Philosophy Discussion Forums

psyreporter wrote: ↑November 28th, 2021, 2:18 am Is your argument intended to denote that meaning is necessarily applicable to subjective experience on the basis of which the concept consciousness is identified?

I'm not saying anything about meaning.

If there's an illusion that there's water in the road ahead, what does that amount to?
It amounts to:
(1) the fact that the road is actually dry ahead, but
(2) It mistakenly appears to something that the road is not dry ahead.

The "something" that the appearance is to in (2) above is consciousness.

Well, if we're saying that there's no consciousness, then how do we make sense of the something that receives the appearance of water in the road ahead where it's the case that there actually is NO water in the road (which is required for it to be an illusion)?

The answer to what "has the illusion" can't be consciousness in that case, because we'd be positing that there is no consciousness. So what would have the illusion? How would we make sense of that idea?

I'm arguing that the idea of an illusion is incoherent when there is no consciousness. If there is no consciousness, there's nothing to have or receive illusions.

By the way, the above also has nothing to do with the ontological status of what consciousness is, exactly.

It only has to do with making sense of the idea of illusions if we're proposing that there is no consciousness.

When considering consciousness to be an illusion, one obviously does not impose that consciousness is non-existent, but merely that it is meaningless and bound by causality (determinism).

The indicated illusion is merely such, that what one may consider to be meaningful experience (e.g. free will) isn't meaningful but merely a physical process.

psyreporter wrote: ↑November 29th, 2021, 12:08 am When considering consciousness to be an illusion, one obviously does not impose that consciousness is non-existent, but merely that it is meaningless and bound by causality (determinism).

The indicated illusion is merely such, that what one may consider to be meaningful experience (e.g. free will) isn't meaningful but merely a physical process.

The word "illusion" implies that the illusory thing doesn't exist. Otherwise don't use that term.

If we want to say that "free will is an illusion" (that is, free will doesn't exist, even though it appears to), then that's what we should say.

I should say, actually, that "illusion" implies that the illusory thing doesn't exist at least in the context that it appears to exist. If we're referring to a particular instance of something, and not the thing in general, then another particular instance might exist elsewhere.

So, "The road being wet ahead is an illusion" tells us that the road ahead appears to be wet but it's actually dry. It does suggest that there are no wet roads anywhere.

But if we were to say, "Wet roads are an illusion," that would tell us that no wet roads exist.

So if we say, unqualified, that "consciuosness is an illusion," then either we're saying that there is no consciousness (yet somehow there are illusions--which is the incoherent bit), or we do not understand the normal way to employ the word "illusion."

Oops, parity typo:

"It does suggest that there are no wet roads anywhere"

should have read

"It does NOT suggest that there are no wet roads anywhere."

And re free will being an illusion, I know we've done this discussion before, but to try to do it again, let's keep it simple to start.

First, let's momentarily forget about living creatures and consciousness. Let's say that we have the physical world with no living creatures in it, no consciousness.

On my view, that physical world is NOT deterministic.

For context:

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑March 5th, 2020, 4:30 pmSo I'm a physicalist. I'm convinced that the mind is simply brain processes.

I don't at all buy determinism.

psyreporter wrote: ↑November 28th, 2021, 2:18 am

1. Do you believe in intrinsic existence without mind?
2. Do you believe that mind has a cause within the scope of physical reality?

Yes and yes. I'm a realist and a physicalist (aka "materialist").

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 4th, 2021, 6:16 pm First, why would "what causes reality to exist" be necessary for knowing whether there is reality? (Keeping in mind that by "reality" here we're referring to the objective world.)

My reply: Because without such knowledge, one can pose anything, from 'random chance' to 'illusion' to 'magic' to a simulation by aliens. Such a situation does not allow one to make a claim that poses that reality is 'real'.

---

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑November 29th, 2021, 7:15 am And re free will being an illusion, I know we've done this discussion before, but to try to do it again, let's keep it simple to start.

First, let's momentarily forget about living creatures and consciousness. Let's say that we have the physical world with no living creatures in it, no consciousness.

On my view, that physical world is NOT deterministic.

What would allow for the consideration that the aspect free is applicable to a world consisting solely of what can be termed 'physical reality' and in which no mind or consciousness exists or is applicable?

What else than 'physical reality' is there to be considered to allow the possibility for that world to be undetermined?

What do you think of the reasoning by free will sceptics that argues that a purely physical world is necessarily bound by determinism?

To make a choice that wasn’t merely the next link in the unbroken chain of causes, you’d have to be able to stand apart from the whole thing, a ghostly presence separate from the material world yet mysteriously still able to influence it. But of course you can’t actually get to this supposed place that’s external to the universe, separate from all the atoms that comprise it and the laws that govern them. You just are some of the atoms in the universe, governed by the same predictable laws as all the rest.

(2021) The clockwork universe: is free will an illusion?
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2021/a ... n-illusion

With regard the described world being possible (intrinsic existence without mind):

What potential essence can a pattern fulfil if it hasn't been observed (i.e. when mind did not precede it)? Without essence to fulfil, there can be no meaning and a meaningless pattern would amount to pure randomness that equals nothing. A deviation from pure randomness implies meaning and thus necessarily, fulfilment of essence. Based on this logic, mind is logically the origin of physical reality and must precede it on a fundamental level.

That's not at all the context in which my comments above were made.

It was intended to denote that your addressing of 'free will' is actually on topic. The questions in the OP are essentially related to questioning 'materialism' in general. The OP starts with a quote of a materialist who is denoted and questioned as such.

The question that we were discussing as precursor to your 're-addressing' the free will discussion, was 'Do you believe in intrinsic existence without mind?' to which you answered with Yes.

Context:

1) you consider yourself to be a materialist in a robust sense
2) you consider a physical world to exist without mind
3) according to free will sceptics, the above necessarily implies that you cannot escape determinism

What do you think of the quoted reasoning by free will sceptics in my previous post that argues that a purely physical world is necessarily bound by determinism?

psyreporter wrote: ↑November 29th, 2021, 10:04 pm It was intended to denote that your addressing of 'free will' is actually on topic. The questions in the OP are essentially related to questioning 'materialism' in general. The OP starts with a quote of a materialist who is denoted and questioned as such.

The question that we were discussing as precursor to your 're-addressing' the free will discussion, was 'Do you believe in intrinsic existence without mind?' to which you answered with Yes.

Context:

1) you consider yourself to be a materialist in a robust sense
2) you consider a physical world to exist without mind
3) according to free will sceptics, the above necessarily implies that you cannot escape determinism

What do you think of the quoted reasoning by free will sceptics in my previous post that argues that a purely physical world is necessarily bound by determinism?

As I said in the earlier post about this, if we imagine a (physical) world wherein no living things, no consciousness exists, I would say that that world is NOT deterministic.

In other words, I'm not a determinist in general, even if we're only talking about the world in general, where we're not addressing anything about living things. So if we're just talking about collections of hydrogen and helium and carbon and nitrogen and oxygen, and planets and stars and so on, but we're not at all talking about any living creatures, then I am still NOT a determinist.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑November 30th, 2021, 6:47 amAs I said in the earlier post about this, if we imagine a (physical) world wherein no living things, no consciousness exists, I would say that that world is NOT deterministic.

In other words, I'm not a determinist in general, even if we're only talking about the world in general, where we're not addressing anything about living things. So if we're just talking about collections of hydrogen and helium and carbon and nitrogen and oxygen, and planets and stars and so on, but we're not at all talking about any living creatures, then I am still NOT a determinist.

3) according to free will sceptics, the above (materialist + intrinsic existence without mind) necessarily implies that you cannot escape determinism

What do you think of the quoted reasoning by free will sceptics that argues that a purely physical world is necessarily bound by determinism?

Quote:

To make a choice that wasn’t merely the next link in the unbroken chain of causes, you’d have to be able to stand apart from the whole thing, a ghostly presence separate from the material world yet mysteriously still able to influence it. But of course you can’t actually get to this supposed place that’s external to the universe, separate from all the atoms that comprise it and the laws that govern them. You just are some of the atoms in the universe, governed by the same predictable laws as all the rest.

(2021) The clockwork universe: is free will an illusion?
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2021/a ... n-illusion

The following question is unanswered as well:

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 3rd, 2021, 8:27 amI'm a realist and a physicalist (aka "materialist").

... I'm convinced that the mind is simply brain processes.

When mind originates from the physical, how can consciousness not be an illusion?

psyreporter wrote: ↑December 1st, 2021, 12:28 pm What do you think of the quoted reasoning by free will sceptics that argues that a purely physical world is necessarily bound by determinism?

Obviously I do not agree with it. Hence me informing you that even if we're only talking about the world in absence of any living creatures, I'm not a determinist.

But of course you can’t actually get to this supposed place that’s external to the universe, separate from all the atoms that comprise it and the laws that govern them. You just are some of the atoms in the universe, governed by the same predictable laws as all the rest.[/i]

I'm not a realist on physical laws.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑November 29th, 2021, 7:04 am

psyreporter wrote: ↑November 29th, 2021, 12:08 am When considering consciousness to be an illusion, one obviously does not impose that consciousness is non-existent, but merely that it is meaningless and bound by causality (determinism).

The indicated illusion is merely such, that what one may consider to be meaningful experience (e.g. free will) isn't meaningful but merely a physical process.

The word "illusion" implies that the illusory thing doesn't exist. Otherwise don't use that term.

If we want to say that "free will is an illusion" (that is, free will doesn't exist, even though it appears to), then that's what we should say.

There is a distinction between perceptual illusions and doxastic illusions: A doxastic illusion is a false belief (an erroneous conviction), whereas a perceptual illusion is a case where the object of perception exists/is real, but it doesn't appear as it really is. So, strictly speaking, perceptual illusions are different from perceptual hallucinations, where there appears to be an object of perception, but there isn't really any.

So-called "illusionism" about phenomenal consciousness is a form of eliminativism about it, according to which it doesn't exist/isn't real. So:

"According to the standard distinction, 'hallucinationism' might be a more accurate (although perhaps less catchy) name for the position Frankish is advocating."

(Chrisley, Ron, and Aaron Sloman. "Functionalism, Revisionism, and Qualia." APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 6/1 (2016): 2–13. p. 3)

Consul wrote: ↑December 1st, 2021, 2:57 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑November 29th, 2021, 7:04 am

psyreporter wrote: ↑November 29th, 2021, 12:08 am When considering consciousness to be an illusion, one obviously does not impose that consciousness is non-existent, but merely that it is meaningless and bound by causality (determinism).

The indicated illusion is merely such, that what one may consider to be meaningful experience (e.g. free will) isn't meaningful but merely a physical process.

The word "illusion" implies that the illusory thing doesn't exist. Otherwise don't use that term.

If we want to say that "free will is an illusion" (that is, free will doesn't exist, even though it appears to), then that's what we should say.

There is a distinction between perceptual illusions and doxastic illusions: A doxastic illusion is a false belief (an erroneous conviction), whereas a perceptual illusion is a case where the object of perception exists/is real, but it doesn't appear as it really is. So, strictly speaking, perceptual illusions are different from perceptual hallucinations, where there appears to be an object of perception, but there isn't really any.

So-called "illusionism" about phenomenal consciousness is a form of eliminativism about it, according to which it doesn't exist/isn't real. So:

"According to the standard distinction, 'hallucinationism' might be a more accurate (although perhaps less catchy) name for the position Frankish is advocating."

(Chrisley, Ron, and Aaron Sloman. "Functionalism, Revisionism, and Qualia." APA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers 6/1 (2016): 2–13. p. 3)

On your view, how do any of those distinctions help make the idea coherent?