Philosophy Discussion Forums

RJG wrote: ↑August 2nd, 2018, 9:23 pm A subject cannot logically posit that a world without subjects exists.

Now if you admit that it is logically impossible for a subject to posit the being of a world with no subjects, then who can posit the logical possibility of the being of such a world? If no one, where does this logical possibilty come from? Does the logical universe extend beyond the subject-world structure? And if so, if logic precedes the being of the world, so that some Platonic principle says that there can be worlds without subjects, what relevance can such a principle have? How can we ever use that kind of logic? We can only use logic within the subject-world dipole. That basic ontological structure defines the limits of our logical universe. That the being of x is logically possible means that it is possible for a subject or other unknown principle to posit the being of x into the logical universe. And if it is not possible, it is impossible.

Tamminen wrote:Not quite. A subject can logically try to posit a possible world of any kind, but because that world must fit into the logical space within the structure of 'subject-world', which is our logical universe, so to speak, the possible world we really posit cannot be without subjects. The weak point which I challenged you to attack on, is the question of where logic itself stands in our reality, and if it stands in our reality at all. So if you look what Wittgenstein says about it, you can oppose him or not. But if you agree with him, as I do, the logical conclusion should be clear. Or is it?

Tam, it certainly is not clear to me. If it were clear, then you should be able to show the math. -- please put this in a syllogism so we all can see the logic trail.

RJG wrote:It is logically impossible for a subject to posit that a subject-less world exists, because the subject must exist in this world to do the positing. Note: it is the "positing" of this that is logically impossible, NOT the "subject-less world". This is similar to the logical impossibility of me denying my own existence, because I must exist to be able to deny my existence. BUT this is very different from the conclusion that you (Tamminen) seem to be making. -- that a world without subjects is logically impossible.

Tamminen wrote:Now if you admit that it is logically impossible for a subject to posit the being of a world with no subjects, then who can posit the logical possibility of the being of such a world?

It is one thing to say
1. "A subject cannot logically posit that a world without subjects exists", and it is quite another to say
2. "A world without subjects is logically impossible".

We have two different "logically impossibility's" here. The first being the self-contradictory ("logically impossible") statement itself, and in the second, we have a (baseless) claim that the world without subjects is "logically impossible". These "logically impossible's" refer to DIFFERENT impossibilities.

1. X posits that X does not exist in this world -- a self contradictory statement which makes the posited claim "logically impossible".
2. A world without X is not "logically possible" -- a baseless claim, needs supporting premises to validate this claim

Tam, 1 does not prove 2. These are saying different things. Again, please show the missing premise that connects these two!

RJG:

You have totally ignored the main point in my argument: what is the logical universe where we can posit the being of anything? I suggest that you read carefully what I wrote in my latest post, so that I do not need to repeat it. There is no missing premise. But perhaps we return to this tomorrow.

When we speak about the logical possibility of a being, we must define the logical space in the logical universe where the possibility of that being can or cannot be posited. If the possibility of that being lies outside of the limits of the logical universe, it can be said that positing the possibility of that being is logically impossible or absurd, or that it makes no sense to speak of its possibility. Which one of these expressions we should use, we can discuss, but I think they all lead to the same: impossibility. Now the logical universe can or cannot extend beyond our logical universe: the logical universe where we can use logic. My position, and also Mr. Wittgensteins's, is that the logical universe coincides with our logical universe, which means that the subject-world relationship defines the limits for what is logically possible.

A world cannot be an object for the subjects of another world. There is only one world. We must speak about alternate worlds or possible worlds. Now it is not logically possible that there is a world without subjects in our logical universe, which is the only logical universe within which we can use logic. The possibility of a world without subjects lies outside of the logical universe, because it lies outside of the subject-world relationship. Therefore all possible worlds have a subjective viewpoint and necessarily contain subjects.

So, contrary to your first premise, I can logically posit the possibility of a world in which I do not exist as an individual subject, but I cannot logically posit a world without subjects. And because no subject can posit that kind of a world, we cannot speak about its possibility. Its possibility is beyond all logic. Therefore its being is not logically possible if we use logic in the usual way.

About abstractions:

A unicorn is an abstraction that fits perfectly into our logical universe, and makes sense as part of a possible world.

A Christian's Heaven is a beautiful abstraction and extension of our world, and makes a perfect example of a possible world, with all its inhabitants, although only some of us believe it is real.

A world without inhabitants is an abstraction of our world that does not belong to the group of possible worlds, because its possibility of being lies outside of the limits of our logical universe, outside of the subject-world relationship. It is a "forbidden" world.

Thanks Tam for the extra explanations. I will study this to try to absorb your meaning, and respond next week when I get free time.

I agree that consciousness is not a phenomenon of the physical world. I prefer to call it self-awareness to distinguish it from "being awake". This implies the existence of another dimension otherwise our self-awareness would have no place in which to exist.

There is no mechanism in the physical world which has the capability to create something that exists in another dimension. By definition no dimension can cross into another, otherwise, it would not be a separate dimension.

We are both these dimension beings but at least four dimensional beings. That is how we can perceive our self-awareness in the fourth dimension. This dimension is existence itself, Nothing can exist without being in that dimension. Just like nothing can exist in our three dimensional physical world without having all three dimensions.

Many of the good discussions involving the theories of the universe such as quantum mechanics are themselves part of the physical world. They cannot go beyond because they themselves are constrained by the laws of the physical world.

Tamminen;

A unicorn is an abstraction that fits perfectly into our logical universe,

It is not logical to use a unicorn is an example of an abstraction that fits perfectly into our logical universe.

Your example of an abstraction is an Illusion not an abstraction.

It should be a possibility for an abstraction to exist if it is going to fit as an example into your logical Universe.

Tammenin;

Now if you admit that it is logically impossible for a subject to posit the being of a world with no subjects,

It would not be logical for me to admit, that it is logically impossible for a subject to posit the being of a world with no subjects,

Halc

Thanks for the detailed and informative reply, and sorry for the delay responding

Gertie wrote: ↑
July 29th, 2018, 10:10 pm
That doesn't seem to get us very far then, does it? In terms of being able to establish if serial (arrow of time) cause and effect, and independently existing stuff, are mutually exclusive possibilities ?

You mean does my answer prove Bell's theorem. No, it doesn't. I don't know my physics well enough to express exactly why these two principles are mutually exclusive.

Fair enough.

And isn't there a deeper issue, to do with defining reality in terms of maths (an abststract desciptor) identified/created by conscious subjects, to describe 'real stuff''? What's the justification for giving maths a stronger claim to reality, than the stuff it's describing?

This is all based on empirical results, not some conclusion drawn from a mathematical abstraction. The theory says that no mathematical abstraction can have both those properties and still be consistent with empirical results.

Ah OK.

So the upshot is, QM gives results, which when interpreted, are hard to reconcile with classical physics, and our observations/intuitions about eg time/causal relationships.

It seems like there's no settled explanation, but this at least suggests we should keep an open mind to the world being very different in reality to how we've evolved to perceive and think about it.

Is there any physics behind the idea that the Subject-Object relationship (Conscious Observer-Non-Conscious Observed) are key to the ontological/independent existence of either, as Taminen speculates?

Of sharing a model, or a model of the same apple shared between observers? Describing the universe different ways is not really "sharing a model of the universe".

I'd put it this way.

I have to take a leap of faith to accept the model exists independently of my directly known phenomenal experiencing of it (sights, sounds, sensations, memories, thoughts, reasoning etc). Including you and the apple and my own body/brain. But once I take that leap of inference, it's a world where your experiencing and mine, and our internal models, are each unique, but also largely tally - that's what empirical science is built on, how patterns are observed and theories about our shared universe are constructed.

That's why I can point at what I call a green apple, and you can say yes, you see a green apple too. It's possible (tho unlikely imo) that you're actually looking at something I would call a purple square, or hearing a symphony, or have bat sonar. Never-the-less we can communicate coherently about 'the green apple', because we have a similar enough shared model and signifiers which work. We can even talk about abstract ideas like the apple falling because of gravity, make predictions, etc. And you can explain some QM stuff to me, adding to my personal model of the world - which adjusts from moment to moment.

Now within our shared (inter-subjective if you like) model of the universe there is evidence that our phenomenal experiencing (consciousness) is something that evolved in our ancestors well after non-conscious stuff existed. Which is evidence that stuff can exist independently of being observed or measured. And also that my senses, cognitive abilities etc evolved for 'good enough' utility not perfect accuracy, and for navigating (perceiving and understanding) the world a particular ('classical') level of granularity.

Now there is also QM (and who knows what next), in our shared model, which raises questions about issues of locality, time, cause and effect, the fundamental nature of stuff, and the relationship between phenomenological experiencing/measuring and stuff.

But I'm not sure it offers answers yet, on the issues raised in this thread. For me it suggests we should be wary of making hard claims.

But all that exists can't be maths or QM, because they are mere abstract descriptions of something else - descriptions of stuff doing things. Either/or the describer/the described must exist for descriptions to exist.

Something must exist for something to exist, a tautology I guess. But I don't find objective existence necessary for the apple to stand in relation to me, thus allowing me to experience it.

I think you can get a handle on this if you think about the 'heirarchy of knowing'.

You can't know anything exists but your own direct phenomenological experiencing. Even your embodied self.

So you know for certain your experiencing of the apple, and of the 'external world' exists.

If you infer that those experiences are describing something which exists in reality, then you can infer you know some things (roughly,imperfectly, limitedly) about them.

If your experiences tally with mine, and nearly everybody else, then we have a shared model. One we can communicate coherently about, and which includes something we agree to call green apples. And science, the Standard Model of Physics, QM, etc. Which can help us correct and refine some of our rough, imperfect, limited perceptions and understanding of our shared world model.

But all that is inside the model, parts of it - the only thing you know for certain, is your experiencing of the green apple.

That's a difficult bias to drop, but try as I did, I could not identify what either the describer or the described being 'real' provided except to make the experience real. I'm not a realist, so that doesn't bother me. Even an idealist is a realist of sorts, believing experience to be real, and then failing the same old question of why the idealist happens to be real.

My view is that if you take scepticism to its logical conclusion, all that can be known for certain as being real are the experiences themselves. You can even discard the Subject-Experiencer, tho this seems counter-intuitive.

The descriptions might be accurate or inaccurate, or tell us something more about the nature of actual stuff, but they wouldn't exist as descriptions, if there wasn't something to be described.

I'm describing what we experience. That's something. It's just not objective.

I'd say that 'objective' is a notion that refers to our shared model, more akin to intersubjective.

'A measurement is taken' means what? I'm never sure. Does it require a conscious observer?

Interpretation dependent.

Aaaagh! Doesn't this stuff drive you bonkers?

Giving up now! But again, thank you for taking the time to explain. Unfortunately it's just beyond me, can't get me noggin round it.

In the context of this thread, my general points would be that -

QM is a way of describing reality, not 'the stuf of reality' itself.

Well, some interpretations say it IS the stuff itself. Nobody has actually ever found stuff, no matter how close they look. What they find instead is a mathematical wave function (which uses imaginary numbers). Some QM interpretations say this function is the actual stuff of reality, and some just say it is a descriptive part of the model or some such. MWI for instance posits that the wave function (and only the wave function) is actually what the universe is.

Huh? But a wave is just a shape, a description of a wave-shaped something. Not a something itself.

It seems that reality can be described in different ways at different levels of resolution (classical, quantum and who knows what else we haven't discovered), but there still has to be a reality for it to describe.

Plenty of things describe non-real things, so it just doesn't seem to follow. But hey, most interpretations say there is reality being described by the model. I'm not saying there is no objective reality, just that I don't take it as a given. My favored model describes my reality. It is quite real, just not objectively real.

I think that's kinda true of everybody, but we can also have coherent discussions beyond that, create (imperfect, limited) models within the caveated 'heirarchy of knowing'.

Gertie wrote: ↑August 4th, 2018, 1:46 pm Halc

Thanks for the detailed and informative reply, and sorry for the delay responding

No problem. Your posts seem more thought out and open than most I see, and for one, it takes time to put together such posts. I try to be open myself, evidenced by the fact that my favored position seems to never stay in one place. I love attacking my own view.

So the upshot is, QM gives results, which when interpreted, are hard to reconcile with classical physics, and our observations/intuitions about eg time/causal relationships.

QM gives results which cannot be reconciled with principles of classical physics. The interpretations thus need to be based on which principles to keep and which to discard. Some discard both. Time/causal relationships is one of them, and the other is meaningful state independent of observation.

It seems like there's no settled explanation, but this at least suggests we should keep an open mind to the world being very different in reality to how we've evolved to perceive and think about it.

Yes. I don't think it is possible to settle on an explanation. There seem to be no tests (not even a functional quantum computer) which validate or falsify any natural interpretation.

Is there any physics behind the idea that the Subject-Object relationship (Conscious Observer-Non-Conscious Observed) are key to the ontological/independent existence of either, as Taminen speculates?

No physics corresponds to what Tamminen is pushing, since it seems a self-contradictory mix of idealism and perhaps the sort of universe you get from Wigner interpretation, which is not a natural interpretation.

Yes, there is physics (or at least valid interpretations) behind the Subject-Object relationship. My own favored interpretation is one of them, but the relationship is intrinsic, not causal, and humans/carbon-based-life is not special in any way. (Carlo Rovelli (1996). "Relational Quantum Mechanics". International Journal of Theoretical Physics.). That one just solves a lot of metaphysical problems that plague many of the others. No, I'm not going to assert that it must be the correct interpretation. There is no falsification test for the others.

I have to take a leap of faith to accept the model exists independently of my directly known phenomenal experiencing of it

Careful of your wording. The model does not exist independent of somebody abstracting the model, but the territory mapped by the model might. It takes a leap of faith to accept that the model corresponds to a real territory. I'll take your comment to mean that.

But once I take that leap of inference, it's a world where your experiencing and mine, and our internal models, are each unique, but also largely tally - that's what empirical science is built on, how patterns are observed and theories about our shared universe are constructed.

Good so far.

That's why I can point at what I call a green apple, and you can say yes, you see a green apple too. It's possible (tho unlikely imo) that you're actually looking at something I would call a purple square, or hearing a symphony, or have bat sonar.

Agree. Probably demonstrably so. However the apple appears to me, it is not via sonar that I see it since that would not render color. It renders a better 3D image that the binocular 2D colorized image pair that most humans have (not binocular in my case), but the sonar yields just apple, not green apple.

Never-the-less we can communicate coherently about 'the green apple', because we have a similar enough shared model and signifiers which work. We can even talk about abstract ideas like the apple falling because of gravity, make predictions, etc. And you can explain some QM stuff to me, adding to my personal model of the world - which adjusts from moment to moment.

You express all this quite well.

Now within our shared (inter-subjective if you like) model of the universe there is evidence that our phenomenal experiencing (consciousness) is something that evolved in our ancestors well after non-conscious stuff existed. Which is evidence that stuff can exist independently of being observed or measured.

Here is where the water gets muddy. We have only the one data point, and what you said just doesn't necessarily follow. In fact that non-conscious part of the universe is very much observed since anything you look at is in the past. There is a point beyond which we cannot see (which has no direct causal influence on us) and I cannot necessarily assert that if I exist, it must exist.

And also that my senses, cognitive abilities etc evolved for 'good enough' utility not perfect accuracy, and for navigating (perceiving and understanding) the world a particular ('classical') level of granularity.

Evolved for 'better than the other guy' more than for 'good enough'. But yes, agree.

Now there is also QM (and who knows what next), in our shared model, which raises questions about issues of locality, time, cause and effect, the fundamental nature of stuff, and the relationship between phenomenological experiencing/measuring and stuff.

But I'm not sure it offers answers yet, on the issues raised in this thread. For me it suggests we should be wary of making hard claims.

Good suggestion. Yes, that's what it says to me also. I mostly rag on people making hard claims, such as the title of this thread does.

I think you can get a handle on this if you think about the 'heirarchy of knowing'.

You can't know anything exists but your own direct phenomenological experiencing. Even your embodied self.

So you know for certain your experiencing of the apple, and of the 'external world' exists.

Well, it seems to exist to me (whatever I am), but I definitely stop short of concluding that it just exists from that. It seems to serve no purpose to anything that it would. The apple stands in relation to me, and you as well, and that's good enough. Please don't think I'm preaching some sort of truth here. My view is not a common one, and you are free to disregard it.

If you infer that those experiences are describing something which exists in reality, then you can infer you know some things (roughly,imperfectly, limitedly) about them.

I can know things about them without needing to infer that they exist in reality. See how I approach things? Annoying, no? Sorry that I already seem to have fallen off your hierarchy track.

If your experiences tally with mine, and nearly everybody else, then we have a shared model. One we can communicate coherently about, and which includes something we agree to call green apples. And science, the Standard Model of Physics, QM, etc. Which can help us correct and refine some of our rough, imperfect, limited perceptions and understanding of our shared world model.

But all that is inside the model, parts of it - the only thing you know for certain, is your experiencing of the green apple.

Agree to all this.

My view is that if you take scepticism to its logical conclusion, all that can be known for certain as being real are the experiences themselves. You can even discard the Subject-Experiencer, tho this seems counter-intuitive.

The subject-experiencer as a thing is not too hard to drop. There are all sorts of mind-games that attack the idea of what you are and show it to not be an objective thing. This can often be done within classical physics.

I'd say that 'objective' is a notion that refers to our shared model, more akin to intersubjective.

OK, shared between us. I agree to that much. I use 'objective' to mean context-independent, or 'view from nowhere'. What we share is neither of those. I suppose I'll have to be careful when using the word since it seems to mean different things to us.

Aaaagh! Doesn't this stuff drive you bonkers?

Giving up now! But again, thank you for taking the time to explain. Unfortunately it's just beyond me, can't get me noggin round it.

A measurement of system S by measurer M is to say that the state of S has some causal effect (makes any difference) to the state of M. That's straight out of QM, not particularly interpretational. But the interpretation comes into play when you ask what happens as a result of that causal interaction. Does it result in wave collapse? Entanglement? Do these things happen, but not because of the causal interaction? Different interpretations give different descriptions of what actually happens.

Huh? But a wave is just a shape, a description of a wave-shaped something. Not a something itself.

Some interpretations say that, yes. It's about 50/50 in that nice chart-summary.

Halc wrote: ↑August 5th, 2018, 2:48 pm No physics corresponds to what Tamminen is pushing, since it seems a self-contradictory mix of idealism and perhaps the sort of universe you get from Wigner interpretation, which is not a natural interpretation.

Just to avoid misunderstanding, my view is a metaphysical interpretation of reality as a whole, and it does not take a stand on whether consciousness is part of the QM phenomena. It does not conflict with naturalism, it is an interpretation of natural phenomena as they are described by science, and in particular an interpretation of our existential situation. If it is self-contradictory or in conflict with science, and someone shows this, I am of course immediately ready to give up everything I have thought so far.

If proposing the fundamental nature of the subject-world relationship is idealism, then I am an ontological idealist, as many of our most famous philosophers have been.

Someone has said that a philosophical discussion is impossible, because we speak about different things. Each of us has a different horizon, a way of thinking, perhaps built during many decades, and only in the context of that horizon understanding is possible. But also philosophical monologues can be interesting sometimes.

Tamminem, since everyone has the same sticking point with your ideas, maybe we could delve a little more into your ideas regarding the early universe.

My understanding is that you do not claim that the plasma, molecular clouds and black holes were conscious, but the configuration of that reality was such that the emergence of consciousness was made possible. So, while there was no visceral sense of being within these pre nervous system entities there was ...

...?

Tamminen wrote: ↑August 5th, 2018, 4:17 pm

Halc wrote: No physics corresponds to what Tamminen is pushing, since it seems a self-contradictory mix of idealism and perhaps the sort of universe you get from Wigner interpretation, which is not a natural interpretation.

Just to avoid misunderstanding, my view is a metaphysical interpretation of reality as a whole, and it does not take a stand on whether consciousness is part of the QM phenomena.

The QM interpretations are all metaphysical interpretation of reality as a whole. The natural ones don't give any special treatment to consciousness, so don't mention it. The Wigner interpretation has the concept of living conscious presence which defines reality. It was the closest to what you've been sometimes describing.

If it is self-contradictory or in conflict with science, and someone shows this, I am of course immediately ready to give up everything I have thought so far.

Well it might be outside of the assumptions of science, but not contradictory with it. It seems contradictory with itself, and you need to resolve that.

If proposing the fundamental nature of the subject-world relationship is idealism, then I am an ontological idealist, as many of our most famous philosophers have been.

Idealism is not provably wrong, but has some serious epistemological issues if you want my opinion. It posits the reality only of experience and abstractions, not an external reality. No Ding an sich so to speak. This would be consistent with a logical impossiblility of a universe unobserved. But you're not consistent about it, positing that other presences can also anchor reality despite the fact that other people only exist as experiences and abstractions. I can imagine a super-intelligent evolving on earth, but my imagination is incapable of actually learning anything new from this abstraction since it isn't actually conscious and able to convey new information. Such a being cannot anchor reality without you to anchor it in turn. If you posit that other people exist independent of your presence, then the idealism falls apart since you've acknowledged the thing in itself, which conflicts with your denial of it when I asked about the logical impossibility of an unobserved universe.

You seem to turn it on and off as suits your purpose, but this forms an inconsistency with your position.

Greta wrote: ↑August 5th, 2018, 6:27 pm My understanding is that you do not claim that the plasma, molecular clouds and black holes were conscious, but the configuration of that reality was such that the emergence of consciousness was made possible. So, while there was no visceral sense of being within these pre nervous system entities there was ...

My interpretation is that the laws of physics are such that they make the cosmic and biological evolution possible and necessary, also the evolution towards consciousness. So the essential nature of consciousness is the driving force of the universe. That matter behaves according to the principles of causality and randomness does not conflict with this. I am trying to answer the 'why' questions without getting in conflict with the 'hows' of science.

Halc wrote: ↑August 5th, 2018, 11:31 pm It seems contradictory with itself, and you need to resolve that.

I am still waiting.

Halc wrote: ↑August 5th, 2018, 11:31 pm Idealism is not provably wrong, but has some serious epistemological issues if you want my opinion. It posits the reality only of experience and abstractions, not an external reality. No Ding an sich so to speak. This would be consistent with a logical impossiblility of a universe unobserved. But you're not consistent about it, positing that other presences can also anchor reality despite the fact that other people only exist as experiences and abstractions. I can imagine a super-intelligent evolving on earth, but my imagination is incapable of actually learning anything new from this abstraction since it isn't actually conscious and able to convey new information. Such a being cannot anchor reality without you to anchor it in turn. If you posit that other people exist independent of your presence, then the idealism falls apart since you've acknowledged the thing in itself, which conflicts with your denial of it when I asked about the logical impossibility of an unobserved universe.

If you read my latest replies to RJG, and understand the "logic" behind those reasonings, you can perhaps get a better view of my version of idealism. It is not subjective idealism. I can easily posit the possibility of an objective world and the objective existence of other subjects. The only thing I cannot logically posit is the world without inhabitants. Objects are objective in relation to a subject. They are the same objects for every subject. Also a subject's consciousness is "objective". It is what it is. It is perhaps the most objective phenomenon there is. Only the subject's relationship with objects changes. Therefore there are varying perspectives to objects. If the objects were not the same objects for every perspective, there would not be any sense of speaking of truth and falsity. Now this is important: the being of an individual subject does not define the being of the world, but there must be some manifestation of subjectivity, or presence, or consciousness, to logically posit the possibility of the being of the world. A world without subjects is outside of the logical universe, the logical space, within which we can posit anything. And what is outside of the use of logic is absurd and impossible. It is not a logical contradiction, it is a logical reductio ad absurdum, but it leads to the same conclusion as a contradiction: impossibility. We can do this reasoning because we are living here in our universe with inhabitants, to limit the group of possible worlds to those with inhabitants. If there is a weak point in my reasoning, it is the validity of the premise that the subject-world relationship defines the limits of the logical universe, but no one has so far attacked on that.

As seen from above, even if an intuition is clear, it is sometimes very difficult to put into words and logical statements. But what I am trying to do is to lead to my way of thinking, sometimes using unusual expressions.