- May 1st, 2012, 5:30 pm
#84109
A few years ago a guy called Bill Gaede made some startling propositions about the way in which science, and physics in particular, is practiced by the vast majority of its practitioners. He proposed that the standard scientific method, most of the central concepts in physics (mass, energy, etc) and most of the way that mathematic is used by physicists is irrational.
His ideas are published in a book and on a website: http://www.youstupidrelativist.com.
I have not read the book but I have started to examine the website. I've started this thread for anybody who is interested in discussing the ideas in it. It would be particularly interesting to hear from anybody who has read the book and/or examined the whole of the website and who thinks they have understood them enough to eludiate the ideas in them.
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It is initially easy (in my view) to be put off by the style and content of the opening pages of the site. There is extensive fairly shallow ridiculing of "standard" ideas about physics using humour, cartoons, sarcasm and assertions about the things that standard physics says which are often gross parodies or simply misunderstandings or misrepresentations.
But if you persevere, and find the parts where Gaede sets out his view of how the discipline of physics ought to be approached, I think it is worth closer examination.
It's also worth looking at his "rope hypothesis", a hypothesis for the mechanism for EM radiation:
scribd.com/doc/54917714/Light-%E2%80%94 ... Hypothesis
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Gaede sets out his view of what physics should be all about in the form of 20 bullet points, shown at the bottom of this post. I think he would consider it important to keep these points in mind when considering something like his rope theory of the propogation of electromagnetic waves.
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Some comments on the points he makes below:
In the first few points he sets out his definitions of the words "object" and "concept". He doesn't explicitly say how these definitions relate to observations of those objects. He says the defining feature of an object is "shape", where shape means a discontinuous transition, or "boundary", between the object and its surroundings. The trouble is, the definition of what constitutes a discontinuous transition is generally a function of both the object and the observer. We define the transition point - the point where, say, liquid becomes gas, according to our requirements and the accuracy and methods of our observations. Observations using one method (e.g. light bouncing off the edge of the object into our unaided eyes) may yield a fairly well defined boundary where observations using another method (e.g. sensitive measurement of an electric field) may yield a continuous transition from one object to another or to empty space. I suspect he is thinking purely of unaided observations using EM waves in the visible range (i.e. light) scattering from objects made from atoms. He doesn't seem to acknowledge the "objective" existence of anything that cannot be directly observed using visible light. But the fact that small things can't be seen using visible light is purely a function of the relatively long wavelength of that light. So his definition seems to be arbitrarily defined by this.
He defines a "concept" as a relationship between objects. This must presumably include the configuration of objects. So, in this system, a wave on the surface of water, for example, is a concept, not an object. It is the configuration of, and relationship between, water molecules - objects. In point 8 he says that concepts cannot move. In the old system, we thought of water waves as moving. In Gaede's system we have to remember that it is the water molecules that are moving and that the apparent movement of the wave is itself just a concept. But it is too useful a concept to abandon. So we must now keep in mind two types of movement - real movement of real object, and the abstract, artificial concept of "movement" applied to concepts like waves.
Also, if the above paragraph is true, the idea that the relationship between objects is an abstract concept would also have to apply to the relationships between atoms in solids, just as it does for liquids when considering water waves. In this case a composite object like a molecule or a chair is, in reality, a collection of smaller objects (atoms) connected by concepts.
Here and elsewhere he places emphasis on the idea that objects should be visualizable. It must be possible to draw a picture of them, and place them in movies. Now, it is perfectly possible to draw a picture of various characteristics of something like an electron, just as it is perfectly possible to draw a picture of various aspects of, say, a person's face. But this in not a picture in the conventional sense. i.e. It is not a representation of the pattern produced when many many waves/photons of light bounce off various parts of the electron, because the concept of a picture of an electron is meaningless in that sense. If he thinks that this fact precludes an electron being thought of as an object, then his definition of an object is very much tied to arbitrary facts about the way that human beings see things. Anything smaller than the wavelength of visible light, for example, is not an object. On the other hand, if he allows a wider definition of the word "picture" to mean any graphical representation of some characteristics of an object, then I think many things he may try to define as concepts can quite happily be defined as objects. In fact, even a mathematical equation is a graphical representation of some aspect of its subject. It is a "picture".
In point 19 he asserts that the words energy, mass, field, force and time are irrational and unscientific. Given that he is setting out to completely redefine the term "scientific" I can see how he could argue that they are unscientific, by his new definition. I do not see how he can argue that they are irrational. This, to me, would mean that they could not possibly be used as part of any logical system of knowledge gathering. That system would be rendered meaningless and useless. It seems clear from a study of the history of science that these concepts have been used as part of a system that has accumulated a very large quantity of predictive knowledge about the empirical world that has been demonstrated to be very useful.
In the interests of brevity I will leave further comments for future discussion (if any) on this thread.
---
Some comments on the points he makes below as they relate to his rope theory of electromagnetic waves:
In his paper on rope theory, Gaede proposes the existence of two entwined ropes which connect every atom in the universe to every other atom and along which torsional oscillations can travel. These oscillations are EM waves. He sets out his view of how this model explains various observed EM phenomena and, as a bonus at the end, gravitational lensing.
My first thought is that it is not clear the extent to which he is talking metaphorically or literally. When he talks about a "rope" he appears to be placing it in his "object" category, as opposed to his "concept" category. He attributes properties to that rope (flexibility, elasticity etc) that, in a literal rope, would be a result of the atomic structure and inter-atomic EM bonds inside the rope. But presumably he cannot literally be talking about a long thin piece of material made from molecules; possibly polymers like nylon. In this case, the atoms comprising that rope would themselves have to be interconnected by lesser ropes, and so on ad infinitum. The universe would be stuffed full of an infinite quantity of rope atoms!
So the comparison with a real rope, whose wave carrying properties are a result of inter-atomic elastic forces, which are a result of EM interactions, must be an analogy. The trouble is, this still makes his explanation of EM wave phenomena circular and infinitely self-referential. It relies, by analogy, on properties of real ropes that have to be explained. The only current explanation of those properties is EM interactions between atoms! He uses the observed properties of those EM interactions (elasticicity etc) to explain EM interactions.
The part about ropes "bunching together" when objects approach each other or becoming superimposed when they are far apart is not really explained in any way that allows it to be properly critically examined.
Given the above, the rope looks more like a concept than any kind of possible object. In which case his description of it breaks many of the laws (e.g. movement) that he has set for the definition of "concept". And it seems to be not too different from the concepts that are often invoked in conventional explanations but which are clearly understood to be simply ways of visualising underlying mathematical descriptions.
The supposed explanation of gravitational lensing around the Sun as being caused by the ropes from the atoms in the Sun's corona looks like a hasty afterthought. It bears only the faintest superficial resemblance to observation. For one thing, the movements and variations in that corona would cause variations in lensing that are not observed in practice.
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In summary, I can't see any real merit in the rope theory. It doesn't define its terms properly, e.g. what it means by a rope. It makes no quantitative predictions by which it can be tested. It doesn't make any new predictions that existing theories do not make. Even qualitatively, it incorrectly predicts existing observations that are correctly predicted by existing theories. It fails to account for various existing observations that are accounted for by existing theories. In short, it fails pretty much every test of a valid scientific hypothesis.
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Gaede's 20 Points:
1. Physics is the study of objects, specifically, of objects that exist.
2. An object is that which has shape; space is that which doesn't. An object is that which has dimensions; space is that which doesn't. The words object and space are antonyms.
3. A concept is a relation between two or more objects. The definition of the word object precedes the definition of the word concept. Concepts and space are similar in that neither has shape. Concepts differ from space in that they are artificial.
4. An object is inherently continuous: for the purposes of Science, it is regarded to be made of a single piece. We can only point and name objects. Anything beyond this converts the object into a concept. We are now referring not to the object but to the relation of the object with respect to something else.
5. We refer to the specific space separating the surfaces of any two objects as distance. The distance of Physics is not the same as the distance-traveled of Mathematics.
6. Location consists of the set of distances from one object to the remaining ones in the Universe.
7. Exist is a word circumscribed to objects. An object exists if it has location. The aggregate of all objects that exist is what we call matter. An object that doesn't exist is known as an abstract or imaginary object. For the purposes of Science, concepts do not exist. They lack the two necessary attributes: shape and location.
8. Motion involves two or more locations of an object. Motion is a property circumscribed to objects that exist. Concepts and imaginary objects do not have the ability to move.
9. A scientific theory requires a hypothesis, a theory, and a conclusion.
10. A hypothesis is comprised of three steps or stages: the exhibits, the definitions, and the statement of the facts.
11. The exhibits phase of the scientific method involves the presentation of the objects that are to play a relevant role in the theory.
12. A definition is a set of limitations or restrictions placed on a word.
13. An object cannot be defined. The only way to present an object during a scientific presentation is to point to it and utter a sound (i.e., name it). The image may be an illustration, a statue, a mockup, or the real thing. After the exhibits phase, an object is treated as a concept for the remainder of the presentation.
14. A statement of the facts is a description of the initial scene(s). Its purpose is to introduce the relevant points to the jury. The prosecutor issues the statement of the facts. The jury makes assumptions (i.e., takes the statement of the facts at face value).
15. A theory is a movie, the prosecutor's version of how or why something occurred. The theory does not contain any of the frames of the statement of the facts.
16. Science differs from religion in that it does not offer supernatural or irrational explanations for physical phenomena.
17. The term supernatural refers to a theory for which the proponent presents valid exhibits and can make a movie of the explanation, yet the explanation cannot be imagined (e.g., God making matter in zero time) or violates natural laws as they are known to that point (e.g., Jesus walking on water).
18. Irrational involves any of the following: presenting unimaginable objects (e.g., 4-D space-time, 0-D black hole, 1-D line) moving concepts (e.g., energy transfer, moving the center of mass, applying a force) substituting an object for a concept (e.g., heart for love, point for location, 'ghost' for soul, etc.).
19. Traditional religion is for the most part supernatural. Mathematical Physics is almost entirely irrational. The five crucial words of Mathematical Physics -- energy, mass, field, force, time -- are irrational and unscientific.
20. A conclusion is the prosecutor's opinion of the theory: what he got out of it.
His ideas are published in a book and on a website: http://www.youstupidrelativist.com.
I have not read the book but I have started to examine the website. I've started this thread for anybody who is interested in discussing the ideas in it. It would be particularly interesting to hear from anybody who has read the book and/or examined the whole of the website and who thinks they have understood them enough to eludiate the ideas in them.
---
It is initially easy (in my view) to be put off by the style and content of the opening pages of the site. There is extensive fairly shallow ridiculing of "standard" ideas about physics using humour, cartoons, sarcasm and assertions about the things that standard physics says which are often gross parodies or simply misunderstandings or misrepresentations.
But if you persevere, and find the parts where Gaede sets out his view of how the discipline of physics ought to be approached, I think it is worth closer examination.
It's also worth looking at his "rope hypothesis", a hypothesis for the mechanism for EM radiation:
scribd.com/doc/54917714/Light-%E2%80%94 ... Hypothesis
---
Gaede sets out his view of what physics should be all about in the form of 20 bullet points, shown at the bottom of this post. I think he would consider it important to keep these points in mind when considering something like his rope theory of the propogation of electromagnetic waves.
---
Some comments on the points he makes below:
In the first few points he sets out his definitions of the words "object" and "concept". He doesn't explicitly say how these definitions relate to observations of those objects. He says the defining feature of an object is "shape", where shape means a discontinuous transition, or "boundary", between the object and its surroundings. The trouble is, the definition of what constitutes a discontinuous transition is generally a function of both the object and the observer. We define the transition point - the point where, say, liquid becomes gas, according to our requirements and the accuracy and methods of our observations. Observations using one method (e.g. light bouncing off the edge of the object into our unaided eyes) may yield a fairly well defined boundary where observations using another method (e.g. sensitive measurement of an electric field) may yield a continuous transition from one object to another or to empty space. I suspect he is thinking purely of unaided observations using EM waves in the visible range (i.e. light) scattering from objects made from atoms. He doesn't seem to acknowledge the "objective" existence of anything that cannot be directly observed using visible light. But the fact that small things can't be seen using visible light is purely a function of the relatively long wavelength of that light. So his definition seems to be arbitrarily defined by this.
He defines a "concept" as a relationship between objects. This must presumably include the configuration of objects. So, in this system, a wave on the surface of water, for example, is a concept, not an object. It is the configuration of, and relationship between, water molecules - objects. In point 8 he says that concepts cannot move. In the old system, we thought of water waves as moving. In Gaede's system we have to remember that it is the water molecules that are moving and that the apparent movement of the wave is itself just a concept. But it is too useful a concept to abandon. So we must now keep in mind two types of movement - real movement of real object, and the abstract, artificial concept of "movement" applied to concepts like waves.
Also, if the above paragraph is true, the idea that the relationship between objects is an abstract concept would also have to apply to the relationships between atoms in solids, just as it does for liquids when considering water waves. In this case a composite object like a molecule or a chair is, in reality, a collection of smaller objects (atoms) connected by concepts.
Here and elsewhere he places emphasis on the idea that objects should be visualizable. It must be possible to draw a picture of them, and place them in movies. Now, it is perfectly possible to draw a picture of various characteristics of something like an electron, just as it is perfectly possible to draw a picture of various aspects of, say, a person's face. But this in not a picture in the conventional sense. i.e. It is not a representation of the pattern produced when many many waves/photons of light bounce off various parts of the electron, because the concept of a picture of an electron is meaningless in that sense. If he thinks that this fact precludes an electron being thought of as an object, then his definition of an object is very much tied to arbitrary facts about the way that human beings see things. Anything smaller than the wavelength of visible light, for example, is not an object. On the other hand, if he allows a wider definition of the word "picture" to mean any graphical representation of some characteristics of an object, then I think many things he may try to define as concepts can quite happily be defined as objects. In fact, even a mathematical equation is a graphical representation of some aspect of its subject. It is a "picture".
In point 19 he asserts that the words energy, mass, field, force and time are irrational and unscientific. Given that he is setting out to completely redefine the term "scientific" I can see how he could argue that they are unscientific, by his new definition. I do not see how he can argue that they are irrational. This, to me, would mean that they could not possibly be used as part of any logical system of knowledge gathering. That system would be rendered meaningless and useless. It seems clear from a study of the history of science that these concepts have been used as part of a system that has accumulated a very large quantity of predictive knowledge about the empirical world that has been demonstrated to be very useful.
In the interests of brevity I will leave further comments for future discussion (if any) on this thread.
---
Some comments on the points he makes below as they relate to his rope theory of electromagnetic waves:
In his paper on rope theory, Gaede proposes the existence of two entwined ropes which connect every atom in the universe to every other atom and along which torsional oscillations can travel. These oscillations are EM waves. He sets out his view of how this model explains various observed EM phenomena and, as a bonus at the end, gravitational lensing.
My first thought is that it is not clear the extent to which he is talking metaphorically or literally. When he talks about a "rope" he appears to be placing it in his "object" category, as opposed to his "concept" category. He attributes properties to that rope (flexibility, elasticity etc) that, in a literal rope, would be a result of the atomic structure and inter-atomic EM bonds inside the rope. But presumably he cannot literally be talking about a long thin piece of material made from molecules; possibly polymers like nylon. In this case, the atoms comprising that rope would themselves have to be interconnected by lesser ropes, and so on ad infinitum. The universe would be stuffed full of an infinite quantity of rope atoms!
So the comparison with a real rope, whose wave carrying properties are a result of inter-atomic elastic forces, which are a result of EM interactions, must be an analogy. The trouble is, this still makes his explanation of EM wave phenomena circular and infinitely self-referential. It relies, by analogy, on properties of real ropes that have to be explained. The only current explanation of those properties is EM interactions between atoms! He uses the observed properties of those EM interactions (elasticicity etc) to explain EM interactions.
The part about ropes "bunching together" when objects approach each other or becoming superimposed when they are far apart is not really explained in any way that allows it to be properly critically examined.
Given the above, the rope looks more like a concept than any kind of possible object. In which case his description of it breaks many of the laws (e.g. movement) that he has set for the definition of "concept". And it seems to be not too different from the concepts that are often invoked in conventional explanations but which are clearly understood to be simply ways of visualising underlying mathematical descriptions.
The supposed explanation of gravitational lensing around the Sun as being caused by the ropes from the atoms in the Sun's corona looks like a hasty afterthought. It bears only the faintest superficial resemblance to observation. For one thing, the movements and variations in that corona would cause variations in lensing that are not observed in practice.
---
In summary, I can't see any real merit in the rope theory. It doesn't define its terms properly, e.g. what it means by a rope. It makes no quantitative predictions by which it can be tested. It doesn't make any new predictions that existing theories do not make. Even qualitatively, it incorrectly predicts existing observations that are correctly predicted by existing theories. It fails to account for various existing observations that are accounted for by existing theories. In short, it fails pretty much every test of a valid scientific hypothesis.
---
Gaede's 20 Points:
1. Physics is the study of objects, specifically, of objects that exist.
2. An object is that which has shape; space is that which doesn't. An object is that which has dimensions; space is that which doesn't. The words object and space are antonyms.
3. A concept is a relation between two or more objects. The definition of the word object precedes the definition of the word concept. Concepts and space are similar in that neither has shape. Concepts differ from space in that they are artificial.
4. An object is inherently continuous: for the purposes of Science, it is regarded to be made of a single piece. We can only point and name objects. Anything beyond this converts the object into a concept. We are now referring not to the object but to the relation of the object with respect to something else.
5. We refer to the specific space separating the surfaces of any two objects as distance. The distance of Physics is not the same as the distance-traveled of Mathematics.
6. Location consists of the set of distances from one object to the remaining ones in the Universe.
7. Exist is a word circumscribed to objects. An object exists if it has location. The aggregate of all objects that exist is what we call matter. An object that doesn't exist is known as an abstract or imaginary object. For the purposes of Science, concepts do not exist. They lack the two necessary attributes: shape and location.
8. Motion involves two or more locations of an object. Motion is a property circumscribed to objects that exist. Concepts and imaginary objects do not have the ability to move.
9. A scientific theory requires a hypothesis, a theory, and a conclusion.
10. A hypothesis is comprised of three steps or stages: the exhibits, the definitions, and the statement of the facts.
11. The exhibits phase of the scientific method involves the presentation of the objects that are to play a relevant role in the theory.
12. A definition is a set of limitations or restrictions placed on a word.
13. An object cannot be defined. The only way to present an object during a scientific presentation is to point to it and utter a sound (i.e., name it). The image may be an illustration, a statue, a mockup, or the real thing. After the exhibits phase, an object is treated as a concept for the remainder of the presentation.
14. A statement of the facts is a description of the initial scene(s). Its purpose is to introduce the relevant points to the jury. The prosecutor issues the statement of the facts. The jury makes assumptions (i.e., takes the statement of the facts at face value).
15. A theory is a movie, the prosecutor's version of how or why something occurred. The theory does not contain any of the frames of the statement of the facts.
16. Science differs from religion in that it does not offer supernatural or irrational explanations for physical phenomena.
17. The term supernatural refers to a theory for which the proponent presents valid exhibits and can make a movie of the explanation, yet the explanation cannot be imagined (e.g., God making matter in zero time) or violates natural laws as they are known to that point (e.g., Jesus walking on water).
18. Irrational involves any of the following: presenting unimaginable objects (e.g., 4-D space-time, 0-D black hole, 1-D line) moving concepts (e.g., energy transfer, moving the center of mass, applying a force) substituting an object for a concept (e.g., heart for love, point for location, 'ghost' for soul, etc.).
19. Traditional religion is for the most part supernatural. Mathematical Physics is almost entirely irrational. The five crucial words of Mathematical Physics -- energy, mass, field, force, time -- are irrational and unscientific.
20. A conclusion is the prosecutor's opinion of the theory: what he got out of it.
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