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If you think as a scientist would, how Willard Quine did, that naturalism, the spirit of empirically based ideas being the foundation for philosophical inquiry, then explain the following:

For me, it is the simplicity of philosophical issues that are striking. I put the question forward: ever hear of a physicist studying, Jupiter's moon's or carbon dating or whatever, who decides to begin the study with an account of the perceptual act the produces basic data? No. This is extraordinary. Such neglect is unthinkable in science, like neglecting the sun in the study of moon light. One looks at, around, all over this simple question and it becomes very clear that according to science, such data being about a world is impossible. This point is, nothing really could be more simple, but it is entirely ignored.

Of course we know why it is ignored. Because to study perception itself requires perception. It is impossible to study empirically. Literally impossible. But this changes nothing in terms of the "distance" that remains between claims about the world, and the things those claims are "about". Is this something that can be overcome?

Knowledge seems impossible. Because the "aboutness" of a knowledge claim must, to defensible, include how the perceptual act itself receives a world. There must be something "epistemic" about this connection. Can anyone say what this is?

thrasymachus wrote: ↑January 25th, 2025, 3:32 pm If you think as a scientist would, how Willard Quine did, that naturalism, the spirit of empirically based ideas being the foundation for philosophical inquiry, then explain the following:

For me, it is the simplicity of philosophical issues that are striking. I put the question forward: ever hear of a physicist studying, Jupiter's moon's or carbon dating or whatever, who decides to begin the study with an account of the perceptual act the produces basic data? No. This is extraordinary. Such neglect is unthinkable in science, like neglecting the sun in the study of moon light. One looks at, around, all over this simple question and it becomes very clear that according to science, such data being about a world is impossible. This point is, nothing really could be more simple, but it is entirely ignored.

Of course we know why it is ignored. Because to study perception itself requires perception. It is impossible to study empirically. Literally impossible. But this changes nothing in terms of the "distance" that remains between claims about the world, and the things those claims are "about". Is this something that can be overcome?

Knowledge seems impossible. Because the "aboutness" of a knowledge claim must, to defensible, include how the perceptual act itself receives a world. There must be something "epistemic" about this connection. Can anyone say what this is?

I think it's understood that science enables observers to create models of the actual world, from which theories can be extrapolated.  In lay terms we talk about such theories as if they're facts, but scientists don't.

Science has also helped us to understand that naive realism is wrong - for example that colour manifests in minds, not in nature.

What the scientific methodology relies on is our ability to inter-subjectively falsify our observations and measurements.  There-by creating a shared model of the world we inhabit.  And it's been remarkably successful in that, in both detail and explanatory scope. 

But because we humans who are inter-subjectively comparing notes suffer similar limitations and flaws, it's impossible to know how correct our inter-subjectively falsifiable model is - we simply don't have access to a god's-eye view of reality outside our first person povs.   However, it's the best methodology we have for apprehending reality  imo.  What else could work as well?

Gertie wrote

I think it's understood that science enables observers to create models of the actual world, from which theories can be extrapolated. In lay terms we talk about such theories as if they're facts, but scientists don't.

Several issues in this. One: a fact? How is a fact distinct from a theory? I suggest the latter is just more derivative of what is commonly held to be true. We don't question calling a fence post what it is because this is well shared reference, not because fence posts being "fence posts" has some objectively privileged ontology. There was a time when Copernicus' solar model was mere theory and far fetched. Now, it is a fact. Such things are all in play, and fixity is temporary, as Kuhn said, we live in the grasp paradigmatic truths, only.

"Actual" begs the question. How is actuality acknowledged at all?

Science has also helped us to understand that naive realism is wrong - for example that colour manifests in minds, not in nature.

So knowing what is natural rather than merely in the appearance makes knowledge non-naïve? But nature is a seriously slippery idea. How does one even begin to recognize what it is?

What the scientific methodology relies on is our ability to inter-subjectively falsify our observations and measurements. There-by creating a shared model of the world we inhabit. And it's been remarkably successful in that, in both detail and explanatory scope.

But because we humans who are inter-subjectively comparing notes suffer similar limitations and flaws, it's impossible to know how correct our inter-subjectively falsifiable model is - we simply don't have access to a god's-eye view of reality outside our first person povs. However, it's the best methodology we have for apprehending reality imo. What else could work as well?

How does agreement and success make for a model of the world that itself is not simply a model of agreement and success? It is built of ways to manage in cooperative environments, but are you saying because I live in a world where turning knobs and pulling levers "works," that therefore the world IS pulling and turning?

Falsifiability and verifiability are only as meaningful as the conditions in which they arise. Such conditions, says the OP, are going to be arbitrary if no account of perception itself accounted for. A bit like giving an account of gravity while ignoring all references to mass; or or explaining carbon dating leaving out all talk of particle physics.

You use the term "reality" rather loosely. You have to show how reality presents itself in science. Ask a physicist what a force is, and you will get values of measurement and comparison. Useful, sure. But is this reality?

thrasymachus

I think it's understood that science enables observers to create models of the actual world, from which theories can be extrapolated. In lay terms we talk about such theories as if they're facts, but scientists don't.

Several issues in this. One: a fact? How is a fact distinct from a theory? I suggest the latter is just more derivative of what is commonly held to be true. We don't question calling a fence post what it is because this is well shared reference, not because fence posts being "fence posts" has some objectively privileged ontology.

Here's how I see the epistemological issue.

You agree a 2m tall fence post exists when I point to it, because our observations and measuements tally. That's why we agree it's 'true'. Later on we give it a handy label 'fence post', and fence posts become a ''well shared reference''. Science uses the same methodology of inter-subjective falsification, using the the same flawed and limited ways humans observe and conceptualise ontological reality. Science itsel tells us we are flawed and limited observers, and rightly caveats its claims using the vocabulary of models and theories, accounts and current best explanations.

"Actual" begs the question. How is actuality acknowledged at all?

Commonly as I outlined, we assume the content of our conscious experience represents a real world 'out there' and we compare noteson the content of our conscious experience.

If we don't individually make this first assumption that our experience references some representation of reality, we end up with solipsism.

Science has also helped us to understand that naive realism is wrong - for example that colour manifests in minds, not in nature.

So knowing what is natural rather than merely in the appearance makes knowledge non-naïve?

Naive Realism is a term of art - ''Naive realism is the tendency to believe our perception of the world reflects it exactly as it is, unbiased and unfiltered.''

But nature is a seriously slippery idea. How does one even begin to recognize what it is?

Again, via the content of MY conscious experience. Which either represents a world 'out there', or is itself all that exists (solipsism). That's unknowable because I can't get outside my conscious experience to check - experiencing is how I know anything, and my experience itself is the only thing I can be certain exists.

But if I assume a world 'out there' exists, including other experiencing people I can check my observations with, together we can build a shared model of the world we inhabit. Some argue that this has resulted in a model of Physical (observable/measurable) reality which is so vast, detailed, predictive and has such explanatory scope, that it's reasonable to assume it's close to correct for the most part. And these seem like the best available criteria available to judge a model's accuracy. However, personally I'd say we simply can't know how accurate our model is. But we do seem to be 'in sync' with ontological reality in useful ways (at a particular level of resolution) - what the cognitive scientist Hoffman calls 'Darwinian fictions'.

Because we humans who are inter-subjectively comparing notes suffer similar limitations and flaws in perception and cognition, it's impossible to know how correct our inter-subjectively falsifiable model is - we simply don't have access to a god's-eye view of reality outside our first person povs. However, it's the best methodology we have for apprehending reality imo. What else could work as well?

How does agreement and success make for a model of the world that itself is not simply a model of agreement and success?

See above.

It is built of ways to manage in cooperative environments, but are you saying because I live in a world where turning knobs and pulling levers "works," that therefore the world IS pulling and turning?

The model which science and inter-subjective falsifiability provides (from agreeing we both see a 2m fence post to abstruse extrapolatory scientific theories) is basically a physicalist one. Of door knobs which turn when both you and I observe it together, rather than us and everyone else observing the planet to twist. Just like we check with each other that the fence post doesn't shrink and grow when one of us moves away/towards it.

As I say, it's the best methodology in our tool kit, but we can't check our flawed and limited toolkit for accuracy. We each can't even check it's not a solipsistic fantasy. Partly because science can't get a handle on conscious experience itself. But fundamentally because of the nature of conscious experience as a private, discrete, first person pov located in a specific time and space. We don't have access to 'a god's eye' pov.

Falsifiability and verifiability are only as meaningful as the conditions in which they arise. Such conditions, says the OP, are going to be arbitrary if no account of perception itself accounted for. A bit like giving an account of gravity while ignoring all references to mass; or or explaining carbon dating leaving out all talk of particle physics.

I've explained why science is not arbitrary above. Rather it's a process of building assumptions upon assumptions. Right from each person's assumption that solipsism isn't true.

You use the term "reality" rather loosely. You have to show how reality presents itself in science. Ask a physicist what a force is, and you will get values of measurement and comparison. Useful, sure. But is this reality?

By ''reality'' I mean the actual ontological state of affairs - that's how I've been using the word. And I've explained the epistemological limtations humans have.


TLDR -

- I assume my experience references an ontological reality.

- I assume that my experience either is a direct/flawless observation of reality, or is an experiential representation/ model of the actual ontological world as it is in itself.

- I compares notes on my experience with others who I assume are conscious experiencers like me, and together we inter-subjectively iron out anomalies and come up with a shared model of our shared world.

- Science applies this methodology to the physical things we can observe and measure, noting patterns which can be extrapolated to predictive theories.

- This eventually led to the current Physicalist model of the universe.

There are known problems with the methodology science is based on. I've out-lined the ones I find most relevant, which boil down to humans being flawed and limited observers and thinkers (and therefore flawed and limited knowers).

If you think you have a methodology which is a better way of knowing reality despite our limitations and flaws - that's what a real challenge to science would look like imo. I mean nobody can even rebut solopsism...

Gertie wrote

Here's how I see the epistemological issue.

You know, I just spend some solid time on a response, submitted it, only to find I was not logged in. I logged in, went back to recover, and it was all lost. Mildly put put. I do it tomorrow.

Same thing has happened to me, it's annoying. For some reason you now have to check the box which says ''keep me signed in'' by the log in boxes to stop it.