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[Belindi]

Everybody hates pain, and with good reason: pain is intrinsically undesirable, and severe pain is terrible. Pain is just bad, and the more severe the pain, the worse it is. It could never be reasonable to regard pain as good or even neutral, it flies in the face of all our experience. That pain is bad is a fact....

An eternal truth, indeed.

Yet people choose to endure pain or to risk enduring pain in order to secure other goods. Being pain-free is not the only value.

As just one example, we value life. Saving life is not reducible to minimising pain. If I could put you to death painlessly, and thereby both save you the pains of growing old and prevent you from inflicting pain on others, does that mean I should do it ?

And more valuable than your life is your agency, your freedom. If you want to risk your life by climbing mountains, jumping out of aeroplanes, etc, should I stop you ?

The right to autonomy of mad people is a separate division of moral philosophy.
Generally though, if there is a candidate for an eternal moral truth I think that candidate is freedom to seek the good.Fortunately we have real life precedents as to how to seek the good and what acts define the good.

[Atla]

They're features of the natural world. As Gertie has already said, morality comes along with consciousness. Specifically, it comes along with pleasure and pain. Pain is an evil, as anyone who has had severe pain knows. To knowingly and deliberately create an evil is morally wrong. So once you have pain, and beings capable of deliberately causing it, you have the moral truth that deliberately causing pain without good reason is wrong.

The problem is that in this picture, there is always an organism in pain. But what if we remove all parts of the organism except the pain? Can that remaining pain in itself, be called a moral feature of the natural world? I don't think so. For there to be eternal moral truths more would be needed.

[CIN]

Sounds as if you are expecting people to tell you the moral value they place on things so you can then organise those values so as to help you make moral choices. If so, I take issue with the whole procedure, because it begs the question against objectivism. If there are objective moral values and truths, then those are what we should be using to make moral choices, rather than relying on people's subjective and fallible ideas about moral values.

Exactly, morals are not objective (as I described). The proof is: if you tell me what objective moral truths are and the next guy tells me what objective moral truths are and the two sets don't match... guess what? They're subjective.

So if one guy tells you the earth is round, and another guy tells you it's flat, then... guess what? The shape of the earth is subjective.

Nice try. The Earth's shape has a Gold Standard that both opinions can be measured against.

I've no idea what you mean by 'The Earth's shape has a Gold Standard'. Can you make your point without the metaphor?

I suppose you might feel that "objective" moral truths also have a Gold Standard, so whose moral truth is that standard? Your's? Mine? Some other guy's?

Perhaps I'll be able to answer this when you've discarded your Gold Standard metaphor. At present I again have no idea what you mean.

If you feel that objective moral truths are beyond human understanding, and they are thus unknown, then I cannot prove you wrong, but they then evaporate into insignificance.

I don't think they are beyond human understanding.

[CIN]

If you mean what these judgments and statements are about - i.e. moral truths - then whether these are created by humans is precisely what we are arguing about. You say they are, I say they aren't.

If humans didn't create these moral truths, then they must be out there somewhere, in the real physical universe itself, yes? If so, where are they?

They're features of the natural world. As Gertie has already said, morality comes along with consciousness. Specifically, it comes along with pleasure and pain. Pain is an evil, as anyone who has had severe pain knows. To knowingly and deliberately create an evil is morally wrong. So once you have pain, and beings capable of deliberately causing it, you have the moral truth that deliberately causing pain without good reason is wrong.

You say that (objective) moral truths are "features of the natural world." Then, apparently to support this view, you offer examples of how humans might judge the moral status of such acts.

I'm not offering examples of how humans might judge the moral status of certain acts, I'm claiming that this is what in fact does justify their moral status.

Even if there was a universally-agreed human definition of morality, and moral action - which there very clearly is not - are you saying that universality - an aspect of objectivity - requires only that humans agree on whatever-it-is?

No, I'm not saying that at all. I have no interest in how many humans agree in their supposed moral judgments. Everyone in the world, including me, could be mistaken in their beliefs about what is morally good or bad or right or wrong, and yet there still be things that are morally good or bad or right or wrong. People's opinions do not make moral truths true. Moral truths are true because that's how the world is. 'Pain is intrinsically bad' is true because of what pain is like, just as 'the earth is round' is true because of what the earth is like.

If I were a cow, I might point out that the "good reasons" that humans see to kill and eat me are not "good reasons" at all, but are in fact evil! Again, as a cow, you (humans) have raised me in captive slavery, forced me to breed, forced me to produce milk long after my calf doesn't need it any more, and then killed me. As a cow, I have to observe that your notions of "evil" are highly subjective, and take account only your own species whims. I conclude that humans are evil, maybe even objectively-evil?

I entirely agree with the cow about all this. (You're talking to someone who has been vegetarian for over 40 years.) Yes, people's notions of what is evil are often largely or even wholly subjective. I'm on a quest to try and find out if there are any objective moral truths. I claim to have found one or two. I don't claim that none of my moral judgments are subjective, I'm sure a lot of them still are. It's not a good argument against my position to point out that most human moral judgments are subjective: I know that, but it doesn't by itself refute the suggestion that there may, nevertheless, be objective moral truths. We may just be bad, historically, at distinguishing between the subjective and the objective.

[CIN]

Everybody hates pain, and with good reason: pain is intrinsically undesirable, and severe pain is terrible. Pain is just bad, and the more severe the pain, the worse it is. It could never be reasonable to regard pain as good or even neutral, it flies in the face of all our experience. That pain is bad is a fact....

An eternal truth, indeed.

Yet people choose to endure pain or to risk enduring pain in order to secure other goods.

In such cases pain may perhaps be instrumentally good, but it is still intrinsically bad, it's just that the good outweighs the bad (or at least is claimed to).

Being pain-free is not the only value.

I think people frequently assume that something is good or bad in itself when in fact it is only good or bad insofar as it leads to more or less pain or pleasure. For example, I would suggest that neither freedom nor health is good in itself, though people often assume that they are; they are good only insofar as they make it possible for people to avoid pain and experience pleasure.

As just one example, we value life.

Not everyone does all the time, or people would not commit suicide.

Saving life is not reducible to minimising pain. If I could put you to death painlessly, and thereby both save you the pains of growing old and prevent you from inflicting pain on others, does that mean I should do it ?

I think you should take the precaution of asking me just how bad I'm finding the pains of growing old. I'm nearly 70, and so far the pains are irritating but not intolerable. But If you could be reasonably sure that the rest of my life would be more painful than pleasurable, and if no-one else is given pain by my death, and if you can be sure that you won't start a fashion of copycat killings done for less justification, then yes, I think you should do it. In practice we don't generally know all these things.

And if you could be reasonably sure that I would spend much of my remaining life inflicting pain on others, then yes, you should kill me. Give me a gun and put me in a room with Vladimir Putin, and I'll have no hesitation in ridding the world of the maleficent little creep.

And more valuable than your life is your agency, your freedom. If you want to risk your life by climbing mountains, jumping out of aeroplanes, etc, should I stop you ?

Again, you should probably ask me how necessary it is to my happiness that I do these things. As I'm probably the best judge, if I say I need to do them to be happy, you should probably let me get on with it. If I die, I die. Everyone does in the end.

[CIN]

They're features of the natural world. As Gertie has already said, morality comes along with consciousness. Specifically, it comes along with pleasure and pain. Pain is an evil, as anyone who has had severe pain knows. To knowingly and deliberately create an evil is morally wrong. So once you have pain, and beings capable of deliberately causing it, you have the moral truth that deliberately causing pain without good reason is wrong.

The problem is that in this picture, there is always an organism in pain. But what if we remove all parts of the organism except the pain? Can that remaining pain in itself, be called a moral feature of the natural world? I don't think so. For there to be eternal moral truths more would be needed.

Do you mean actually remove all parts of the organism except the pain? How could you have a pain without there being something that is experiencing the pain? I don't think that is possible.

Or do you mean conceptually remove all parts of the organism except the pain, i.e. think about the question while only considering the pain and not also the organism experiencing it? I think that would be an error. Pain in itself is not morally significant, it's the beings who experience the pain who are morally significant, i.e. who matter from a moral perspective.

[LuckyR]

Exactly, morals are not objective (as I described). The proof is: if you tell me what objective moral truths are and the next guy tells me what objective moral truths are and the two sets don't match... guess what? They're subjective.

So if one guy tells you the earth is round, and another guy tells you it's flat, then... guess what? The shape of the earth is subjective.

Nice try. The Earth's shape has a Gold Standard that both opinions can be measured against.

I've no idea what you mean by 'The Earth's shape has a Gold Standard'. Can you make your point without the metaphor?

I suppose you might feel that "objective" moral truths also have a Gold Standard, so whose moral truth is that standard? Your's? Mine? Some other guy's?

Perhaps I'll be able to answer this when you've discarded your Gold Standard metaphor. At present I again have no idea what you mean.

If you feel that objective moral truths are beyond human understanding, and they are thus unknown, then I cannot prove you wrong, but they then evaporate into insignificance.

I don't think they are beyond human understanding.

OK. The Earth's shape can be photographed, viewed and measured. Thus while two individuals can express two different opinions on the shape, that shape has an objectively correct answer, the two opinions notwithstanding.

OTOH, I am unaware of an objective method to determine which of two individual's opinions on "objective" moral truths is correct (if either). Though I await your elucidation.

[Pattern-chaser]

People's opinions do not make moral truths true.

Er, I think people's opinions are exactly what make moral truths true.

'Pain is intrinsically bad' is true because of what pain is like, just as 'the earth is round' is true because of what the earth is like.

As far as I know, all creatures that feel pain consider it a negative experience. To those creatures, pain appears "bad" and it may even appear to be 'morally wrong' to them. But is any of this demonstrative of 'objective' morality? I can't see it. Perhaps the best we could do is to note that many experiences are characterised as "bad" by the majority of experiencers? Consensus. And consensus is very-much-not objectivity, as we philosophers know well.

[Atla]

They're features of the natural world. As Gertie has already said, morality comes along with consciousness. Specifically, it comes along with pleasure and pain. Pain is an evil, as anyone who has had severe pain knows. To knowingly and deliberately create an evil is morally wrong. So once you have pain, and beings capable of deliberately causing it, you have the moral truth that deliberately causing pain without good reason is wrong.

The problem is that in this picture, there is always an organism in pain. But what if we remove all parts of the organism except the pain? Can that remaining pain in itself, be called a moral feature of the natural world? I don't think so. For there to be eternal moral truths more would be needed.

Do you mean actually remove all parts of the organism except the pain? How could you have a pain without there being something that is experiencing the pain? I don't think that is possible.

Or do you mean conceptually remove all parts of the organism except the pain, i.e. think about the question while only considering the pain and not also the organism experiencing it? I think that would be an error. Pain in itself is not morally significant, it's the beings who experience the pain who are morally significant, i.e. who matter from a moral perspective.

Actually remove all the other parts. I think the pain would still remain, just as I think the quale of red would remain if we removed everything else around it. But without an organism to be in pain, the pain in itelf is just another quale that means nothing. It's just the quale of inherent bad, but it's not bad for anyone becuse there's no organism. That's why I don't think that the natural world has any moral features.

Unless we want to say that the inherent bad in itself, is a moral feature. But then the natural world also has a redness feature. And a yellow feature. And a bitter feature. And a million other features humans can name.

[Good_Egg]

I think people frequently assume that something is good or bad in itself when in fact it is only good or bad insofar as it leads to more or less pain or pleasure. For example, I would suggest that neither freedom nor health is good in itself, though people often assume that they are; they are good only insofar as they make it possible for people to avoid pain and experience pleasure.

I think you started off talking about literal physical pain. As a good example of how we're not actually free to decide what doing good to others will consist of from now on.

But you're now talking about pain and its assumed opposite, pleasure, as shorthand for all positive and negative experiences. Which is also relevant. But possibly a slight shift of the goalposts ?

I think you should take the precaution of asking me just how bad I'm finding the pains of growing old. I'm nearly 70, and so far the pains are irritating but not intolerable. But If you could be reasonably sure that the rest of my life would be more painful than pleasurable, and if no-one else is given pain by my death, and if you can be sure that you won't start a fashion of copycat killings done for less justification, then yes, I think you should do it. In practice we don't generally know all these things.

To decide for you would be to treat you as something less than fully human. We have to make these end-of-life decisions for our dogs.

I suggest that a doctor might well be in a position to have reasonable certainty about how much physical pain there will be if he doesn't give you a life-ending dose. But whether you find in life sufficient positive experiences to outweigh the physical pain in your scale of values is a decision for you. Not for the doctor, and not for any politically-minded person driven more by their own ideas of how things should be rather than by concern for your welfare.

Again, you should probably ask me how necessary it is to my happiness that I do these things. As I'm probably the best judge, if I say I need to do them to be happy, you should probably let me get on with it.

Not disagreeing at all. Just seems to me that your conclusion is more consistent with a morality that values freedom/agency than with the pain-minimisation morality that I thought you were arguing for.

[CIN]

People's opinions do not make moral truths true.

Er, I think people's opinions are exactly what make moral truths true.

What does 'true' mean here? Can something be true if it isn't objectively true, merely by virtue of people's opinions?

'Pain is intrinsically bad' is true because of what pain is like, just as 'the earth is round' is true because of what the earth is like.

As far as I know, all creatures that feel pain consider it a negative experience. To those creatures, pain appears "bad" and it may even appear to be 'morally wrong' to them. But is any of this demonstrative of 'objective' morality? I can't see it. Perhaps the best we could do is to note that many experiences are characterised as "bad" by the majority of experiencers? Consensus. And consensus is very-much-not objectivity, as we philosophers know well.

I doubt if pain would appear to be morally wrong to a non-human. I don't think they'd have the concept of moral wrongness.

I think we can move beyond mere consensus, and I shall now attempt to do so.

I'm glad you accept that all creatures consider pain a negative experience. I agree. I can see only three ways of explaining this: either all animals are suffering from a kind of universal subjective delusion, a belief that pain is a negative experience when in fact it is not; this seems unlikely, because it looks very unlikely that many animal species would actually be capable of having such a belief. Or, without actually holding any beliefs, animals are nevertheless universally reacting negatively to something that is not in fact negative (but why would they do this?). Or pain actually is a negative experience, i.e. this negativity is an intrinsic property of pain. I take this third view, as it seems to offer the most straightforward explanation of the way animals (including ourselves) behave. The important point to note about this is that 'negative' is a value term. If we accept that pain is intrinsically negative, then we have bridged the supposed gap between fact and value. We have a natural fact, that animals feel pain, which is also an evaluative fact, that animals feel something that is intrinsically negative. It's because I think pain bridges the supposed fact-value gap in this way that I am an ethical naturalist.

But you are right, of course, in saying that this does not in itself deliver objective morality. To get there takes a bit more work.

What does 'bad' actually mean? I think we need a plausible theory about this, because without one, we don't really know what we're talking about. My own theory is that 'good' and 'bad' are used to attribute properties of goodness and badness (i.e. they're not just approving or disapproving noises), and that these properties are, respectively, the properties of meriting a positive attitude and meriting a negative attitude. 'Pain is bad' means 'pain merits a negative attitude', and pain does indeed merit a negative attitude, the reason being that, as you've already said, pain is a negative experience. The specific negative attitude may be different depending on whose attitude it is and in what relation they stand to the pain. So, for example, my dog's negative attitude to his pain may be to try and escape from it, while someone else's negative attitude may be to feel an emapthic dislike for the pain and a corresponding empathic pity for the dog.

Now, if an action causes a negative experience such as pain, then since the consequence of the action merits a negative attitude, it seems reasonable to infer that the action itself, insofar as it causes a negative result, must itself also merit a negative attiitude. This attitude again may be different depending on the relation of the indivdual to the action: for example, if I am the cause of my dog's pain because I am beating my dog, my dog's negative attitude to my action may be to run away from me, while someone else's negative attitude may be to feel and express disapproval of my action. And then, since my action in giving pain to the dog merits a negative response, by my theory of what 'bad' means, not only is the pain bad, but my action is also bad (and throughout all of this we don't need the scare quotes round 'bad' that you put there). And it seems to me reasonable to say that if an action is bad, then that is a reason, other things being equal, why we ought not to perform it. And there is your objective morality.

That's my theory. I'd be interested to know what you think.

[Gertie]

Right and Wrong and Oughts are human concepts, they don't exist 'out there' to be objectively observed and measured.

I disagree with you about Right and Wrong (see my reply to Pattern-chaser above). I think the truth that it's wrong to deliberately cause pain without a good reason is indeed 'out there'.

I also disagree with you about Oughts. If there are objectively wrong actions, then we ought not to perform them. That seems obvious.

I think many philosophers have failed to grasp the true moral significance of pain and pleasure, especially pain. It dawned on me a while ago that the pain/pleasure axis is an asymmetry built into nature, and that this asymmetry refutes subjectivism. If subjectivism were true, choosing whether to regard pleasure as good and pain as bad, rather than the other way round, ought to be as arbitrary, and as obviously neither correct nor incorrect, as choosing to support one football team rather than another; but clearly it's not like this. Everybody hates pain, and with good reason: pain is intrinsically undesirable, and severe pain is terrible. Pain is just bad, and the more severe the pain, the worse it is. It could never be reasonable to regard pain as good or even neutral, it flies in the face of all our experience. That pain is bad is a fact, and it's from grasping that fact that a correct understanding of morality flows.

I find the objective vs subjective debate re morality a stale and pointless red herring. It can be argued this way and that relying on definitions trying to make it fit. Who cares, the point is that it's the capacity of conscious beings to flourish or suffer which matters, is appropriate, as regards right and wrong and oughts.

Mattering, interests, a stake in the state of affairs - that's the territory morality operates in, the appropriate way to think about it. This stake in what happens to you is what what bridges the Is-Ought divide. And without qualiative conscious experience, it doesn't exist.

This might not be a perfect fit with reason, logic and objectivity, it's not observable and quantifiable, because experiencing subjects aren't like billiard balls colliding. But it's not just opinion or consensus either. Morality has to be addressed on its own terms. I don't know why some people find that so hard to grasp, when nearly everybody acts in ways which show they really do understand it at some level, even if they don't articulate it or think it through this way.

The pain-pleasure dichotomy puts it in sharp focus as you say, though of course life is more complicated than that, as is conscious experience. Well-being and suffering can manifest in myriad, sometimes idiosyncratic ways.

[Good_Egg]

Who cares, the point is that it's the capacity of conscious beings to flourish or suffer which matters, is appropriate, as regards right and wrong and oughts.

Mattering, interests, a stake in the state of affairs - that's the territory morality operates in, the appropriate way to think about it. This stake in what happens to you is what what bridges the Is-Ought divide. And without qualiative conscious experience, it doesn't exist.

Not quite sure what you mean by "qualiative consciousness". You seem to think that flies (for example) don't have it, and therefore there's nothing wrong with pulling the wings off flies. And goldfish don't have it, so there's no wrong in neglecting to feed your goldfish. And if a mentally handicapped child doesn't meet your standard of consciousness, does that mean there's no wrong in doing whatever you like with them ?

So one objection is that you seem to be drawing a binary division where nature has potentially a spectrum of levels of mental development.

And another is that if I eat your goldfish, it may conceivably not matter to the goldfish but matter to you. If I smash up your car, similarly. So if it matters to some believer in animal rights whether or not a Buddhist treads on an ant, does the fact that they care elevate it to a moral issue ?

Thus while two individuals can express two different opinions on the shape, that shape has an objectively correct answer, the two opinions notwithstanding.

OTOH, I am unaware of an objective method to determine which of two individual's opinions on "objective" moral truths is correct (if either). Though I await your elucidation.

If two people express different opinions on the height of a mountain, then the way you find out which one is closest to being right is to get a whole lot of other people to measure the height of the mountain, and take some sort of average of their answers as being a good estimate. In other words, consensus.

And in practice if the level of disagreement between them is small then you chalk it up to measurement imprecision. And if the level of disagreement is large enough, you begin to suspect that they went out and measured different mountains.

Nobody doubts that the height of a mountain is an objective fact. But consensus plays a role in how we know that fact. And if there's enough lack of consensus, we should admit that we don't know.

So, by analogy, to the extent that there is consensus on morality, that points to people perceiving the same thing, but imprecisely.

And to the extent that there is major lack of consensus, that points to absence of knowledge.

And while absence of knowledge is not knowledge of absence, the possibility of a perfect moral code undiscoverable by humans seems like one of those philosophical dead-ends. Like solipsism. You know - ideas that can't be disproven but aren't really worth your attention because nothing constructive can come of them.

So I maintain that consensus is a valid indicator that falls short of proof.

[Gertie]

Good Egg

Gertie wrote: ↑Today, 9:40 am Who cares, the point is that it's the capacity of conscious beings to flourish or suffer which matters, is appropriate, as regards right and wrong and oughts.

Mattering, interests, a stake in the state of affairs - that's the territory morality operates in, the appropriate way to think about it. This stake in what happens to you is what what bridges the Is-Ought divide. And without qualiative conscious experience, it doesn't exist.

Not quite sure what you mean by "qualiative consciousness".

Nagel describes it as ''there is something it is like'' to be a conscious being. My moral foundation relies on ''that something it is like'' having nasty and nice aspects. Which seems to be a a basic part of most, maybe all, critters' experiential reward systems.

You seem to think that flies (for example) don't have it, and therefore there's nothing wrong with pulling the wings off flies. And goldfish don't have it, so there's no wrong in neglecting to feed your goldfish.

No you've misunderstood me. I don't know if flies or goldfish have conscious experience, but I assume they do, so I treat them with moral consideration as if they do, to be on the safe side. Not as much consideration as I would a human or a dog who I assume has a richer conscious life, but what I consider as commensurate. I'd likely jump in a pond to save a drowning human or dog, but not a fly. But I don't deliberately harm flies and goldfish because it would be wrong. I have no such moral qualms about pulling wings off plastic immitation flies.


How about you? Do you recognise a moral difference between how we treat conscious goldfish and flies vs plastic immitations? And if so, what is your moral foundation for it?

And if a mentally handicapped child doesn't meet your standard of consciousness, does that mean there's no wrong in doing whatever you like with them ?

I don't assume there isn't something to be like a mentally handicapped person! What constitutes flourishing and suffering might be different for them that's all. That's true of every individual to some extent, and more marked in different species.

However, if someone is brain dead without hope of recovery, then I assume they have no potential conscious experience and see no point in keeping their body alive. So unike the Buddhist example you gave before, it isn't Life which warrants moral consideration, it's specifically conscious experience. To kill a conscious being takes away something of value from them, which is their conscious experience. I kill and eat living vegetables because I assume they don't have conscious experience, but I don't kill and eat animal species because I believe they do.

So one objection is that you seem to be drawing a binary division where nature has potentially a spectrum of levels of mental development.

I do think there's a spectrum of conscious experience, 'levels' doesn't really capture it tho, experience is qualiative rather than quantitative that way. What it is like to be a dog or cow or human or ant is all different. Even two humans will be different. But it's just the having of conscious experience which is the qualifier for moral consideration. Because it has this qualiative nature.

And another is that if I eat your goldfish, it may conceivably not matter to the goldfish but matter to you. If I smash up your car, similarly. So if it matters to some believer in animal rights whether or not a Buddhist treads on an ant, does the fact that they care elevate it to a moral issue ?

If it turns out goldfish don't have conscious experience I'd be surprised, but if that's the case, then yes the moral harm you'd be doing is upsetting me if you ate my goldfish I was fond of, or my smashed car. Do you agree/disagree? On what grounds?


Hope this cleared up some misconceptions?

[Pattern-chaser]

I'm glad you accept that all creatures consider pain a negative experience. I agree. I can see only three ways of explaining this: either all animals are suffering from a kind of universal subjective delusion, a belief that pain is a negative experience when in fact it is not; this seems unlikely, because it looks very unlikely that many animal species would actually be capable of having such a belief. Or, without actually holding any beliefs, animals are nevertheless universally reacting negatively to something that is not in fact negative (but why would they do this?). Or pain actually is a negative experience, i.e. this negativity is an intrinsic property of pain. I take this third view, as it seems to offer the most straightforward explanation of the way animals (including ourselves) behave. The important point to note about this is that 'negative' is a value term. If we accept that pain is intrinsically negative, then we have bridged the supposed gap between fact and value. We have a natural fact, that animals feel pain, which is also an evaluative fact, that animals feel something that is intrinsically negative. It's because I think pain bridges the supposed fact-value gap in this way that I am an ethical naturalist.

But you are right, of course, in saying that this does not in itself deliver objective morality. To get there takes a bit more work.

What does 'bad' actually mean? I think we need a plausible theory about this, because without one, we don't really know what we're talking about. My own theory is that 'good' and 'bad' are used to attribute properties of goodness and badness (i.e. they're not just approving or disapproving noises), and that these properties are, respectively, the properties of meriting a positive attitude and meriting a negative attitude. 'Pain is bad' means 'pain merits a negative attitude', and pain does indeed merit a negative attitude, the reason being that, as you've already said, pain is a negative experience. The specific negative attitude may be different depending on whose attitude it is and in what relation they stand to the pain. So, for example, my dog's negative attitude to his pain may be to try and escape from it, while someone else's negative attitude may be to feel an empathic dislike for the pain and a corresponding empathic pity for the dog.

Now, if an action causes a negative experience such as pain, then since the consequence of the action merits a negative attitude, it seems reasonable to infer that the action itself, insofar as it causes a negative result, must itself also merit a negative attitude. This attitude again may be different depending on the relation of the individual to the action: for example, if I am the cause of my dog's pain because I am beating my dog, my dog's negative attitude to my action may be to run away from me, while someone else's negative attitude may be to feel and express disapproval of my action.

I wonder if 'pain' is not so complicated as this? I read, years ago, that pain just alerts us to the fact that we are injured or damaged, and that we need to tend the wound, or otherwise take care of it, to prevent infection, etc. So, since pain indicates injury, and this impacts on our survival, it is a negative experience. After all, if we enjoyed pain, we wouldn't survive as well as if we try to avoid/minimise it.

And then, since my action in giving pain to the dog merits a negative response, by my theory of what 'bad' means, not only is the pain bad, but my action is also bad (and throughout all of this we don't need the scare quotes round 'bad' that you put there). And it seems to me reasonable to say that if an action is bad, then that is a reason, other things being equal, why we ought not to perform it. And there is your objective morality.

That's my theory. I'd be interested to know what you think.

You say that we should not perform bad actions, but how does that impact with the pain (?) we inflict when we kill other creatures for food? This embraces all the other carnivorous creatures too, of course. Is a cat bad for killing mice? I can see no "objectivity" emerging from this train of thought?