A tough test for theism. Theism can only assume God who merely existed in the past, i.e. who is no longer present.
Posted: March 28th, 2023, 8:52 am
I present an argument for the bygone existence of God. It is important to note that I refer only to theism. What I write is of course not without alternatives: pantheism, panentheism etc., provided the first premise is true. It is probably philosophically and empirically impossible to prove an absolute temporal beginning of the world.
A 1. The universe began to exist a finite time ago.
A 2. Only an act originating from God could have caused the universe to begin.
B 1. Creation from nothing is impossible.
B 2. However, the transformation of a transcendent substance into mundane things is possible.
C 1. God is absolutely simple. Otherwise, He would not be the first and most original principle.
C 2. Accordingly, He has no parts to offer for transformation. Rather, He would have to give Himself completely for this purpose. In fact, in His simplicity, He is so much of one piece that He would be entirely the power that would serve to transform.
D Therefore, God has completely transformed Himself into the universe.
Here are three quotes to help explain B 1:
(1) “The Supreme does not create out of nothing. Ex nihilo nihil fit—out of nothing nothing comes. He produces from His Own eternal nature and eternal wisdom, wherein all things dwell in a latent condition, all contrasts exist in a hidden or non-manifest state.” (W. P. SWAINSON – JACOB BOEHME. THE TEUTONIC PHILOSOPHER)
(2) “Classical theists hold that God created the world ex nihilo, out of nothing. This phrase carries a privative, not a positive, sense: it means not out of something as opposed to out of something called ‘nothing.’ This much is crystal clear. Less clear is how creation ex nihilo (CEN), comports, if it does comport, with the following hallowed principle:
ENN: Ex nihilo nihit fit. Nothing comes from nothing.
My present problem is this: If (ENN) is true, how can (CEN) be true? How can God create out of nothing if nothing can come from nothing? It would seem that our two principles form an inconsistent dyad. How solve it?
It would be unavailing to say that God, being omnipotent, can do anything, including making something come out of nothing. For omnipotence, rightly understood, does not imply that God can do anything, but that God can do anything that it is possible to do.
God does not create out of pre-given matter, essences, or mere possibilia. But if God creates out of nothing distinct from himself, this formulation allows that, in some sense, God creates ex Deo, out of himself. Creating the world out of himself, God creates the world out of nothing distinct from himself. In this way, (CEN) and (ENN) are rendered compatible.” (Maverick Philosopher – Creation ex nihilo or ex deo)
(3) “If the world (as effect) emerges neither from sheer nothingness [...] nor from any pre-existent some-thing, it seems that the world must emerge ex deo – i.e. from God[.] [...] [Thomas] Aquinas seems to reject this conclusion when, for example, he castigates David of Dinant for teaching the ‘absurd thesis’ that God is prime matter. [...] As long as we are careful, however, not to assume that a material cause has to be some kind of physical ‘stuff’, there seems to be no reason why we cannot speak of God being the ‘material cause’ of the world: i.e., the innermost Cause that provides the whole substantial reality of the creature.” (Daniel Soars - Creation in Aquinas: ex nihilo or ex deo?)
The following quote mentions a theological problem in case one wants to assume that God is not absolutely simple and has parts:
“There’s an objection—I’ll call it the ‘Injury Problem’—that I think poses a larger problem for the claim that God creates out of His proper parts. The objection is this: if the x’s are proper parts of God and God creates the universe out of the x’s, then God loses whatever functions or features the x’s conferred on God. And this would make God worse off or lessened. For instance, if Michelangelo created the statue of David not out of a block of marble but out of the flesh and bone in his right foot, Michelangelo would no longer be able to walk as he once did. It would seem that something just as injurious to God would take place if He were to create out of Himself. Perhaps we could reply that God creates out of parts that don’t really contribute to God’s properties or functions. But this response seems unappealing and ad hoc, for why did God have those parts in the first place and in what sense are they really parts of Him if they don’t really serve any function? A different response is to say that God could heal Himself—replace those parts from which He created the universe with new parts. But the problem (and the injury) would just be pushed back to where those parts were taken from.” (Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker - A Theory of Creation Ex Deo)
So, wouldn't creating out of His parts lessen or weaken and ultimately destroy Him anyway?
Supporting my argument, here are some more quotes:
Cosmological proofs of God do not necessarily lead to a God who still exists:
“Even if valid, the first-cause argument is capable only of demonstrating the existence of a mysterious first cause in the distant past. It does not establish the present existence of the first cause. On the basis of this argument, there is no reason to assume that the first cause still exists — which cuts the ground from any attempt to demonstrate the truth of theism by this approach.” (George H. Smith – Atheism. The Case Against God)
“Indeed, why should God not be the originator and now no longer exist? After all, a mother causes a child but then dies.” (Peter Cole – Philosophy of Religion)
“This world […] is the production of old age and dotage in some superannuated deity; and ever since his death has run on at adventures, from the first impulse and active force which it received from him….” (David Hume – Dialogues concerning Natural Religion Part V)
Moreover, a postulated or even reasoned necessity of the existence of God probably does not exclude the possibility of his self-annihilation:
“What about the necessary existence of God? I have already suggested that what is metaphysically necessary is God’s initial existence. I see no reason to hold that God necessarily continues to exist. That is, I hold God had the power to bring a universe into being and then cease to exist, while the universe went on.” (Peter Forrest – Developmental Theism: From Pure Will to Unbounded Love)
“The reasons given for believing that there is a necessary and simple being are only reasons for holding that, necessarily, at some time, there exists such a being. There is nothing incoherent in the idea that there was a first moment of Time, and that everything that was the case then was necessarily the case, including the existence of a simple being. That leaves open the possibility that this being might change or even cease to exist, contrary to classical theism.” (Peter Forrest – Developmental Theism: From Pure Will to Unbounded Love)
This depends on a certain conception of time:
“For Time, I take it, is characterized by the before/after relation between its parts. As it is, there is a succession of other moments. Brian Leftow has pointed out that if you are the only person at the counter, you are not a queue, and that Time is like a queue in that respect. But as soon as someone else comes along, there is a queue, and you are at the head of it. Likewise, if there are no other moments because God chooses to do nothing, then that moment is timeless. Yet if God acts, there is then at least one other moment, and so there is Time.” (Peter Forrest – Developmental Theism: From Pure Will to Unbounded Love)
A 1. The universe began to exist a finite time ago.
A 2. Only an act originating from God could have caused the universe to begin.
B 1. Creation from nothing is impossible.
B 2. However, the transformation of a transcendent substance into mundane things is possible.
C 1. God is absolutely simple. Otherwise, He would not be the first and most original principle.
C 2. Accordingly, He has no parts to offer for transformation. Rather, He would have to give Himself completely for this purpose. In fact, in His simplicity, He is so much of one piece that He would be entirely the power that would serve to transform.
D Therefore, God has completely transformed Himself into the universe.
Here are three quotes to help explain B 1:
(1) “The Supreme does not create out of nothing. Ex nihilo nihil fit—out of nothing nothing comes. He produces from His Own eternal nature and eternal wisdom, wherein all things dwell in a latent condition, all contrasts exist in a hidden or non-manifest state.” (W. P. SWAINSON – JACOB BOEHME. THE TEUTONIC PHILOSOPHER)
(2) “Classical theists hold that God created the world ex nihilo, out of nothing. This phrase carries a privative, not a positive, sense: it means not out of something as opposed to out of something called ‘nothing.’ This much is crystal clear. Less clear is how creation ex nihilo (CEN), comports, if it does comport, with the following hallowed principle:
ENN: Ex nihilo nihit fit. Nothing comes from nothing.
My present problem is this: If (ENN) is true, how can (CEN) be true? How can God create out of nothing if nothing can come from nothing? It would seem that our two principles form an inconsistent dyad. How solve it?
It would be unavailing to say that God, being omnipotent, can do anything, including making something come out of nothing. For omnipotence, rightly understood, does not imply that God can do anything, but that God can do anything that it is possible to do.
God does not create out of pre-given matter, essences, or mere possibilia. But if God creates out of nothing distinct from himself, this formulation allows that, in some sense, God creates ex Deo, out of himself. Creating the world out of himself, God creates the world out of nothing distinct from himself. In this way, (CEN) and (ENN) are rendered compatible.” (Maverick Philosopher – Creation ex nihilo or ex deo)
(3) “If the world (as effect) emerges neither from sheer nothingness [...] nor from any pre-existent some-thing, it seems that the world must emerge ex deo – i.e. from God[.] [...] [Thomas] Aquinas seems to reject this conclusion when, for example, he castigates David of Dinant for teaching the ‘absurd thesis’ that God is prime matter. [...] As long as we are careful, however, not to assume that a material cause has to be some kind of physical ‘stuff’, there seems to be no reason why we cannot speak of God being the ‘material cause’ of the world: i.e., the innermost Cause that provides the whole substantial reality of the creature.” (Daniel Soars - Creation in Aquinas: ex nihilo or ex deo?)
The following quote mentions a theological problem in case one wants to assume that God is not absolutely simple and has parts:
“There’s an objection—I’ll call it the ‘Injury Problem’—that I think poses a larger problem for the claim that God creates out of His proper parts. The objection is this: if the x’s are proper parts of God and God creates the universe out of the x’s, then God loses whatever functions or features the x’s conferred on God. And this would make God worse off or lessened. For instance, if Michelangelo created the statue of David not out of a block of marble but out of the flesh and bone in his right foot, Michelangelo would no longer be able to walk as he once did. It would seem that something just as injurious to God would take place if He were to create out of Himself. Perhaps we could reply that God creates out of parts that don’t really contribute to God’s properties or functions. But this response seems unappealing and ad hoc, for why did God have those parts in the first place and in what sense are they really parts of Him if they don’t really serve any function? A different response is to say that God could heal Himself—replace those parts from which He created the universe with new parts. But the problem (and the injury) would just be pushed back to where those parts were taken from.” (Michael Tze-Sung Longenecker - A Theory of Creation Ex Deo)
So, wouldn't creating out of His parts lessen or weaken and ultimately destroy Him anyway?
Supporting my argument, here are some more quotes:
Cosmological proofs of God do not necessarily lead to a God who still exists:
“Even if valid, the first-cause argument is capable only of demonstrating the existence of a mysterious first cause in the distant past. It does not establish the present existence of the first cause. On the basis of this argument, there is no reason to assume that the first cause still exists — which cuts the ground from any attempt to demonstrate the truth of theism by this approach.” (George H. Smith – Atheism. The Case Against God)
“Indeed, why should God not be the originator and now no longer exist? After all, a mother causes a child but then dies.” (Peter Cole – Philosophy of Religion)
“This world […] is the production of old age and dotage in some superannuated deity; and ever since his death has run on at adventures, from the first impulse and active force which it received from him….” (David Hume – Dialogues concerning Natural Religion Part V)
Moreover, a postulated or even reasoned necessity of the existence of God probably does not exclude the possibility of his self-annihilation:
“What about the necessary existence of God? I have already suggested that what is metaphysically necessary is God’s initial existence. I see no reason to hold that God necessarily continues to exist. That is, I hold God had the power to bring a universe into being and then cease to exist, while the universe went on.” (Peter Forrest – Developmental Theism: From Pure Will to Unbounded Love)
“The reasons given for believing that there is a necessary and simple being are only reasons for holding that, necessarily, at some time, there exists such a being. There is nothing incoherent in the idea that there was a first moment of Time, and that everything that was the case then was necessarily the case, including the existence of a simple being. That leaves open the possibility that this being might change or even cease to exist, contrary to classical theism.” (Peter Forrest – Developmental Theism: From Pure Will to Unbounded Love)
This depends on a certain conception of time:
“For Time, I take it, is characterized by the before/after relation between its parts. As it is, there is a succession of other moments. Brian Leftow has pointed out that if you are the only person at the counter, you are not a queue, and that Time is like a queue in that respect. But as soon as someone else comes along, there is a queue, and you are at the head of it. Likewise, if there are no other moments because God chooses to do nothing, then that moment is timeless. Yet if God acts, there is then at least one other moment, and so there is Time.” (Peter Forrest – Developmental Theism: From Pure Will to Unbounded Love)