Philosophy Discussion Forums

At one time science was a part of philosophy and was known as natural philosophy. Then it broke off (possibly starting with Sir Francis Bacon). Over the years, it has experienced phenomenal success in explaining our world and universe while improving on technology. Can philosophy serve as an underpinning to science or would science be better off going its own way?

PhilX

I don't think philosophy can serve as underpinning for sciences. Changes/revolution in sciences usually lead to a reorganization and reinterpretation of metaphysics. I like this quote by Friedman:

[T]he philosophers of the modern tradition from Descartes are not best understood as attempting to stand outside the new science so as to show, from some mysterious point outside of sciences itself that our scientific knowledge somehow mirrors an independently existing reality. Rather, they start from the fact of modern scientific knowledge as a fixed point, as it were. Their problem is not so much to justify this knowledge from some 'higher' standpoint so as to articulate the new philosophical conceptions that are forced upon us by the new science. In Kant's words, mathematics and the science of nature stand in no need of philosophical inquiry for themselves, but for the sake of another science: metaphysics.

Science will never remove itself from philosophy. If it ever does it will no longer be science and will turn into some scientific dogma akin to scientism.

I agree with ShrimpMaster but I'll take it even further. The scientism that he warns about is simply the philosophy of Positivism taken to its extreme. Such a form does not escape metaphysics: it establishes its own metaphysics as an unspoken default position without realizing it has done so. (Anyone interested in this should read this forum's book review thread about Stephen Hawking's "The Grand Design" where Hawking himself states that "philosophy is dead; science has replaced it" and see the reactions of this forum's members to such hubris).

What I find interesting is to take the quote from Friedman that poster Bohm2 provided, and to invert it: Instead of noticing what philosophers do to articulate the philosophical ramifications of the findings of science, take notice of what scientists themselves think constitutes the objectivity of their methodologies and why. In general you will find that they feel that reductionism justifies itself (that is, explaining phenomena in terms of relations between more general, better appreciated, phenomena constitutes objectivity). I hate to belabor what should be obvious, but THAT is a philosophical position. In short, the scientific method is an epistemological stance, and science without philosophy would be incoherent.

A Poster He or I wrote:In general you will find that they feel that reductionism justifies itself (that is, explaining phenomena in terms of relations between more general, better appreciated, phenomena constitutes objectivity). I hate to belabor what should be obvious, but THAT is a philosophical position. In short, the scientific method is an epistemological stance, and science without philosophy would be incoherent.

Are you talking about science or reductionism? One doesn't imply the other. In science, if reductionism works fine. If not, try whatever approach gets you to best explain/model the phenomena. I've spent over 10 years in science and the first time I ever heard of reductionism was in a philosophy of science course.

Bohm2 wrote:

A Poster He or I wrote:In general you will find that they feel that reductionism justifies itself (that is, explaining phenomena in terms of relations between more general, better appreciated, phenomena constitutes objectivity). I hate to belabor what should be obvious, but THAT is a philosophical position. In short, the scientific method is an epistemological stance, and science without philosophy would be incoherent.

Are you talking about science or reductionism? One doesn't imply the other. In science, if reductionism works fine. If not, try whatever approach gets you to best explain/model the phenomena. I've spent over 10 years in science and the first time I ever heard of reductionism was in a philosophy of science course.

He was implying many individuals who conduct scientific inquiry assume reductionism. I don't think he was asserting reductionism and scientific inquiry are one and the same. I believe his point is that scientists assume reductionism is self-justified, but that is a philosophical worldview and cannot be empirically verified. Therefore, far from dis-joining science from philosophy they end up realizing that it is the foundation of their understanding of the sciences.

ShrimpMaster's right again. My point applies to however scientists presume to establish the objectivity of their methodologies whether that methodology is reductionistic or not.

Let's take a couple of examples where reductionism doesn't work: say how the human body maintains homeostasis or how quantum non-locality can happen. In both cases, science records specific empirical observations, but to LEVERAGE those observations, one needs to make systematic generalizations that will hold true in either (A) the broadest set of circumstances or (B) in specific circumstances where most pertinent variables are recognized and can be accommodated. And how does one systematically generalize if not by reductionism? Same way: by relating phenomena to other, more familiar, phenomena; an idea whose legitimacy rests on purely philosophical presumption.

Don't get me wrong: I think it is FANTASTIC that science adheres to such presumption because it is underwritten by the best insurance available: human experience. Just keep in mind, human experience per se is of no value until it has been interpreted through a given cultural lens (the epistemology of science in this case); and that is a philosophical enterprise.

ShrimpMaster wrote:He was implying many individuals who conduct scientific inquiry assume reductionism. I don't think he was asserting reductionism and scientific inquiry are one and the same.

Even if some/many scientists believe that, this isn't what the history of science shows. In fact, reductionism has not been the norm in science. The original post was questioning if science needs philosophy. The way, I read the question (maybe I'm mistaken) is whether taking some particular philosophical perspective will result in doing better science. I don't believe this is the case as there have been great advances made in science irrespective of the particular philosophical perspective of a given scientist. Some were atheists, other theists, some empiricists/positivists others rationalists or Platonists, etc. Furthermore, I don't see the value of evaluating the merits of some scientific model from some arguably "higher ground/standpoint" or philosophically-imposed criterion. So I guess I see the sciences as "first philosophy".

ShrimpMaster wrote:Science will never remove itself from philosophy. If it ever does it will no longer be science and will turn into some scientific dogma akin to scientism.

Scientism is itself a philosophy, in this case about science which is neither good, accurate or powerful. In short, Scientism relates more to bunk than science and is thoroughly misleading as to how it defines science and/or its methods and not least its value. If Science had not been given a "philosophy" the distortion of scientism would not likely have occurred.

The essence/seed of Science is philosophy.
Therefore no Philosophy* means no Science.

*philosophy in this case is the essence of philosophy not general and the various forms of philosophy, i.e. academic, common philosophy, Western, Eastern, general philosophy etc.

It already has, or is starting to. Mainstream science is becoming Ego, as Religion already is.

We can create our fancy technology derived from intelligence, but we lack the wisdom derived from philosophy to use it properly. The proof is there right now, take a look at the news. I can give further explanation if needed.