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[Consul]

"I am not ready to take lessons in ontology from quantum physics as it is now. First I must see how it looks when it is purified of instrumentalist frivolity and dares to say something not just about pointer readings but about the constitution of the world; and when it is purified of doublethinking deviant logic and—most of all—when it is purified of supernatural tales about the power of the observant mind to make things jump. If, after all that, it still teaches nonlocality, I shall submit willingly to the best of authority."

(Lewis, David. Philosophical Papers, Vol. II. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. p. xi)

Yea…

[Dachshund]

The problem with physical realism is the claim for the ontological independence of the physical world. As I have said many times, the being of the world in itself, without the being of a subject for which the world exists, does not make sense to me. This nonsense appears in a simple phenomenological intuition - for me at least. Another intuition says to me that if I did not exist, there would be nothing.

Tamminen, I am interested in this topic but not very well read wrt the subject matter at hand I'm afraid, so you may find my query regarding what you are saying above rather obtuse.

My question is this... about 9.1 billion years after the "Big Bang" happened there were, so I we are told by physicists like Steven Hawking and Co. definitely physical objects in the universe , for example, rocky and metallic lumps of matter called asteroids. Some asteroids were quite big ( they're called planetoids) while some were relatively smaller ( these are called meteoroids).

So here we have - in asteroids - a classic, text-book example of basic physical/material objects in the form of lots of great big rocks and smaller rocks, as well as big and small chunks of metal all floating about in space in our galaxy. I can visualise this very clearly in my imagination. But 9.1 billion years ago there were no human beings, right, that is, there were no human subjects present to observe these asteroids,( and lets imagine that there were no other intelligent, conscious life - forms apart from human beings on the scene yet either, that is, no aliens present as subjects and observing these asteroids I am talking about through the widows of their spacecraft or whatever.

So Tamminen, you position is that with no subject/s to observe these asteroids they could not exist; you say that this is a simple phenomenological intuition on your part , and I understand precisely what you mean. I geddit .This understanding then leads you to propose a metaphysical theory of "generic subjective continuity". What I want to know is are you, with the later term, in any sense positing the existence of an eternal, infinite, unconditional ( i.e. always was/is/and always will be) omnipresent conscious subject like, say, the entity some Christian theologists (like Karl Barth, for example) would refer to as God as He exists in himself - that is, God as "wholly other" and utterly unknowable/inexpressible/incomprehensible for human being like you and I.

If I am on the completely wrong track here - ( and I suspect I probably am) - could you explain for me, in simple terms, how your thesis of "generic subjective continuity" works. How does it, for instance, make sense of the existence of the existence of the asteroids I was discussing above, that were floating about ( so I am told by expert scientists) 9.1 billion years ago in our galaxy with no living, conscious observing subjects to see them ( and thereby make them real) ?

Regards

Dachshund

[Tamminen]

Dachshund:

On the subject-object dependence: see my reply to your earlier post.

On God: no, I do not believe in a trancendent God.

On generic subjective continuity:
viewtopic.php?f=2&t=15496
viewtopic.php?f=2&t=15258
http://www.naturalism.org/philosophy/de ... bjectivity

[Sy Borg]

Yep, fair critique re: logic and pragmatism. Taken on board. Thanks :)

I also agree regarding what appears to be thoughts about the subtle effects of the quantum realm occasionally making a difference, perhaps where there is an extremely fine tipping point; as you say, it's a "teeny" probability, but teeny is more than zero.

I hope the boffins can work out why quanta can act at a distance, pass through barriers, multiply and diminish and so forth - I suspect the answer will either be incredibly interesting or incomprehensible.

[Felix]

Consul (addressing Tamminen): But yours is still an "intersubjective idealism", isn't it? For you believe that objects are at least generically existentially dependent on subjects, don't you?

If the existence of something cannot be known because there are no subjects to be aware of it, how can it be said to "exist"?

Consul: There's nothing impossible or inconsistent about a physical realism which assumes that conscious states are brain states and hence physically explainable.

If you can explain how "brain states" (whatever they are) produce consciousness then please stop beating around the bush and do so!

BigBango: So, to repeat, a world of physical things could exist and evolve according to classical laws.

I can make no sense of that sentence, what is it that would "evolve" in such a world?

I really don't see anything controversial about Tamminen's position. In simple terms, subject and object go together, they are two sides of the same coin. Materialists claim that physical objects can exist whether or not anyone is aware of them (despite the fact that they must be conscious to even make such a claim) and mystics say that there can be consciousness without physical objects of awareness (In fact, Franklin Merrill Wolfe wrote a book on the subject entitled The Philosophy of Consciousness Without an Object).

[Dachshund]

Consul: There's nothing impossible or inconsistent about a physical realism which assumes that conscious states are brain states and hence physically explainable.
If you can explain how "brain states" (whatever they are) produce consciousness then please stop beating around the bush and do so!

Consul is right, Felix. It is possible that the subjective experience of a bodily sensation like pain, say, or an experience of phenomenal red in waking consciousness, is identical (in a strict sense, like the way that 2+2 is identical with 4) with a certain brain state/ brain process (such as the firing of a certain groups of neurons in a certain region of living brain tissue). It is counter-intuitive of course and it initially sounds like utter nonsense to seriously claim that the feeling of pain could be identical with the neurophysiological/ biochemical etc; properties a certain region of living human brain tissue, but it isn't.

if you want to understand the argument, i.e. materialist Identity Theory (IT) in Philosophy of Mind, here is a classic paper by one of the original proponents of IT that explains how it is, in fact, possible that it could be true...

It is free to access on the internet, just google the terms: "Is Consciousness a Brain Process by U.T. PLace 1956" and your computer will bring up the paper for you.

It's interesting.

Regards

Dachshund

[Dachshund]

Tamminen,

The theory of GSG immediately brings to my mind, David Bohm's conception of the implicate order and the explicate order. The explicate order is continually emerging from, and re-submerging back into the one fundamental implicate order (what Bohm called "The Holoflux") of primal consciousness/mind.

Dachshund

[Consul]

The problem with physical realism is the claim for the ontological independence of the physical world. As I have said many times, the being of the world in itself, without the being of a subject for which the world exists, does not make sense to me. This nonsense appears in a simple phenomenological intuition - for me at least. Another intuition says to me that if I did not exist, there would be nothing.

What is it about the physical world that makes it dependent on the mental states of subjects?
Of course, a (reductive) spiritualist like Berkeley can answer that the whole physical world is in itself mental, with all physical things being nothing but complexes of "ideas" in the minds of nonphysical souls.

[Consul]

But yours is still an "intersubjective idealism", isn't it? For you believe that objects are at least generically existentially dependent on subjects, don't you?

If the existence of something cannot be known because there are no subjects to be aware of it, how can it be said to "exist"?

Of course, if no subjects exist, nothing can be said or known to exist; but real natural/physical things don't depend for their existence on being said or known to exist.

There's nothing impossible or inconsistent about a physical realism which assumes that conscious states are brain states and hence physically explainable.

If you can explain how "brain states" (whatever they are) produce consciousness then please stop beating around the bush and do so!

I wish I could present a reductive neuroscientific explanation of the HOW, but I can't—and no one else can in 2018; but this doesn't mean that it isn't most plausible to assume in the light of what is already scientifically known about the mind-brain relationship THAT conscious states are in fact brain states.

[Tamminen]

Consul is right, Felix. It is possible that the subjective experience of a bodily sensation like pain, say, or an experience of phenomenal red in waking consciousness, is identical (in a strict sense, like the way that 2+2 is identical with 4) with a certain brain state/ brain process (such as the firing of a certain groups of neurons in a certain region of living brain tissue). It is counter-intuitive of course and it initially sounds like utter nonsense to seriously claim that the feeling of pain could be identical with the neurophysiological/ biochemical etc; properties a certain region of living human brain tissue, but it isn't.

I live in the material world, experiencing it. This experiencing can be thought of as a relation: the subject's relation to the objective world. From the subject's point of view this relation is consciousness of the world. But because the world is “out there”, transcendent, there must be an objective, material side of this relation, a sort of an interface to the world. This objective side of my relation to the world is my body.

Now we have one relation and these two sides of it: mind and body. And because there is only one relation, these two sides refer to the same event and are in this sense identical, like two sides of the same coin, as Felix remarked. And therefore there must be a correspondence between their descriptions. But conceptually they are totally different, and there cannot be any conceptual bridge between them, so that we could explain the being of consciousness by the being of matter. Consciousness is fundamental, its being cannot be explained and need not be explained. It is the starting point of philosophy, and the point where we must always return if we get lost.

[Consul]

If you can explain how "brain states" (whatever they are) produce consciousness then please stop beating around the bush and do so!

I wish I could present a reductive neuroscientific explanation of the HOW, but I can't—and no one else can in 2018; but this doesn't mean that it isn't most plausible to assume in the light of what is already scientifically known about the mind-brain relationship THAT conscious states are in fact brain states.

Any demand for explanation backfires on the dualists: How can an immaterial soul produce consciousness?

[Tamminen]

The problem with physical realism is the claim for the ontological independence of the physical world. As I have said many times, the being of the world in itself, without the being of a subject for which the world exists, does not make sense to me. This nonsense appears in a simple phenomenological intuition - for me at least. Another intuition says to me that if I did not exist, there would be nothing.

What is it about the physical world that makes it dependent on the mental states of subjects?
Of course, a (reductive) spiritualist like Berkeley can answer that the whole physical world is in itself mental, with all physical things being nothing but complexes of "ideas" in the minds of nonphysical souls.

It is not that the being of the physical world is dependent on mental states, but it is dependent on the being of subjectivity in general. Subjectivity cannot be eliminated in any description of reality if it wants to be concrete and all-embracing. Everything refers back to it. And as I have said, it need not be everywhere, because an instrument for the concrete existence of subjectivity need not be in the same place in physical spacetime as an individual subject. And the instrument for the concrete being of subjectivity is the universe itself, seen as a totality. So this implies some kind of cosmic teleology. But an instrument is something else than an idea. It has an objective nature.

[anonymous66]

The problem is to determine just what physical structures are required for consciousness. Do we even have reason to believe that a physical organic brain is necessary for consciousness?

Have you heard this thought experiment? (I believe it's Searle's): Imagine a man goes to the doctor because he's having some problem with his eyesight. The doctor looks at the scans and determines that there is some degenerative problem with some of his brain cells. But, this is the in the future, and they have the ability to replace the damaged tissue with microchips. The problem is solved. But then, the disease progresses, and they have to replace more and more tissue with microchips until one day, all the patient has is microchips inside his skull. Seems plausible, doesn't it?

And would you automatically reject the idea that we will one day have conscious machines of some kind? On what grounds?

I don't think the physical possibility of artificial inorganic, non-biological organs of consciousness can be eliminated a priori. What I reject is the belief in the physical possibility of natural, non-artificial consciousness that isn't realized by and in organic wetware (cerebral wetware, to be more precise).

However, there are a posteriori (empirical) reasons to doubt the physical possibility of non-biological artificial consciousness. For example, one of the leading cognitive neuroscientists writes the following in his new book:

"The most surprising discovery for me is that I now think we humans will never build a machine that mimics our personal consciousness. Inanimate silicon-based machines work one way, and living carbon-based systems work another. One works with a deterministic set of instructions, and the other through symbols that inherently carry some degree of uncertainty. This perspective leads to the view that the human attempt to mimic intelligence and consciousness in machines, a continuing goal of the field of AI, is doomed."

(Gazzaniga, Michael S. The Consciousness Instinct: Unraveling the Mystery of How the Brain Makes the Mind. New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 2018. p. 236)

And the neurobiologist Gerald Edelman (a Nobel Prize awardee) writes:

"The brain is not a computer, and the world is not a piece of tape."

(Edelman, Gerald M. Wider than the Sky: The Phenomenal Gift of Consciousness. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004. p. 39)

"In many scientific circles, there remains a widespread belief that the brain is a computer. This belief is mistaken for a number of reasons. First, the computer works by using logic and arithmetic in very short intervals regulated by a clock. As we shall see, the brain does not operate by logical rules. To function, a computer must receive unambiguous input signals. But signals to various sensory receptors of the brain are not so organized; the world (which is not carved beforehand into prescribed categories) is not a piece of coded tape. Second, the brain order that I have briefly described is enormously variable at its finest levels. As neural currents develop, variant individual experiences leave imprints such that no two brains are identical, even those of identical twins. This is so in large measure because, during the development and establishment of neuroanatomy, neurons that fire together wire together. Furthermore, there is no evidence for a computer program consisting of effective procedures that would control a brain’s input, output, and behavior. Artificial intelligence doesn’t work in real brains. There is no logic and no precise clock governing the outputs of our brains no matter how regular they may appear. Last, it should be stressed that we are not born with enough genes to specify the synaptic complexity of higher brains like ours. Of course, the fact that we have human brains and not chimpanzee brains does depend on our gene networks. But these gene networks, like those in the brain themselves, are enormously variable since their various expression patterns depend on environmental context and individual experience."

(Edelman, Gerald M. Second Nature: Brain Science and Human Knowledge. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006. pp. 20-1)

My thinking goes like this: We agree that the physical is a requirement for a mind. There are many different forms of physical structures that result in mental states (think of all the different animal brains there are). We don't know what kind of brain hardware is required for consciousness (or even pain- Octopuses have a very different neurology but do experience pain). There is no logical reason to assume that a wet organic brain is required for consciousness- and you didn't point out any logical difficulties with the microchip thought experiment above.

If we encountered a form of intelligent sentient alien life that was made out of previously unknown materials, I see no logical reason to assume it didn't have a mind.

[Consul]

…if you want to understand the argument, i.e. materialist Identity Theory (IT) in Philosophy of Mind, here is a classic paper by one of the original proponents of IT that explains how it is, in fact, possible that it could be true...
It is free to access on the internet, just google the terms: "Is Consciousness a Brain Process by U.T. PLace 1956" and your computer will bring up the paper for you.

The author of the SEP entry on the identity theory is Jack Smart, one of the three most prominent champions of reductive materialism (aka central-state materialism): Ullin Place & Jack Smart & David Armstrong (whose book A Materialist Theory of the Mind [1968, 2nd ed. 1993] is the definitive statement of their doctrine and essential reading in the philosophy of mind).

"[M]an is nothing but a material object having none but physical properties."

(Armstrong, D. M. A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1968. p. 1)

Historical remark:

Place&Smart&Armstrong aren't the inventors of reductive materialism about the mind but only its reanimators in the 20th century. For example, the German materialists in the 19th century had already endorsed and defended it. Their most famous text is Ludwig Büchner's Kraft und Stoff [1st ed. 1855]—English translation: Force and Matter—, which was a very popular bestseller.

For example, in Friedrich Paulsen's Einführung in die Philosophie [Introduction to Philosophy] from 1892 we find a clear definition of reductive materialism that corresponds to the one by the 20th-century identity theorists:

"First of all, it is necessary to exhort the materialist philosophers to formulate their actual assertion exactly. One regularly encounters different formulas in their work which are used synonymously. They can be reduced to two basic forms: 1) Conscious processes are effects of physical processes; 2) conscious processes are in themselves, or considered objectively, nothing but physical processes in the brain. Both formulas are constantly used indiscriminately by our materialist authors." [© my transl. from German]

1 is causative/emergentive materialism, and 2 is equative/reductive materialism.

And let's not forget the materialists in the 18th century such as La Mettrie (Man a Machine, 1748) and d'Holbach (System of Nature, 1770).

Friedrich Lange even begins his famous Geschichte des Materialismus [History of Materialism] with the following statement:

"Materialism is as old as philosophy, but not older."

[anonymous66]

I came across another way of thinking about the subject. Neutral monism. From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

Neutral monism is a monistic metaphysics. It holds that ultimate reality is all of one kind. To this extent neutral monism is in agreement with the more familiar versions of monism: idealism and materialism. What distinguishes neutral monism from its monistic rivals is the claim that the intrinsic nature of ultimate reality is neither mental nor physical. This negative claim also captures the idea of neutrality: being intrinsically neither mental nor physical in nature ultimate reality is said to be neutral between the two.

It's very similar to panpsychism.

I could be wrong, but it seems to me that the reality of mental states is not consistent with physicalism. But it is also the case that philosophers like Galen Strawson call themselves physicalists while also holding that both mental states and physical objects are real (although other people argue that that makes Strawson a proponent of panpsycism, and thus not a physicalist).

For my part, I'm convinced that both mental states and physical objects are real- and I'm looking for a way to explain just how it could be that that is the case.