Philosophy Discussion Forums

stevie wrote: ↑March 29th, 2022, 5:14 pm

SteveKlinko wrote: ↑March 29th, 2022, 2:14 pm

stevie wrote: ↑March 29th, 2022, 1:09 pm

SteveKlinko wrote: ↑November 20th, 2021, 11:02 am
Next, I would like to talk about Eliminativism and Illusionism with respect to Conscious Experience. Eliminativism is another Physicalist proposition. Eliminativism proposes that Conscious Experience does not even exist. Illusionism is a sub category of Eliminativism that proposes that Conscious Experience exists only as an Illusion. This is pure Denialism. How on Earth can someone think that the Redness or Salty Taste that they Experience is only an Illusion and does not Exist? They cannot have the same kind of Conscious Experience about these things that I have. They must also believe that the CM itself does not Exist. So for them the IM will not exist since the CM does not exist. There is not much more that can be said about this proposition. Please, someone show me how Conscious Experience does not Exist?

What the **** is "Eliminativism and Illusionism"? I never came across these terms but I know "eliminative materialism" which appear to be the most persuasive theory.

Eliminativism is just another name for Eliminative Materialism. So what Conscious Experiences can Eliminativism Explain? What is the Explanation for the Experience of Redness, or the Standard A Tone, or the Salty Taste, or etc.?

It seems you have not understood the theory of "eliminative materialism". It is a speculative philosophical theory, not a scientific theory. It deals with conceptual theories of psychological or mental phenomena as such and it is a kind of meta theory about theories.

I disagree that Eliminativism is not a Theory about Conscious Experience. It explicitly says there are no such things as Qualia. This means no Redness, no Standard A Tone, no Salty Taste, etc. The questions I ask about Redness, the Standard A Tone, and the Salty Taste are answered using Eliminativism by saying that these Qualia do not exist. This is completely Incoherent. So when it comes to a particular Conscious Experience like Redness, Eliminativists are saying don't believe your Lying Eyes. It's almost as if Eliminativists don't have Qualia like Redness. There is no amount of torturous Philosophical blabbering that can make Eliminativism logically Coherent. Qualia are a huge problem for Physicalists/Materialists because they cannot push Qualia into any functioning or process in the Material Universe (they can't even find Qualia in the Neurons), so they must make Qualia go away. I Experience Redness in my Visual Experience, and it is not an Illusion, and it is not going to go away, but it must be explained.

stevie wrote: ↑March 29th, 2022, 1:09 pm I know "eliminative materialism" which appear to be the most persuasive theory.

The most self-refuting theory, like ever, appears to be the most persuasive one? Even if everything is material, we are using consciousness to deny the existence of consciousness. Unless none of this is happening.

The dichotomy with “Experience” is emphatic. It is like saying experience is reality and so the dichotomy of reality and its rules. The rules of evolution make the assertion of matter out of its rules. Evolution makes the assertion that life is a result of the possible. It is that thought is a property of living. With thought we bend the rules of gravity and add new elements to the periodic table. If this is experience of breaking the rules, then it is safe to say that thought is first unless there is an inversion from rules/matter. Reality/Experience came out of thought.

SteveKlinko wrote: ↑March 30th, 2022, 7:39 amI disagree that Eliminativism is not a Theory about Conscious Experience. It explicitly says there are no such things as Qualia.

There is a distinction between absolute eliminativism about all kinds of mental entities and relative eliminativism about some (but not all) kinds of mental entities. For example, one of the most famous eliminative materialists, Paul Churchland, is not an absolute eliminativist, because he is a reductive materialist and thus a non-eliminativist (realist) about sensations. Instead, his target of elimination are propositional attitudes such as belief and desire.

QUOTE>
"In one important area, a blanket eliminative materialism bids fair to be just plain wrong. The reason is simple: The portion of folk psychology concerned with the various sensations to which we are subject is in the process of finding a moderately smooth and highly illuminating reduction at the hands of unfolding neuroscience."
(p. 166)

"Where the common-sense ontology of sensations is concerned, eliminative materialism looks to be false. Sensations are not likely to be eliminated from our scientific ontology. They are already in the process of being smoothly reduced thereto."
(p. 171)

(Churchland, Paul M. "The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism." In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen, 160-181. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007.)
<QUOTE

SteveKlinko wrote: ↑March 29th, 2022, 2:14 pmEliminativism is just another name for Eliminative Materialism.

There are also non-materialistic versions of eliminativism: eliminative mentalism (about the material/physical) & eliminative neutralism (about the material/physical & the mental)

Belindi wrote: ↑March 27th, 2022, 5:51 pmMind is thing, an ontic substance .The absolute idealist claims there is no ontic substance whatsoever and there is nothing but experience.

As far as I know, absolute idealism (as represented by Hegel and Schelling) endorses monism rather than nihilism about substances.

"[A]bsolute idealism is the doctrine that everything is a part of the single universal organism, or that everything conforms to, or is an appearance of, its purpose, design, or idea."

(Beiser, Frederick C. German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781–1801. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002. p. 352)

Belindi wrote: ↑March 27th, 2022, 5:51 pmMind is thing, an ontic substance .The absolute idealist claims there is no ontic substance whatsoever and there is nothing but experience.

Anyway, a subjectless subjective idealism cannot be true, because it is ontologically incoherent.

Consul wrote: ↑March 30th, 2022, 4:30 pm

Belindi wrote: ↑March 27th, 2022, 5:51 pmMind is thing, an ontic substance .The absolute idealist claims there is no ontic substance whatsoever and there is nothing but experience.

Anyway, a subjectless subjective idealism cannot be true, because it is ontologically incoherent.

That's right. That is why I like absolute idealism where there are no objects or subjects but experience only. (See Bradley)

In particular, Bradley rejected on these grounds the view that reality can be understood as consisting of many objects existing independently of each other (pluralism) and of our experience of them (realism). Consistently, his own view combined substance monism — the claim that reality is one, that there are no real separate things — with metaphysical idealism — the claim that reality consists solely of idea or experience. This vision of the world had a profound effect on the verse of T.S. Eliot, who studied philosophy at Harvard and wrote a Ph.D. thesis on Bradley.

(Stanford Dictionary of Philosophy)

Consul wrote: ↑March 30th, 2022, 3:17 pm

SteveKlinko wrote: ↑March 30th, 2022, 7:39 amI disagree that Eliminativism is not a Theory about Conscious Experience. It explicitly says there are no such things as Qualia.

There is a distinction between absolute eliminativism about all kinds of mental entities and relative eliminativism about some (but not all) kinds of mental entities. For example, one of the most famous eliminative materialists, Paul Churchland, is not an absolute eliminativist, because he is a reductive materialist and thus a non-eliminativist (realist) about sensations. Instead, his target of elimination are propositional attitudes such as belief and desire.

QUOTE>
"In one important area, a blanket eliminative materialism bids fair to be just plain wrong. The reason is simple: The portion of folk psychology concerned with the various sensations to which we are subject is in the process of finding a moderately smooth and highly illuminating reduction at the hands of unfolding neuroscience."
(p. 166)

"Where the common-sense ontology of sensations is concerned, eliminative materialism looks to be false. Sensations are not likely to be eliminated from our scientific ontology. They are already in the process of being smoothly reduced thereto."
(p. 171)

(Churchland, Paul M. "The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism." In Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen, 160-181. Oxford: Blackwell, 2007.)
<QUOTE

To any major Philosophical proposition there are usually different Nuances of Interpretation, Caveats, and a general watering down of the initial concept. The more of these additions that there are, is usually an indication of problems with the initial concept. It would seem from the Quotes that Relative Eliminativists are expecting that Science will save them by finding Conscious Experience in the Neurons. But that isn't happening either. Eliminativism cannot be saved by watering it down.

Belindi wrote: ↑March 31st, 2022, 4:50 am

Consul wrote: ↑March 30th, 2022, 4:30 pmAnyway, a subjectless subjective idealism cannot be true, because it is ontologically incoherent.

That's right. That is why I like absolute idealism where there are no objects or subjects but experience only. (See Bradley)

In particular, Bradley rejected on these grounds the view that reality can be understood as consisting of many objects existing independently of each other (pluralism) and of our experience of them (realism). Consistently, his own view combined substance monism — the claim that reality is one, that there are no real separate things — with metaphysical idealism — the claim that reality consists solely of idea or experience. This vision of the world had a profound effect on the verse of T.S. Eliot, who studied philosophy at Harvard and wrote a Ph.D. thesis on Bradley.

(Stanford Dictionary of Philosophy)

Absolute idealism isn't a subjectless subjective idealism, so I doubt that Bradley's claim really is "that reality consists solely of idea or experience." – I'll check it!

Belindi

See: viewtopic.php?p=408132#p408132

Let's get to the point of this thread. How does Idealism (any version of it) Explain how Neural Activity produces Conscious Experience? Since Idealism requires a backward Causality Trajectory maybe I should ask: How does Idealism (any version of it) Explain how Conscious Experience produces Neural Activity?

Consul wrote: ↑April 2nd, 2022, 10:09 am Ralph Stefan Weir: Does Idealism Solve the Problem of Consciousness?

Have you read this, or did you just like the title? At first, I thought all right, somebody has finally submitted something that would at least try to prove one of these theories. I did take the time to read this and the answer to the question in the title was that No, Idealism in any of its forms does not solve the problem of Conscious Experience. Maybe I missed the point of you posting this.

SteveKlinko wrote: ↑April 2nd, 2022, 8:29 am Let's get to the point of this thread. How does Idealism (any version of it) Explain how Neural Activity produces Conscious Experience? Since Idealism requires a backward Causality Trajectory maybe I should ask: How does Idealism (any version of it) Explain how Conscious Experience produces Neural Activity?

Idealism explains neural activity as yet another construct in a reality that's entirely constructed by mind.

I say "mind" and there are absolute idealists who claim mind too is a construct and there is nothing but experience. This is rather nice BTW as it lets humble experiencers such as earthworms have their little say.