Peter Holmes wrote: ↑March 17th, 2020, 3:33 pm
For my argument, 'judgement', 'belief' and 'opinion' are synonymous in this context. I'll use 'belief', if you prefer. But anyway, talk of 'internal criteria' is obfuscatory. We're discussing the objectivity or subjectivity of assertions. And I assume you agree there are no public truth conditions for subconscious and ineffable criteria - whatever they may be.
Well, no. Those internal criteria are not propositions, and thus "subjective" and "objective" don't apply. They are latent, inexplicable, and ineffable (just as are the factors which underlie any other primary interest, desire, taste, preference). They are "just there." One's opinion, or belief, that X is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, beautiful or ugly, delicious or foul-tasting, results from weighing phenomena against those criteria, of which one is not consciously aware and cannot articulate. It is a subconscious, autonomic process. Why does Alfie prefer chocolate, and Bruno vanilla? Who knows? But there is --- presumably ---
some reason.
So, to substitute: The only possible truth condition for the assertion 'X is morally wrong' is its consistency with a belief as to what constitutes moral wrongness.
I assume what what you're "substituting" there is "morally wrong" for "beautiful." Is that correct? But no, consistency with a belief is not a truth condition for a proposition asserting that belief. That is tautological, and circular. The truth condition for Alfie's belief that Paris is beautiful is that Paris satisfies some internal criteria of beauty that he harbors, not merely that he believes it. He believes it
because it satisfies those criteria.
So, to substitute: An assertion expressing a belief as to what constitutes moral wrongness is subjective.
It can be --- often is --- but it need not be. If X is declared morally wrong because it conflicts with some postulated moral goal, as explained at length in previous posts, then that declaration can be objective.
No. This is where your argument goes astray. To recapitulate what you've agreed to above:
The only possible truth condition for the assertion 'X is morally wrong' is its consistency with a subjective assertion expressing a belief as to what constitutes moral wrongness.
Again, that is circular. The truth condition for a proposition cannot be the belief that the proposition is true. Nor did I "agree to" any such claim.
That all parties to the discussion accept or endorse that subjective assertion doesn't mean the assertion is objective. (The only fact of the matter is that all parties accept or endorse the assertion.) To put it another way:
From the objective assertion 'all parties believe X is morally wrong' - which may be true - it doesn't follow that the assertion 'X is morally wrong' is also objective. All that follows is that doing X is inconsistent with the shared belief that X is morally wrong.
That's true. But a goal is not a belief. If a group of mountain climbers declare, "Our goal is to reach the summit of K2," the truth condition for that proposition is that they take actions to further that goal. A particular action taken by a particular climber in the group may or may not further that goal, and whether it does or not will be objective. That action will be (instrumentally) "wrong." The beliefs of the climbers have nothing to do with the truth or falsity of that judgment.
But that doesn't make the moral rule or judgement itself objective. You've been making this mistake all along.
Of course it does. But what do you mean by, "the judgment itself"? You're not unwittingly assuming there is some, other, hidden, criterion of rightness or wrongness applicable here, are you? There isn't. The act is wrong depending upon whether it does or does not further the goal. The judgment is objective if it reflects that fact.