word about an assertion. You say people have no obligation to believe that water is made up of H2O. I say they do. I say they ought to believe that water is made up of H2O.
The reason the obligation arises could be several: investigation, arguments from authority, accepting the common opinion, etc.

Those constitute reasons justifying the factual assertion that water is H2O. But your idea that the assertion itself implies an obligation to agree with it is simply false. Nobody is obliged to agree with any assertion, factual or non-factual. You've made that up.

The obligation arises from a sound argument, which I have addressed elsewhere. Let's establish two propositions about water:

WP1: "Educated people living in the 21st century ought to believe that water is made up of H2O."
WP2: "WP1 is false. Educated people living in the 21st century have no obligation to believe that water is made up of H2O."

I hold WP1. You hold WP2. Let's keep these in mind.

My challenge stands: what is the difference between the presumptive "ought" and the conventional moral "ought"? As noted, you are begging the question. You are giving no argument for your assertion that they are different.

Not so. I've given a clear argument for the functional difference between the falsifiable factual assertion 'this is a tangerine' and the unfalsifiable non-factual assertion (say) 'capital punishment is morally wrong'. And the evidence for the functional difference is that, given the way we use the words involved, 'this is a tangerine' is falsifiable - because, if it's an apple, the assertion is false. Whereas 'capital punishment is morally wrong' is unfalsifiable, which is why it's rationally possible to accept or reject that moral assertion. The moral rightness/wrongness of capital punishment is nothing like a tangerine. I wonder why this is so hard to grasp.

You are not giving arguments, you are just asserting your position (begging the question). I could mimic your words, "And the evidence for the functional difference is that, given the way we use the words involved, 'capital punishment is morally wrong' is falsifiable - because, if someone claims it's right, the assertion is false. Whereas 'this is a tangerine' is unfalsifiable, which is why it's rationally possible to accept or reject that assertion--and the sister does reject it."

These aren't arguments.

But I've spoken to this question at length with Gertie. Feel free to read that. My guess is that you also subscribe to knowledge as consensus.

Sound or obligatory arguments are always person-specific. If you are able to present an argument to your interlocutor that they believe to be sound, then they must accept the conclusion. That is, they are obliged to accept the conclusion. This is the relevance of the three conditionals I gave above. Each of them illustrate the nature of the obligatory inference. Again, the punch-line is that if you believe an argument is sound then you have an obligation to believe it.

So what's an example? What you are doing right now is an example. You are trying to convince me that morality is not objective. All you are trying to do is present an argument that I agree is sound. You are not trying to convince me that I must accept sound arguments. If we get to the end of this and I say, "Well, I accept that all of the premises of your argument are true, and I also accept that all of your inferential reasoning is valid, but I still reject your conclusion," what would you say? You certainly would not go on arguing. You might say that I am intellectually dishonest, or that I am engaging in bad faith, or that I am not a real philosopher, etc. At root I would be failing my obligation accept truth where it is found. To accept an argument as sound and to reject its conclusion is to fail one's obligation to truth, and the very fact that you are engaging with me presupposes this obligation. If you didn't think I had an obligation to accept sound arguments you would stop engaging immediately.

QED. You're free to accept or reject my argument. There's no obligation. And this is all a red herring anyway.

Do you even know what soundness is? Again, we are not talking about someone who accepts or rejects an argument. We are talking about someone who admits that an argument is sound and then rejects the conclusion. This is contrary to our obligation to truth.

Side-question: do you think we are obliged to accept and apply the law of non-contradiction?

Oh, okay. 'Propositional truth'? Well, propositionas don't exist. They're misleading metaphysical fictions. So the expression 'propositional truth' is dead in the water, as is the expression 'propositional knowledge'. In this context, the only features of reality that have truth-value - can be true or false - are factual assertions, such as 'this is a tangerine' and 'water is H2O'. And those factual assertions have truth-value because they assert things about reality that may or may not be the case - which has nothing to do with language whatsoever.

Oh dear.

If you have to deny the existence of propositions to try to save your system then it must be erroneous indeed.

[Peter Holmes]

Oh, okay. 'Propositional truth'? Well, propositionas don't exist. They're misleading metaphysical fictions. So the expression 'propositional truth' is dead in the water, as is the expression 'propositional knowledge'. In this context, the only features of reality that have truth-value - can be true or false - are factual assertions, such as 'this is a tangerine' and 'water is H2O'. And those factual assertions have truth-value because they assert things about reality that may or may not be the case - which has nothing to do with language whatsoever.

Oh dear.

If you have to deny the existence of propositions to try to save your system then it must be erroneous indeed.

Oh dear. Just a quickie, for now...

Can you demonstrate the existence of propositions, or any other so-called abstract things? For example, can you produce an example of a proposition that isn't a linguistic expression? If, as you'll find, you can't - what might that mean, do you think?

[Belindi]

Peter Holmes wrote(my underlines):

the only features of reality that have truth-value - can be true or false - are factual assertions, such as 'this is a tangerine' and 'water is H2O'. And those factual assertions have truth-value because they assert things about reality that may or may not be the case - which has nothing to do with language whatsoever.

Ontological reality is not the same as social reality.

Contrary to what has been asserted by one of the participants n this conversation, great philosophers have actually created theories of what really exists, and those theories have real moral implications.

" 'this is a tangerine' and 'water is H2O' " are facts of social reality, they are not facts of ontological reality. Factuality applies to social reality, but not to ontological reality.

Moral reality is 'objective' only insofar as the morality in question is implicated in a grand theory of existence.

[Peter Holmes]

Peter Holmes wrote(my underlines):

the only features of reality that have truth-value - can be true or false - are factual assertions, such as 'this is a tangerine' and 'water is H2O'. And those factual assertions have truth-value because they assert things about reality that may or may not be the case - which has nothing to do with language whatsoever.

Ontological reality is not the same as social reality.

Contrary to what has been asserted by one of the participants n this conversation, great philosophers have actually created theories of what really exists, and those theories have real moral implications.

" 'this is a tangerine' and 'water is H2O' " are facts of social reality, they are not facts of ontological reality. Factuality applies to social reality, but not to ontological reality.

Moral reality is 'objective' only insofar as the morality in question is implicated in a grand theory of existence.

1 Inasmuch as I understand it, I don't accept your distinction between ontological and social reality. The reality I refer to is physical reality, of which 'social reality' can only be a part. And what we call facts are features of that physical reality, or descriptions of them. So the chemical constitution of water is one of those facts - a feature of physical reality. The claim that it's not a feature of 'ontological reality' is absurd.

2 The so-called theories of reality or being (ontologies) produced by philosophers have been nothing more than explanations of the ways we use or could use certain words. And to the extent they have proposed physical explanations of reality, they've been wrong and long-superceded by natural science theories.

3 No theory of physical reality has or can ever entail moral conclusions. An is-the-case cannot entail an ought-to-be-the-case. The very expression 'moral reality', like the expression 'moral fact', is incoherent.

[Belindi]

Peter Holmes wrote(my underlines):

the only features of reality that have truth-value - can be true or false - are factual assertions, such as 'this is a tangerine' and 'water is H2O'. And those factual assertions have truth-value because they assert things about reality that may or may not be the case - which has nothing to do with language whatsoever.

Ontological reality is not the same as social reality.

Contrary to what has been asserted by one of the participants n this conversation, great philosophers have actually created theories of what really exists, and those theories have real moral implications.

" 'this is a tangerine' and 'water is H2O' " are facts of social reality, they are not facts of ontological reality. Factuality applies to social reality, but not to ontological reality.

Moral reality is 'objective' only insofar as the morality in question is implicated in a grand theory of existence.

1 Inasmuch as I understand it, I don't accept your distinction between ontological and social reality. The reality I refer to is physical reality, of which 'social reality' can only be a part. And what we call facts are features of that physical reality, or descriptions of them. So the chemical constitution of water is one of those facts - a feature of physical reality. The claim that it's not a feature of 'ontological reality' is absurd.

2 The so-called theories of reality or being (ontologies) produced by philosophers have been nothing more than explanations of the ways we use or could use certain words. And to the extent they have proposed physical explanations of reality, they've been wrong and long-superceded by natural science theories.

3 No theory of physical reality has or can ever entail moral conclusions. An is-the-case cannot entail an ought-to-be-the-case. The very expression 'moral reality', like the expression 'moral fact', is incoherent.

Do you think mind is (an) ontological reality?

Do you think nature is (an) ontological reality?

[Sculptor1]

Peter Holmes wrote(my underlines):

the only features of reality that have truth-value - can be true or false - are factual assertions, such as 'this is a tangerine' and 'water is H2O'. And those factual assertions have truth-value because they assert things about reality that may or may not be the case - which has nothing to do with language whatsoever.

Ontological reality is not the same as social reality.

Contrary to what has been asserted by one of the participants n this conversation, great philosophers have actually created theories of what really exists, and those theories have real moral implications.

" 'this is a tangerine' and 'water is H2O' " are facts of social reality, they are not facts of ontological reality. Factuality applies to social reality, but not to ontological reality.

Moral reality is 'objective' only insofar as the morality in question is implicated in a grand theory of existence.

1 Inasmuch as I understand it, I don't accept your distinction between ontological and social reality. The reality I refer to is physical reality, of which 'social reality' can only be a part. And what we call facts are features of that physical reality, or descriptions of them. So the chemical constitution of water is one of those facts - a feature of physical reality. The claim that it's not a feature of 'ontological reality' is absurd.

2 The so-called theories of reality or being (ontologies) produced by philosophers have been nothing more than explanations of the ways we use or could use certain words. And to the extent they have proposed physical explanations of reality, they've been wrong and long-superceded by natural science theories.

3 No theory of physical reality has or can ever entail moral conclusions. An is-the-case cannot entail an ought-to-be-the-case. The very expression 'moral reality', like the expression 'moral fact', is incoherent.

Do you think mind is (an) ontological reality?

Do you think nature is (an) ontological reality?

Ontological reality is something of a tautology.
I think it possible to talk about the ontological statuses of nature and mind. But you would have to say in what way you are talking about the words. In a real sense ontology is all about the nature of things. So you are also asking what is the real nature of nature.