Philosophy Discussion Forums

The Problem of Evil, as most of us know, can be stated like this:

1) God is the all-powerful and all-benevolent creator of the universe.
2) Evil exists in that universe.
3) If God is all-powerful, and yet evil exists, God must not be all-benevolent.
4) If God is all-benevolent, and yet evil exists, God must not be all-powerful.
5) So, the all-powerful and all-benevolent God does not exist.

The argument is sound provided that you accept its definition of God.

However, the definition depends on a conception of God that is akin to our conception of geometric shapes. For example, if a polygon has three angles, then it is a triangle. If it has some other number of angles, it is not. So too with the definition of God in the argument above: If a being is all-powerful and all-benevolent, then it is God. If the being lacks one or both of these characteristics, then it is not.

However, most theists conceive of God as a person rather than a geometric shape. The former, unlike the latter, can have characteristics that are apparent but not actual.

For example, consider a nonce person we'll call "Greg," a thirty-year-old man who lives in a middle-class neighborhood with a low crime rate. Greg helps little old ladies across the street. People trust him to babysit their children, and he has never violated that trust. He has no criminal record. His neighbors praise him frequently for his cheerful willingness to help them whenever he can. In light of all this, people in his social universe credit him with consistent moral goodness.

That's because the latter people do not know that Greg is a serial killer who abducts people from a neighboring city, takes them to a secret sound-proof room beneath his kitchen floor, and uses the equipment there to process them into canned dog food, which he feeds to his dog. Greg finds his clandestine activity to be ... well, let's just say personally gratifying. It's best not to be too specific about the type of gratification on a family-oriented philosophy forum.

Now imagine that Greg is found out, thanks to a brilliant detective on the local police force. The neighbors are shocked. The neighbors say that Greg is not the consistently good man that they thought he was. <b>But the neighbors do not say that Greg does not exist.</b> They might say that the good Greg they knew did not exist, but they would say so only in a metaphorical sense. They would know that, literally, Greg still exists because Greg is a person and, as such, can have apparent rather than real characteristics. He can lack an apparent characteristic and still be Greg.

If we conceive of God as a person, rather than some mathematical entity, then God can exist even if he lacks one of these two characteristics: a) being all-powerful, and b) being all-benevolent.

Indeed, I once knew someone who lost his children in a natural disaster. He credits God with the strength to carry on after that tragedy, but does not believe that God is all-powerful. (Yes, this is real.)

As for a God who is all-powerful but not all-benevolent, such a being would constitute a good theistic explanation of many of the events we all read about in newspapers.

That's my argument. What do you think?

rainchild wrote: ↑January 28th, 2024, 11:45 pm The Problem of Evil, as most of us know, can be stated like this:

1) God is the all-powerful and all-benevolent creator of the universe.
2) Evil exists in that universe.
3) If God is all-powerful, and yet evil exists, God must not be all-benevolent.
4) If God is all-benevolent, and yet evil exists, God must not be all-powerful.
5) So, the all-powerful and all-benevolent God does not exist.

The argument is sound provided that you accept its definition of God.

[...]

That's my argument. What do you think?

The argument also depends on its definition of "Evil". In fact, I think the whole nonsensical discussion hinges on what is meant by "Evil". In the traditional Christian 'problem of evil', I think it is normally taken to mean "something that humans view negatively". This skewed and astonishingly-arrogant perspective leads to the strange arguments we have all seen in the past, and (I presume) will continue to see for as long as there are Christians...

rainchild wrote: ↑January 28th, 2024, 11:45 pm The Problem of Evil, as most of us know, can be stated like this:

1) God is the all-powerful and all-benevolent creator of the universe.
2) Evil exists in that universe.
3) If God is all-powerful, and yet evil exists, God must not be all-benevolent.
4) If God is all-benevolent, and yet evil exists, God must not be all-powerful.
5) So, the all-powerful and all-benevolent God does not exist.

The argument is sound provided that you accept its definition of God.

However, the definition depends on a conception of God that is akin to our conception of geometric shapes. For example, if a polygon has three angles, then it is a triangle. If it has some other number of angles, it is not. So too with the definition of God in the argument above: If a being is all-powerful and all-benevolent, then it is God. If the being lacks one or both of these characteristics, then it is not.

However, most theists conceive of God as a person rather than a geometric shape. The former, unlike the latter, can have characteristics that are apparent but not actual.

For example, consider a nonce person we'll call "Greg," a thirty-year-old man who lives in a middle-class neighborhood with a low crime rate. Greg helps little old ladies across the street. People trust him to babysit their children, and he has never violated that trust. He has no criminal record. His neighbors praise him frequently for his cheerful willingness to help them whenever he can. In light of all this, people in his social universe credit him with consistent moral goodness.

That's because the latter people do not know that Greg is a serial killer who abducts people from a neighboring city, takes them to a secret sound-proof room beneath his kitchen floor, and uses the equipment there to process them into canned dog food, which he feeds to his dog. Greg finds his clandestine activity to be ... well, let's just say personally gratifying. It's best not to be too specific about the type of gratification on a family-oriented philosophy forum.

Now imagine that Greg is found out, thanks to a brilliant detective on the local police force. The neighbors are shocked. The neighbors say that Greg is not the consistently good man that they thought he was. <b>But the neighbors do not say that Greg does not exist.</b> They might say that the good Greg they knew did not exist, but they would say so only in a metaphorical sense. They would know that, literally, Greg still exists because Greg is a person and, as such, can have apparent rather than real characteristics. He can lack an apparent characteristic and still be Greg.

If we conceive of God as a person, rather than some mathematical entity, then God can exist even if he lacks one of these two characteristics: a) being all-powerful, and b) being all-benevolent.

Indeed, I once knew someone who lost his children in a natural disaster. He credits God with the strength to carry on after that tragedy, but does not believe that God is all-powerful. (Yes, this is real.)

As for a God who is all-powerful but not all-benevolent, such a being would constitute a good theistic explanation of many of the events we all read about in newspapers.

That's my argument. What do you think?

An interesting and thoughtful post you've made here. I'll offer a couple of points for your consideration.

First, I believe there is a flaw in your argument. Though I think you've stated the 'problem of evil' correctly (i.e. that the existence of an all-powerful and all-benevolent God is incompatible with the existence of evil), your conclusion in point 5 does not follow in the argument as presented. If points 1) and 2) are your premises, and points 3) and 4) are the contradictions that result from those premises, then your conclusion in 5) should be restated to be:

5) So, either the all-powerful and all-benevolent God does not exist, or evil does not exist in that universe.

In other words, the contradictions imply that one or the other of the premises must be incorrect - it does not imply that the only first premise must be incorrect.

The remainder of your post suggests that you take it for granted that evil exists, and that therefore the first premise is incorrect (and I think that's the position that a lot of people would take), but that you revise the premise to redefine God rather than to simply dismiss God as not existing.
That's my take on what you've written, but you can let me know if I've misunderstood any of it.

From my own point of view, I'm not able to accept the revised definition of God as a being that is less than omnibenevolent and omnipotent because this suggests to me a being that is no longer really a God any more at all, but just another contingent being that is beholden to other higher powers than those from within itself, which sounds like a kind of 'demi-god' that is subservient to another God or gods, or to other higher powers of good and evil over which it has no control. In other words, in redefining God this way, rather than resolving the problem of evil, you've just displaced that power and benevolence formerly attributed to God out to some yet unidentified other being or locus of power elsewhere in the universe.

So, rather than this solution, I would take the position that premise 2) must be the false one here, and that it is evil that does not really exist in the universe, but rather only appears to exist. This resolution of the argument, of course, will lead to a lot of additional questions that will be controversial and maybe too much to try to address here, so that's probably better left as a topic for another thread.

Thanks for your post!

Thanks for your response. My central point is that, if we conceive of God as a person, then the fact that he lacks a characteristic that we thought he had does not prove that he does not exist.<p>

If I were a cult-leader, and my followers alleged that I was all-powerful and all-benevolent, my lack of these characteristics would not prove that I don't exist.<p>

There is nothing incoherent about accepting the horns of the dilemma that the Problem of Evil establishes.<p>

God's power could have limits, notwithstanding prior assertions to the contrary, because there's nothing incoherent about saying "We used to think that God was all-powerful but now we don't."<p>

So too with God's all-benevolence: "We used to think that God was all-benevolent, but now we know that he creates natural catastrophes and starts bloody wars just to get his giggles." There is nothing incoherent about that statement either.<p>

That's because, since God is a person, there are many characteristics that identify him as God, not just the few referenced in the argument from evil that God does not exist. (e.g., creator of the universe, personal concern for all of the beings he has created--especially humans, temporarily incarnate as a man according to Christians, the inner voice that stops me from drinking, incorporeal, metaphysically simple, the reason that my church is the only true one, etc.)<p>

So, all the argument from evil establishes is that God can't be both all-powerful and all-benevolent: his non-existence doesn't follow.

At least, that's what I think. Your views may vary.

Rainchild, I think that you have stated the problem of evil correctly. If a god is omnipotent and omnibenevolent, and if there is evil in the world, then the description god as omnipotent and omnibenevolent is problematic. One way out of this is a Thomyum2 suggested - evil may not really exist, perhaps it's an illusion. But that would be hard to sustain: an earthquake that kills my innocent children is difficult to see as anything other than BAD, as a natural evil over which an omnipotent and omnibenevolent god ought to have had control and prevented. Also, if evil did not exist, then why did god need to prohibit it? If my innocent children are murdered, why didn't god make it impossible for us to commit such evil so that their murder would not have happened.? He is said to have made us in his image. So why didn't he at least make us omnibenevolent so that we would be always nice to each other? There just seem to be too many holes in the omni-god story. I cannot see how to make myself believe that earthquakes and murders are somehow not evil, that their evil is illusory. The only thing to do, if one wanted to continue to believe in an omni-god is to say that, despite the contradictions, the god must know what he's doing because he's omni, right? But that does not work easily for me either.

rainchild wrote: ↑January 29th, 2024, 5:28 pm Thanks for your response. My central point is that, if we conceive of God as a person, then the fact that he lacks a characteristic that we thought he had does not prove that he does not exist.<p>

If I were a cult-leader, and my followers alleged that I was all-powerful and all-benevolent, my lack of these characteristics would not prove that I don't exist.<p>

There is nothing incoherent about accepting the horns of the dilemma that the Problem of Evil establishes.<p>

God's power could have limits, notwithstanding prior assertions to the contrary, because there's nothing incoherent about saying "We used to think that God was all-powerful but now we don't."<p>

So too with God's all-benevolence: "We used to think that God was all-benevolent, but now we know that he creates natural catastrophes and starts bloody wars just to get his giggles." There is nothing incoherent about that statement either.<p>

That's because, since God is a person, there are many characteristics that identify him as God, not just the few referenced in the argument from evil that God does not exist. (e.g., creator of the universe, personal concern for all of the beings he has created--especially humans, temporarily incarnate as a man according to Christians, the inner voice that stops me from drinking, incorporeal, metaphysically simple, the reason that my church is the only true one, etc.)<p>

So, all the argument from evil establishes is that God can't be both all-powerful and all-benevolent: his non-existence doesn't follow.

At least, that's what I think. Your views may vary.

God may exist as creator of everything and every event , but lack omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence. This is the God of the deists, who were actually atheists trying to ingratiate themselves with theists.
The argument from evil establishes what you say, Rainchild. The moral of what you say is we need to define a reasonable God.

Belindi wrote: ↑January 31st, 2024, 6:32 am God may exist as creator of everything and every event, but lack omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence. This is the God of the deists, who were actually atheists trying to ingratiate themselves with theists.
The argument from evil establishes what you say, Rainchild. The moral of what you say is we need to define a reasonable God.

Yes, we agree that the Problem of Evil addresses God's character rather than his existence. However, I know of no historical evidence that deists were actually atheists. You have to remember that deism had its heyday before the intricacy and diversity of life and other features of the natural world had any explanation other than a superhumanly intelligent and powerful creator.

I do think the problem of evil requires some adjusting of theology, besides the formation of a theodicy or defense.
The biggest reformation needed in theology is a requirement that God does not sustain or create the world at every second, as God cannot sustain evil. This requires a rejection of some philosophical arguments for the existence of God such as the Thomistic Cosmological Argument, as that requires that God sustains every cause and effect that has existed, does exist, and will exist.
Rather, we should understand that God created free beings and that those free beings decided to act in a way contradictory to God's nature.
The question here is then "Could God have created free beings that never sin?" Plantinga's Free Will Defense seems to give a good reason as to why God could not have.

rainchild wrote: ↑January 28th, 2024, 11:45 pm The Problem of Evil, as most of us know, can be stated like this:

1) God is the all-powerful and all-benevolent creator of the universe.
2) Evil exists in that universe.
3) If God is all-powerful, and yet evil exists, God must not be all-benevolent.
4) If God is all-benevolent, and yet evil exists, God must not be all-powerful.
5) So, the all-powerful and all-benevolent God does not exist.

The argument is sound provided that you accept its definition of God.

However, the definition depends on a conception of God that is akin to our conception of geometric shapes. For example, if a polygon has three angles, then it is a triangle. If it has some other number of angles, it is not. So too with the definition of God in the argument above: If a being is all-powerful and all-benevolent, then it is God. If the being lacks one or both of these characteristics, then it is not.

However, most theists conceive of God as a person rather than a geometric shape. The former, unlike the latter, can have characteristics that are apparent but not actual.

For example, consider a nonce person we'll call "Greg," a thirty-year-old man who lives in a middle-class neighborhood with a low crime rate. Greg helps little old ladies across the street. People trust him to babysit their children, and he has never violated that trust. He has no criminal record. His neighbors praise him frequently for his cheerful willingness to help them whenever he can. In light of all this, people in his social universe credit him with consistent moral goodness.

That's because the latter people do not know that Greg is a serial killer who abducts people from a neighboring city, takes them to a secret sound-proof room beneath his kitchen floor, and uses the equipment there to process them into canned dog food, which he feeds to his dog. Greg finds his clandestine activity to be ... well, let's just say personally gratifying. It's best not to be too specific about the type of gratification on a family-oriented philosophy forum.

Now imagine that Greg is found out, thanks to a brilliant detective on the local police force. The neighbors are shocked. The neighbors say that Greg is not the consistently good man that they thought he was. <b>But the neighbors do not say that Greg does not exist.</b> They might say that the good Greg they knew did not exist, but they would say so only in a metaphorical sense. They would know that, literally, Greg still exists because Greg is a person and, as such, can have apparent rather than real characteristics. He can lack an apparent characteristic and still be Greg.

If we conceive of God as a person, rather than some mathematical entity, then God can exist even if he lacks one of these two characteristics: a) being all-powerful, and b) being all-benevolent.

Indeed, I once knew someone who lost his children in a natural disaster. He credits God with the strength to carry on after that tragedy, but does not believe that God is all-powerful. (Yes, this is real.)

As for a God who is all-powerful but not all-benevolent, such a being would constitute a good theistic explanation of many of the events we all read about in newspapers.

That's my argument. What do you think?

I agree this argument only works for a definition of ''God'' as ''the all-powerful and all-benevolent creator of the universe.''. It sort of says so on the can.

But ''God(s)'' denotes a title which can be defined (or conferred) in pretty much any way enough people agree with to establish a religion. And we know there have been innumerable gods in vogue at different times and places, so there's really no set list of attributes to qualify.

So if your definition of ''God'' retains ''the all-powerful and creator of the universe'' part but omits ''all-benevolent'', then yes clearly a different argument would be required to counter the claim of that God's existence.

My own feeling is that I wouldn't be inclined to bestow the ''God'' title on a being which is all-powerful, but not benevolent. Except if I was scared of being punished. As for creator, I wouldn't call the Big Bang or whatever else 'creation' might be ''God'' either. I mean my parents created me, but ''Gods'' would be stretching it .

lincoy3411 wrote: ↑February 2nd, 2024, 6:01 pm I do think the problem of evil requires some adjusting of theology, besides the formation of a theodicy or defense.
The biggest reformation needed in theology is a requirement that God does not sustain or create the world at every second, as God cannot sustain evil. This requires a rejection of some philosophical arguments for the existence of God such as the Thomistic Cosmological Argument, as that requires that God sustains every cause and effect that has existed, does exist, and will exist.
Rather, we should understand that God created free beings and that those free beings decided to act in a way contradictory to God's nature.
The question here is then "Could God have created free beings that never sin?" Plantinga's Free Will Defense seems to give a good reason as to why God could not have.

I personally prefer the formulation 'The Problem of Suffering', as it specifies the nature of evil - tho some might disagree. So I'll address the Free Will'' theodicy on that basis.

The most obvious objection is that of 'natural' causes of suffering which happen regardless of people freely choosing to act in accordance with God's all-good nature. Natural disasters, disease, accidents, predation necessary to survival - and moral choices where there is no perfectly good outcome come to mind. That's a heck of a list. Would a perfectly benevolent God create such a world?

Plantinga takes a position which basically claims this is best of all possible worlds compatible with free will (as I understand it), but how do you justify such apparently avoidable awful and ubiquitous suffering unrelated to free will?

lincoy3411 wrote: ↑February 2nd, 2024, 6:01 pm I do think the problem of evil requires some adjusting of theology, besides the formation of a theodicy or defense.
The biggest reformation needed in theology is a requirement that God does not sustain or create the world at every second, as God cannot sustain evil. This requires a rejection of some philosophical arguments for the existence of God such as the Thomistic Cosmological Argument, as that requires that God sustains every cause and effect that has existed, does exist, and will exist.
Rather, we should understand that God created free beings and that those free beings decided to act in a way contradictory to God's nature.
The question here is then "Could God have created free beings that never sin?" Plantinga's Free Will Defense seems to give a good reason as to why God could not have.

Oh and wellcome to the forum btw!

Based on my paradigms, I replace God with the Sun and the Earth, our creators.

Some theists have understandably wondered if the Earth was not a level of hell. When you think of the tremendous suffering that happens, along with the inevitability of death, when you consider inhuman treatment of humans and harsh and cruel treatment of animals, and then consider what happens to wild animals in nature (from which civilisation is an escape) ... and the claim has some merit.

We are born, clueless and afraid, we spend a period trying to work out what's going on, and then we tend to finish up clueless and afraid as we die. Still, there's plenty of good times being had too, because a biosphere that develops by eating itself is a zero-sum game. The antelope is hunted by the lion. While the antelope experiences terror and agony, the lion experiences excitement and bliss.

Even when we cooperate, the bloc then acts at the expense of other people and living beings.

God is not omnipotent either. The Sun and Earth might be remarkably potent, but they are not omnipotent. An argument that God is amoral and highly potent makes more sense, given the realities, than a omnibenevolent and omnipotent God.

Plantinga proposes that humans are not the only free creatures, as would be in line with typical Christian Doctrine. He claims that other free creatures caused natural evil. These free creatures are often called demons.

If all was created by "God", then that includes demons, so they cannot be blamed.

Then, however, the problem would be completely collapsed into the regular problem of evil in which Plantinga's Free Will Defense provides a plausible solution.