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[Spectrum]

Kant differentiated between ideas and concepts.

Concepts are mental conceptions that has an empirical basis linked to experiences and the senses, and are rationalized with the understanding [reason and intellect].

If he did, then he was having an off day since that word 'linked' begs the question. (But he didn't.)

'Link" that is only a semantic issue.

Kant first statement in the CPR is;
"THERE can be no doubt that all our Knowledge begins with Experience."

'knowledge' in this sense is empirical and these elements are essential for 'concepts'.

Ideas [philosophical] are thoughts that are rationalized and idealized via pseudo basis and do not contain any empirical elements [known and possible] at all.

That is just defining 'Ideas' as wrong/'pseudo'. I think I can see where this is going.

Yes, that is throwing in a claim without supporting but I will not do that unless I have provided supporting before in other posts [often many times]. It is NEVER my intentions to throw in claims without supporting. It is tedious to do so in this situation. Note, this is from Kant [italics = mine],

There will therefore be Syllogisms which contain no Empirical premisses, and by means of which we conclude from something which we know to something else of which we have no Concept, and to which, owing to an inevitable Illusion, we yet ascribe Objective Reality.

These conclusions [the 3 ideas] are, then, rather to be called pseudo-Rational 2 than Rational, although in view of their Origin they may well lay claim to the latter title, since they are not fictitious and have not arisen fortuitously, but have sprung from the very Nature of Reason.

They are sophistications not of men but of Pure Reason itself. Even the wisest of men cannot free himself from them. After long effort he perhaps succeeds in guarding himself against actual error; but he will never be able to free himself from the Illusion, which unceasingly mocks and torments him. -B397

There are only three extra-ordinary philosophical ideas that are empirically-rationally impossible, i.e. 1. God, 2. Soul, 3. The Total Universe [created by a God].

These 3 philosophical ideas are illusory and an impossibility within empirical-rational reality. They are only possible within thoughts rising from pseudo-rationality.

So the entire argument is

• (a) All 'ideas' are wrong.
  (b) God etc. is an 'idea'.
  (c) Therefore God is wrong.

We have also gone through the above in the past.

I would put it this way;

• (a) All 'ideas' are illusion [of reason].
  (b) God etc. is an 'idea'.
  (c) Therefore God is an illusion [of reason].

I have further argued based on the above, why God as an idea is an impossibility within an empirical-rational reality.

[Spectrum]

Our immediate reality, immanence, or consciousness, is such that it has always a relation to transcendence, objects "out there", but we can never say what those objects are like. We can make good and exact descriptions of them, like modern physics with its amazingly accurate theories, but nevertheless they are just descriptions of how objects appear to us. So it is true that in this sense it is meaningless to speak of the nature of objects as they are "in themselves". But if there were no objects, we would not exist either. And if we did not exist, there would be no objects. So the subject-object relation is ontologically fundamental.

This is Philosophical Realism and it is a false theory.

Realism (in philosophy) about a given object is the view that this object exists in reality independently of our conceptual scheme. In philosophical terms, these objects are ontologically independent of someone's conceptual scheme, perceptions, linguistic practices, beliefs, etc.

The above arise from the psychological, i.e. habit, customs and constant exposure to facilitate basis survival.
There is no such thing as an ontological thing-in-itself "out there" existing independent of the subject's conditions.

Instead of such 'subject-object relation' [of the layperson] what is more philosophically realistic is;

'subject-object[intersubjective] relation'

In this case reality is never independent of the subject in various senses. The subject is always entangled and interacts with 'reality'. In this case, reality is merely "is" [spontaneous emergent] not "it".

[Spectrum]

Interesting question but then again I can create a parallel saying what is the necessity of postulating the existence of cosmic evolution if its origin remains unintuitive.

We can never be 100% certain of the origin of cosmic and biological evolution. What we can infer is an empirical possible origin. By connecting all the dots from this justified 'speculated' origin to the present, humanity can understand the present and predict the future [empirically] and take corrective actions to prevent and avoid threats.

It is based on the above connected dots that I could prove 'God is an impossibility''.

OTOH, theists believed with 100% certainty God exists as real [for many -God listens and answers their prayers, promised them eternal life in Paradise].
For many theists their God had delivered an immutable holy book that contain loads of evil laden elements that trigger evil prone believers to commit terrible evils and violence. Such immutability will ensure these terrible evils and violence will continue eternally.

Secondly the existence of God can be substantiated through the disprove of evolution little something called reductive reasoning

How can disproving any point substantiate any thesis substantially?

if you are tempted to ask because of the laws of continuity where does God come from then you really are not being rational because anyone rational would realise that the perfect explanation of creation is an explanation that does not need an explanation otherwise the preliminary becomes superflous.

It has to be a joke and being ridiculous to insist 'asking about the origin of God' is irrational.

Note this is a Philosophy Forum, not a seminary. Note one of the main purpose and value of Philosophy;

Thus, to sum up our discussion of the value of philosophy; Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any definite answers to its questions since no definite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves;

A rational person within Philosophy will keep asking questions.

One clue to the question of the origin of the idea of God is due to psychological impulses. As mentioned above to Londoner, I have given evidences all over the places in this forum and note one clue above relating to Temporal Epilepsy.

[Spectrum]

I think a lot of people do assert that God objectively exists. And I think one reason why they do that is because other people do it. So think there is a strong sense in which the God concept is indeed the common factor in various different perceptions and is purported to exist objectively for that reason. These may not be just external sensory perceptions (sight, sound, etc). They may be feelings people get by introspecting and then discuss with others.

Impossible to answer but perhaps interesting question: If an individual had never shared/compared his/her experiences with any other person, could they believe in the objective existence of anything that we would recognize as God?

One critical point you have not bring in is the psychological factor, i.e. the existential crisis.

The idea of a God is the most effective balm to soothe the existential angst. It is because potentially all are vulnerable to it and the majority suffer from it that individual[s] has this shared-idea of a God as their savior.

Because there is a majority consensus on the 'idea' of God, it is merely pseudo-objective because there is no concept of object at all within the 'idea' of God.

[Steve3007]

One critical point you have not bring in is the psychological factor, i.e. the existential crisis.

I wasn't interested in it for this post. I was specifically attempting to address Londoner's comments.

[LuckyR]

That's the thing, faith is not for the real world, it is for the supernatural world

What supernatural world? How do you know this supernatural world exists?

Uummm... I don't (by definition), it's SUPERnatural after all, that's why belief in it requires faith (because there is no proof).

[SimpleGuy]

Interesting question but then again I can create a parallel saying what is the necessity of postulating the existence of cosmic evolution if its origin remains unintuitive.
Secondly the existence of God can be substantiated through the disprove of evolution little something called reductive reasoning and if you are tempted to ask because of the laws of continuity where does God come from then you really are not being rational because anyone rational would realise that the perfect explanation of creation is an explanation that does not need an explanation otherwise the preliminary becomes superflous.

I think you perfectly understood, the interpretation of the verse.

[Londoner]

]Note I emphasized 'know' i.e. whatever that can be 'known' are always conditioned upon its specific Framework and System, e.g. Science.

I understand pure logic do not rely on empirical evidence.

But later:

To ensure knowledge [empirical] is more credible, one need to use reasoning power to understand [use intellect and reason] its limits, refine its processes, state assumptions, etc.

Thus to ensure credibility on knowledge re 'reality' we need basically empirical evidence which must be organized and processed with refined reasonings. This is what I would called the empirical-rational reality.

These statements surely contradict each other.

As you say, what is 'known' is contingent on some framework, like science. But we cannot use the knowledge that was contingent on the framework to ensure that framework is valid, e.g. we cannot use geometry to justify the axioms of geometry.

And nor can we take something outside that framework to validate that framework, since - as you say - that would also be 'conditioned upon its specific Framework and System'. For example, we cannot use logic to validate science because it works in a different system, most obviously in that it does not relate to empirical experiences at all.

Your use of words like 'reasonings' and 'intellect' disguise this because they have an informal meaning. We would want to say scientists as people are 'reasonable' and 'use their intellects'. But that is not how they do their science. A scientific theory describes an empirical event; if that description also required us to 'reason' about what was happening it would be going beyond the empirical.

Justified true beliefs [= knowledge] involved personal convictions and agreements among the specific group. What else?

'Involved'? That qualifier seems to be inserted to provide an escape route should this definition be found wanting.

I think it is wanting because if that is the meaning of 'Justified true beliefs' where do 'justified' and 'true' come in? There is only the belief bit.

Under that definition, if I say X is a Justified true belief and you say Not-X is a Justified true belief then we are not contradicting each other, because we are not discussing X. We are only reporting 'personal convictions and agreements among (a) specific group' so we can both be right.

But again, this seems to be contradicted by what you write below:

You got is wrong. The point is all justified true beliefs [intersubjective consensus] always begin with some individual[s] personal conviction.
A personal conviction [belief] no matter how much one believe it is true cannot be JTB until it is subjected to testing, reproducibility and other requirements within a F&S [Framework and System].

I'd say we do not start already convinced that something is true, then only later get round to seeing if it is. What we start with is not a 'conviction', it is a hypothesis. It might turn into a conviction later.

You write that we always begin with a 'conviction/justified true belief' - but you also say that it isn't a 'conviction/justified true belief' until it is subjected to testing etc. Which is it?

I have given my reasonings many times all over the place.

I do not think so. You again use this vague word 'reasonings' and I think the plural form indicates the problem. You refer to psychological states, like conviction, to science, to logic, but there is no single strand of arguement that others can identify and follow.

Again, here is an example:

Me: It is interesting that you cannot follow the question. You jump straight into your own beliefs about morality and 'absolute moral laws' without having considered the nature of moral judgments. Yes, I know you have this 'belief' but your belief is not an argument. You need to be able to show that your belief is better than any other belief. That depends on showing why any moral judgement is meaningful.

That is what I asked you. Unless you can explain what you think are the nature of moral judgments, then your pronouncements about 'moral laws' are built on sand.

Yes, whatever I have stated is my personal beliefs [conviction] and I have always presented my arguments to support my personal convictions.
I have presented my arguments re absolute moral laws in the 'Ethics and Morality' section of this forum. If I am mistaken we could have gone through this argument in the past before.

So which is it?

Is your notion of morality purely a report of your 'personal beliefs [conviction]'? So, when you say 'Eating people is wrong' that should be understood as 'Personally, I don't like eating people' i.e. it isn't asserting that others should share your feelings. e.g. So, I do not feel the same way as the terrorists, but I cannot say they are wrong in an objective sense.

Or, are there 'absolute moral laws', which are (presumably) applicable to everyone? e.g. Terrorists are evil: fact.

You say you present 'reasonings' but I still cannot make out what you think, let alone how you got there. I do not think I am alone in this.

[Tamminen]

Our immediate reality, immanence, or consciousness, is such that it has always a relation to transcendence, objects "out there", but we can never say what those objects are like. We can make good and exact descriptions of them, like modern physics with its amazingly accurate theories, but nevertheless they are just descriptions of how objects appear to us. So it is true that in this sense it is meaningless to speak of the nature of objects as they are "in themselves". But if there were no objects, we would not exist either. And if we did not exist, there would be no objects. So the subject-object relation is ontologically fundamental.

This is Philosophical Realism and it is a false theory.

It is a combination of epistemological realism and ontological idealism. Whether it is true or false I leave open, it is just how I see thing at the moment.

[Eduk]

Uummm... I don't (by definition), it's SUPERnatural after all, that's why belief in it requires faith (because there is no proof).

I don't get it. I asked before, but can you give me some examples?
If there is no proof then how do you know the thing you are believing in the your head and the thing are the same thing?
For example if I said something is behind mars. You then found something behind mars. Would I be right?

[Steve3007]

For example if I said something is behind mars. You then found something behind mars. Would I be right?

I think this is a good illustration of the principle that "useful" is a better criterion for judging whether to pay attention to something than "right". If you're guessing, and you just happen to be right, then your utterance is of no more use than if you'd got it wrong, because it had no predictive utility.

[Eduk]

Oh was trying to take it further than that to be honest.
I meant a specific something not a general something.
For example if I said my car was behind Mars and you then found a car behind Mars, would you then just assume it was my car? How could you be sure?

[Belindi]

Spectrum wrote:

If Spinoza's God is 'Nature' then it must be conditioned by the empirical-rational.
But no one has produced any empirical evidence to justify the Spinozan's God exists.

If it is related to 'nature' it cannot qualify as 'than whom nothing is greater ' as nature is always subjected to infinite regression.

No and No.

Spinoza's version of God is empirical insofar as it chimes with modern science. Spinoza himself set out to prove by deductive logic that nature is God and God is nature.

For followers of Spinoza, i.e. scientific pantheists, God and nature are the same.

[Dark Matter]

For example if I said something is behind mars. You then found something behind mars. Would I be right?

I think this is a good illustration of the principle that "useful" is a better criterion for judging whether to pay attention to something than "right". If you're guessing, and you just happen to be right, then your utterance is of no more use than if you'd got it wrong, because it had no predictive utility.

Ever hear of the Gettier problem?

[Spectrum]

]Note I emphasized 'know' i.e. whatever that can be 'known' are always conditioned upon its specific Framework and System, e.g. Science.

I understand pure logic do not rely on empirical evidence.

But later:

To ensure knowledge [empirical] is more credible, one need to use reasoning power to understand [use intellect and reason] its limits, refine its processes, state assumptions, etc.

Thus to ensure credibility on knowledge re 'reality' we need basically empirical evidence which must be organized and processed with refined reasonings. This is what I would called the empirical-rational reality.

These statements surely contradict each other.

As you say, what is 'known' is contingent on some framework, like science. But we cannot use the knowledge that was contingent on the framework to ensure that framework is valid, e.g. we cannot use geometry to justify the axioms of geometry.

Unfortunately your view is too narrow and shallow, that is why you see a contradiction.

Yes, we cannot use Science to know Science nor Geometry to justify the axioms of geometry.

And nor can we take something outside that framework to validate that framework, since - as you say - that would also be 'conditioned upon its specific Framework and System'. For example, we cannot use logic to validate science because it works in a different system, most obviously in that it does not relate to empirical experiences at all.

But we can use philosophy [reasoning, intellect, and the likes] to reinforce the credibility for knowledge of Science and to avoid Scientism.

I have defined 'Philosophy' in terms of an analogy of a symphony conductor who bring all the different instruments into alignment and create synergy.
This is why we have Philosophy of Science to manage and secure [as best as possible] the knowledge of Science.

In this case, philosophy [no holds barred ] at a meta-level can bring in any specific Framework & System of knowledge to reinforce the knowledge from a specific Framework & System of knowledge.
For example in Philosophy of Science, philosophy itself has the passport to bring in any specific knowledge to reinforce the knowledge of Science or dismantle any pseudo-scientific claims. At the meta-level, the Philosophy of Science can even bring in scientific knowledge X to reinforce scientific knowledge Y.

For example, Hume pointed to the Problem of Induction and introduced psychology into as a critical factor that limit scientific knowledge. I can further rely on Science [neuroscience, neuro-psychology, others if necessary] to dig deeper into the brain to understand that psychology. There is some element of contradiction here, but it should be made transparent in any judgement involving scientific knowledge.

Your use of words like 'reasonings' and 'intellect' disguise this because they have an informal meaning. We would want to say scientists as people are 'reasonable' and 'use their intellects'. But that is not how they do their science. A scientific theory describes an empirical event; if that description also required us to 'reason' about what was happening it would be going beyond the empirical.

I am wondering what wrong with your views above when you think scientists do not use the faculty of reason and intellect to do science.
The point is scientists do not rely on purely reason [Rationalism] to arrive at their scientific knowledge but they use reason and intellect in the various processes within the Scientific Framework and System to arrive at their conclusions. First one must have a high intelligence to detect patterns to form a good hypothesis from abduction. They have to use their reason and intellect to be efficient to process the empirical evidences arrive at their conclusion. Note in the past scientist rely of their human reasoning power, but these days scientist use the most powerful computers and efficient softwares to process their data. This is evidence of the use of reason and intellect within Science.

Note the following;

Reason is the capacity for consciously making sense of things, establishing and verifying facts, applying logic, and changing or justifying practices, institutions, and beliefs based on new or existing information.[1] It is closely associated with such characteristically human activities as philosophy, science, language, mathematics, and art and is normally considered to be a distinguishing ability possessed by humans.[2] Reason, or an aspect of it, is sometimes referred to as rationality.

Reasoning is from the faculty of reason within the cortex which is very general, as defined above, i.e. including art. The faculty of reason also cover primal reason, i.e. the Pure Reason of Kant's Critique's of Pure Reason.
Intellect is a subset of the faculty of reason which is more analytical and objective.

Intellect is a term used in studies of the human mind, and refers to the ability of the mind to come to correct conclusions about what is true or real, and about how to solve problems.

Einstein and many famous scientists is said to have an estimated IQ within the 1% [or less] percentile of humans. The average scientist has above average IQ. A stupid person is not likely to become a scientist.

Note how I have thought in depth and width while you are not.

Justified true beliefs [= knowledge] involved personal convictions and agreements among the specific group. What else?

'Involved'? That qualifier seems to be inserted to provide an escape route should this definition be found wanting.

I think it is wanting because if that is the meaning of 'Justified true beliefs' where do 'justified' and 'true' come in? There is only the belief bit.

Under that definition, if I say X is a Justified true belief and you say Not-X is a Justified true belief then we are not contradicting each other, because we are not discussing X. We are only reporting 'personal convictions and agreements among (a) specific group' so we can both be right.

It is justified true-beliefs.
First we have 'beliefs' from personal conviction X which the person would claim to be true bit not to the collective.
For the collective or any group to accept that personal conviction X is true, it has to be justified to be a true belief.
To be justified true belief, it has to be justified within a specific Framework and System, e.g. Science, legal, economics.

If anyone claim Not-X is JTB, then one has to prove it within his or an agreed Framework and System.

Say A is accused of murdering B and proven guilty in a court of law and sentenced to death. So this is Justified True Belief within that specific to that court of law.
A may insist s/he is not guilty - but that is only his/her personal conviction.
Ultimately A will be sentenced to death and that is based on the truth conditioned [qualified] within that specific court of Law [National Constitution].

A may appeal to a different court, say an international court and subject to the conditions of that International Court.
Whatever the outcome - the truth - it is still conditioned [qualified] to Framework and System.

The point is whatever the Justified True Belief - truth or knowledge - it is always subjected to some specific Framework and System. There is no absolute truth or knowledge that is totally independent of any human Framework and System.

But again, this seems to be contradicted by what you write below:

You got is wrong. The point is all justified true beliefs [intersubjective consensus] always begin with some individual[s] personal conviction.
A personal conviction [belief] no matter how much one believe it is true cannot be JTB until it is subjected to testing, reproducibility and other requirements within a F&S [Framework and System].

I'd say we do not start already convinced that something is true, then only later get round to seeing if it is. What we start with is not a 'conviction', it is a hypothesis. It might turn into a conviction later.

You write that we always begin with a 'conviction/justified true belief' - but you also say that it isn't a 'conviction/justified true belief' until it is subjected to testing etc. Which is it?

I did not get to the above details as I don't think it was necessary.
It can start from anywhere, a dream, a knock on the head, a hunch, imagination, then we have a abduction process to see patterns, then an opinion and to a hypothesis and one confidence level of the truth develops gradually.
Since it is on a personal level, there is nothing to stop someone to jump to the truth and 100% personal conviction of certainty.

I have given my reasonings many times all over the place.

I do not think so. You again use this vague word 'reasonings' and I think the plural form indicates the problem. You refer to psychological states, like conviction, to science, to logic, but there is no single strand of arguement that others can identify and follow.

Again, here is an example:

Me: It is interesting that you cannot follow the question. You jump straight into your own beliefs about morality and 'absolute moral laws' without having considered the nature of moral judgments. Yes, I know you have this 'belief' but your belief is not an argument. You need to be able to show that your belief is better than any other belief. That depends on showing why any moral judgement is meaningful.

That is what I asked you. Unless you can explain what you think are the nature of moral judgments, then your pronouncements about 'moral laws' are built on sand.

Yes, whatever I have stated is my personal beliefs [conviction] and I have always presented my arguments to support my personal convictions.
I have presented my arguments re absolute moral laws in the 'Ethics and Morality' section of this forum. If I am mistaken we could have gone through this argument in the past before.

So which is it?

Is your notion of morality purely a report of your 'personal beliefs [conviction]'? So, when you say 'Eating people is wrong' that should be understood as 'Personally, I don't like eating people' i.e. it isn't asserting that others should share your feelings. e.g. So, I do not feel the same way as the terrorists, but I cannot say they are wrong in an objective sense.

Or, are there 'absolute moral laws', which are (presumably) applicable to everyone? e.g. Terrorists are evil: fact.

You say you present 'reasonings' but I still cannot make out what you think, let alone how you got there. I do not think I am alone in this.

Reasonings meant I have presented various arguments and explanations to justify my points.

As for Morality, I don't rely on casuistry cases, my personal conviction is based on the model of a Framework and System of Morality and Ethics [Kantian]. I have explained the details of such a Framework and System of Morality and Ethics [Kantian] many times in the Philosophy of Morality and Ethics section.

Note "system" meant it is self-correcting towards continuous improvement with its input, out and control feedback.