Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Belindi]

Concretes are particulars: specific, single existents, just as they are as a particular, with all of their details as a particular, etc.

Abstractions are types/categories arching over a number of concretes (a number of particulars). Abstractions focus on similarities while ignoring many unique details of concretes/particulars, in order to create a "type," "category" or "kind" concept.

So the particular furry creature in front of you, in all its unique details, is a concrete. There's only one of that particular. Nothing else is the same as it.

The abstraction is that it's an example of a type or category of thing called a "dog," of which there are many other examples .

Is that the same as saying abstractions=universals ?

[Terrapin Station]

Concretes are particulars: specific, single existents, just as they are as a particular, with all of their details as a particular, etc.

Abstractions are types/categories arching over a number of concretes (a number of particulars). Abstractions focus on similarities while ignoring many unique details of concretes/particulars, in order to create a "type," "category" or "kind" concept.

So the particular furry creature in front of you, in all its unique details, is a concrete. There's only one of that particular. Nothing else is the same as it.

The abstraction is that it's an example of a type or category of thing called a "dog," of which there are many other examples .

Is that the same as saying abstractions=universals ?

Yes, "universals" is another common term for types/categories/kinds. Basically the same thing as platonic forms or "ideas," too, as well as essences (at least re what those things really amount to).

[Belindi]

Concretes are particulars: specific, single existents, just as they are as a particular, with all of their details as a particular, etc.

Abstractions are types/categories arching over a number of concretes (a number of particulars). Abstractions focus on similarities while ignoring many unique details of concretes/particulars, in order to create a "type," "category" or "kind" concept.

So the particular furry creature in front of you, in all its unique details, is a concrete. There's only one of that particular. Nothing else is the same as it.

The abstraction is that it's an example of a type or category of thing called a "dog," of which there are many other examples .

Is that the same as saying abstractions=universals ?

Yes, "universals" is another common term for types/categories/kinds. Basically the same thing as platonic forms or "ideas," too, as well as essences (at least re what those things really amount to).

That is helpful. I wonder if the question of abstract? concrete? can be settled by using set theory.

[Steve3007]

I wonder if the question of abstract? concrete? can be settled by using set theory.

What's the question again?

[Belindi]

I wonder if the question of abstract? concrete? can be settled by using set theory.

What's the question again?

I forget.

Oh yes, it is to do with 'there is no difference in set theory between universals and particulars '. Is that true?

E.g. Oscar the dog likes to chase tennis balls.

Oscar, Buster, Tilly, Alfie, and Candy the dogs all like to chase tennis balls.

All dogs like to chase tennis balls.

I imagine each and every proposition is a potential item in a set of items. I also imagine my perception of Oscar the dog is as mind-dependent as is my concept of all dogs.

All percepts and all concepts are abstracted from 'reality'(if there be such a thing).

I fancy that set theory may illustrate that what we usually consider to be a concrete reality is no more absolutely real than what we usually consider to be abstract concepts.

However mathematics is not concerned with relativity as far as I know. But this is a relative world ; some percepts and some concepts are more real than others. I think it is not helpful or true to differentiate between concrete and abstract as if one were more true than the other.

[Terrapin Station]

Oh yes, it is to do with 'there is no difference in set theory between universals and particulars '. Is that true?

No, that's not true. That's the whole distinction between first-order and second-order. First order ranges over individuals (particulars). Second-order can range over collections of individuals (types, for example, as well as sets qua sets).

[Belindi]

Oh yes, it is to do with 'there is no difference in set theory between universals and particulars '. Is that true?

No, that's not true. That's the whole distinction between first-order and second-order. First order ranges over individuals (particulars). Second-order can range over collections of individuals (types, for example, as well as sets qua sets).

Thanks. That has cleared that up anyway.

[Steve3007]

I fancy that set theory may illustrate that what we usually consider to be a concrete reality is no more absolutely real than what we usually consider to be abstract concepts.

I don't think so. If we decide that "reality" means the parts of the world that exist independently of minds (such that they continue existing when minds don't exist, when people close their eyes etc) and "concrete" refers to individual instances of things that are real, then concrete reality is, by definition, absolutely real and is not abstract. This is true even if we don't think that in practice there are actually any concrete things. In that case "concrete reality" still means the same thing, even if it refers to something that we don't consider to exist. Likewise if various observations and experiments lead to some kind of antirealist view of the world.

As far as I know, set theory is simply a tool to help us organize the way that we categorize instances of things. It doesn't tell us anything about whether those things are real or not.

[Belindi]

Yes, thanks Steve. I am puzzled about a lot of philosophical ideas and I sometimes think out loud.