value wrote: ↑November 28th, 2022, 2:05 pm
GE Morton wrote: ↑November 12th, 2022, 2:06 pm
value wrote: ↑November 11th, 2022, 7:20 pmIn ontological realism the assumption is made that the quality 'be definite/determinate' (i.e. that it exists) is able to be denoted meaningfully which means that one is obligated to explain the origin of that ability.
Biochemistry and organic evolution explain that ability pretty well.
The denoted ability is a philosophical ability.
I'm sorry. What is a "philosophical ability"? Whatever it may be, all human (and other animal) abilities are adequately explained via biochemistry and evolution.
In ontological realism one poses that an external world exists intrinsically without mind. You confirmed to have a similar belief (as part of physicalism) with the following statement as quoted in the OP:
'Explaining the existence of the "sensory facility per se" is precisely the purpose of "physicalist theory." It postulates an external world with mechanisms for producing conscious creatures. And it does a pretty good job of it.'
It would be invalid to pose that conscious creatures would conjure up the intrinsic existing quality of the external world subjectively because the ability to meaningfully denote anything at all is directly derived from the idea 'intrinsic existence without mind'.
Sorry, but that is circular, and thus meaningless. It seems to amount to, "The ability to conjure up an external world is directly derived from the idea of an external world." I.e., that "idea" is derived from itself. Which is nonsensical.
GE Morton wrote: ↑November 12th, 2022, 2:06 pm
It will be "meaningless" is there are no sentient creatures to whom it has meaning. "Meaning," like "good," and "value" are relative terms --- they denote relations between some thing and some sentient creature. There is nothing "nonsensical" about a universe which harbors no sentient creatures. In such a universe "good," "value," "meaning," etc. would have no application; they'd denote nothing.
It is correct that good and value denote relations and what is argued is that those concepts are applicable - philosophically - to any relation in general (any pattern in the cosmos).
Well, no they're not. They are only applicable to particular relations between sentient creatures and various other things, namely, things some sentient creature finds desirable or worth pursuing or protecting. The terms are not applicable to "patterns" not desired or even noticed by some sentient creature.
Good is a relation that involves an unforeseen future. Good precedes value as a concept that refers to the aspect that makes value possible (the origin of existence turned around as the purpose or 'goal' of existence would be 'good').
Exactly wrong. "Good" is a pseudo-property applied by sentient creatures to things they desire, to which they assign some value, or of which they approve. It is not a real property of anything. Nor does it exist in the absence of valuer who applies it to something. Calling something "good" is merely placing a personal "stamp of approval" upon it. What stamps of approval are applied to which things are entirely subjective and idiosyncratic, varying from person to person. Nor does "good" involve any "unforeseen future." Normally one "stamps" something "good" just because he foresees deriving some benefit or satisfaction from it.
Value would denote anything of empirical nature - anything that can be 'seen' in the world - as a simple term to denote 'beholder of a meaningful relation'.
Also incorrect. Many things may have "meaningful relations" with someone without being deemed valuable by them. "Value" denotes a
particular relation between a person and thing, namely, the relation of the thing being desired or sought by the person.
How can it be said that that external world exists intrinsically and causally produces mind (experience)?
I'm not sure what you mean by "exists intrinsically," but an external world is postulated to exist prior to and independently from minds. How that external world produces minds is explained by the laws of physics, biochemistry, and neurophysiology. Minds are products of physical processes.
The idea is that for there to be a relation of any kind - a pattern - it implies value that indeed requires a valuer which therefore must be a priori to the cosmos. That valuer cannot be valued itself since that would be absurd.
No, it doesn't. "For there to be a relation of any kind - a pattern - it implies
value" is simply false. There are all kinds of relations that have nothing to do with value. Value is a particular relation between a person (or other sentient creature) and a particular thing, as described above.
Valuing is signification - the act of assigning meaning.
No, it isn't. You're inventing your own definition of that term. Nor are all things someone deems "meaningful" also deemed "valuable" by him. To be deemed valuable the thing must be desirable to someone, not merely meaningful. Things can be "meaningful" for all kinds of reasons.
GE Morton wrote: ↑November 12th, 2022, 2:06 pm
"Something cannot come from nothing. Therefore something has always existed."
---Robert Nozick (which argument he attributes to his 9-year old daughter)
That reasoning is a fallacy. At question would be how a philosophical 'option' (magically always existed or magically have sprung into existence) is possible in the first place. It is then seen that for any option to be possible an aspect is required that is not of a nature that allows a choice.
Not sure to what "philosophical option" you refer. What is postulated to exist is some sort of external world, not any "philosophical option." Nor is any "magic" required to explain an eternal universe. Eternal entities require NO explanation; only things with definite beginnings or ends do.
Terrapin Station wrote: ↑April 28th, 2021, 5:01 pmFor any given initial existent, either it "spontaneously appeared" or it always existed. Those are the only two options, and they're both counterintuitive. Nevertheless, there's no other choice.
Logical options. Either we're exhausting the logical possibilities or we're not. Again, if you can think of a third option, that's great, but you'd need to present what the third option would be.
Do you agree with TP that there would be just two options to 'choose' from? If so, how would that reasoning potentially explain that choice?
Yes, I agree (in substance, though it isn't true for "any existent." Most existents have causal explanations). Do you mean "explain the absence of other choices"? If so, it is our inability to conceive any further options. As TP says, if you have one, please set it forth.
GE Morton wrote: ↑November 12th, 2022, 2:06 pm
Well, that argument is simply a non sequitur. The term "value" does not denote "all of which it can be said to exist or to be empirically evident." It denotes a relation between something and some valuer. That something X exists does not entail that it has any value, and it will have none unless some valuer assigns one to it. And there certainly need not be a valuer to assign a value to some X in order for X to exist.
Anything in the cosmos is meaningfully relevant and requires a value-explanation. It is the 'why' question of the cosmos.
"Meaningfully relevant"
to whom? "Relevant" in what way?
Until you fill in those blanks your claim there is ill-formed and incoherent. It has no determinable truth-value.
And what is a "value explanation"?
Why does force X have a value of Y?
Good question. Why the physical constants have the values they do is an unanswerable question (this is a different meaning of "value," BTW, from that discussed above).
It turns out that, for life to be possible, the numbers in basic physics – for example, the strength of gravity, or the mass of the electron – must have values falling in a certain range. And that range is an incredibly narrow slice of all the possible values those numbers can have. It is therefore incredibly unlikely that a universe like ours would have the kind of numbers compatible with the existence of life. But, against all the odds, our Universe does.
Yep. But unlikely events nonetheless occur regularly. Every time you deal a hand of Solitaire the probability of getting that particular deal is ~ 1/ 8 x 10^67 --- a number roughly equal to the number of atoms in the Milky Way galaxy. Yet it occurred. If you play another game it will occur again.
When you believe in physicalist theory and intrinsic existence without mind those values will require a causal explanation.
No, they don't. Or rather, I've just given one --- improbable events nonetheless occur regularly. In an eternal, cyclic universe the number of cycles will far exceed that large number above. One in a while the right combination of physical constants will turn up.