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[Terrapin Station]

Then, what is matter? What actually is it? What is it made from?

Matter is what things are made from. It's not made from something else. Matter is a "chunk of stuff." Presumably there is going to be some smallest bit of matter because (1) it's not comprised of separate parts, and (2) it would be practically (if not physically) impossible to "cut" it because it wouldn't be (practically, if not physically) possible to make a tool small enough/powerful enough to separate such a small chunk of stuff into two or more different parts.

Re "what actually is it/what is it made from"--we could ask that about anything we posit as an ontic simple.

[Sculptor1]

A bit of matter, a tiny material substance.

Then, what is matter? What actually is it? What is it made from?

Subatomic particles, especially point particles like electrons and quarks, are said to be irreducible. They are what they are, being irreducible. That is a supposition. If we had the technology to observe Planck scale physics, we may change our minds.

In the end, if hypotheses about the BB theory are correct, then we had a field of dark energy, replete with virtual particles that snap back into non-existence as soon as they appear. Energy. But, apparently, one such fluctuation in the fabric of reality did not pop back out of existence but continued to expand, becoming the universe. This, at the very least, suggests that matter is an emergent property of energy, but energy would be fundamental.

Atoms are, by definition, irreducible. They started out in life as a theoretical proposition to be found in the works of Aristotle and fed into the philosophies of the epicureans and the stoics who liked to talk about determinism and free will. It was not until the 20thC that we had a model for one, and within 30ish years Hiroshima discovered to its horror that atoms were in fact very divisible. Since then we have had a bewildering litany of subatomic particles, and it is rather dubious if any of these sere any function. The model of that atom seems to hold good for chemistry. It's not sytemically predictive, your can tell mass and density from the model of compounds and the elements' place on the table, but you have to rely on empiricism to find out what these elements and their compound to and how they act - which indicates to me that the model is partial.
But you have to wonder in what way does such a model well represent reality. What we can say for sure is the the content of an atom is nearly all ... er.. nothing. Its basically a massive empty space with a tiny dot in the middle with almost completely non existent satellites called electrons whose mass tends to zero.
This is only a model. For everyday usage, I think we are forced to resign ourselves to the idea that if you can kick it; it is matter.
Stuff that poisons you, nourishes you, kills you if it falls on your head, stuff you can sleep on all that is material.

[Consul]

Atoms are, by definition, irreducible.

Physical atoms aren't mereological atoms, because, being composed of smaller things, they do have material parts. Whether the elementary particles physical atoms are composed of are ontologically irreducible objects or substances is another question.

QUOTE>
"What Are the Objects?

Let us suppose that every complex object is ultimately made up of simple objects: objects not themselves composed of objects. I have described these objects as ‘building blocks’. This might suggest a seventeenth-century corpuscular picture: the simple objects are billiard-ball-like bits of matter capable of bonding with other material bits to form complex objects.

If physics is on the right track, this picture is highly unlikely. Elementary ‘particles’, electrons, for instance, behave in a wavelike way. Depictions of electrons as minute billiard balls would be wildly misguided. A commitment to an ontology of objects, however, is not a commitment to material corpuscles. What the fundamental objects are is anybody’s guess. The answer is not something to be had a priori, but only by appeal to empirical theories advanced in basic physics. We need not imagine that the fundamental objects are particle-like. Objects could be fields. Perhaps there is but a single object: space, or space–time, or some all-embracing quantum field. If that were so, then ordinary objects would turn out to be modes of the one all-inclusive object. A beetroot, for instance, might be a red, spherical, pungent region of space–time.The question what the objects are, like the question what the properties are, is not one to be answered from the armchair.

Let me emphasize that an ontology of objects—a substance ontology—is not an ontology according to which the things we ordinarily regard as objects must turn out to be objects in a strict sense. For Locke, ordinary objects (‘substances’) are in reality modes: ways collections of particles are arranged. Similarly, rocks, or beetroots, or electrons could turn out to be local disturbances or thickenings in the fabric of space–time.
...
Objects might, then, turn out not to be objects. Less mysteriously, we might discover that what we ordinarily regard as objects are not objects in the strict sense, but only modes: ways objects are (or ways some object is). Does this cast doubt on what we ordinarily call objects? In rejecting the Picture Theory, I have rejected this inference. To discover that what we ordinarily regard as an object—the beetroot, for instance—is, at bottom, not a ‘continuant’, but a thickening of a region space–time, is not to discover that beetroots do not exist; it is to discover that beetroots—surprisingly—just are local thickenings of space–time."

(Heil, John. From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. pp. 177-8)
<QUOTE

[Sculptor1]

Atoms are, by definition, irreducible.

Physical atoms aren't mereological atoms, because, being composed of smaller things, they do have material parts. Whether the elementary particles physical atoms are composed of are ontologically irreducible objects or substances is another question.

Serously?
IS that where you stopped reading my post?
Hurumph!

QUOTE>
"What Are the Objects?

Let us suppose that every complex object is ultimately made up of simple objects: objects not themselves composed of objects. I have described these objects as ‘building blocks’. This might suggest a seventeenth-century corpuscular picture: the simple objects are billiard-ball-like bits of matter capable of bonding with other material bits to form complex objects.

If physics is on the right track, this picture is highly unlikely. Elementary ‘particles’, electrons, for instance, behave in a wavelike way. Depictions of electrons as minute billiard balls would be wildly misguided. A commitment to an ontology of objects, however, is not a commitment to material corpuscles. What the fundamental objects are is anybody’s guess. The answer is not something to be had a priori, but only by appeal to empirical theories advanced in basic physics. We need not imagine that the fundamental objects are particle-like. Objects could be fields. Perhaps there is but a single object: space, or space–time, or some all-embracing quantum field. If that were so, then ordinary objects would turn out to be modes of the one all-inclusive object. A beetroot, for instance, might be a red, spherical, pungent region of space–time.The question what the objects are, like the question what the properties are, is not one to be answered from the armchair.

Let me emphasize that an ontology of objects—a substance ontology—is not an ontology according to which the things we ordinarily regard as objects must turn out to be objects in a strict sense. For Locke, ordinary objects (‘substances’) are in reality modes: ways collections of particles are arranged. Similarly, rocks, or beetroots, or electrons could turn out to be local disturbances or thickenings in the fabric of space–time.
...
Objects might, then, turn out not to be objects. Less mysteriously, we might discover that what we ordinarily regard as objects are not objects in the strict sense, but only modes: ways objects are (or ways some object is). Does this cast doubt on what we ordinarily call objects? In rejecting the Picture Theory, I have rejected this inference. To discover that what we ordinarily regard as an object—the beetroot, for instance—is, at bottom, not a ‘continuant’, but a thickening of a region space–time, is not to discover that beetroots do not exist; it is to discover that beetroots—surprisingly—just are local thickenings of space–time."

(Heil, John. From an Ontological Point of View. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. pp. 177-8)
<QUOTE

[Sy Borg]

The idea of fields and substratum is an odd one, and possibly more perceptual than actual.

No, on the contrary, it's the idea of free-floating, substrate-independent properties (qualities, quantities) which is "odd"!

That only shifts the problem down one level. Can you tell me about the free-floating substrate-independent qualities of the substrate itself?

[Sy Borg]

Then, what is matter? What actually is it? What is it made from?

Subatomic particles, especially point particles like electrons and quarks, are said to be irreducible. They are what they are, being irreducible. That is a supposition. If we had the technology to observe Planck scale physics, we may change our minds.

In the end, if hypotheses about the BB theory are correct, then we had a field of dark energy, replete with virtual particles that snap back into non-existence as soon as they appear. Energy. But, apparently, one such fluctuation in the fabric of reality did not pop back out of existence but continued to expand, becoming the universe. This, at the very least, suggests that matter is an emergent property of energy, but energy would be fundamental.

Atoms are, by definition, irreducible. They started out in life as a theoretical proposition to be found in the works of Aristotle and fed into the philosophies of the epicureans and the stoics who liked to talk about determinism and free will. It was not until the 20thC that we had a model for one, and within 30ish years Hiroshima discovered to its horror that atoms were in fact very divisible. Since then we have had a bewildering litany of subatomic particles, and it is rather dubious if any of these sere any function. The model of that atom seems to hold good for chemistry. It's not sytemically predictive, your can tell mass and density from the model of compounds and the elements' place on the table, but you have to rely on empiricism to find out what these elements and their compound to and how they act - which indicates to me that the model is partial.
But you have to wonder in what way does such a model well represent reality. What we can say for sure is the the content of an atom is nearly all ... er.. nothing. Its basically a massive empty space with a tiny dot in the middle with almost completely non existent satellites called electrons whose mass tends to zero.
This is only a model. For everyday usage, I think we are forced to resign ourselves to the idea that if you can kick it; it is matter.
Stuff that poisons you, nourishes you, kills you if it falls on your head, stuff you can sleep on all that is material.

I'm unsure what is meant by this: "It's not sytemically predictive, your can tell mass and density from the model of compounds and the elements' place on the table, but you have to rely on empiricism to find out what these elements and their compound to and how they act - which indicates to me that the model is partial". ... elements and their [x] compound to?

Otherwise all makes sense to me. I never bought that "empty space" line. One can similarly say that the solar system consists of one area of concentration surrounded by only space and relatively negligible bits of debris (planets). But the space between is not empty, in atoms, it is one is replete with the SNF and the other is replete with solar radiation. Anything that is concentrated exerts influence on its surrounding areas.

Really, all I see is one stuff appearing in different configurations. Sometimes, the stuff is highly concentrated and systematises under pressure like planets, stars and black holes. Sometimes the mass is not so concentrated, rather the configurations are, like eggs, seeds, protists, brains and ICs. In fanciful moments, I like to think of brains as informational black holes that suck information into themselves, mash it into much simpler forms and plays havoc with their surroundings.

[Sculptor1]

Atoms are, by definition, irreducible. They started out in life as a theoretical proposition to be found in the works of Aristotle and fed into the philosophies of the epicureans and the stoics who liked to talk about determinism and free will. It was not until the 20thC that we had a model for one, and within 30ish years Hiroshima discovered to its horror that atoms were in fact very divisible. Since then we have had a bewildering litany of subatomic particles, and it is rather dubious if any of these sere any function. The model of that atom seems to hold good for chemistry. It's not sytemically predictive, your can tell mass and density from the model of compounds and the elements' place on the table, but you have to rely on empiricism to find out what these elements and their compound to and how they act - which indicates to me that the model is partial.
But you have to wonder in what way does such a model well represent reality. What we can say for sure is the the content of an atom is nearly all ... er.. nothing. Its basically a massive empty space with a tiny dot in the middle with almost completely non existent satellites called electrons whose mass tends to zero.
This is only a model. For everyday usage, I think we are forced to resign ourselves to the idea that if you can kick it; it is matter.
Stuff that poisons you, nourishes you, kills you if it falls on your head, stuff you can sleep on all that is material.

I'm unsure what is meant by this: "It's not sytemically predictive, your can tell mass and density from the model of compounds and the elements' place on the table, but you have to rely on empiricism to find out what these elements and their compound to and how they act - which indicates to me that the model is partial". ... elements and their [x] compound to?

Only that an element's position on the periodic table says lots about mass, and basic quantitative values. And whilst elements near each other have similarities, we have had to rely heavily on experimentation and observation to figure out the properties of the elements and the compounds they make. The periodic table is simply not enough information to predict their qualities. This is odd since they are supposedly made of the same stuff, just in differing quantities. So IRON is just more protons, neutrons and electrons, exactly like hydrogen and mercury. The same stuff just in different configurations. Their qualities such as appearance and colour are not predicted by their position on the table (not without the empirical input). WHen it comes to compunds the predictability is more strange.

Otherwise all makes sense to me. I never bought that "empty space" line. One can similarly say that the solar system consists of one area of concentration surrounded by only space and relatively negligible bits of debris (planets). But the space between is not empty, in atoms, it is one is replete with the SNF and the other is replete with solar radiation. Anything that is concentrated exerts influence on its surrounding areas.

Really, all I see is one stuff appearing in different configurations. Sometimes, the stuff is highly concentrated and systematises under pressure like planets, stars and black holes. Sometimes the mass is not so concentrated, rather the configurations are, like eggs, seeds, protists, brains and ICs. In fanciful moments, I like to think of brains as informational black holes that suck information into themselves, mash it into much simpler forms and plays havoc with their surroundings.

I always reflect on the words of the Master in this context.
It is known that there are an infinite number of worlds, simply because there is an infinite amount of space for them to be in. However, not every one of them is inhabited. Therefore, there must be a finite number of inhabited worlds. Any finite number divided by infinity is as near to nothing as makes no odds, so the average population of all the planets in the Universe can be said to be zero. From this it follows that the population of the whole Universe is also zero, and that any people you may meet from time to time are merely the products of a deranged imagination.

Douglas Adams, The Restaurant at the End of the Universe.

[Sy Borg]

I'm unsure what is meant by this: "It's not systemically predictive, your can tell mass and density from the model of compounds and the elements' place on the table, but you have to rely on empiricism to find out what these elements and their compound to and how they act - which indicates to me that the model is partial". ... elements and their [x] compound to?

Only that an element's position on the periodic table says lots about mass, and basic quantitative values. And whilst elements near each other have similarities, we have had to rely heavily on experimentation and observation to figure out the properties of the elements and the compounds they make. The periodic table is simply not enough information to predict their qualities. This is odd since they are supposedly made of the same stuff, just in differing quantities. So IRON is just more protons, neutrons and electrons, exactly like hydrogen and mercury. The same stuff just in different configurations. Their qualities such as appearance and colour are not predicted by their position on the table (not without the empirical input). When it comes to compounds the predictability is more strange.

If I had even a tenth of your nous about half a century ago, that is exactly what I might have said when being confused in chemistry class. Then again, our brains aren't evolved to make sense of reality, at least not beyond finding ways of staying alive long enough to do the horizontal tango and then dealing with the consequences of that act.

The Standard Model does have an air about it of, "We don't know what is actually going on, but here are the internal dynamics we have found so far".

I always reflect on the words of the Master in this context.
It is known that there are an infinite number of worlds, simply because there is an infinite amount of space for them to be in. However, not every one of them is inhabited. Therefore, there must be a finite number of inhabited worlds. Any finite number divided by infinity is as near to nothing as makes no odds, so the average population of all the planets in the Universe can be said to be zero. From this it follows that the population of the whole Universe is also zero, and that any people you may meet from time to time are merely the products of a deranged imagination.

Douglas Adams, The Restaurant at the End of the Universe.

Well, they do say that the overall energy of the universe balances out to zero ...

[Consul]

No, on the contrary, it's the idea of free-floating, substrate-independent properties (qualities, quantities) which is "odd"!

That only shifts the problem down one level. Can you tell me about the free-floating substrate-independent qualities of the substrate itself?

A property had by a substance isn't "free-floating".

A property qua Platonic, transcendent universal is generically substrate-independent in the sense that the number of its instances can be 0, whereas a property qua Aristotelian, immanent universal is generically substrate-dependent in the sense that the number of its instances must be ≥1.

I believe neither in immanent universals nor in transcendent ones, because I believe properties are particulars rather than universals. I also believe that property-particulars are both generically and rigidly substrate-dependent. That is, if a is a K having the property F, then F doesn't only depend for its existence on the existence of Ks, but also on the existence of the one K which is a.

[The Beast]

It is only been 100 years since the croc’s first. Briefly. Nature has four basic interactions: Strong; weak; electromagnetic and gravity. The Universe exist due to the Higgs mechanism and the electromagnetic interaction produces photons and currently gravitons are making the plaque or maybe the substrate. The substrate is at the core of the brain interacting with the photonic bombardment … and there is a loop where thought happens… unknown and hidden. It has any control over the electromagnetic forces and is self-calibrated. It has Free Will..

[Dolphin42]

The idea of fields and substratum is an odd one, and possibly more perceptual than actual.

No, on the contrary, it's the idea of free-floating, substrate-independent properties (qualities, quantities) which is "odd"!

In a recent post I suggested that unless we constantly weigh our propositions about the world in terms of the accuracy with which they describe and predict what is observed, we're just having endless intractable discussions about personal taste and the logical consistency of our statements/semantics. I think the above particular point is an example of the latter.

To resolve it, can we agree that the concept of "Y, a property of X" is not logically coherent in the absence of X? I presume so. If so, I presume we can then agree that if anybody finds it useful to think of a thing called Y existing in the absence of a thing called X, then as a matter of internal consistency, they are implicitly proposing that Y is not a property of X.

Given the above, Consul: Did you say what you said in the quote above because you believe that somebody has said something which is incoherent in the sense described here?

I believe neither in immanent universals nor in transcendent ones, because I believe properties are particulars rather than universals. I also believe that property-particulars are both generically and rigidly substrate-dependent. That is, if a is a K having the property F, then F doesn't only depend for its existence on the existence of Ks, but also on the existence of the one K which is a.

Do you believe these things because:

1. They are your personal taste; you like the cut of their jib.
2. You think that it would be logically inconsistent to believe otherwise. (as in the example above)
3. You think that this belief leads to propositions that more accurately describe and predict what is observed to be the case than possible alternative beliefs do.

Or some combination of the above?

[Steve3007]

In case of confusion: The above post was me, accidentally logged in under a different name that hasn't been used for a long time.

[Sculptor1]

Only that an element's position on the periodic table says lots about mass, and basic quantitative values. And whilst elements near each other have similarities, we have had to rely heavily on experimentation and observation to figure out the properties of the elements and the compounds they make. The periodic table is simply not enough information to predict their qualities. This is odd since they are supposedly made of the same stuff, just in differing quantities. So IRON is just more protons, neutrons and electrons, exactly like hydrogen and mercury. The same stuff just in different configurations. Their qualities such as appearance and colour are not predicted by their position on the table (not without the empirical input). When it comes to compounds the predictability is more strange.

If I had even a tenth of your nous about half a century ago, that is exactly what I might have said when being confused in chemistry class. Then again, our brains aren't evolved to make sense of reality, at least not beyond finding ways of staying alive long enough to do the horizontal tango and then dealing with the consequences of that act.

It all makes me think there there is something more than the 3 main particles. Whatever that might be, it does offer consistency.
When we go smaller than the 3 (electrons, neutrons, and protons) we get into the treacherous are of QM and indeterminism - no wonder if our model is less than perfect in the first place. But even with the double slot experiment we get a perfectly predictable unpredictability.
I think we are going to have to wait until someone figures out a better model. On the other end of the scale the cosmologists had improved the model from early attempts Aristotle aristarchus to Ptolemy until Newton nailed it down, but the thing keeps looking shaky. I've no doubt that we shall reach a point where further descriptive explanations fail us as the metaphors we use run out of common sense. Maybe we are here already?

The Standard Model does have an air about it of, "We don't know what is actually going on, but here are the internal dynamics we have found so far".

I always reflect on the words of the Master in this context.
It is known that there are an infinite number of worlds, simply because there is an infinite amount of space for them to be in. However, not every one of them is inhabited. Therefore, there must be a finite number of inhabited worlds. Any finite number divided by infinity is as near to nothing as makes no odds, so the average population of all the planets in the Universe can be said to be zero. From this it follows that the population of the whole Universe is also zero, and that any people you may meet from time to time are merely the products of a deranged imagination.

Douglas Adams, The Restaurant at the End of the Universe.

Well, they do say that the overall energy of the universe balances out to zero ...

[Atla]

Why do people in the 21st century still talk about matter and substratum like they were anything more than reified ideas from over 2000 years ago?

[Consul]

Why do people in the 21st century still talk about matter and substratum like they were anything more than reified ideas from over 2000 years ago?

Because there are good ontological reasons to do so.