Philosophy Discussion Forums

Just finished The Moral Landscape (Sam Harris) and wanted to debate the central thesis of his book.

Do you believe that we can scientifically quantify what it means to be moral? Harris believes so, and says that we can find a way to maximize human well-being through scientific measures. His claim rests on the idea that increasing human well being should be the goal of morality. He defends this by stating that anything that we should care about related to morality is something that actually effects our well being. In other words, while some moral systems reference abstract values, he believes that the only thing we should really define as moral is something that increases human well being.

I imagine a counter example.

What if scientists could invent a machine where users would be given unlimited pleasure and their well being would be taken care of to the utmost. This machine has no drawbacks in that there is no "hangover" from leaving, and it can faithfully simulate the utmost pleasures of real life. This would not be a matrix-like machine, rather we would all be conscious of our participation, and the effects would be just as good as any other source of pleasure/wellbeing. A thin layer of professionals might be required to keep these machines running, but in their off hours they too would be hooked up to the machine. It seems that under Harris's framework, it would be moral to hook us all up to this machine.

Of course, I am writing this because I have an intuition that this is incorrect. There must be some other factor at play other than simply an increase to all human wellbeing. Is it our freedom to actually create worse consequences, to actually lower human wellbeing that in a roundabout way is really what we mean when we think of morality? I hope discussion leads to more ideas here, as I cant carry this train of thought forwards at this time without further reflection and discussion.

HJCarden wrote: ↑February 20th, 2024, 5:31 pm Just finished The Moral Landscape (Sam Harris) and wanted to debate the central thesis of his book.

Do you believe that we can scientifically quantify what it means to be moral? Harris believes so, and says that we can find a way to maximize human well-being through scientific measures. His claim rests on the idea that increasing human well being should be the goal of morality. He defends this by stating that anything that we should care about related to morality is something that actually effects our well being. In other words, while some moral systems reference abstract values, he believes that the only thing we should really define as moral is something that increases human well being.

I imagine a counter example.

What if scientists could invent a machine where users would be given unlimited pleasure and their well being would be taken care of to the utmost. This machine has no drawbacks in that there is no "hangover" from leaving, and it can faithfully simulate the utmost pleasures of real life. This would not be a matrix-like machine, rather we would all be conscious of our participation, and the effects would be just as good as any other source of pleasure/wellbeing. A thin layer of professionals might be required to keep these machines running, but in their off hours they too would be hooked up to the machine. It seems that under Harris's framework, it would be moral to hook us all up to this machine.

Of course, I am writing this because I have an intuition that this is incorrect. There must be some other factor at play other than simply an increase to all human wellbeing. Is it our freedom to actually create worse consequences, to actually lower human wellbeing that in a roundabout way is really what we mean when we think of morality? I hope discussion leads to more ideas here, as I cant carry this train of thought forwards at this time without further reflection and discussion.

Let’s say the entire world population is composed by Harry and Sally. Each one has a criterion for their well-being:

Harry feels that his well-being is achieved by living alone on an island X in the Caribbean.

Sally feels that her well-being is achieved by living in the company of another person on an island X in the Caribbean.

If you got Harris right, he thinks that we can achieve the well-being of Harry and Sally at the same time, because there must be an objective, universal measure of human well-being. He’s then obviously wrong, since these are mutually exclusive conceptions of well-being and there’s no way to conciliate them.

Having not read the book, I'm still stuck on if the author considers being "moral" as successfully following one's personal moral code (regardless of what they are) or following a set of predetermined codes regardless if the individual believes in them or not.

LuckyR wrote: ↑February 21st, 2024, 6:24 pm Having not read the book, I'm still stuck on if the author considers being "moral" as successfully following one's personal moral code (regardless of what they are) or following a set of predetermined codes regardless if the individual believes in them or not.

The author is not trying to practically etch out an ethical code, but is rather arguing that scientific discovery can lead to finding out what set of behaviors best maximize human wellbeing. He believes that increasing human wellbeing should be the goal of what we consider "morality" to be.

Count Lucanor wrote: ↑February 21st, 2024, 5:10 pm If you got Harris right, he thinks that we can achieve the well-being of Harry and Sally at the same time, because there must be an objective, universal measure of human well-being. He’s then obviously wrong, since these are mutually exclusive conceptions of well-being and there’s no way to conciliate them.

Harris's argument doesn't fail on this hypothetical, or at least I believe he would say that it doesn't affect his thesis. He's trying to show a path to increased human happiness by using science to maximize human wellbeing. In this hypothetical world, Harris might forced to throw his hands up in despair as he could have no answer. But in the real world, it's quite obvious that not all conceptions of happiness are mutually exclusive, and theres probably a lot of shared conceptions of happiness/wellbeing. Harris thinks that we can find a path to Morality through research aimed at isolating the conditions that satisfy widely held conditions of human well being, and then finding what behaviors most reliably create those conditions.

HJCarden wrote: ↑February 22nd, 2024, 10:40 am

LuckyR wrote: ↑February 21st, 2024, 6:24 pm Having not read the book, I'm still stuck on if the author considers being "moral" as successfully following one's personal moral code (regardless of what they are) or following a set of predetermined codes regardless if the individual believes in them or not.

The author is not trying to practically etch out an ethical code, but is rather arguing that scientific discovery can lead to finding out what set of behaviors best maximize human wellbeing. He believes that increasing human wellbeing should be the goal of what we consider "morality" to be.

Ah so. Well in that case, I agree with him that one can "scientifically" predict such a course of action. How accurate such predictions might be will definitely be lower than 100%, but likely superior to both the Law and average human behavior. Though I don't see this ability (of science) as important since in my experience the majority of the imperfections in human behavior involves not following what individuals know is the "correct" path, as opposed to a lack of knowledge of what is the correct path.

HJCarden wrote: ↑February 22nd, 2024, 10:56 am

Count Lucanor wrote: ↑February 21st, 2024, 5:10 pm If you got Harris right, he thinks that we can achieve the well-being of Harry and Sally at the same time, because there must be an objective, universal measure of human well-being. He’s then obviously wrong, since these are mutually exclusive conceptions of well-being and there’s no way to conciliate them.

Harris's argument doesn't fail on this hypothetical, or at least I believe he would say that it doesn't affect his thesis. He's trying to show a path to increased human happiness by using science to maximize human wellbeing. In this hypothetical world, Harris might forced to throw his hands up in despair as he could have no answer. But in the real world, it's quite obvious that not all conceptions of happiness are mutually exclusive, and theres probably a lot of shared conceptions of happiness/wellbeing. Harris thinks that we can find a path to Morality through research aimed at isolating the conditions that satisfy widely held conditions of human well being, and then finding what behaviors most reliably create those conditions.

As in many philosophical discussions, the use of the pronoun “we” makes it all muzzy and hard to reach useful conclusions. What do the participants in this debate and Sam Harris understand as “we”? It is very likely that it refers to a limited group of people, a set composed of an undetermined amount of members. So, Harris, according to you, is claiming that a group of people can generalize the common conditions of well-being of another group of people and then look for providing such conditions. The question is: to whom? To the group of people from which those conditions were abstracted or to other people as well?

I liked Harris’ book, The Moral landscape: How Science Can Determines Human Vaues. But it is flawed. Science cannot determine our moral values. Only we can do that. Science has no inbuilt, infallible moral-ometer. It cannot tell us that, morally, “wellbeing” is the only game in town. What if I think that, say, virtue or duty are morally more important?

The other problem is that we don’t know what wellbeing even means. It’s a vague term that will mean different things to different people. Who gets to decide what wellbeing is? What if the wellbeing of one conscious creature conflicts with the wellbeing of another? How can wellbeing be aggregated? These are problems common to all consequentialist ethical theories. They are problems that Harris simply ignores.

Well known professional philosophers such as Daniel Dennett, Simon Blackburn and Russel Blackford pointed out these problems soon after the book was published. They spoil an otherwise great book. Harris needs to rethink them.

Count Lucanor wrote: ↑February 21st, 2024, 5:10 pm
Let’s say the entire world population is composed by Harry and Sally. Each one has a criterion for their well-being:

Harry feels that his well-being is achieved by living alone on an island X in the Caribbean.

Sally feels that her well-being is achieved by living in the company of another person on an island X in the Caribbean.

If you got Harris right, he thinks that we can achieve the well-being of Harry and Sally at the same time, because there must be an objective, universal measure of human well-being. He’s then obviously wrong, since these are mutually exclusive conceptions of well-being and there’s no way to conciliate them.

Nope, you got Sam Harris wrong. He would say that those two criteria would obviously not be the well-being of humanity. Two separately different concepts obviously qualifies as being subjective, not objective.

Count Lucanor wrote: ↑February 22nd, 2024, 3:00 pm

HJCarden wrote: ↑February 22nd, 2024, 10:56 am

Count Lucanor wrote: ↑February 21st, 2024, 5:10 pm If you got Harris right, he thinks that we can achieve the well-being of Harry and Sally at the same time, because there must be an objective, universal measure of human well-being. He’s then obviously wrong, since these are mutually exclusive conceptions of well-being and there’s no way to conciliate them.

Harris's argument doesn't fail on this hypothetical, or at least I believe he would say that it doesn't affect his thesis. He's trying to show a path to increased human happiness by using science to maximize human wellbeing. In this hypothetical world, Harris might forced to throw his hands up in despair as he could have no answer. But in the real world, it's quite obvious that not all conceptions of happiness are mutually exclusive, and theres probably a lot of shared conceptions of happiness/wellbeing. Harris thinks that we can find a path to Morality through research aimed at isolating the conditions that satisfy widely held conditions of human well being, and then finding what behaviors most reliably create those conditions.

As in many philosophical discussions, the use of the pronoun “we” makes it all muzzy and hard to reach useful conclusions. What do the participants in this debate and Sam Harris understand as “we”? It is very likely that it refers to a limited group of people, a set composed of an undetermined amount of members. So, Harris, according to you, is claiming that a group of people can generalize the common conditions of well-being of another group of people and then look for providing such conditions. The question is: to whom? To the group of people from which those conditions were abstracted or to other people as well?

Wrong. Sam Harris isn't arguing that a group of people should decide what is well-being for another group. That's totally the opposite of his argument.

Morality is objective is not even wrong. It is a statement without any meaning what ever.

Let us set the record straight on this idiotc question that keeps coming up
"Is moraltiy sujective or objective", " "what would it take?" etc..
The whole problem seem to be a mischaracterisation of what the subject/object argument is all about.
Things are not objective or subjective in and of themselves.
Subjectiity and objectivity refer to a RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN two things. Between the percieved and the perceiver.
SO it may not be asked "is morality objective" anymore than "is morality subjective".
What is morality but a collection of rules "decided" by society, or through normative association rules that it is claimed ought to be followed for society to work to minimises conflict and aportion rights. SOme moral systems claim to do this equally, others to reserve rights to special groups.

For any given "moral rule" it may not be said to be subjective or objective.
The utterance of the rule and its relationship to the person uttering it is where the object/subject argument lies.
It does not have to be absolute, it can be seen as a spectrum where the interests of the speaker amy or not be favoured; may or not favour their group, or favour their own society - all these are subjective showing a tendancy towards the objectness.
One might conclude that only rules that treat with all humans equally without excpetion are objective. But who wants a morality without mitigation?
As the years have passed I have asked these threads to NAME ONE OBJECTIVE RULE, yet never once has a successful attempt been made to achieve that.
Usually they go for the jugular: "It is wrong to kill".
Once they are showered with all the exceptions; Killing Hitler; euthanasia, just war; legal execuations; abortion of non viablee foetuses; killing to eat;use of insecticides; antibiotics....
Where is YOUR limit? And what appears is a subjective opinion about which forms of killing are morally acceptible, with a claim that they are being objective - they are not.
Each of us has a different reaction to these levels of killing - an there is not necessarily agreement about where on the scale each should appear.
Defenders of moral objectivism usuall end with something very extreme as an example; It is wrong to skin-alive human babies. WHilst it is possible to find rational objections to this rule, by then the argument has gone beyond the Hitler realm.
But the only and ultimate answer to why an action is immoral is "it feels bad", "it causes suffering", or "I don't like it" or the banal "life is sacred" - a rule they have already transgressed with their choice of acceptible killing. Whatever justification used, without mitigation no rule ITSELF is useful, or moral.

The objectivity or subjectivity lies between the reality and the perceiver. It is not inherent in the rule. Humans make up these rules, never all humans (that is impossible) but some humans who have taken the "moral highground" to demand that their personal choices are better argued, have better raison detre, serve better purposes.
But usually these do not suit everyone. Whilst other might try to judge the level of subjectivity in any given particular utterance, no one is without some bias. Bias in where we get our opinions.

Morality is objective is not even wrong. It is a statement without any meaning what ever.

All arguments for moral objectivity that I have seen fail. A lot of people find it really really hard to accept that moral goodness and badness are not objectively real. They find it hard to believe that the only thing wrong with boiling babies alive is that they don't like it. But that really is all there is to it. It may be objectively true that they don't like boiling babies, but that is not in question. The badness does no adhere in the act but in our feelings about the act. It's the same with moral goodness. I think helping people out where we can is nice. I like it. And that's all there is to it. The goodness and badness is to be found in how we feel about actions and not in the actions themselves. And that's ok because no normal human likes boiling babies and almost all normal humans feel good about helping others out if they can. Therefore, we don't lose anything by abandoning moral realism and attempts to objectify moral goodness and badness. Our feelings about our actions are by and large reliable guides.

Sam Harris' attempt to objectify morality failed just as all other attempts have failed over the last two-and-a-half millennia. And that is unfortunate because in all other respects The Moral Landscape is a very good book. Dennett criticism of the book was right on the mark - Harris should have gotten up to speed on moral philosophy before he stated writing about morality. Sure, once we have decided that the wellbeing of conscious creatures is what is important, and once we agree on what wellbeing means, then science can help us achieve it. But science cannot tell us that the WBCC is what is morally right. That will depend on how we feel about it.

night912 wrote: ↑April 12th, 2024, 5:13 am

Count Lucanor wrote: ↑February 21st, 2024, 5:10 pm
Let’s say the entire world population is composed by Harry and Sally. Each one has a criterion for their well-being:

Harry feels that his well-being is achieved by living alone on an island X in the Caribbean.

Sally feels that her well-being is achieved by living in the company of another person on an island X in the Caribbean.

If you got Harris right, he thinks that we can achieve the well-being of Harry and Sally at the same time, because there must be an objective, universal measure of human well-being. He’s then obviously wrong, since these are mutually exclusive conceptions of well-being and there’s no way to conciliate them.

Nope, you got Sam Harris wrong. He would say that those two criteria would obviously not be the well-being of humanity. Two separately different concepts obviously qualifies as being subjective, not objective.

He’s wrong, then. All concepts of value are subjective. They depend on a person deciding whether state of being A is better than state of being B or not. All that can be made objective is how some observed conditions match some criterion of well-being, which will be subjective, even though agreed upon with a group of people.

night912 wrote: ↑April 12th, 2024, 5:17 am

Count Lucanor wrote: ↑February 22nd, 2024, 3:00 pm

HJCarden wrote: ↑February 22nd, 2024, 10:56 am

Count Lucanor wrote: ↑February 21st, 2024, 5:10 pm If you got Harris right, he thinks that we can achieve the well-being of Harry and Sally at the same time, because there must be an objective, universal measure of human well-being. He’s then obviously wrong, since these are mutually exclusive conceptions of well-being and there’s no way to conciliate them.

Harris's argument doesn't fail on this hypothetical, or at least I believe he would say that it doesn't affect his thesis. He's trying to show a path to increased human happiness by using science to maximize human wellbeing. In this hypothetical world, Harris might forced to throw his hands up in despair as he could have no answer. But in the real world, it's quite obvious that not all conceptions of happiness are mutually exclusive, and theres probably a lot of shared conceptions of happiness/wellbeing. Harris thinks that we can find a path to Morality through research aimed at isolating the conditions that satisfy widely held conditions of human well being, and then finding what behaviors most reliably create those conditions.

As in many philosophical discussions, the use of the pronoun “we” makes it all muzzy and hard to reach useful conclusions. What do the participants in this debate and Sam Harris understand as “we”? It is very likely that it refers to a limited group of people, a set composed of an undetermined amount of members. So, Harris, according to you, is claiming that a group of people can generalize the common conditions of well-being of another group of people and then look for providing such conditions. The question is: to whom? To the group of people from which those conditions were abstracted or to other people as well?

Wrong. Sam Harris isn't arguing that a group of people should decide what is well-being for another group. That's totally the opposite of his argument.

What is his point, then? Seems like no one can put forward what his point is…

Harris argues that the WBCC is moral bedrock. He fails to recognize that science cannot tell us that the WBCC is moral bedrock. Only we can decide that based on our sujective moral sentiments. Science cannot do the moral work for us.

Harris also fails to recognise that, even if we decide that the WBCC is moral bedrock, people can reasonably disagree about what constitutes wellbeing and about how to achieve wellbeing. Maybe wellbeing is to be found in doing what Allah or the Pope commands. Maybe wellbeing is to be found in the purest hedonism.