Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Good_Egg]

I find that I'm a little surprised that UK law has a definition of "Islamophobia".

Does it also define "phobias" about Protestantism or Zen Buddhism ?

How can that possibly be consistent with the notion of equality under the law ?

Could this be as simple as saying that we have a law against Islamophobia, because we have noted numerous cases of it, in practice, while we have not been so troubled with anti-Protestant or anti-Buddhist crimes?

No problem in saying that case law about group-prejudice (as a motivation for crime) is predominantly couched in terms of anti-Islamic prejudice rather than anti-Buddhist prejudice, because those are the cases that the legal system has to deal with.

But if any equivalent act is defined as a crime when directed against the Islamic religion but not when directed against the Buddhist religion, then equality under the law has been lost.

There is a managerialist argument that says "We have a law-and-order problem driven by high levels of anti-Islamic motivation, but minimal equivalent anti-Buddhist motivation.
We should deal with this by criminalizing more behaviours, or increasing the severity of sentence, in the one case but not the other."

Such an argument is unjust.

There is a human temptation to escalate responses. To start off reasonable and tolerant and measured, but as one's words are not heeded, to grow louder and more extreme, threatening ever-greater punishment until one's message is heard and responded to.

Which is fine at the individual level. Persistent offenders may need escalating punishment until a level that achieves deterrence is reached (subject to considerations of overall proportionality).

But is unjust if applied to groups. Punishing Alfie more severely because Bruno and Charlie and Don have previously committed similar crimes is unjust to Alfie. Each of us is the protagonist of our own story. Each person's first offence is a first offence and should be judged as such.

As with so much else, treating people as instances of a group instead of as individuals in their own right is at the root of much wrongness.

[Pattern-chaser]

I think it is true to say that all criminal action is inextricably linked to intention. Even things such as criminal negligence, the crime is the deliberate decision not to take the necessary precautions to prevent the accident occurring (rather than the accident itself being the crime). Hence we cannot fully separate the concepts of actions and thoughts when it comes to consideration of criminal justice.

I think this is the point I was offering, that the judgement of alleged crimes is inextricably linked to thought, intention and motivation. And that so-called 'hate crimes' are no different in this respect.

So, to be clear, I am not trying to say that the criminal justice system should (or does) attempt to completely divorce actions from the motivations behind them. My contention is that with "hate" crimes, it is the motivation itself that is the crime, not the action.

I don't think that's quite accurate? With 'hate crimes', it is the choice of *target* that worsens the crime itself. The crime is a crime, of course, but so is the selection of a victim on the basis of membership, not anything the victim did. It is the latter, pure and simple, that makes the crime worse than it would otherwise have been. It's worse because it is the whole group that is attacked, using the victim as a sort of synecdoche. It's not, for example, a crime against Jean, but against all women. It's not a crime against James, it's a crime against all black men. And so on.

[Fried Egg]

I think it is true to say that all criminal action is inextricably linked to intention. Even things such as criminal negligence, the crime is the deliberate decision not to take the necessary precautions to prevent the accident occurring (rather than the accident itself being the crime). Hence we cannot fully separate the concepts of actions and thoughts when it comes to consideration of criminal justice.

I think this is the point I was offering, that the judgement of alleged crimes is inextricably linked to thought, intention and motivation. And that so-called 'hate crimes' are no different in this respect.

The adjudication of regular crime has nothing to do with intention/motivation. If I take something from you without your consent it is a crime. It does not matter why, or what I intended. In attempting to determine my guilt, whether or not I had a motivation to commit the crime is something that the judge and jury will consider, but it is not a crime in its own right. Only the facts of the matter are pertinent (e.g. did I in fact take it? Was it clear to me that consent had not been given? Did you make it clear that you had not given your consent? etc.)

A hate crime on the other hand is a crime in it's own right. It might compound with other crimes (i.e. with assault or murder) or it might stand on it's own (such as hate speech).

Clearly, as with any crime, it must manifest in action. No one is going to prosecute me for sitting here thinking hateful thoughts in silence if I don't do or say anything to act on those thoughts (although what about that woman who was arrested after preying silently outside an abortion clinic?). But my actions might be taken as evidence of my crime (that of saying or acting in hateful ways) but it is the motivation/intention that is the crime here, not the action (to be clear, the action might also be a crime in it's own right but it might not be).

So, to be clear, I am not trying to say that the criminal justice system should (or does) attempt to completely divorce actions from the motivations behind them. My contention is that with "hate" crimes, it is the motivation itself that is the crime, not the action.

I don't think that's quite accurate? With 'hate crimes', it is the choice of *target* that worsens the crime itself. The crime is a crime, of course, but so is the selection of a victim on the basis of membership, not anything the victim did. It is the latter, pure and simple, that makes the crime worse than it would otherwise have been. It's worse because it is the whole group that is attacked, using the victim as a sort of synecdoche. It's not, for example, a crime against Jean, but against all women. It's not a crime against James, it's a crime against all black men. And so on.

I hope I have cleared up the first part of your objection above. However, the second part of your argument above doesn't even make sense. An individual commits a crime against other individuals. Neither the group identity of the victim or the perpetrator should have anything to do with it.

For example, if a man hits a woman because he is misogynistic, other women no more share in the victimhood of the crime than other men share in the blame.

[Pattern-chaser]

I think it is true to say that all criminal action is inextricably linked to intention. Even things such as criminal negligence, the crime is the deliberate decision not to take the necessary precautions to prevent the accident occurring (rather than the accident itself being the crime). Hence we cannot fully separate the concepts of actions and thoughts when it comes to consideration of criminal justice.

I think this is the point I was offering, that the judgement of alleged crimes is inextricably linked to thought, intention and motivation. And that so-called 'hate crimes' are no different in this respect.

The adjudication of regular crime has nothing to do with intention/motivation.¹ If I take something from you without your consent it is a crime. It does not matter why, or what I intended.² In attempting to determine my guilt, whether or not I had a motivation to commit the crime is something that the judge and jury will consider, but it is not a crime in its own right. Only the facts of the matter are pertinent³ (e.g. did I in fact take it? Was it clear to me that consent had not been given? Did you make it clear that you had not given your consent? etc.)

A hate crime on the other hand is a crime in it's own right.⁴ It might compound with other crimes (i.e. with assault or murder) or it might stand on it's own (such as hate speech).

Adjudication is the legal process by which an arbiter or judge reviews evidence and argumentation, including legal reasoning set forth by opposing parties or litigants, to come to a decision which determines rights and obligations between the parties involved.

¹ — the judgement (i.e. "adjudication") of a criminal court has *everything* "to do with intention/motivation", and even sometimes with the very thoughts of the offender.



² — Yes, it does. Sometimes. It depends on the particular crime we are considering. The crimes of murder and manslaughter are only distinguished based on the intentions of the offender, and this distinction is present in the law itself, as it is written, as well as in that law's implementation.



³ — thoughts, intentions and motivations are (some of the) "facts" pertinent to the case and its judgement.



⁴ — No, a (wrongly-named) 'hate crime' is a modifier. It modifies the nature of the crime, and (if the crime is indeed a 'hate crime') worsens it. Hate crime, of itself, is not a crime.

[Fried Egg]

Well Mr Pattern Chaser, it appears we are at an impasse as you deny the facts of reality (as I see it). There is no point in repeating myself here.

I will comment on your 4th point as it should be clear to anybody (just by looking at the Crown Prosecution Service or Metropolitan Police's websites) that some hate crimes crimes in and of themselves. These include verbally abusing somebody (based on their protected characteristics) or incitement to hatred (again based on protected characteristics).

[Pattern-chaser]

...it should be clear to anybody (just by looking at the Crown Prosecution Service or Metropolitan Police's websites) that some hate crimes crimes in and of themselves. These include verbally abusing somebody (based on their protected characteristics) or incitement to hatred (again based on protected characteristics).

Yes, if you "verbally abuse" me, then that is an offence, isn't it? And if you "verbally abuse" me, specifically because I am a <member of 'protected' community>, and not for anything I have personally said or done, then that offers *further* and *greater* offence, doesn't it?




N.B. I consider a law against (e.g.) 'Islamophobia' to be wrong, because it distorts the whole idea of discrimination and so-called "hate crimes". The law should not protect any single minority, it should protect all communities, minority or majority. Such laws should be universal, protecting every group of every sort. Only then do they make sense (to me, at least).

If an individual is confronted because of what that individual has done or said, fair enough. That's OK, even encouraged.

If an individual is similarly confronted, but because they are black, Hindu, or MAGA Republican, not because of any *individual* act, that's a "hate crime".

[Good_Egg]

No, a (wrongly-named) 'hate crime' is a modifier. It modifies the nature of the crime, and (if the crime is indeed a 'hate crime') worsens it. Hate crime, of itself, is not a crime.

That's a useful clarification - thank you. You're saying that "group prejudice" should not be a crime of itself, but you think it should be treated as an aggravating factor for acts that are crimes regardless.

I think you've also clarified your view that:

A) it should be seen as more of an aggravating factor where the prejudice relates to a "protected characteristic" than if the same level of prejudice relates to some other characteristic of the victim

B) but that prejudice in each direction should be an equally-serious aggravating factor. There should be no difference in the treatment of anti-male and anti-female prejudice, for example, thus preserving the principle of equality under the law.

Have I understood you rightly ?

I agree with B) but not with A).

[Good_Egg]

PS: so you don't need to argue that crime has a wider social impact - that's agreed.

The non-obvious proposition that seems to lack justification is that
- it's worse to make 2% of the population (defined by a "protected characteristic") afraid to go out at night than it is to make 100% of the population afraid to go out at night
- that the designation of some characteristics as "protected" is non-arbitrary, and is just to those minorities whose difference from the majority lies elsewhere.

[Pattern-chaser]

No, a (wrongly-named) 'hate crime' is a modifier. It modifies the nature of the crime, and (if the crime is indeed a 'hate crime') worsens it. Hate crime, of itself, is not a crime.

That's a useful clarification - thank you. You're saying that "group prejudice" should not be a crime of itself, but you think it should be treated as an aggravating factor for acts that are crimes regardless.

Well, I suppose it would depend on the form that this "group prejudice" took, but yes, I think I agree with that.

I think you've also clarified your view that:

A) it should be seen as more of an aggravating factor where the prejudice relates to a "protected characteristic" than if the same level of prejudice relates to some other characteristic of the victim

B) but that prejudice in each direction should be an equally-serious aggravating factor. There should be no difference in the treatment of anti-male and anti-female prejudice, for example, thus preserving the principle of equality under the law.

Have I understood you rightly ?

I agree with B) but not with A).

I agree with you here, I think, and do not agree with "A". All discrimination/prejudice should and must (IMO) be treated equally. I see no reason to differentiate between prejudice against autists and prejudice against Hindus, in this discussion and its context.

[Pattern-chaser]

The non-obvious proposition that seems to lack justification is that
- it's worse to make 2% of the population (defined by a "protected characteristic") afraid to go out at night than it is to make 100% of the population afraid to go out at night
- that the designation of some characteristics as "protected" is non-arbitrary, and is just to those minorities whose difference from the majority lies elsewhere.

I'm not sure where these two items come from. They look to me like the sort of straw-man excuses put out by those who have firm opinions, seeking to discredit the argument(s) of their own opponents.

[Good_Egg]

The second of the above points is irrelevant, because you've agreed that protected characteristics should have no special status.

But I'm now unclear where you're coming from regarding "hate crime".

Seems like you think
1) the term describes actions motivated by prejudice against a particular group
2) such prejudice shouldn't be a crime in itself but only an aggravating factor
3) this applies to all prejudices not just those relating to "protected characteristics"
4) the reason is because of "wider impacts" - the fear of crime created in those other than the direct victim.

Again - this is the (good-faith) impression I've gained from what you said. If that's not what you meant, then do please re-state your position more precisely. Communication is difficult...

The above makes sense to me, but only if having a group-prejudice motive necessarily has a greater wide-impact. Do you believe that ? That the fear of crime caused by any individual crime is greater when the motive is prejudice against some subset of the population ? Is that the unstated missing piece of your argument ? If so, let's examine that proposition.

Or have you - as an act of bad faith or otherwise - pointed to fear of crime as a "wider impact". When what you really mean by the term is something different ? Something like "a crime against my idea of how the world should be ?"

[Pattern-chaser]

Seems like you think
1) the term describes actions motivated by prejudice against a particular group
2) such prejudice shouldn't be a crime in itself but only an aggravating factor
3) this applies to all prejudices not just those relating to "protected characteristics"
4) the reason is because of "wider impacts" - the fear of crime created in those other than the direct victim.

Yes, pretty much. Although I think the "wider impacts" are actually wider than you describe.

The above makes sense to me, but only if having a group-prejudice motive necessarily has a greater wide-impact. Do you believe that ? That the fear of crime caused by any individual crime is greater when the motive is prejudice against some subset of the population ? Is that the unstated missing piece of your argument ?

I wasn't aware that it remained "unstated", but yes, it is. The killing of one trans person keeps the rest of those 'weirdos' or 'perverts' out of sight, and so forth. Sickening. The victim in this example was one trans individual, but the target was all trans people. The victim stood as a sort of synecdoche for the whole community.

[Good_Egg]

Do you believe that ? That the fear of crime caused by any individual crime is greater when the motive is prejudice against some subset of the population ?

yes, it is. The killing of one trans person keeps the rest of those 'weirdos' or 'perverts' out of sight,

I've said that I think this is a valid argument when applied to terrorism. That the intent to create terror in the general population makes a criminal act into a more serious crime.

So it makes sense that if anyone has the intent of making a minority (or indeed a majority) of people afraid, then that is in effect terrorism on a smaller scale.
And that would apply to football hooligans who want to make rival supporters afraid to show their allegiance, xenophobes who want to "send a message" to immigrants that they're not welcome here, vigilantes who want sex offenders to go live somewhere else etc etc.

But there is s distinction to be drawn between a prejudicial intent and this sort of terror-inducing intent. A person can have one motive without the other.

Whether football-related or not, a gang can seek to make others afraid to enter their territory without necessarily thinking those others inferior. And conversely, an out-group may be thought to be collectively inferior or evil or guilty without an intent to make them afraid.

So I would dispute any attempt to infer a motive of inducing fear from a non-egalitarian worldview. Just the same as an attempt to infer hatred...

[Fried Egg]

...it should be clear to anybody (just by looking at the Crown Prosecution Service or Metropolitan Police's websites) that some hate crimes crimes in and of themselves. These include verbally abusing somebody (based on their protected characteristics) or incitement to hatred (again based on protected characteristics).

Yes, if you "verbally abuse" me, then that is an offence, isn't it? And if you "verbally abuse" me, specifically because I am a <member of 'protected' community>, and not for anything I have personally said or done, then that offers *further* and *greater* offence, doesn't it?

No, it is not a criminal offence to verbally abuse somebody. That is precisely my point. Although the level and degree of verbal abuse might reach a level where it is regarded as harassment and be against the law. But in the case of hate crime, this threshold is significantly lower, whereby something that wouldn't have ordinarily been regarded as a crime now is.

The problem we are having right now in the UK is that free speech is being curtailed in the name of prosecuting hate crime and I think it is an inevitable consequence of having the very concept of a hate crime in law. The Free Speech Union has estimated (based on data gather from a freedom of information request) that the number of NCHI (non crime hate incidents) recorded by the police in the last year (for England and Wales) is over 11 thousand.

[Pattern-chaser]

Whether football-related or not, a gang can seek to make others afraid to enter their territory without necessarily thinking those others inferior.

Their opinion ("inferior") of others is not [directly] relevant here. It is their actions we judge*, yes? And if they abuse these "others" in some way, and their 'justification' for this is that they, er, strongly disapprove' of those others, that is what we must call a "hate crime" (lacking a better label).



* — and when we judge these actions, it is then that we (often in a court setting) delve into the accompanying thoughts, beliefs and motivations, so that we may best reach a fair, just, and moral conclusion.