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I often find when presenting a Problem of Evil (henceforth PoE) style argument that a common response is some kind of "greater good" theodicy, e.g., that perhaps God allows suffering because it's necessary to enable some sort of greater good. Analogies are usually drawn to enduring the brief pain of an inoculation for the greater good of boosting the immune system, for instance.

The PoE-giver might respond with something like, "well, what possible greater good could there be for something like child leukemia, or any other form of egregious suffering?" This is usually when the theodicy I'm interested in comes out: the theist might say, "well, as we are mere humans and can't presume to know the mind of God, all that we can know is that God has a good reason to allow child leukemia such that it isn't incongruent with God's benevolence to allow it."

I think that this line of theodicy is problematic in that it's invincible, and feels very similar to special pleading. It's a kind of trap that -- once accepted -- might never be un-accepted because God could literally do anything at that point, even kicking puppies in the street and laughing maniacally while they fly, and the excuse could still be made: "Maybe He has an unknowable reason for this such that it's good, even though it appears evil."

We can construct an analogy if we get all of the same pieces that make up this theodicy: all we need is something smarter than us to cause suffering in some way and then the same excuse can be made. But I'll get to that in a moment. First I need to discuss toy worlds (as hinted in the title) because first we must answer the question of what suffering God is even accused of being culpable for.

I submit that it's possible for an omnipotent and omniscient being to have created a universe where the physics simply doesn't allow for the existence of physical suffering while preserving free will (to pre-empt another common theodicy). An omnipotent and omniscient being should be able to make physics such that everything from natural disasters to debilitating genetic disorders to gunshot wounds to stubbed toes is physically impossible. It's easy to imagine, too; particularly if you've ever used a cheat code in a video game: if physics incapable of harming people can be simulated, it's certainly the case that an omnipotent being could actualize it and an omniscient being could conceptualize it. I will borrow Swinburne's term "toy world" for such a category of world (where physical suffering isn't possible because the physics don't allow it).

It follows that if an omnipotent and omniscient being created a universe wherein physical suffering is plentiful -- if we look out and we see a world ravaged by heinous amounts of suffering, grotesque possibilities that are able to be actualized, privation, starvation, disease, violence, and so on, all of it preventable if there were simply different physics -- it follows that if the world is that way instead of otherwise, then it has to be because the omnipotent/omniscient being deliberately chose it to be that way. God is culpable for *all* physical suffering, in other words: every last bit of it; even in instances where He didn't pull the proverbial trigger, He had to have set the laws of the universe in such a way that it was possible to happen (and deliberately so: there is no such thing as unforeseen consequences to an omniscient and omnipotent being; it is always "a feature, not a bug" with such beings).

The question the PoE-giver is asking in this instance is, "if God is omnipotent and omniscient, then He is culpable for the existence of physical suffering in the world." The theist may give the greater good theodicy by responding, "well, maybe God had a good reason for building the universe with physical suffering." The PoE-giver may ask, "ok, what reason?" The theodicy-giver responds, "well, since we are mere humans, we can't know. It's beyond us to know."

And there it is: the problem. It smells so much like special pleading, and as I've mentioned above, it's an invincible line of argument. God could do anything at all and the excuse would still work: God could torture babies and laugh maniacally and there still may be some reason so inscrutable for why it's actually good and not evil that maybe we can't know it.

Is it reasonable to reject a line of argument that's invincible in order to avoid such a trap? Can we reasonably use the evidence of observation -- "this appears incongruent with benevolence" -- and rationally affirm that maybe the being perpetrating whatever act is actually not benevolent? I think that it is. It is true that we're epistemically limited, and technically true that any apparent perception might be false for unknowable reasons beyond our limitation: but it's epistemological chaos to embrace this excuse as a crutch, isn't it? At that point wouldn't we have to throw up our arms and say that anything we think is true might actually be false because we're epistemically limited and there might just be some unknowable reason why we're wrong about it? Isn't this exactly what we see in special pleading fallacy?

This brings us back to the analogy I wanted to build.

Suppose that you have a pocket dimension that is a toy world: in this universe, people have free will, but the physics of the universe do not allow for suffering. There is no disease, no privation of resources. If someone tries to stab someone else, the knife loses all inertia (or something, there are any number of ways to build physics without suffering). People still have free will, however: they are able to decide what to do on a given day, whom to spend it with, whether to write a book or watch a film or engage in sports or whatever.

Now, say there is an alien creature with immense technological power that is truly far more intelligent than humans: it's not just that their civilization has existed longer to research technology longer, it's that they are truly simply mentally superior to humans in that they're able to conceive of things that humans can't even begin to comprehend, even if the creature attempts to teach humans from the ground up.

Let's say this alien creature uses technology to slide into our toy world pocket dimension and sees that there is no suffering, everyone is bustling about their days just enjoying themselves. "Oh, this won't do at all," the alien says.

The alien gathers people in the town square and announces that she is much smarter than they are (and is able to prove it, too), and that she is benevolent and wants to give everyone a very important gift. She builds a particle accelerator that changes the vacuum state of the pocket universe (or whatever, just go with it), changing the physics of the pocket universe. Suddenly, earthquakes rock the land! Children start to be born with debilitating physical defects. Disease starts to emerge. People find that they're suddenly able to physically assault and hurt one another (the term "innocent victim" has to be created, as they didn't have it before!)

"You see?!" The alien asks. "Isn't this so much better, can't you see how benevolent I am?"

Now, obviously, and it seems to me quite reasonably, a lot of people may suppose that even though the alien is smarter than they are and that it might technically be true they could have some unknowable reason for doing what they did, that maybe the alien simply isn't benevolent regardless of their claim that they are.

Another group of people, though, develops the greater good theodicy: they accept that the alien is benevolent and they reason "the alien is smarter than us: she says she has a good reason to do this so I guess she must have a good reason." But how does this group ever disabuse themselves of this notion? If the alien starts running through the streets with a ray gun blasting people with a ray that turns them inside out for a horrible death, Mars Attacks style, shouting "do not run, I am your friend," is there ever a point that it's reasonable for people to think, "ok, maybe she isn't actually our friend?"

If there is such a point where it's more rational to reject the greater good theodicy than it is to accept it, can the theodicist be convinced by the heinous amounts of suffering in the world that the threshold is met?

Astro Cat wrote
If there is such a point where it's more rational to reject the greater good theodicy than it is to accept it, can the theodicist be convinced by the heinous amounts of suffering in the world that the threshold is met?

If you're just playing with a thought experiment for fun, well, fine. But if you really think such an idea deserves defending, or even giving serious thought to, then I am afraid you are possessed by a bit of bad metaphysics, as with those absurd omni-this and omni-thats.

Of course, this is not to say God is a meaningless concept, or that suffering isn't a meta-ethical issue. It is. It just means the problem you are looking at is wholly invented.

Astro Cat wrote: ↑February 3rd, 2023, 1:54 am I often find when presenting a Problem of Evil (henceforth PoE) style argument that a common response is some kind of "greater good" theodicy, e.g., that perhaps God allows suffering because it's necessary to enable some sort of greater good. Analogies are usually drawn to enduring the brief pain of an inoculation for the greater good of boosting the immune system, for instance.

The PoE-giver might respond with something like, "well, what possible greater good could there be for something like child leukemia, or any other form of egregious suffering?" This is usually when the theodicy I'm interested in comes out: the theist might say, "well, as we are mere humans and can't presume to know the mind of God, all that we can know is that God has a good reason to allow child leukemia such that it isn't incongruent with God's benevolence to allow it."

I think that this line of theodicy is problematic in that it's invincible, and feels very similar to special pleading. It's a kind of trap that -- once accepted -- might never be un-accepted because God could literally do anything at that point, even kicking puppies in the street and laughing maniacally while they fly, and the excuse could still be made: "Maybe He has an unknowable reason for this such that it's good, even though it appears evil."

We can construct an analogy if we get all of the same pieces that make up this theodicy: all we need is something smarter than us to cause suffering in some way and then the same excuse can be made. But I'll get to that in a moment. First I need to discuss toy worlds (as hinted in the title) because first we must answer the question of what suffering God is even accused of being culpable for.

I submit that it's possible for an omnipotent and omniscient being to have created a universe where the physics simply doesn't allow for the existence of physical suffering while preserving free will (to pre-empt another common theodicy). An omnipotent and omniscient being should be able to make physics such that everything from natural disasters to debilitating genetic disorders to gunshot wounds to stubbed toes is physically impossible. It's easy to imagine, too; particularly if you've ever used a cheat code in a video game: if physics incapable of harming people can be simulated, it's certainly the case that an omnipotent being could actualize it and an omniscient being could conceptualize it. I will borrow Swinburne's term "toy world" for such a category of world (where physical suffering isn't possible because the physics don't allow it).

It follows that if an omnipotent and omniscient being created a universe wherein physical suffering is plentiful -- if we look out and we see a world ravaged by heinous amounts of suffering, grotesque possibilities that are able to be actualized, privation, starvation, disease, violence, and so on, all of it preventable if there were simply different physics -- it follows that if the world is that way instead of otherwise, then it has to be because the omnipotent/omniscient being deliberately chose it to be that way. God is culpable for *all* physical suffering, in other words: every last bit of it; even in instances where He didn't pull the proverbial trigger, He had to have set the laws of the universe in such a way that it was possible to happen (and deliberately so: there is no such thing as unforeseen consequences to an omniscient and omnipotent being; it is always "a feature, not a bug" with such beings).

The question the PoE-giver is asking in this instance is, "if God is omnipotent and omniscient, then He is culpable for the existence of physical suffering in the world." The theist may give the greater good theodicy by responding, "well, maybe God had a good reason for building the universe with physical suffering." The PoE-giver may ask, "ok, what reason?" The theodicy-giver responds, "well, since we are mere humans, we can't know. It's beyond us to know."

And there it is: the problem. It smells so much like special pleading, and as I've mentioned above, it's an invincible line of argument. God could do anything at all and the excuse would still work: God could torture babies and laugh maniacally and there still may be some reason so inscrutable for why it's actually good and not evil that maybe we can't know it.

Is it reasonable to reject a line of argument that's invincible in order to avoid such a trap? Can we reasonably use the evidence of observation -- "this appears incongruent with benevolence" -- and rationally affirm that maybe the being perpetrating whatever act is actually not benevolent? I think that it is. It is true that we're epistemically limited, and technically true that any apparent perception might be false for unknowable reasons beyond our limitation: but it's epistemological chaos to embrace this excuse as a crutch, isn't it? At that point wouldn't we have to throw up our arms and say that anything we think is true might actually be false because we're epistemically limited and there might just be some unknowable reason why we're wrong about it? Isn't this exactly what we see in special pleading fallacy?

This brings us back to the analogy I wanted to build.

Suppose that you have a pocket dimension that is a toy world: in this universe, people have free will, but the physics of the universe do not allow for suffering. There is no disease, no privation of resources. If someone tries to stab someone else, the knife loses all inertia (or something, there are any number of ways to build physics without suffering). People still have free will, however: they are able to decide what to do on a given day, whom to spend it with, whether to write a book or watch a film or engage in sports or whatever.

Now, say there is an alien creature with immense technological power that is truly far more intelligent than humans: it's not just that their civilization has existed longer to research technology longer, it's that they are truly simply mentally superior to humans in that they're able to conceive of things that humans can't even begin to comprehend, even if the creature attempts to teach humans from the ground up.

Let's say this alien creature uses technology to slide into our toy world pocket dimension and sees that there is no suffering, everyone is bustling about their days just enjoying themselves. "Oh, this won't do at all," the alien says.

The alien gathers people in the town square and announces that she is much smarter than they are (and is able to prove it, too), and that she is benevolent and wants to give everyone a very important gift. She builds a particle accelerator that changes the vacuum state of the pocket universe (or whatever, just go with it), changing the physics of the pocket universe. Suddenly, earthquakes rock the land! Children start to be born with debilitating physical defects. Disease starts to emerge. People find that they're suddenly able to physically assault and hurt one another (the term "innocent victim" has to be created, as they didn't have it before!)

"You see?!" The alien asks. "Isn't this so much better, can't you see how benevolent I am?"

Now, obviously, and it seems to me quite reasonably, a lot of people may suppose that even though the alien is smarter than they are and that it might technically be true they could have some unknowable reason for doing what they did, that maybe the alien simply isn't benevolent regardless of their claim that they are.

Another group of people, though, develops the greater good theodicy: they accept that the alien is benevolent and they reason "the alien is smarter than us: she says she has a good reason to do this so I guess she must have a good reason." But how does this group ever disabuse themselves of this notion? If the alien starts running through the streets with a ray gun blasting people with a ray that turns them inside out for a horrible death, Mars Attacks style, shouting "do not run, I am your friend," is there ever a point that it's reasonable for people to think, "ok, maybe she isn't actually our friend?"

If there is such a point where it's more rational to reject the greater good theodicy than it is to accept it, can the theodicist be convinced by the heinous amounts of suffering in the world that the threshold is met?

From your previous posts I understood that you are an atheist so I am unsure why you are framing the problem of evil and suffering in the context of there being a God. I am not traditionally religious or an atheist, but not a materialist, believing that there is some underlying creative consciousness in the universe. However, there is also the nature of destruction, like the opposition between yin and yang.

I do wonder about the problem of evil and suffering and wrote a thread on the topic in the last week. During that discussion what has been one of the prominent issues is to what extent are the concepts of good, evil and suffering human constructs?

I see the problem of understanding of suffering as a real one because it is an existential one, looked at differently from various worldviews. Your outpost seems to be similar to the one on omnipotence but with a long thought experiment. However, unless your post is simply about trying to argue there is not a God, which does not rely on the issue of evil, I am unsure what philosophy question you are actually raising. So, perhaps you could clarify your own position in regard to the issue of good, evil and suffering.

thrasymachus wrote: ↑February 3rd, 2023, 2:10 am

Astro Cat wrote
If there is such a point where it's more rational to reject the greater good theodicy than it is to accept it, can the theodicist be convinced by the heinous amounts of suffering in the world that the threshold is met?

If you're just playing with a thought experiment for fun, well, fine. But if you really think such an idea deserves defending, or even giving serious thought to, then I am afraid you are possessed by a bit of bad metaphysics, as with those absurd omni-this and omni-thats.

Of course, this is not to say God is a meaningless concept, or that suffering isn't a meta-ethical issue. It is. It just means the problem you are looking at is wholly invented.

I am an atheist; I’m just engaging with a common argument I encounter with my thoughts, analysis, and questions.

JackDaydream wrote: ↑February 3rd, 2023, 6:20 am
From your previous posts I understood that you are an atheist so I am unsure why you are framing the problem of evil and suffering in the context of there being a God. I am not traditionally religious or an atheist, but not a materialist, believing that there is some underlying creative consciousness in the universe. However, there is also the nature of destruction, like the opposition between yin and yang.

I do wonder about the problem of evil and suffering and wrote a thread on the topic in the last week. During that discussion what has been one of the prominent issues is to what extent are the concepts of good, evil and suffering human constructs?

I see the problem of understanding of suffering as a real one because it is an existential one, looked at differently from various worldviews. Your outpost seems to be similar to the one on omnipotence but with a long thought experiment. However, unless your post is simply about trying to argue there is not a God, which does not rely on the issue of evil, I am unsure what philosophy question you are actually raising. So, perhaps you could clarify your own position in regard to the issue of good, evil and suffering.

I am an atheist, just adopting some of the language of theism for a common argument I encounter when I present my version of the PoE.

The post is just an attack on the greater good theodicy as weak and/or an inescapable trap (and posing the question: isn’t that a problem?)

Colloquially it’s a long-winded way of saying “the PoE is still a problem for those that believe God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent even if they propose greater good theodicies.”

Astro Cat wrote
I am an atheist; I’m just engaging with a common argument I encounter with my thoughts, analysis, and questions.

But atheism plays into the hands of theism, that is, you have to take seriously what these traditional theological constructs are saying when you respond to their ideas. It is like arguing against a flat earth. The point is, atheism is just as assailable as theism: the trick to understanding religion in philosophy is to first do the basic descriptive work by inquiring as to what the world IS at the basic level such that God was a necessary invention, then reduce the bloated medieval nonsense to what is essentially there. Only then can you have a respectable debate about God. Atheism as it is discussed, say, here in this forum, is just a straw-person argument: arguing against a fragile fiction of what God is.

thrasymachus wrote: ↑February 3rd, 2023, 11:39 am

Astro Cat wrote
I am an atheist; I’m just engaging with a common argument I encounter with my thoughts, analysis, and questions.

But atheism plays into the hands of theism, that is, you have to take seriously what these traditional theological constructs are saying when you respond to their ideas. It is like arguing against a flat earth. The point is, atheism is just as assailable as theism: the trick to understanding religion in philosophy is to first do the basic descriptive work by inquiring as to what the world IS at the basic level such that God was a necessary invention, then reduce the bloated medieval nonsense to what is essentially there. Only then can you have a respectable debate about God. Atheism as it is discussed, say, here in this forum, is just a straw-person argument: arguing against a fragile fiction of what God is.

You make some valid points because on this forum there often seems little discussion in which both sides are looked at critically. It seems to involve people arguing against caricature representations of ideas more than anything else in so many threads, making them rather superficial. Some of the time, although I am not suggesting the author of this outpost is doing so, it can seem like while the theists are preaching so are the atheists.

JackDaydream wrote
It seems to involve people arguing against caricature representations of ideas more than anything else in so many threads, making them rather superficial. Some of the time, although I am not suggesting the author of this outpost is doing so, it can seem like while the theists are preaching so are the atheists.

The hardest part, then, is getting real about theism in order to make atheism just as real. What does one argue against?

Astro Cat wrote: ↑February 3rd, 2023, 1:54 am I often find when presenting a Problem of Evil (henceforth PoE) style argument that a common response is some kind of "greater good" theodicy, e.g., that perhaps God allows suffering because it's necessary to enable some sort of greater good.

Wouldn't it make matters easier if we just looked out into the real world, and noted that we observe pain and joy too, suffering and ecstasy, and everything in between. Does it not seem likely that God does not actively "allow" (i.e. impose) such things, but that they are simply part of life, the universe and everything, and not punishments inflicted by a demonic deity?

I have to admit, after so many years, I become impatient with the arrogant conceit of PoE arguments. Humans!!! Who the do you think you are?

Sorry; rant over.

thrasymachus wrote: ↑February 3rd, 2023, 2:10 am ...the problem you are looking at is wholly invented.

Yes.

thrasymachus wrote: ↑February 3rd, 2023, 12:49 pm

JackDaydream wrote
It seems to involve people arguing against caricature representations of ideas more than anything else in so many threads, making them rather superficial. Some of the time, although I am not suggesting the author of this outpost is doing so, it can seem like while the theists are preaching so are the atheists.

The hardest part, then, is getting real about theism in order to make atheism just as real. What does one argue against?

That was the reason why I wrote the thread on what do people understand by the idea of 'God'. That was intended to look more at the nature of ideas in depth, as opposed to the simple for and against, which often seems more about battling against the opposition. I did feel that it generated some worthwhile discussion beyond the level of just winning arguments or attacking opponents. Of course, constructing rational arguments is important and is essential to philosophy but, sometimes, it is disappointing when the discussions don't go into much in depth analysis of both concepts and the strengths and weaknesses of both sides of any argument.

A frustration I experience sometimes on forums is that I will make a post that’s effectively saying “I’m interested in this concept” (be it strengthening it, attacking it, analyzing it, etc.) but a lot of responses will be effectively pet issues people have that they want to talk about that are a little off topic to the initial interest of the OP.

For instance, if I say “hey, I’m interested in responses to the greater good theodicy” and I get back “well classical theism is riddled with problems” or “humans are conceited for thinking the PoE is worthwhile” (obviously paraphrasing here), the thing I came here to discuss has been sort of set aside.

Isn’t the idea of a forum with subjects to kind of put on the hat of the post we’re responding to? To stay sort of within the interests of the question asker/OP?

This sounds more frustrated than I really am, and for instance I appreciate everyone that’s posted here and their input (of course!) but shouldn’t a post asking about greater good theodicy have responses where people put on a classical theism hat to talk about the actual ramifications of greater good theodicies?

This is why some of my topics just kind of drop off (e.g. I stop having the time to engage with them) because I came for a specific curiosity and the responses get so off topic I stop checking because I have such limited time

Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑February 3rd, 2023, 12:58 pm

Astro Cat wrote: ↑February 3rd, 2023, 1:54 am I often find when presenting a Problem of Evil (henceforth PoE) style argument that a common response is some kind of "greater good" theodicy, e.g., that perhaps God allows suffering because it's necessary to enable some sort of greater good.

Wouldn't it make matters easier if we just looked out into the real world, and noted that we observe pain and joy too, suffering and ecstasy, and everything in between. Does it not seem likely that God does not actively "allow" (i.e. impose) such things, but that they are simply part of life, the universe and everything, and not punishments inflicted by a demonic deity?

I have to admit, after so many years, I become impatient with the arrogant conceit of PoE arguments. Humans!!! Who the do you think you are?

Sorry; rant over.

That is one take; as a nontheist I do think the universe is amoral so of course we’re going to see both desirable and undesirable things about it. But that was not the main interest of the OP, I’m looking to see whether my analysis of the greater good theodicy is effective

thrasymachus wrote: ↑February 3rd, 2023, 12:49 pm

JackDaydream wrote
It seems to involve people arguing against caricature representations of ideas more than anything else in so many threads, making them rather superficial. Some of the time, although I am not suggesting the author of this outpost is doing so, it can seem like while the theists are preaching so are the atheists.

The hardest part, then, is getting real about theism in order to make atheism just as real. What does one argue against?

This post is about responding to theists that would give the greater good theodicy, whether the analysis of the greater good theodicy given in the OP has bite

JackDaydream wrote: ↑February 3rd, 2023, 6:20 am
I do wonder about the problem of evil and suffering and wrote a thread on the topic in the last week. During that discussion what has been one of the prominent issues is to what extent are the concepts of good, evil and suffering human constructs?

All concepts are human constructs.* The terms "good" and "evil" merely denote someone's desire for, or approval of, something (or for "evil," the desire to avoid or be rid of something, or disapproval of it). They don't denote natural or objective properties of things, and certainly not any transcendental" substances, forces, entities, etc. As such they are idiosyncratic and subjective.

* At least, all those invoked in human conversations. It doesn't preclude other sentient creatures having/creating similar cognitive structures.

Your outpost seems to be similar to the one on omnipotence but with a long thought experiment. However, unless your post is simply about trying to argue there is not a God, which does not rely on the issue of evil, I am unsure what philosophy question you are actually raising. So, perhaps you could clarify your own position in regard to the issue of good, evil and suffering.

I took her post to be arguing that the concept of "God," as usually defined, is incoherent. That would be the case with any "being" described as having infinite attributes (whether infinite power, wisdom, benevolence, extent, duration, etc.).