Philosophy Discussion Forums

Kettle wrote:

neopolitan wrote:The extent to which religion falls under science is constrained to the psychology and neurology that leads to people to believe in the claims of religion...

So 'claims of religion' are necessarily the result of some neuro-pathology, right? Which the good doctors in the white coats will save us from.

Not necessarily, the mind-set required to believe the truth is also interesting, irrespective of what the truth is. Perhaps we will find that there is some neuro-pathology involved in religious belief, perhaps we will find that it is an emergent feature that arises from something beneficial (which I consider more likely), perhaps the organ responsible for sensus divinitatis will be discovered and shown to be deficient in non-theists (that's not likely though, is it?)

Kettle wrote:

neopolitan wrote: Science is not a popularity poll...

This thread is not about science. It is about philosophy. I did mention the qualifications of Dawkins and Dennett and said they hadn't published papers in scientific journals - Dawkins has, of course, so I in that was incorrect. I don't believe that Dennett has. In any case, this is not about science, it is about the application of science to questions which are not matters for science; they are neither 'matters of fact' but I think they are more than simply 'matters of opinion'. They are important philosophical matters which are beyond the scope of science.

You put the thread in "Philosophy of Science".

Now we have this new category between "fact" and "opinion". Care to label it? Surely "philosophical matters of importance which are beyond the scope of science" is a bit of mouthful. Shall we call is "faith"?

Kettle wrote:

neopolitan wrote:You're not making a rational point here due to your confusion, so I'm not going to address it further other to say that no-one is saying that physics explains first-person experience/consciousness and that you appear to be in a mighty battle with a straw man.

The confusion is all yours. You said earlier

neopolitan wrote:There is, though, the problem of introducing some other sort of process simply to explain consciousness, given that everything else can be explained by natural and material processes...

The implication is clearly that 'the scientific method' explains 'everything else', and so will eventually 'explain the nature of consciousness'. I responded by saying that physics is paradigmatic to the scientifc method, because it deals with precisely measurable entities subject to quantification; however, that in the case of 'consciousness' we are dealing with a type of problem which is of a different order altogether from the kinds of issues that the objective sciences consider.

That is not 'confused'. You simply haven't understood the argument and you still don't. If you can put aside your sense of righteous umbrage long enough, you will realize there is a basic idea in philosophy that you haven't addressed at all.

Yes it is confused. You have a different understanding of "explain". You're looking for a narrative. There is no narrative, unless you introduce an author of some kind, in which case you need to explain not only the narrative that is lacking, but also the author and the narrative into which that author sits. Some will say that this author requires no narrative, but if so why not apply the "no narrative" rule to the universe and dispense with the problems you encounter when positing the author?

The basic idea of philosophy, according to whom exactly?

Kettle wrote:

neopolitan wrote:Would you agree with Pinker's statement if it were slightly less shrill and reworded as "the worldview that guides the moral and spiritual values of an educated person today is a worldview that is informed by science"? I agree that science isn't in the business of handing out worldviews, but more in the providing the information and understanding that assists in the development of worldviews by individuals.

Of course I would agree! That's part of the point. There is a difference between 'science' and 'scientific materialism' - it's a really important difference, and one that is especially important in light of the arguments about religion, culture, science and philosophy. (Actually there's a lot about Steve Pinker's books I like, *except* for anything he says about religion.)

One of the reasons I don't like anything to do with 'intelligent design' is because I have found that those who promote it are invariably 'climate change deniers', which I seriously think ought to be made subject to criminal sanction. I think climate science (and the application of science in medicine, energy, food supply, and innummerable other areas) is absolutely indispensable and of utmost importance. I would never want to disparage science as a method or even as an attitude to solving problems of that kind.

But the unfortunate fact is that Pinker, Dennett, Dawkins, and others, do in fact present 'evolutionary science' as an argument against religious faith. You can't deny that or sweep it under the carpet or say that is not what they're doing. And I say that this is because there is a deep, deep misunderstanding about some very fundamental philosophical questions, the deepest of which is 'what is mind'?

A little history would be good about now. Which came first, Pinker, Dennett and Dawkins (I notice that we have a new one who has crept in, Sam Harris might be next - although he's a bona fide scientist with machines that go "ping" and mapping of neurons and all that) or Creation Science? Let's have a look shall we? Let's say that all these people started getting excited about atheism in their angsty teenage years, say at sixteen.

• Dawkins at sweet sixteen - 1957 CE
• Dennett at sweet sixteen - 1958 CE
• Pinker at sweet sixteen - 1970 CE
• Harris at sweet sixteen - 1983 CE
• Creation Science at sweet sixteen - ~3984 BCE (or the 1960s if you want the modern variant)

Well, there you go, perhaps modern Creation Science really did emerge as a direct response to Dawkins and Dennett's angsty atheism. Here's me thinking that they were responding to Creation Science, its forebears in ignorant fundamentalism (starting with the Evangelicalism of "First Great Awakening" of 1730-1740 although the "Second Great Awakening" from 1790 onwards was the one that probably pushed the US more towards the fundamentalism) and their tarted-up offspring, Intelligent Design.

I can't help noticing, however, that Pinker and the remaining Horsemen don't seem to have as much of a problem with strains of religion that don't poison the minds of their young like fundamentalists of any stripe do. Perhaps they are largely reactive after all.

Hmmm. Science as a "metal detector." Where I have seen analogy before? It's similar to another analogy: science casting a net designed to catch fish no larger or smaller than six inches and concluding that all the ocean's fishes are six inches, no more, no less.

Neopolitan wrote:The basic idea of philosophy, according to whom exactly?

Not THE basic idea, but A basic idea. There is a particular, important, basic idea, which has slipped through the cracks of your immaculately-crafted-but-mainly-meaningless replies on this subject. Are you interested in discussing that, or are you too busy spouting vitriol?

Neopolitan wrote:perhaps the organ responsible for sensus divinitatis will be discovered and shown to be deficient in non-theists (that's not likely though, is it?)

That is a really interesting point, but I'll wait until there's a response to the above before going further.

Neopolitan wrote:Which came first, Pinker, Dennett and Dawkins?

Dawkins published 'The God Delusion', which references evolutionary biology to prove that belief in God is irrational, in around 2007.

Dennett published 'Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon' around the same time.

These are among the canonical texts - oops, sorry - of the 'New Atheist' phenomenon, which I'm sure you will have no problem proving doesn't exist. To help you do so, please refer to Leon Wieseltier's well-known criticism of the latter.

Pinker hasn't published anything directly on the same subject, but is of similar views in many points.

-- Updated October 4th, 2014, 6:30 pm to add the following --

Philoso4 wrote:I don’t know where the bulk of research funding is coming from today, but I am not sure that the like of Dawkins and Dennett really have that much influence on the direction of scientific research.

Maybe not research, but research funding might be another question. Consider that many of the big donors to the Republicans are aligned with conservative evangelicalism; consider that in the USA, a sizeable minority of the population (even a majority according to some polls) don't accept Darwinian evolution. I think Dawkins and Dennett are driving a lot of that alienation and hostility towards science. I mean, you have people like Dawkins more or less shouting from the rooftops: 'hey, if you believe in God, you must be an ignorant, superstitious bigot. Don't you realize that science proves that the Universe is meaningless, and you're basically just a species of ape?'

OK, I am taking some license but not much. It is very much the way Dawkins speaks; it's gotten to the point where actual working scientists, like Peter Higgs, say that he is an embarrassment.

-- Updated October 4th, 2014, 6:52 pm to add the following --

Nepolitan wrote:Surely "philosophical matters of importance which are beyond the scope of science" is a bit of mouthful. Shall we call it "faith"?

No, we shan't.

I think that in order to establish that there is a difference between scientific and philosophical truths, there has to be a notion of some kind of truth-value that is not amenable to, or is out of the scope of, the scientific method. That means, asking whether there are values that are, if you like, not dependent on my acquisence or say-so; that there are values that are real, independently of whether anyone in particular says they are real. Now whether or not there are such values is, of course, open to debate; but I think I can say without fear of contradiction, that whether or not there are such values, is not a matter for science. One of the fundamental axioms of current ethical discourse is that moral judgements must be a matter for persons; there isn't, and can't be, a basis for moral judgement in the so-called objective order. So it is quite possible to discuss that question, without asserting 'faith' in the sense you intend.

Quotidian wrote:
I think that in order to establish that there is a difference between scientific and philosophical truths, there has to be a notion of some kind of truth-value that is not amenable to, or is out of the scope of, the scientific method.

But there is no difference between scientific and philosophical truth. And there is no indication that anything in this universe works outside the scope of science. There is only the very distinct possibility that that there are some things unknown to science or outside of known science. Once can always jump to the conclusion that what is unknown or cannot be explained is outside the scope of science or the scientific method but nothing so far suggests that it is likely.

Kettle wrote:Not THE basic idea, but A basic idea. There is a particular, important, basic idea, which has slipped through the cracks of your immaculately-crafted-but-mainly-meaningless replies on this subject. Are you interested in discussing that, or are you too busy spouting vitriol?

I can't really commit to that when you are being so coy as to what it is. If it is, as advertised, important and I've overlooked it, then sure, I am interested.

Kettle wrote:

neopolitan wrote:perhaps the organ responsible for sensus divinitatis will be discovered and shown to be deficient in non-theists (that's not likely though, is it?)

That is a really interesting point, but I'll wait until there's a response to the above before going further.

Response provided.

Kettle wrote:

Neopolitan wrote:Which came first, Pinker, Dennett and Dawkins?

Really? We're doing this now? That wasn't my question, and cursory glance up the page shows that it was not my question. Your response was to the wrong question, so:

Kettle wrote:<snip>

Kettle wrote:

neopolitan wrote:Surely "philosophical matters of importance which are beyond the scope of science" is a bit of mouthful. Shall we call it "faith"?

No, we shan't.

That wasn't an entirely mocking suggestion. But ok, we shan't.

Kettle wrote:I think that in order to establish that there is a difference between scientific and philosophical truths, there has to be a notion of some kind of truth-value that is not amenable to, or is out of the scope of, the scientific method.

I can almost buy that. But I do think that you are artificially limiting the scientific method to telescopes and beakers and little gizmos.

Kettle wrote:That means, asking whether there are values that are, if you like, not dependent on my acquisence or say-so; that there are values that are real, independently of whether anyone in particular says they are real.

No, Kettle. No. You've just boiled down the whole "I can imagine a god, therefore there is one" argument to a couple of sentences with a minor change to the target. We must do more than just ask whether there are such values, we must show that there are such values.

Kettle wrote:Now whether or not there are such values is, of course, open to debate; but I think I can say without fear of contradiction, that whether or not there are such values, is not a matter for science.

If there are "values that are real, independently of whether anyone in particular says they are real" and they are not amenable to science, how are you suggesting that we will ever know what they are and that they exist? If they are undetectable by science, what are you suggesting as the mechanism for detecting them? You've simply got a replacement for the hidden god and the invisible unicorn in the corner of my room.

Let's say we agree, there are such values and they are real, but they are not amenable to any implement of science. So what? We'll never know what they are, so they might as well not exist.

Kettle wrote:One of the fundamental axioms of current ethical discourse is that moral judgements must be a matter for persons; there isn't, and can't be, a basis for moral judgement in the so-called objective order. So it is quite possible to discuss that question, without asserting 'faith' in the sense you intend.

A fundamental axiom? The only reference I could find to a fundamental axiom with regard to ethics was Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism. This seems to be an unfounded claim dressed up in fancy clothing. The problem is that all I see is the unfounded claim. If you have support for your claim (noting that you appear to be claiming that this "fundamental axiom" applies to more than a fringe element), then feel free to present it. If you wish to rephrase, along the lines that you, Kettle, consider the idea "that moral judgements must be a matter for persons (and that) there isn't, and can't be, a basis for moral judgement in the so-called objective order" to be a fundamental axiom, then feel free to do so.

I wasn't asserting "faith", I was giving you a possible label. You chose to dismiss it. You still need a label though. And a mechanism.

I guess you are right in one thing. Science (in the form of the community of scientists) is simply not interested in endlessly discussing the question. If philosophy is just about finding an unanswerable question and rehashing it for ever, while making reference to people who also spent their lives rehashing unanswerable questions, then it's little surprise that "scientism" might appeal to some. I imagine it is annoying to those who want to just intellectually dither their entire lives that science occasionally shows that a previously thought to be "unanswerable question" is, actually, answerable.

Quotidian:

Erwin Schrodinger wrote:

I am very astonished that the scientific picture of the real world around me is deficient.

I do not know why he is astonished by this. I take his point to be that people wrongly assume that science has solved all the riddles of life. I don’t think anyone here would disagree with that. I do not think that Pinker, Dawkins, or Dennett would disagree with that. The question is whether we should assume that there is a consciousness or intelligence that must be a necessary and fundamental part of any satisfactory answer to these questions. Here we reach an impasse.

So my argument is that there is 'a domain of law' which is ontologically distinct from 'the domain of phenomena'.

But if I am right then the laws of nature have no more ontological status than my description what my dog does when it’s time for dinner. I am not talking about what my dog does, but about the description of what she does. When you say that the law of acceleration of matter is real, I do not think that means anything more than that we can quantify and predict the acceleration of matter. What is real is not the law but what it describes. It is not subject to a 'a domain of law'. The laws are epistemological not ontological.

Neznac:

I was making reference to the chemistry at the foundations of life up to the structure of complex proteins and the function of replication.

In what sense would they be Platonic? Are you in agreement with Quotidian that there is a 'a domain of law' that chemical processes obey?

Well, I should not have brought in Plato but stayed with Parmenides.

We know Parmenides largely for two things: that man is the measure and his denial of change. We can look at Plato as having given both Heraclitus and Parmenides their due. The visible world is flux but there is an unchanging intelligible world that makes the world of flux intelligible. In the absence of knowledge of the intelligible world man is the measure, but is capable at best of true opinion. Pythagoras, or more precisely, the Pythagoreans influenced Plato’s idea of mathematical Forms. The idea that mathematical relations are what are ultimately real still has its proponents.

Neo:

I was trying to indicate, in a humorous way

I have found from experience that humor often does not get conveyed through this form of communication, but then again, I am usually the only one who thinks I am funny, or rather, humorous.

You can't just grab the first guy in a white lab jacket

This reminds me of another thread where someone with serious problems with gaps (I will leave it open as to where those gaps were) kept citing an authority on irritable bowel syndrome as an authority on evolutionary biology.

Pinker, Dennett, Dawkins, and others, do in fact present 'evolutionary science' as an argument against religious faith.

The problem is that faith is indiscriminate. Defense of faith amounts to defense of license to do and say anything you want, except when what you do or say threatens faith. I am not saying that this is what you are doing. It is clear that you are not, but it is a logical but not necessary consequence of the authority of faith. Abraham’s willingness to offer his son as sacrifice to his god still stands as the paradigm example of faith.

What is necessary. What may seem logical bathes reality but at the division of the impossible decays into the realm of emotion. It is here that we find belief. It is true that the impossible line is different for every mind and unless there are considerations of non human nature and for practical purposes they are the same. So the same and not the same conformal to QM. Lapses in the logical stream are addressable. Is there a memory that relates the passing of Time. It is my “belief” that in the beginning the mind follows the truth imprinted in the DNA and that it should be an important label: “the exuberance of youth”. Posterior to this is the emergence of a disagreement of what is necessary and the history of the intellect is created in the cloud. In my older consideration (and still so), the intellect is part of consciousness and of the soul. So if it can live in a cloud (Science) would still be part of the soul or is it more like a collective property that is revisited (see Bohm2). The intellectual has no feeling… a circular motion…a wave conformal to matter. Matter is necessary.

The Beast:

So the same and not the same conformal to QM.

You beast! This is an abuse of quantum theory. What happens at the level of human experience does not conform to the quantum level. Wave/particles are unlike anything we encounter in our experience. No real cat is conformal to Schrodinger’s cat. In inability to measure the position and momentum of a particle has no bearing on our ability to measure the position and momentum of a cat. What is impossible for cats is not impossible for quantum wave/particles. It only seems impossible because our touchstone of what is and is not possible are, so to speak, cat sized things.

The Beast wrote:What is necessary. What may seem logical bathes reality but at the division of the impossible decays into the realm of emotion. It is here that we find belief. It is true that the impossible line is different for every mind and unless there are considerations of non human nature and for practical purposes they are the same. So the same and not the same conformal to QM. Lapses in the logical stream are addressable. Is there a memory that relates the passing of Time. It is my “belief” that in the beginning the mind follows the truth imprinted in the DNA and that it should be an important label: “the exuberance of youth”. Posterior to this is the emergence of a disagreement of what is necessary and the history of the intellect is created in the cloud. In my older consideration (and still so), the intellect is part of consciousness and of the soul. So if it can live in a cloud (Science) would still be part of the soul or is it more like a collective property that is revisited (see Bohm2). The intellectual has no feeling… a circular motion…a wave conformal to matter. Matter is necessary.

I always appreciate it when our alien overlords try to communicate with us. It's hilarious when their universal translators on on the fritz.

On a similar note, I see that someone has been helping our future overlords with their translations ... I'll have a #17 thanks, can I get it delivered? (Warning, some very funny mistakes, some of them a bit rude.)

As for relevance? When you don't know the meaning of a word, and you don't bother to consult with others as to the meaning of the word ... think seriously about not using the word. Communicating with unclear words can be a bit tricky.

-- Updated October 4th, 2014, 11:42 am to add the following --

Fooloso4 wrote:What is impossible for cats is not impossible for quantum wave/particles. It only seems impossible because our touchstone of what is and is not possible are, so to speak, cat sized things.

Oh come on, nothing is impossible for cats. Thinking of which, I had better go feed Mr Bigglesworth.

Neo:

I had better go feed Mr Bigglesworth

But what happens when you open the box to feed him? Killing him to feed him just seems wrong, but put the food in there anyway. As long as you keep opening the box sooner or later both a live Mr. Bigglesworth and the kibble will show up together and he can eat.

Fooloso4 wrote:

Quotidian wrote: So my argument is that there is 'a domain of law' which is ontologically distinct from 'the domain of phenomena'.

But if I am right then the laws of nature have no more ontological status than my description what my dog does when it’s time for dinner. I am not talking about what my dog does, but about the description of what she does. When you say that the law of acceleration of matter is real, I do not think that means anything more than that we can quantify and predict the acceleration of matter. What is real is not the law but what it describes. It is not subject to a 'a domain of law'. The laws are epistemological not ontological.

Your response to Q above answered the questions you raised about my position, in which case you've got it right.
Before I got sidetracked with the Ancient Greeks I think my point was that evolution is as much about preserving structure/function (s/f) as it is about changing them. At the genetic level there is a built in momentum to preserve s/f intact (in the sense of an apparent, eternal maintenance), but **** happens and s/f changes (the real world intrudes into the apparent domain). I wanted to make the point here that unlike other scientific theories evolution IS existential in some critical way? Anyway, I was making this distinction in response to Q's use of the term 'biological materialism' as somehow being epistemologically equivalent to the laws of motion. Perhaps I'm just barking up the wrong tree?

Oops, I didn't finish my sentence. I meant to write "I had better go feed Mr Bigglesworth to the dogs." This is all part of their scientific diet. Sometimes, when they open the box, he's in there and they get a tasty (and rather noisy) snack. Often though, he's not. It's called the Quantum Diet, and as with all diets, it leads to indeterminate weight - you cannot know how much the dogs weigh until you put them on the scales.

I know this sounds cruel, but it's not really. If anything untoward happens, I just keep shutting and opening the box until Mr Bigglesworth is alive - good as new. I should advise that this process does not work with Grandmothers, I did want to run the experiment a few more times to obtain a more complete data set, but my exhumation request was denied.

I do have standards. The same and not the same refers to the forms of human consciousness in our present time. We are the same in death. Relevance? I may live longer if my chosen words do not offend those of relevance. For a few of us that live in the clouds the meaning of relevance is lost in the paper. Is your age or custom of relevance? Is an education of relevance to my analysis of the OP? I may go back to read in the cloud the Platonic view of Virtue or Justice or some other standard of relevance. How anyone justifies positions of survival if not by the use of the word relevant? So relevant is… until is not. So the relevant turns to the absurd “belief” in the relevant position of being relevant. It is just another distraction of real purpose.

Neznac:

I think my point was that evolution is as much about preserving structure/function (s/f) as it is about changing them.

Right, and this is something that those who dismiss evolution because of words like random and accident seem not to know. Although I do not agree with what you said in an earlier post about:

preserving that which is eternal and true to its original manifestation

Anyway, I was making this distinction in response to Q's use of the term 'biological materialism' as somehow being epistemologically equivalent to the laws of motion.

For Q, and I am sure he will correct me if I am wrong, the epistemological is ontological. It is intellect that determines the world and our knowledge is of the intelligible laws by which and through which the world is created and functions. These laws, according to this view, are not descriptive, they are real and determinate, they have ontological status and order things in such a way that they are intelligible to our intellect; which is itself a product of intellect. This is Aristotle’s God, thought thinking itself, or intellect becoming intelligible. In Hegel’s version this takes place through history, the history of philosophy being the self-realization of mind or consciousness.

Neo:

I should advise that this process does not work with Grandmothers

What about with my mother in the basement? (a reference to a different thread).

Beast:

For a few of us that live in the clouds the meaning of relevance is lost in the paper.

You will have to come down out of the clouds if you wish to make you meaning clear to me. Even Socrates, perched high above the earth in a basket, descended. From our terrestrial perspective we might well wonder whether those suspended above are basket cases.

Neznac wrote:... I think my point was that evolution is as much about preserving structure/function (s/f) as it is about changing them ...

I'm going to look past the implied question "What is evolution for?" on the assumption that you didn't mean to imply it.

Are you trying to get at the idea that resides in the "space elevator" description of evolution that seems to be inherent to "punctuated equilibrium" models? In other words, a species might bimble along in close to stasis for millions of years, with only minor changes, but if a particular feature develops (or rather the ability to develop a particular feature - if the oxygen levels were precluding such development), this can lead to explosive change - such as the development of collagen and skeletal structures that led to the Cambrian Radiation.

In this case, evolution can build on the existing structure/function. I don't think there is any overwhelming requirement to preserve structure or function, as the penguin, the kiwi, the dolphin and the atretochoana, among many other animals attest (wings to fly, gone, legs to run along the ground, gone, eyes, gone). Even humans (along with other simians such as the other apes and monkeys and proto-simians such as tarsiers) have lost the ability to synthesise vitamin C - an ability that exists in more "primitive" primates such as lemurs and lorises and the majority of mammals. You may also note that we have lost the prehensile tail (although admittedly a long time ago).

It's purely our desire to impose a narrative which makes us look at our current "skill set" and trace it back through various species and declare that it has been "preserved".