GE Morton wrote:Your wording in the above quote reveals the issue. "Feeling free" is not the same as being free. That you are reluctant or hesitant to do X because you are uncertain of the consequences of doing X, does not mean than you are not free to do X. Nor are we unfree if "we restrict our freedoms;" we are only unfree if someone else, another moral agent, restricts our freedoms, physically or by threat (in the sense defined). Personal, internal
inhibitions, whether due to worries about the "general risk of crime" or any other source, do not constitute restraints on our freedom, in any morally relevant sense. Moral issues arise only when one moral agent violates the rights of another, or threatens to do so.
Yes, you made it clear that this is your view not only here but also in the earlier post in which you quoted a distinction between three definitions of the word "threat". Here:
http://onlinephilosophyclub.com/forums/ ... 30#p306030
You've made it clear here and in that post that you see a fundamental difference between explicit threats by other individually identifiable moral agents and general threats of potential harm from a pool of other moral agents who have not yet been individually identified. The definition of "freedom" that you use is such that the former is regarded by you as a reduction of freedom and the latter is not regarded as a reduction of freedom. And therefore (in your view) the former warrants the passing of freedom-restricting legislation and the latter does not.
I disagree. I don't think it is always necessary for there to be an explicit declaration of intent to do harm by a particular individual in order for legislation to be passed which (like all legislation) restricts freedoms. And, for reasons previously discussed, I don't accept your slippery slope argument that this leads to a police state. (Stated by you here and in that earlier post.)
There is a "general risk of crime" in every community of 2 or more persons. We may not impose real restraints on the liberties of moral agents merely in order to prevent crimes they could conceivably or hypothetically commit, but are highly unlikely to commit and have indicated no intention of committing. As I said, the contrary principle, if taken to its logical conclusion, yields a police state.
As I explained earlier, I still maintain that the abortion analogy shows that things can exist on opposite ends of a continuous spectrum/slope, with no
objectively existing barrier (i.e. no barrier whose position all fair minded, clear thinking people would agree on) on that spectrum/slope, and yet our common sense tells us that an argument for one end does not facilitate an argument for the other.
I see nothing wrong with destroying a single celled embryo. I see it as wrong to destroy a newborn child. There is no objectively existing hard dividing line between the two which shows clearly to all fair minded people where right turns to wrong.
I don't think citizens should be routinely allowed to own live hand grenades. I do think they should be routinely allowed to own scissors. There is no objectively existing hard dividing line on the continuum between the two.
Allowing the destruction of single celled embryos doesn't give others an excuse to kill newborns. Banning the ownership of hand grenades doesn't give others an excuse to ban scissors. Agreeing where to place a dividing line between single celled embryos and newborns, or between hand grenades and scissors is difficult, and, in both cases, often leads to intractable arguments, because it is subjective. It depends on the type of society in which we wish to live - the trade-off between safety and individual liberty that we believe to be acceptable.
You've said that we have no right to expect freedom-limiting legislation whose purpose is to keep us safe from general dangers. I disagree. That doesn't mean I believe in a totalitarian state in which we attempt to eliminate all forms of potential danger and it doesn't mean that I give others an excuse to argue for that. I believe that
some level of safety-ensuring legislation is desirable in order to make life
tolerably safe.
So (to use Greta's earlier example) I believe that people who drive cars should be legally required to pass a driving test first, even though they have absolutely no intention of running anybody over and, individually, are unlikely to do so. They have no criminal intentions; no intentions to restrict the freedoms of others. We restrict people's freedom to drive until they've passed a test because we want to reduce the general incidence of road accidents. We want to make the roads safer.
We do not restrict people's liberties because of something they might conceivably do, but have expressed or otherwise indicated no intention of doing or any significant probability of doing.
Yes we do.
Legally requiring people to pass driving tests (even though they haven't threatened any harm to anyone and, for all I know, might be extremely unlikely, as individuals, to cause any harm) has not so far led to a police state and I don't believe that it will.
Likewise, I believe that people who drive cars should be legally required to have them checked to ensure that they reach a particular level of road-worthiness that means they reach a particular level of safety. Cars that are deemed to be beyond that level are not permitted to be driven. Again, the owners of those cars show no sign of deliberately wanting to hurt anybody and, individually, are probably unlikely to do so.
Likewise, I believe that people who own firearms should be legally obliged to learn how to use them and that there is a level of danger above which their ownership and therefore potential use should not be allowed without restrictions. Deciding on the precise values of all these levels, just like deciding the precise number of weeks after which abortions should be forbidden, is the difficult part.
But my central point is that when you say that legislation has no role to play in reducing the general risk - the fear - of something harmful happening, I disagree.