Philosophy Discussion Forums

Do you believe people who are stupid, angry, malevolent, jealous, willfully ignorant,greedy, and so forth are as whole as people who are none of these ?

I can't make out your question there. You seem to be asking whether people who are X are not X.

??

Sorry.
I am asking you if you believe the stupid, angry, malevolent people are less whole( i.e. less psychologically sound and healthy) than people whose behaviour is based on helping others to feel happy.

That is possible, but those "cognitive processes" are a black box. Experiences surely play into them, but so will various biochemical and neuro-structural factors. And I'm not sure what this has to do with love.

Sure, physiological emotions and cognitive feelings are dynamic experiences.


Homeostasis would be felt as pleasure not pain and therefore painful feelings such as anger and malevolence are mainly absence of pleasure, and are eventually morbid. Love is behaviour that increases pleasure and decreases pain.

GE Morton wrote: ↑March 1st, 2020, 1:05 pm

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑March 1st, 2020, 6:53 am GE Morton

To clarify terminology: you say that, properly speaking, only assertions are objective or subjective.

Well, this may be a quibble, but I claimed that propositions are objective or subjective; that those are properties of propositions. I use "assertion" to denote a specific utterance made by a specific person at a specific time and place. But two or more assertions made by different people at different times, even in different languages, may express the same proposition (assert the same state of affairs). "Snow is white" and "Der schnee ist weiss" are two different assertions of the same proposition.

As it happens, I think propositions are misleading metaphysical fictions. But that isn't what matters here. We agree that only propositions/assertions are objective or subjective - so that things that aren't propositions/assertions aren't one or the other. And the grammatical form of propositions/assertions is declarative. (To save time, I'll call them assertions.)

Moral principles and rules do express propositions --- that doing X conflicts with, or furthers, a moral goal. Whether it does or not is (usually) objective. If one shares that goal, then one ought or ought not do X (because, by hypothesis, one seeks to attain that goal). "Morality" is a system of moral principles and rules. It is objective if all of its principles and rules are objective.

This is the terminological tangle I referred to earlier. The terms 'a moral principle', 'a moral rule', 'a moral goal', 'a sound moral theory' and 'morality' are obviously not assertions, obviously have no truth-value, and obviously aren't objective or subjective. So any declarative predicating 'is objective' or 'is subjective' of them as subjects is false. Only an assertion expressing a moral principle or goal can be objective or subjective and have a truth-value. This may seem picky, but I think it's important. Here's a remark of yours from another post:

'I didn't say "morality" was objective. I said that a sound moral theory will be objective. Vernacular moralities --- the various moralities embraced by various people at various times and places --- are anything but objective. The aim is to replace those with one that is rationally defensible --- one that is coherent, internally consistent and consistent with known facts regarding human nature and the nature of human societies. That morality will be objective. Developing it is the job of moral philosophy.'

Those claims - 'a sound moral theory will be objective' and 'That morality will be objective' are false.

And the case for rules of any kind, including moral rules, is even clearer. Imperatives obviously aren't decalratives, so they aren't assertions. 'Do this' has no truth-value and can't be objective or subjective. (There has been talk of the 'propositional content' of imperatives, interrogatives and exclamatives - but to my knowledge it's never made much progress.)

What this means is that rules are completely excluded from the objective/subjective issue. The assertion 'moral rules are objective/subjective' is just incoherent. 'Be kind' and 'do no harm' aren't assertions. And the modals that technically turn them into declaratives - 'you should/must be kind' - 'we ought to do no harm' - don't confer truth-value. And those assertions are still neither objective not subjective.

The point of all this is to clear away the confusion around my re-phrased question: what could make a moral assertion objective? Though you may not see the significance of what I'm saying, do you accept that it's correct?

Meanwhile, given your quibble about assertions, you agree that the following fairly represents your argument:

P1 An objective assertion has public truth conditions. (Definition.)

P2 An assertion about morality is a moral assertion. (Definition.)

P3 An assertion about morality could have public truth conditions.

P4 A moral assertion could have public truth conditions. (From P2 and P3.)

C Therefore, a moral assertion could be objective.


Okay. Perhaps a pause here would be welcome.

GE Morton wrote: ↑March 1st, 2020, 12:27 am You've just affirmed, not refuted, my claim. You say, " X is only better than y if S ("better" is always to someone) prefers x to y . . ." But we've already stipulated that S prefers X to Y. Hence S is better off with X than with Y --- by your own analysis. And that he is better off is objective, since that he prefers X to Y is objective (we know that from his behavior). Or are you claiming that "S prefers X to Y" is NOT objective?

Put it this way. Is S prefers x to y a fact about S's mental state, or a fact about something else?

I've defined "human well-being" as "satisfaction of one's desires, fulfillment of one's goals, pursuit of one's interests."

And someone could define it any way they like. There aren't correct definitions.

GE Morton wrote: ↑March 1st, 2020, 12:38 pm

Greta wrote: ↑February 29th, 2020, 11:08 pm
No. You are confusing morality with physical science.

I didn't say "morality" was objective. I said that a sound moral theory will be objective. Vernacular moralities --- the various moralities embraced by various people at various times and places --- are anything but objective. The aim is to replace those with one that is rationally defensible --- one that is coherent, internally consistent and consistent with known facts regarding human nature and the nature of human societies. That morality will be objective. Developing it is the job of moral philosophy.

Humans over the centuries also concocted many vernacular cosmologies ("turtles all the way down") just as irrational, even nonsensical, as most vernacular moralities. Moral philosophers need to do for morality what natural philosophers have done for cosmology.

You might find a sound theory for something that is deeply subjective like morals, but soundness is unrelated to objectivity.

Belindi wrote: ↑March 1st, 2020, 2:11 pm
Homeostasis would be felt as pleasure not pain and therefore painful feelings such as anger and malevolence are mainly absence of pleasure, and are eventually morbid.

Well, that is far too simple, and often downright false. Acts motivated by anger or malevolence can deliver great pleasure to the actor, particularly if he considers the pain he inflicted justified. "He got what he deserved."

Love is behaviour that increases pleasure and decreases pain.

If that is a definition of "love" it is an eccentric one. Love is an emotion that can provoke behaviors that bring pleasure, but also those that bring pain, or inflict it on others. Ask Heathcliff and Catherine (Wuthering Heights).

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑March 1st, 2020, 3:29 pm
Put it this way. Is S prefers x to y a fact about S's mental state, or a fact about something else?

It is a fact about his behavior. His mental state is something we infer, or hypothesize, based on that observable behavior.

I've defined "human well-being" as "satisfaction of one's desires, fulfillment of one's goals, pursuit of one's interests."

And someone could define it any way they like. There aren't correct definitions.

Yes, one can define any word any way one likes. But if you adopt a definition other than the one accepted in your speech community you won't be understood. The latter is the "correct" definition.

There is, of course, a conventional interpretation of "well-being" as implying good health, prosperity, social acceptance and status, etc. But that interpretation presumes that everyone desires those things, which is not necessarily true. The underlying basis for well-being is satisfaction of one's desires, whatever those may be.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑March 1st, 2020, 2:52 pm
This is the terminological tangle I referred to earlier. The terms 'a moral principle', 'a moral rule', 'a moral goal', 'a sound moral theory' and 'morality' are obviously not assertions, obviously have no truth-value, and obviously aren't objective or subjective. So any declarative predicating 'is objective' or 'is subjective' of them as subjects is false. Only an assertion expressing a moral principle or goal can be objective or subjective and have a truth-value. This may seem picky, but I think it's important.

Not picky. You're quite right that terms do not have truth values.

Here's a remark of yours from another post:

'I didn't say "morality" was objective. I said that a sound moral theory will be objective. Vernacular moralities --- the various moralities embraced by various people at various times and places --- are anything but objective. The aim is to replace those with one that is rationally defensible --- one that is coherent, internally consistent and consistent with known facts regarding human nature and the nature of human societies. That morality will be objective. Developing it is the job of moral philosophy.'

Those claims - 'a sound moral theory will be objective' and 'That morality will be objective' are false.

Not so. That is because the referent of "morality" has shifted between the first sentence and the next-to-last. In the first the referent is vernacular moralities. In the next-to-last, it refers to a sound moral theory. A theory is sound if its axioms are true and it is "coherent, internally consistent and consistent with known facts regarding human nature and the nature of human societies."

The axiom of a moral theory, as I said, is a goal statement. The theorems are objective if their truth conditions are public --- whether they advance or retard attainment of the goal is publicly determinable. I do agree that it is somewhat inaccurate to call a theory --- any theory --- "objective" or "subjective." Every theory begins from some axioms accepted as true without proof, and must do so, lest you set up an infinite regress. But its theorems can be objective or subjective.

And the case for rules of any kind, including moral rules, is even clearer. Imperatives obviously aren't decalratives, so they aren't assertions. 'Do this' has no truth-value and can't be objective or subjective. (There has been talk of the 'propositional content' of imperatives, interrogatives and exclamatives - but to my knowledge it's never made much progress.)

The theory doesn't include imperatives. An "ought" statement is not an imperative; it is an advisory. It merely means, "Doing X will advance/retard attainment of Y. Since you seek Y, you should/should not do X." That one ought to pursue one's goals is a tautology; a goal not pursued is not a goal at all. Many moral theories, to be sure, include true imperatives (e.g., Kant's Categorical Imperative). But those can be easily replaced with advisories without loss of import.

What this means is that rules are completely excluded from the objective/subjective issue. The assertion 'moral rules are objective/subjective' is just incoherent.

If the rule is an advisory, as explained above, does that change your mind on that issue?

Meanwhile, given your quibble about assertions, you agree that the following fairly represents your argument:

P1 An objective assertion has public truth conditions. (Definition.)

P2 An assertion about morality is a moral assertion. (Definition.)

P3 An assertion about morality could have public truth conditions.

P4 A moral assertion could have public truth conditions. (From P2 and P3.)

C Therefore, a moral assertion could be objective.

Yes, it does.

GE Morton wrote: ↑March 1st, 2020, 9:50 pm

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑March 1st, 2020, 2:52 pm
This is the terminological tangle I referred to earlier. The terms 'a moral principle', 'a moral rule', 'a moral goal', 'a sound moral theory' and 'morality' are obviously not assertions, obviously have no truth-value, and obviously aren't objective or subjective. So any declarative predicating 'is objective' or 'is subjective' of them as subjects is false. Only an assertion expressing a moral principle or goal can be objective or subjective and have a truth-value. This may seem picky, but I think it's important.

Not picky. You're quite right that terms do not have truth values.

Here's a remark of yours from another post:

'I didn't say "morality" was objective. I said that a sound moral theory will be objective. Vernacular moralities --- the various moralities embraced by various people at various times and places --- are anything but objective. The aim is to replace those with one that is rationally defensible --- one that is coherent, internally consistent and consistent with known facts regarding human nature and the nature of human societies. That morality will be objective. Developing it is the job of moral philosophy.'

Those claims - 'a sound moral theory will be objective' and 'That morality will be objective' are false.

Not so. That is because the referent of "morality" has shifted between the first sentence and the next-to-last. In the first the referent is vernacular moralities. In the next-to-last, it refers to a sound moral theory. A theory is sound if its axioms are true and it is "coherent, internally consistent and consistent with known facts regarding human nature and the nature of human societies."

The axiom of a moral theory, as I said, is a goal statement. The theorems are objective if their truth conditions are public --- whether they advance or retard attainment of the goal is publicly determinable. I do agree that it is somewhat inaccurate to call a theory --- any theory --- "objective" or "subjective." Every theory begins from some axioms accepted as true without proof, and must do so, lest you set up an infinite regress. But its theorems can be objective or subjective.

This where I think your argument goes awry.

1 If the assertion ‘a moral theory is objective’ is false, then the assertion ‘a sound moral theory is objective’ is also false. It’s the assertions made in setting out the theory that can be objective or subjective – and can have truth-value. You acknowledge that in your second paragraph. And it’s not just somewhat inaccurate to call a theory objective or subjective. It’s false.

2 Soundness normally refers to an inference whose premises are or are taken to be true. So it’s unclear how a theory (which contains but is not an inference) can be sound. Perhaps you just mean 'acceptab'e' or 'plausible'.

3 You say a theory is sound if its axioms are true. But a moral goal assertion – ‘our goal is Y’ has only trivial truth-value: it would not be true is our goal were not Y. And, if Y is a term, such as ‘human well-being’, it has no truth-value, and to call it objective or subjective is false, because only assertions can be either of those. Besides, as you say, an axiom has to be ‘accepted as true without proof’, so truth-value is irrelevant anyway.

4 It follows that, since the axiom of a moral theory can’t be objective, the objectivity of its theorums is irrelevant. ‘Action X leads to goal Y’ may be objective – may have public truth conditions – but that doesn’t make the moral theory as a whole objective. Coherence, consistency and conformity to supposed (and always disputed) facts about human nature and society don’t in themselves confer objectivity on the theory.

And the case for rules of any kind, including moral rules, is even clearer. Imperatives obviously aren't decalratives, so they aren't assertions. 'Do this' has no truth-value and can't be objective or subjective. (There has been talk of the 'propositional content' of imperatives, interrogatives and exclamatives - but to my knowledge it's never made much progress.)

The theory doesn't include imperatives. An "ought" statement is not an imperative; it is an advisory. It merely means, "Doing X will advance/retard attainment of Y. Since you seek Y, you should/should not do X." That one ought to pursue one's goals is a tautology; a goal not pursued is not a goal at all. Many moral theories, to be sure, include true imperatives (e.g., Kant's Categorical Imperative). But those can be easily replaced with advisories without loss of import.

But an ‘advisory’ assertion isn’t a rule – or rather, it’s somewhat inaccurate to say it is.

And anyway, the modals ‘ought’ and ‘should’ have no moral significance here. They are, as you say, instrumental. As it happens, I think your assertion that ‘a goal not pursued is not a goal at all’ is false, and easily falsifiable. But even if it were true, the assertion ‘if your goal is Y, you ought to do X’ doesn’t mean ‘if your goal is Y, it is morally right to do X’. And that assertion – like all genuinely moral assertions - has no public truth conditions, so it isn’t objective. It’s a matter of moral judgement, belief or opinion.

What this means is that rules are completely excluded from the objective/subjective issue. The assertion 'moral rules are objective/subjective' is just incoherent.

If the rule is an advisory, as explained above, does that change your mind on that issue?

Meanwhile, given your quibble about assertions, you agree that the following fairly represents your argument:

P1 An objective assertion has public truth conditions. (Definition.)

P2 An assertion about morality is a moral assertion. (Definition.)

P3 An assertion about morality could have public truth conditions.

P4 A moral assertion could have public truth conditions. (From P2 and P3.)

C Therefore, a moral assertion could be objective.

Yes, it does.

As I hope I've shown, the assertion that a moral theory and a moral goal are or can be objective is false.

What remains is your definition that an assertion about morality is a moral assertion. From that definition, you deduce that 'action X leads to goal Y' and 'if your goal is Y, you ought to do X', because they're 'about' morality (moral goal Y), are objective moral assertions.

But this is a definitional sleight-of-hand. (Perhaps 'sophistry' is unfair, for which I apologise. I'm sure you have no intention to deceive.) If an objective assertion refers to a moral assertion, which is not objective (because it expresses a moral value-judgement), that doesn't mean the moral assertion magically becomes objective.

In other words, the claim that a moral assertion can be objective is false.

GEMorton wrote:

Love is behaviour that increases pleasure and decreases pain.

If that is a definition of "love" it is an eccentric one. Love is an emotion that can provoke behaviors that bring pleasure, but also those that bring pain, or inflict it on others. Ask Heathcliff and Catherine (Wuthering Heights).

Agapi is the sort of love that is the basis of whatever might be objective about morality.

Catherine and Heathcliffe are iconic examples of romantic love where two people are convinced personal independence justifies their relationship with each other. True, their personal circumstances justified their Romantic independence, and Heathcliffe's untamed attractions were sufficient lure for Catherine to follow him into the wild. Romantic love between individuals is still valued and so it is sometimes hard to see it was not always so and perhaps ought not to be the case that individuals' passions are any basis for morality. There are sociological and economic reasons for the popularity of romantic love happening at the time and place it did.

The various usages of 'love':
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog ... types-love

GE Morton wrote: ↑March 1st, 2020, 9:08 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑March 1st, 2020, 3:29 pm
Put it this way. Is S prefers x to y a fact about S's mental state, or a fact about something else?

It is a fact about his behavior. His mental state is something we infer, or hypothesize, based on that observable behavior.

That's wrong. Preferences are mental states. Not behavior. Behavior isn't the same thing as mental states. You might use behavior to guess what's going on with someone mentally, but that doesn't make behavior the same thing as mentality.

So any comment about someone's preferences is about their mental state. It's not about their behavior just because you used their behavior to make guesses about their mental state.

This is at least the third time I've explained this to you. You don't have an argument against it because you've never offered one.

And someone could define it any way they like. There aren't correct definitions.

Yes, one can define any word any way one likes. But if you adopt a definition other than the one accepted in your speech community you won't be understood.

Explaining this for like the fifth or sixth time. This isn't the case, because people can learn that someone uses a term with a different definition. We need to do this all the time when we read philosophy, by the way.

The latter is the "correct" definition.

Nope. No such thing. There are conventional definitions, but it's not incorrect to be unconventional.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑March 2nd, 2020, 6:33 am
1 If the assertion ‘a moral theory is objective’ is false, then the assertion ‘a sound moral theory is objective’ is also false. It’s the assertions made in setting out the theory that can be objective or subjective – and can have truth-value. You acknowledge that in your second paragraph. And it’s not just somewhat inaccurate to call a theory objective or subjective. It’s false.

True; theories per se are neither objective nor subjective. Neither are they true or false. But to say, "Theory T is neither objective nor true," would often be misleading. E.g., "Quantum theory is neither true nor objective," would likely be interpreted to mean it is bad theory. Which it isn't.

If QM yields propositions which are empirically verifiable, and consistently generates predictions which observation confirms, then it is much less misleading to say it is a true, objective theory, though that is somewhat inaccurate ---only somewhat, because it generates propositions which are true and objective. But it would be better just to say it's a good theory.

2 Soundness normally refers to an inference whose premises are or are taken to be true. So it’s unclear how a theory (which contains but is not an inference) can be sound. Perhaps you just mean 'acceptab'e' or 'plausible'.

A sound argument is one whose premises are true and whose conclusion logically follows from them. A sound theory is one whose axioms are true (or taken to be true) and whose theorems follow from them and generate confirmable predictions.

3 You say a theory is sound if its axioms are true. But a moral goal assertion – ‘our goal is Y’ has only trivial truth-value: it would not be true is our goal were not Y. And, if Y is a term, such as ‘human well-being’, it has no truth-value, and to call it objective or subjective is false, because only assertions can be either of those.

Not trivial at all. "Fundamental Principle" (Axiom): "The aim, or goal, of moral philosophy is to devise or discover principles and rules governing interactions between agents in a moral field which will allow the welfare of all agents to be maximized."

That axiom is accepted as true. Some definitions and postulates follow the axiom, and theorems asserting principles and rules follow from them. Whether those principles and rules are consistent or conflict with the axiom is objective.

And of course you're right that if "Y is a term, it has no truth value." But the goal of a moral theory is not a term; it is a proposition.

Besides, as you say, an axiom has to be ‘accepted as true without proof’, so truth-value is irrelevant anyway.

What? If it is accepted as true, then it clearly has a truth value, and it is not irrrelevant.

4 It follows that, since the axiom of a moral theory can’t be objective, the objectivity of its theorums is irrelevant.

Irrelevant to what, or whom? Certainly not to those who share that goal, or to the attainment of that goal. "Relevance" always relates to something. If the theorems relate to the stated goal, then they are not "relevantly irrelevant." That they may be irrelevant to some other goal or interest is itself irrelevant.

Coherence, consistency and conformity to supposed (and always disputed) facts about human nature and society don’t in themselves confer objectivity on the theory.

I think we've already covered the "objectivity of the theory" issue. What lends objectivity to the theory is the objectivity of its theorems (though the theory per se is not objective, strictly speaking). And I'm not sure what "always disputed facts about human nature" you have in mind.

But an ‘advisory’ assertion isn’t a rule – or rather, it’s somewhat inaccurate to say it is.

A statement asserting some regularity or advising some generally applicable strategy or methodology is well within the common meaning of "rule" ("As a rule, you should tell the truth").

As it happens, I think your assertion that ‘a goal not pursued is not a goal at all’ is false, and easily falsifiable.

I'd be happy to debate that, but it is tangential.

But even if it were true, the assertion ‘if your goal is Y, you ought to do X’ doesn’t mean ‘if your goal is Y, it is morally right to do X’. And that assertion – like all genuinely moral assertions - has no public truth conditions, so it isn’t objective. It’s a matter of moral judgement, belief or opinion.

It certainly does, if "Y" is a moral goal. And whether X advances or thwarts that goal is objective; it has public truth conditions. An action that supports a goal is the right action, one that thwarts the goal is a wrong action, by definition, relative to that goal (this is the instrumental sense of "right/wrong"). If the goal is a moral one then those instrumental rights and wrongs become moral rights and wrongs.

Whether an act is morally right or wrong is, to be sure, a matter of judgment, belief, opinion. But judgments, beliefs,and opinions are themselves right or wrong (factually correct/incorrect). An act is morally wrong if it conflicts with an adopted moral goal, which is objective. If someone who shares that goal judges it to be right his judgment is (factually) wrong.

What remains is your definition that an assertion about morality is a moral assertion. From that definition, you deduce that 'action X leads to goal Y' and 'if your goal is Y, you ought to do X', because they're 'about' morality (moral goal Y), are objective moral assertions.

But this is a definitional sleight-of-hand. (Perhaps 'sophistry' is unfair, for which I apologise. I'm sure you have no intention to deceive.) If an objective assertion refers to a moral assertion, which is not objective (because it expresses a moral value-judgement), that doesn't mean the moral assertion magically becomes objective.

Well, you're indulging in some sleight-of-hand of your own there. The theorems of a moral theory don't merely "refer to a moral assertion." They assert that various acts advance or thwart a given goal. Whether they do or not is objective. If that goal is a moral one (which the one in question is, also by definition), then those theorems are moral theorems; they assert moral principles and rules, just as a speed limit on a certain stretch of roadway, aimed at the goal of improving traffic effciency and safety, is a traffic rule.

Sound moral judgments are not subjective opinions expressing personal values.They express matters of fact.

Belindi wrote: ↑March 2nd, 2020, 6:57 am
Agapi is the sort of love that is the basis of whatever might be objective about morality.

Ah. Ok. I didn't realize you were speaking of agape. That term is often defined as a type of love, but that is misleading. Agape is not a real emotional state, or at least one many people ever experience, but an idealistic, imaginary one promoted by some theologians.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑March 2nd, 2020, 11:06 am
That's wrong. Preferences are mental states. Not behavior. Behavior isn't the same thing as mental states. You might use behavior to guess what's going on with someone mentally, but that doesn't make behavior the same thing as mentality.

Well, you're right that behavior is not the same thing as "mentality." But if you want propositions concerning preferences to be cognitive --- to have determinable truth values --- then you'll use the term to refer to observable behaviors. I will never know whether you prefer chocolate to vanilla if that preference is a mental state of yours. I'll only learn that by observing your behaviors. My saying, "TP prefers chocolate to vanilla" means, "TP usually chooses chocolate over vanilla." It neither says nor implies anything more than that. It certainly doesn't say anything about what is in your head.

GE Morton wrote: ↑March 2nd, 2020, 11:13 pm

Belindi wrote: ↑March 2nd, 2020, 6:57 am
Agapi is the sort of love that is the basis of whatever might be objective about morality.

Ah. Ok. I didn't realize you were speaking of agape. That term is often defined as a type of love, but that is misleading. Agape is not a real emotional state, or at least one many people ever experience, but an idealistic, imaginary one promoted by some theologians.

The other thing perhaps you have not realised is emotions are physical events which become mental events when the cerebral cortex has become aware of them. After that has happened the emotions are emotions+beliefs/memories i.e. feelings.

The happiest people understand their emotions are fluctuations in hormone levels. When those people can also use their cognitive faculty to regard emotions as part of the overall environment they have to deal with they can be of more use for making others happy too.

GE Morton wrote: ↑March 2nd, 2020, 10:54 pm
Whether an act is morally right or wrong is, to be sure, a matter of judgment, belief, opinion. But judgments, beliefs,and opinions are themselves right or wrong (factually correct/incorrect). An act is morally wrong if it conflicts with an adopted moral goal, which is objective. If someone who shares that goal judges it to be right his judgment is (factually) wrong.

Having to point out the mistakes and slipperiness in your argument is becoming tedious. So I'll just use the above example.

You say: 'Whether an act is morally right or wrong is ,,, a matter of ... opinion.' (I compress, to save time.) But then you say: '...opinions are themselves right or wrong (factually correct/incorrect).'

If you're using 'right or wrong' non-morally, as 'factually correct/incorrect' seems to indicate, then presumably you mean 'true or false'. So you are really saying: 'opinions are true or false - so moral opinions are true or false'.

But only factual assertions have truth-value. And only assertions can be objective - with public truth conditions. To say 'this act is morally wrong' is true or false - that this assertion of an opinion has public truth conditions and is therefore objective - merely begs the question. You're not showing that it does, you're flatly asserting that it does.

Your argument doesn't even qualify as specious. It's patently ridiculous.

Sound moral judgments are not subjective opinions expressing personal values.They express matters of fact.

And that says it all. I think our discussion has run its course. For me, at least, it's been salutary. Thanks.