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[Gertie]

Consul

Remark: If selfhood is the same as personhood, then not all subjects are selves, because not all subjects are persons.

Here's how I put it, which I think works better -

In humans experiential content and the ways it manifests results in a Sense of being a discrete, unified, first person pov moving through space and time correlated to a specific body acting in an 'external' world. These properties enable us to have a mental model of our Self which we are aware of, can introspect, and give traits and agency to in the context of our overall model of the world, how it works and how we fit in.

This individualised model of one's self (personhood if you like), will develop over time as we accrete history, introspect,expand our model, note particular traits, preferences and so on which amounts to a 'personality' we note has differences as well as similarities to others. We can also note ongoing traits and patterns which we can talk about as 'my identity', even though experiential states switch on and off and are always 'in the now'.

As regards ''Subject'', I'd be happy to call any critter which has any experiential state a Subject, whether or not she has a sense of self.

The point of the different labels is then to mark significant distinctions (probably inevitably blurry)

Subject - any entity which has any kind of experiential states.

Sense of self - see my definition.

Personhood - a more sophisticated, individualised model of self.

But I'm not that fussed about which labels we use, as long as they help us agree what we're talking about.

* When you write that "What constitutes such a thing…is essentially experiential", it's not clear to me whether this is an expression of reductive realism or nonreductive realism about subjects or selves.

We know experiential states which amount to a sense of self are real. I've already said I think a sense of self is a feature of complex processes which require features like integration, a unified field, focus/attention/filtering and model building to be experientially coherent and therefore evolutionarily useful.

So yes I think a sense of being a self is a reducible sum of the processes of how experiential states manifest in humans and probably other complex animals. So I pretty much agree with this -

''According to reductive realism, the "empirical self" is the "total self", because there is no "pure ego" underlying and owning it, i.e. a distinct subject/object functioning as a substantial substratum of "the whole complex of contemporary and successive interrelated mental events which together constitute our mental history."

Here's a process-ontological expression of reductive realism, according to which selves aren't "substance-selves" but "process-selves" lacking a substantial substratum...

We're not in a position to make such cut n dried distinctions between Substance-Selves and Process-Selves, without knowing the basis of the mind-body relationship. So far it looks like both are required, is the most we can assume based on what evidence we can observe.

So while I feel confident enough to posit that the self is reducible to its experiential parts based on evolution 'designing' a functionally coherent and useful way for experiential states to manifest, I don't have a path like that to understanding the underlying mind-body relationship. Experiential processes might or might not be the exact same thing as experiencing, but physical processes do seem necessary as far as we can tell. Framing the physical part as the Subject tho doesn't seem to capture the inherent experientialness of what being a Me means (as per my definition).

[Gertie]

Consul

* The Experience/Experiencer Thesis—according to which experience is impossible without an experiencer, because it's part of the essence of an experience to be experienced by an experiencer—is neutral between reductive realism and nonreductive realism about experiencers, and also between materialism and immaterialism/spiritualism about them. What it is not neutral about is antirealism/nihilism about experiencers (subjects/selves/egos/persons), since according to it there are both experiences/experiencings and experiencers/subjects of experience. (Whether experiences and experiences are different from or identical with one another is another question.)

Note that my view, nonreductive realism, is compatible both with materialism and with immaterialism about experiencers (subjects/selves/egos/persons)! For example, Berkeley is a nonreductive realist too, because he denies that "you are only a system of floating ideas, without any substance to support them." (Berkeley)

I get the reasoning behind that. But it seems to me that issues like ''Whether experiencers and experiences are different from or identical with one another is another question'' is foundational to how we subsequently categorise in a way which captures what's actually going on. If they are identical, then what it amounts to is distinguishing one identical thing from another, which looks absurd based on our current ideas about the nature of reality. How do you respond to that?

My basic objection to antirealism and reductive realism is simply that mental/experiential phenomena lacking subjects or being their own subjects are ontologically unintelligible.

There is a fact of the matter as to the nature of the mind-body relationship. It is what it is.

We might have to adjust our ontological thinking as we do periodically in order to understand the mind-body relationship. Nobody seriously suggests we know everything there is to know about the nature of the universe. (Quantum mechanics makes ontological claims which seem unintelligible in terms of classical physics, but it seems to be getting at something real because it makes successful predictions).

What we shouldn't do is dogmatically insist on cramming odd new square pegs into comfortably familiar round holes if the reality is they don't fit.

[Consul]

Energy is not a physical stuff! Energy is not matter or a material substance!

I do not understand what your point or what you are trying to say here.

I'm trying to say what I'm saying here.

Matter and energy are the same. Einstein? Nuclear physics?

No, matter and energy are not the same. See:

The Equivalence of Mass and Energy > Misconceptions about E=mc²

[Sy Borg]

I do not understand what your point or what you are trying to say here.

I'm trying to say what I'm saying here.

Matter and energy are the same. Einstein? Nuclear physics?

No, matter and energy are not the same. See:

The Equivalence of Mass and Energy > Misconceptions about E=mc²

What is matter made from?

[Terrapin Station]

How is this not just (incredibly dim in my view given that we're trying to "make it do philosophy") linguistic analysis re the normal way that language works?

Are "-er"-less "-ings" such as walkerless walkings and experiencerless experiencings ontologically intelligible? – No, they are not!

You're asking that as if it's a question about language.

At any rate, I already explained that processes and "entities" are not separable.

[Consul]

What is matter made from?

If there are (mereological) atoms of matter in the form of simple elementary particles (corpuscles), then matter consists of them. But the simple bits of matter aren't made of anything, since they are what everything else is made of.

[Consul]

Are "-er"-less "-ings" such as walkerless walkings and experiencerless experiencings ontologically intelligible? – No, they are not!

You're asking that as if it's a question about language.

It's not! It's a question about Being.

At any rate, I already explained that processes and "entities" are not separable.

Even if that's true, it doesn't follow that there can be object-/subjectless processes.

[The Beast]

I see Anger. The energy summation has the result of anger. There is no logic in the wiring. Basically, self- awareness and other awareness are part of the curriculum of the average mind. But. Who does the judging?
There are humans born with less brain matter. But, in the case of one sagittal and one axial images of the OP what happens is an enlargement of the ventricles due to some atresia perhaps in the Sylvian aqueduct. The question is: shunt or no shunt. What is true is the correlation with difficulties in learning the human way due to it. Some brains shut the instruments of perception to serve some capacity like taste and smell… It might not be happy with any source of energy we provide. Only purified water seems to agree. Then it likes the sun and some photosynthesis of course. Then it will tell us how calm it is… or maybe cool. For whatever reason I will stare with an unknown facial expression until the crap comes out. Anyway. What is the question?

[Consul]

As regards ''Subject'', I'd be happy to call any critter which has any experiential state a Subject, whether or not she has a sense of self.

The point of the different labels is then to mark significant distinctions (probably inevitably blurry)

Subject - any entity which has any kind of experiential states.
Sense of self - see my definition.
Personhood - a more sophisticated, individualised model of self.

But I'm not that fussed about which labels we use, as long as they help us agree what we're talking about.

Okay, but what is important is the distinction between subjects/selves/egos/persons and the mental representations (perceptions or conceptions) they have of themselves, including a "self-model" or self-image, or an autobiographical narrative (one's first-personal life-story). For self-representations aren't selves!

* When you write that "What constitutes such a thing…is essentially experiential", it's not clear to me whether this is an expression of reductive realism or nonreductive realism about subjects or selves.

We know experiential states which amount to a sense of self are real. I've already said I think a sense of self is a feature of complex processes which require features like integration, a unified field, focus/attention/filtering and model building to be experientially coherent and therefore evolutionarily useful.
So yes I think a sense of being a self is a reducible sum of the processes of how experiential states manifest in humans and probably other complex animals. So I pretty much agree with this…

''According to reductive realism, the "empirical self" is the "total self", because there is no "pure ego" underlying and owning it, i.e. a distinct subject/object functioning as a substantial substratum of "the whole complex of contemporary and successive interrelated mental events which together constitute our mental history."

The sense (awareness) of selfhood, subjecthood, or personhood is a complex of cognitive processes, but the self, the subject, or the person itself is not, because it's the object of that sense (awareness).

To repeat my central point, selves/subjects/egos/persons are neither complexes of experiential processes nor complexes of nonexperiential mental processes. To use John Foster's terms, mental subjects or subjects of mentality are never composed of mental items or items of mentality—but mental representations of mental subjects certainly are.

QUOTE>
"Apart from time-entities (moments and periods), there are two kinds of things which we ordinarily think of as featuring in the ontology of the mental realm. On the one hand, there are those entities which form the concrete ingredients of the mind, the particular episodes and instances of mentality; in other words, such things as sensations, perceptual experiences, episodes of thought, decisions, instances of belief or desire, and surges of emotion. I shall call all these, generically, ‘mental items’. On the other hand, there are those entities in whose minds these mental items occur—the things which can be said to have experiences, to engage in thought, to take decisions, to hold beliefs, to undergo emotions, and so on. I shall call these entities ‘mental subjects’. Corresponding to this distinction, there is also, of course, an analogous distinction between two categories of mental properties—between those properties, like being a pain and being a thought of Vienna, which apply to items, and those properties, like being in pain and thinking about Vienna, which apply to subjects. If we ever need labels for these, we could refer to them as ‘item-properties’ and ‘subject-properties’."

(Foster, John. The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind. London: Routledge, 1991. pp. 31-2)
<QUOTE

Here's a process-ontological expression of reductive realism, according to which selves aren't "substance-selves" but "process-selves" lacking a substantial substratum...

We're not in a position to make such cut n dried distinctions between Substance-Selves and Process-Selves, without knowing the basis of the mind-body relationship. So far it looks like both are required, is the most we can assume based on what evidence we can observe.

So while I feel confident enough to posit that the self is reducible to its experiential parts based on evolution 'designing' a functionally coherent and useful way for experiential states to manifest, I don't have a path like that to understanding the underlying mind-body relationship. Experiential processes might or might not be the exact same thing as experiencing, but physical processes do seem necessary as far as we can tell. Framing the physical part as the Subject tho doesn't seem to capture the inherent experientialness of what being a Me means (as per my definition).

As I already stressed, the experience/experiencer distinction doesn't require that experiencers be physical entities. Substance-selves could be immaterial substances, and process-selves could be immaterial processes.

[Consul]

* The Experience/Experiencer Thesis—according to which experience is impossible without an experiencer, because it's part of the essence of an experience to be experienced by an experiencer—is neutral between reductive realism and nonreductive realism about experiencers, and also between materialism and immaterialism/spiritualism about them. What it is not neutral about is antirealism/nihilism about experiencers (subjects/selves/egos/persons), since according to it there are both experiences/experiencings and experiencers/subjects of experience. (Whether experiences and experiences are different from or identical with one another is another question.)

Note that my view, nonreductive realism, is compatible both with materialism and with immaterialism about experiencers (subjects/selves/egos/persons)! For example, Berkeley is a nonreductive realist too, because he denies that "you are only a system of floating ideas, without any substance to support them." (Berkeley)

I get the reasoning behind that. But it seems to me that issues like ''Whether experiencers and experiences are different from or identical with one another is another question'' is foundational to how we subsequently categorise in a way which captures what's actually going on. If they are identical, then what it amounts to is distinguishing one identical thing from another, which looks absurd based on our current ideas about the nature of reality. How do you respond to that?

Of course, everything is identical to itself, and nothing is different from itself. But when an experiencer is said to be identical to a (synchronic or/and diachronic) sum of experiences, there is still the mereological distinction between a whole and its parts, even if the parts collectively are the whole.

My basic objection to antirealism and reductive realism is simply that mental/experiential phenomena lacking subjects or being their own subjects are ontologically unintelligible.

There is a fact of the matter as to the nature of the mind-body relationship. It is what it is.

We might have to adjust our ontological thinking as we do periodically in order to understand the mind-body relationship. Nobody seriously suggests we know everything there is to know about the nature of the universe. (Quantum mechanics makes ontological claims which seem unintelligible in terms of classical physics, but it seems to be getting at something real because it makes successful predictions).

What we shouldn't do is dogmatically insist on cramming odd new square pegs into comfortably familiar round holes if the reality is they don't fit.

To use Husserl's terms, the experience/experiencer distinction and corresponding thesis (EET) is part of the "formal ontology" of mind, whereas the mind-body problem is part of the "material ontology" of mind (not to be confused with materialistic ontology!). That is to say (and to claim), EET is true in all ontologically possible worlds—irrespective of the actual mind-body relationship. Even if there are immaterial mental subjects in some possible worlds, there are no mental items in any possible worlds which lack subjects or are their own subjects.

[Sy Borg]

What is matter made from?

If there are (mereological) atoms of matter in the form of simple elementary particles (corpuscles), then matter consists of them. But the simple bits of matter aren't made of anything, since they are what everything else is made of.

What are the fermions that make up atoms? Are they energy?

[Consul]

What are the fermions that make up atoms? Are they energy?

If they are ontologically irreducible material objects, they are not. There's a difference between having energy and being energy.

[Sy Borg]

What are the fermions that make up atoms? Are they energy?

If they are ontologically irreducible material objects, they are not. There's a difference between having energy and being energy.

What is that difference?

[Consul]

If they are ontologically irreducible material objects…

I mean: if they are genuine physical objects or substances which are ontologically irreducible to bundles of physical quantities.

[Consul]

There's a difference between having energy and being energy.

What is that difference?

Isn't that obvious?