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[Burning ghost]

No contradiction. I am not conscious of my unconscious or I would be conscious of it. Jung's theory is based on symbols that come in consciousness that share commom features within humans (his "archetypes"). That said these "archetypes" are not rigidly defined or present for everyone in the same way.

I admit I did find a lot of BT to be psychological.

-- Updated August 9th, 2016, 4:43 am to add the following --

I don't honestly see the use of Hedegger's term "Da-sein" other than as to establish, accidentally, over applications and limitations of language.

As a chimeric concept it does its job for me in this respect.

I assume I am misunderstanding it rather than everyone else who has studied Heidegger is misunderstanding it.

[Hereandnow]

Carl Jung????? Connection?

-- Updated August 10th, 2016, 8:32 am to add the following --

Desein as a chimeric concept? Pray, elaborate.

[Burning ghost]

I didn't bring Jung up. They just happen to use the same word to describe something. Coincidence I expect.

As for chimeric, I mean that because I have yet to find a singular definition of it in Heidegger's work. He constantly elaborates the meaning of Da-sein to fit into whatever he happens to be saying.
I am not sure what it is.

I assume I am wrong. I find use of it as a term simply to uncover misuse of language.

Having gone over the introduction it still isn't clear to me what he is saying Da-sein means. Having read BT cover to cover I do recall that I ploughed on regardless last time and later found some othrr definitions of Da-sein that made a little more sense.

You started this thread asking about Da-sein. If you have found out more or less what it is Heidegger is referring to reference the pages.

Again, I assume I am wrong in what I say because many others understand the concept fully so I hear?

If it means the process of grounding then it sort of makes sense. He does in places seem to make it out to be like some kind of objective too, or rather the cause and reason for intentionality.

After the introduction I don't think he attempts to make any concise definition yet keeps using the term Da-sein to refer to this or that in such a way that it makes you know what it is because you know the things he is referring to.

Maybe I am just nto smart enough to get it? Maybe I have over thought the entire concept beyond what he meant?

I thought I understood it before, but having gone back to reread it I think I was mistaken in some of my previous presumptions.

You've put more time into Heidegger than I have so please try and explain as best you can what Da-sein means.

In the copy I have Da-sein is fiest mentioned in the most circumspect manner as if the reader already understands what it means. It is written in brackets next to the word "existence" with a footnote attached that refutes the use of Da-sein in such a manner??

I guess Da-sein is a term Heidegger used and outlined prior to writing Being and Time? If not I cannot help but suspect it is purposefully chimeric or the most bizarre way of introducing a concept to the reader. There is also the problem of translation into English which must lose something along the way?

[Fooloso4]

Burning ghost, there is a disjunction between your suspicion that you have not understood Heidegger and your suspicion that he is being deliberately obscure.
The hermeneutic principles of charity and humility should be employed. If there is something that does not make sense we should assume the fault is our own. Of course this may not be the case but if we begin with the assumption that he is obfuscating we are not likely to ever see beyond that assumption. It should give us pause if we think that we can so easily see what other readers, including some with with highly regarded and well deserved reputations, have missed.

The term Dasein has nothing to do with a process of grounding. He uses the term to indicate the unique relationship between man and Being. He intends to overcome the conceptual framework of subject/object duality. He attempts to get at this by describing our ways of being in the world as well as through his analysis of the history of philosophy. There is no transcendent ground or theoretical basis for Dasein or Being. It is, rather, the fact of our historical situatedness that is fundamental.

[Burning ghost]

I guess my issue is coming at Heidegger from a Husserlian view.

What you describe amount to nothing different from what Husserl already did in the epoche and what he term as the irreducible "I"/"ego".

I have stated three or four times that I must be missing something and/or the translation is bad. I was under the assumption that Heidegger first introduced the term Da-sein, as used in BT, in BT.

The term first appears on page seven:

"Being is found in thatness and whatness, reality, the objective presence of things [Vorhandenheit], subsistence, validity, existence [Da-sein],(1) and in the "there is" [es gibt]. In which being is the meaning of being to be found;(2) from which being is the disclosure of being to get its start? Is the starting point arbitrary, or does certain being have priority in the elaboration of the question of being? Which is this exemplary (3) being and in what sense does it have priority?

1- neither the usual concept nor any other.
2- two different questions are aligned here; misleading, above all in relation to the role of Da-sein.
3- Misleading. Da-sein is exemplary because it si co-player (das Bei-spiel) that in its essence as Da-sein (perduring the truth of being) plays to and with being-brings it into the play of resonance."

I admit I don't understand this properly nor see it as a clear introduction to the term Da-sein.

Also I don't quite get the idea of overcoming the object/subjwct duality as this is the basic premise of phenomenology set up by Husserl in the epoche. For phenomenology there is no object/subject duality so what does Heidegger do that hasn't already been done other than focus on emotion as intentionality? (what is called "stimmung"? by both Heidegger and Husserl. Generally translated as "mood" I believe).

[Felix]

Carl Jung????? Connection?

Jung coined the term "individuation" to describe the process of becoming aware of oneself, of one’s make-up, and discovering one’s true, inner self. Heidegger used this term in the same way so it's reasonable to assume he borrowed it from Jung.

[Fooloso4]

Burning ghost:

I admit I don't understand this properly nor see it as a clear introduction to the term Da-sein.

#7 ( Macquarrie translation):

Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity - the inquirer - transparent in his own Being.
The very asking of this question is an entity's mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about - namely, Being. This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term "Dasein".

1- neither the usual concept nor any other.
2- two different questions are aligned here; misleading, above all in relation to the role of Da-sein.
3- Misleading. Da-sein is exemplary because it si co-player (das Bei-spiel) that in its essence as Da-sein (perduring the truth of being) plays to and with being-brings it into the play of resonance.

I assume the numbers refer to the translator's footnotes. Without a copy of the translation I can only hazard a guess:

1 - The issue is not conceptual. He is not trying to present an adequate concept of Being, but rather to which any concept of Being inadequately refers - the "thatness and whatness, reality, the objective presence of things [Vorhandenheit], subsistence, validity, existence, and in the 'there is' [es gibt] ".

2 - "In which being is the meaning of being to be found?" This is misleading because the meaning of being does not reside in the being that asks the question. The inquiry takes place through man but is not fundamentally about man. "From which being is the disclosure of being to get its start?" The disclosure of being does not get its start from a being who discloses. Dasein is the being to which rather than from which being is disclosed. "Is the starting point arbitrary, or does certain being have priority in the elaboration of the question of being?" Dasein is not an arbitrary starting point. It is essential to Dasein's being that being is disclosed. This is not arbitrary, but simply the way it is. To ask if it could be otherwise is misleading because to ask is to be involved with the question of being. Dasein is not given priority it is the being that asks the question, not one of several beings that ask the question whose answer is given priority.

3 - "Which is this exemplary being and in what sense does it have priority?" This is misleading for the reasons stated above. Dasein is not a particular being to which priority is given. It is not one among other beings that ask the question of Being, and it is not the being of this being that is of primary concern. There is no Being without Dasein and no Dasein without Being.

Also I don't quite get the idea of overcoming the object/subjwct duality as this is the basic premise of phenomenology set up by Husserl in the epoche.

One might look at the whole history of philosophy as the struggle to overcome this duality. Husserl clearly gives priority to the subject. Heidegger's response is that the subject finds itself in the world.

-- Updated August 10th, 2016, 3:05 pm to add the following --

I forgot to use the proper quotation format. Plus a few minor edits for clarification. Let me try again:

Burning ghost:

I admit I don't understand this properly nor see it as a clear introduction to the term Da-sein.

#7 ( Macquarrie translation):

Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity - the inquirer - transparent in his own Being.
The very asking of this question is an entity's mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about - namely, Being. This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term "Dasein".

Burning ghost:

1- neither the usual concept nor any other.
2- two different questions are aligned here; misleading, above all in relation to the role of Da-sein.
3- Misleading. Da-sein is exemplary because it si co-player (das Bei-spiel) that in its essence as Da-sein (perduring the truth of being) plays to and with being-brings it into the play of resonance.

I assume the numbers refer to the translator's footnotes. Without a copy of the translation I can only hazard a guess:

1 - The issue is not conceptual. He is not trying to present an adequate concept of Being, but rather points to that to which any concept of Being inadequately refers - the "thatness and whatness, reality, the objective presence of things [Vorhandenheit], subsistence, validity, existence, and in the 'there is' [es gibt] ".

2 - "In which being is the meaning of being to be found?" This is misleading because the meaning of being does not reside in the being that asks the question. The inquiry takes place through man but is not fundamentally about man. "From which being is the disclosure of being to get its start?" The disclosure of being does not get its start from a being who discloses. Dasein is the being to which rather than from which being is disclosed. "Is the starting point arbitrary, or does certain being have priority in the elaboration of the question of being?" Dasein is not an arbitrary starting point. It is essential to Dasein's being that being is disclosed. This is not arbitrary, but simply the way it is. To ask if it could be otherwise is misleading because to ask is to be involved with the question of being. Dasein is not given priority it is the being that asks the question, not one of several beings that ask the question whose answer is given priority.

3 - "Which is this exemplary being and in what sense does it have priority?" This is misleading for the reasons stated above. Dasein is not a particular being to which priority is given. It is not one among other beings that ask the question of Being, and it is not the being of this being that is of primary concern. There is no Being without Dasein and no Dasein without Being.

Also I don't quite get the idea of overcoming the object/subjwct duality as this is the basic premise of phenomenology set up by Husserl in the epoche.

One might look at the whole history of philosophy as the struggle to overcome this duality. Husserl clearly gives priority to the subject. Heidegger's response is that the subject finds itself in the world.

[Belinda]

Well, "personal genius" was my adjective, Heidegger speaks of "individuation," and it seems to be similar to Jung's definition of the term.

I gather that facticity together with awareness of finitude have the effect of individuation, which is the result of encountering and awarely accepting everyday facts. Those facts are from the hands of the gods, and are nothing to do with theories of ethics or of morality. In the future time facts result in unforeseen events. Dasein then I take to be individuated awareness of being carried along by time. Today I reread the myth of Leda a mortal woman raped by Zeus who had taken the form of a swan. Leda, impregnated, subsequently gave birth to agents of enormous happenings in time to come.

[Burning ghost]

Being-in -the-world is synomynous with Husserl's "life-world". It is not really fair to say Husserl prioritises the subject. In phenomenology there is no subject/object duality. It is fairer to say Husserl makes no distinction between object/subject; they are "out of play".

[Fooloso4]

Burning ghost:

Being-in -the-world is synomynous with Husserl's "life-world".

Once again, you will fail to understand Heidegger as long as you attempt to shoehorn him into Husserl’s terminology. The interpretive problem is only compounded. We must now deal not only with what Heidegger meant by being in the world but with what Husserl meant by lebenswelt. They are not synonymous, but demonstrating that they are not takes us off topic.

It is not really fair to say Husserl prioritises the subject. In phenomenology there is no subject/object duality.

Husserl’s transcendental ego is, in the Kantian sense, the condition for the possibility of phenomenology. He identified himself as a “transcendental idealist”. To put it simply: Husserl’s concern is consciousness, Heidegger’s concern is Being. One cannot explicate Being through consciousness, for consciousness necessitates being. Put differently: Husserl begins with what is given, Heidegger with the giving (es gibt).

It is fairer to say Husserl makes no distinction between object/subject; they are "out of play".

This is simply not true. His concern was with objects of consciousness. Bracketing is methodological, not ontological. It is not a matter of not distinguishing but of putting aside, “out of play”, the question of the physical object to focus on the eidetic object. One might go so far as to say that this is, in Heidegger’s terms, symptomatic of the forgetfulness of Being.

[Burning ghost]

You've probably read a lot more about Heidegger than me.

I think maybe before I continue on my second reading of BT I will look at the pdf's hereandnow gave me regarding BT. I am not really convinced yet probably because I don't understand it properly.

I can only approach Heidegger how I can approach him.

I will start up a thread on Husserl someday and try and deal with some points you make here.

Apologies for not using quotations in editor. I usually write from my phone and in the past I have lost whole post by fiddling with such things.

-- Updated August 13th, 2016, 2:16 am to add the following --

The most succinct definition I can find is at the beginning of part one, p.41:

"What is primarily interrogated in the question of the meaning of being is that being which has the character of Da-sein."

So the meaning of being that is interrogated is a being? That being has the character of Da-sein, which means it is not Da-sein only having the character of "Da-sein" which is previously presented:

"This being which we ourselves in each case are and which includes inquiry among the possibilities of its being we formulate terminologically as "Da-sein"." (p.7)

So the being has the character that includes inquiry among possibilities of its being. This is starting to make little sense.

I am guessing that "character" is not the best word to use and if it is I openly question the meaning of Da-sein because I don't see sense in what I am reading. I see a very loose and evasive summation that to me looks kind of stretched between asking what being means and what a question is.

I understand the idea that a dog probably doesn't think about its being because it does not have language like we do to conceptualise and express such an idea. We can formulate the question "what is the meaning of being?" and if this is what Heidegger is saying Da-sein is then why does he not present it so? I am guessing there is more to it than it simply being my conception and approach toward my being by presenting it as a concept and verbalising it?

-- Updated August 13th, 2016, 2:22 am to add the following --

Now I think about it is it just that bringing being into the world he refers to when he talks about being-in-the-world?

I do remember from previous reading that he was, for me, overly pedantic in places. I guess that is an accusation that can be lain at the feet of any philosopher though! Obviously, in my case, he has not been pedantic enough or overly so because I am unsure of what Da-sein means.

-- Updated August 16th, 2016, 4:26 am to add the following --

Fool-

Hereandnow seems to be absent from this thread so please explain how "being-in-the-world" differs from "lifr-world".

If you can compare and contrast maybe I can understand better.

-- Updated September 13th, 2016, 5:05 am to add the following --

Belinda -

Are you there? What copy do you have?

[Palumboism]

I am a fan of Kierkegaard and Emanuel Levinas, and I have little interest in scientific reductionism.

What's you favorite Emanuel Levinas work?

[Hereandnow]

Palumboism wrote
What's you favorite Emanuel Levinas work?

I suppose that would have to be Totality and Infinity. Of course, this is his tour de force.

I like that Levinas does what analytic philosophers find most annoying: he attempts to give clarity to the MOST problematic part of our dasein which Heidegger tries to keep well delineated. This is the "presence" of transcendence within immanence. One cannot confine this to "the same" and the Other is an essential feature of the structure of dasein.

Totality and Infinity is notoriously difficult, and I don't pretend to understand all of it. I mean, his phrasing can be very puzzling. But I get the most of it, I do think; but then, it all begs for more than one read. I like to imagine I have to teach it. That helps.

We can discuss this if you like. Or Time and the Other, or Alternity and Transcendence. For Levinas, it comes down to the phrasing, and then the words themselves. This makes him puzzling in the details, here and there (then here and there, again). He is, of course, deeply embedded in phenomenological thinking, from Kant, on through Heidegger.

[Palumboism]

Palumboism wrote
What's you favorite Emanuel Levinas work?

We can discuss this if you like. Or Time and the Other, or Alternity and Transcendence. For Levinas, it comes down to the phrasing, and then the words themselves. This makes him puzzling in the details, here and there (then here and there, again). He is, of course, deeply embedded in phenomenological thinking, from Kant, on through Heidegger.

You mentioned in another thread that you thought Nietzsche brought more heat than light. What philosophers do you believe bring the light? Can you rank in order?

[Hereandnow]

Palumboism wrote

You mentioned in another thread that you thought Nietzsche brought more heat than light. What philosophers do you believe bring the light? Can you rank in order?

That is a loaded question, that about bringing the light. Philosophizing with a "hammer" has its grounding in something other than philosophy. The heat he brings is largely the product of managing his own illnesses, and there were many, so awful they drove him insane. But his insanity was IN the coping, wasn't it? Look at the very core meaning of willing to power: What could Nietzsche's entire life have been if not willing himself above the struggle of his own existence? Read the biographical accounts about his brilliance in the midst of a raging battle to control his wretchedness.

That would be the source of his "heat" or zeal, if you prefer, to see the baser motivations in Christianity, Platonism, rationalism, the kind of thinking that had as its principle purpose in grounding human affairs in something sublime, beyond human.

This turns the matter over to the notion of "light". Since I'm a Levinas fan, you could guess that Nietzsche's ideas about resentment, overcoming, the ubermensch will settle well with me. Of course, one thing about him and Kierkegaard that does sit well is an impatience for impotency and a lack of passion in the general mentality. His criticism of common herd like tendencies that pervaded culture, especially among Christians, is something I understand very well, and I find this very "weakness" at the very foundation of Heidegger's thought: the fall into das man, where one's authentic self remains sidelined and freedom is unrealized. Now, Heidegger does not go the route of Kierkegaard, who argued exactly the same thing as Nietzsche on this. I do go with Kierkegaard.

If you read Levinas' Time and the Other you see his objection to Heidegger's grounding the self within the scope of dasein. Levinas wants to take very seriously the "presence" of transcendence in immanence, which is brought by the Other. This is, as I read it and follow its arguments, what I consider "light". I am reading Michel Henri, and others that follow the same path.

Of course, Nietzsche is much more complex than I say here. If you would like to go into any of his ideas, books, it would be a worthy discussion.

Rank in order? I don't think so.