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[Sy Borg]

This thread, where GEM defends an obviously insupportable position, has lasted for thirty-seven pages and I can see another thirty-seven pages again. Talk about stamina and tolerance of repetition.

When we begin to think of moral principles and rules as effective means of accomplishing a certain goal, then they become instrumental "oughts" and can be objective --- either they further that goal or they do not.

There can be no universal goals when different parties have different interests.

[Peter Holmes]

This thread, where GEM defends an obviously insupportable position, has lasted for thirty-seven pages and I can see another thirty-seven pages again. Talk about stamina and tolerance of repetition.

When we begin to think of moral principles and rules as effective means of accomplishing a certain goal, then they become instrumental "oughts" and can be objective --- either they further that goal or they do not.

There can be no universal goals when different parties have different interests.

Agreed. And the problem even simpler than that. It's a matter of misunderstanding the meaning of the word objective.

Objectivity is independence from opinion. That we should have a goal is an opinion, and it remains an opinion even if it's a universal goal. An instrumental 'ought' can't be a fact - and therefore objective - even if everyone agrees with it. If they did, the only fact would be that everyone has this goal.

Of course, it's possible to use the word objective in a different way. But then we have to explain the new meaning, or we're equivocating.

[Peter Holmes]

And the problem is even simpler than that.

[Belindi]

The foundation beneath language is social.

Well, I'm not sure that "foundation" is quite the right word, but language certainly presupposes a social milieu, and is the product of a social process. I said in an earlier post that "reality" is defined per a common conceptual framework constructed and communicated with language. Without that framework the very concept of "real" would not exist; nor would debates, or even thoughts, about its meaning.

Do you think there is such a given reality as human nature? Expert dog trainers know there is such a thing as dog nature, and scientists are getting to know coronavirus nature. Human nature, however, is so complex and so various , so adulterated with religious and other ideologies that we can only make educated guesses at what it is. Therefore the concept of 'real' applied to human nature largely a matter of faith in human nature or alternatively cynicism regarding human nature.

We know the goodness in human nature when we see it and when we do it: or is that claim a subjective one? The prevailing world view is natural forces are real. I must begin somewhere and why not with prevailing view? I then take the next step which is goodness is existential not essential.

The reality of goodness must therefore be made existentially with sweat and blood and cannot be presumed to be Providential. Fortunately for us poor people there are some human beings whose existences are candles in the prevailing dark, and you will find these individuals are all free of ideological madnesses and are knowledgeable and brave.

[Sy Borg]

Yes Peter. What happens when one person declare an "objective" moral and another espouses a different and opposing "objective" moral?

To start, as you said, they are not objective. It's not as though we can call on scientists to run tests and determine which is objective truth. We might look at history and say that x societies thrived because they adopted x morals. Then again, like any social system, different moralities are more or less effective in different places and times.

To some extent, our societies are being retarded back by an inability to adapt morally in a rapidly changing world. So environmentalists are still seen as loonies, even as our natural heritage disappears (and the rarely acknowledged services that they provide). The elderly are still being kept alive, using up tremendous resources, against their wishes and in great discomfort, as we fail to provide basic healthcare to children. The war against drugs has been catastrophically lost, with millions addicted to powerful legal painkillers and anti-nauseants while much gentler painkillers and anti-nauseants remain illegal. Roads clog with ever larger, gas guzzling vehicles when pollution and congestion could be greatly eased if people returned to small vehicles.

Whatever, changing moral and social mores in large societies is like turning an ocean liner. It takes a lot of groundwork to get there.

[Peter Holmes]

Thanks, Greta. I agree with everything you say. And I think the task is political - we can't separate morality and politics, and never could.

[Terrapin Station]

Concepts are constructed by each individual, not acquired from an external source.

Well, either you're concocted an idiosyncratic definition of "concept," or you're back to the reductio ad absurdum pointed out earlier.

The first definition from Merriam-Webster for "concept" is "something conceived in the mind," and the second definition is "an abstract or generic idea generalized from particular instances"

So not that idiosyncratic.

[Terrapin Station]

This thread, where GEM defends an obviously insupportable position, has lasted for thirty-seven pages and I can see another thirty-seven pages again. Talk about stamina and tolerance of repetition.

Heck, I've been at this for over 40 years now. Not here, obviously, but it's essentially the same conversation, and it might as well be with the same people, because the "other side" pretty much says the same stuff all the time.

[Peter Holmes]

I think the cogito is up there with the most catastrophically wrong philosophical doctrines. So your reference to Descartes could also explain where and why we disagree. 'I think therefore I am' doesn't follow at all.

Well, that is a startling claim. Though many of the conclusions Descartes drew from it have been challenged, I'm quite sure I've never encountered a philosopher who challenged the cogito itself.

I'm especially interested in your claim that its conclusion doesn't follow from the premise. Are you suggesting that thought may exist, occur, without a thinking (sentient) being? If not, how could it not follow? I've always taken the cogito as an illuminating tautology.

A quick google is informative. I gather Bernard Williams' 'The Project of Pure Enquiry' is useful, though I haven't read it. Names I came across include Gassendi, Kierkegaard, Wiliams, Heidegger and Macmurray. They've all challenged the cogito. The main objection is that it assumes the 'I' that it purports to establish, so it begs the question.

My objection is that there's no reason to think the malicious demon's tricks can't include deceiving me into thinking that I'm thinking. And, more fundamentally, I reject any essentialism - and therefore the claim that a person's essence is the mind - even if the mind is anything more than a figure of speech - a flatus vocis.

[GE Morton]

There can be no universal goals when different parties have different interests.

Sure there can. People have many goals, and though most of them will differ from person to person, there may still be one shared by all (not likely in a large group, but possible).

But that is a minor logical point. For moral theories and systems, as the subject matter of interest to moral philosophers, there indeed must be agreement as to what the aim, the goal, of moral philosophy is --- what it seeks to accomplish, just as, by comparison, a theory of gravity seeks to explain, and enable us to predict, the trajectories of moving bodies, the orbits of the planets, the tides, etc. A physicist who did not share that goal would not be much interested in theories of gravity.

There is and has been, I think, a near-universal consensus among moral philosophers that the broad aim of the discipline is to improve human welfare, human well-being, particularly as that is affected by interactions between moral agents. That is, moral philosophy has been concerned with how people treat one another; with developing principles and rules governing those interactions, with the aim of improving well-being for all. Moreover, being philosophers (as opposed to shamans, soothsayers, sophists, "holy men," autocrats, etc.) there is a consensus that those principles and rules should be universal --- applicable to all moral agents in a social setting --- and be rationally defensible.

So, yes, someone who did not share that goal or that methodology might have a very different idea as to what what "morality" is and what it entails. Not many moral philosophers, however, would be much interested in that person's views.

[GE Morton]

Agreed. And the problem even simpler than that. It's a matter of misunderstanding the meaning of the word objective.

Objectivity is independence from opinion.

I've given my definition of "objective" several times. As with "subjective," it denotes a property of propositions (as do "true" and "false"). An objective proposition is one whose truth conditions are public (that is what makes an objective proposition "independent of opinion"). The "objectivity" of a state-of-affairs is derivative, a handy colloquialism. If you observe something noteworthy there is no issue of objectivity involved; it is just a percept. It is only when you tell someone about it that issues of objectivity arise; your claims about it are what are objective or subjective --- which will be determined, not by you, but by third parties who investigate your claim.

That we should have a goal is an opinion, and it remains an opinion even if it's a universal goal. An instrumental 'ought' can't be a fact - and therefore objective - even if everyone agrees with it. If they did, the only fact would be that everyone has this goal.

You're correct that goals are subjective (but see response to Greta, above). But whether a certain act or rule advances or is consistent with a given goal is objective, a matter of fact. I may not share the goal, say, of colonizing Mars. But I can't deny that building a spaceship for that purpose advances that goal.

[Peter Holmes]

Agreed. And the problem even simpler than that. It's a matter of misunderstanding the meaning of the word objective.

Objectivity is independence from opinion.

I've given my definition of "objective" several times. As with "subjective," it denotes a property of propositions (as do "true" and "false"). An objective proposition is one whose truth conditions are public (that is what makes an objective proposition "independent of opinion"). The "objectivity" of a state-of-affairs is derivative, a handy colloquialism. If you observe something noteworthy there is no issue of objectivity involved; it is just a percept. It is only when you tell someone about it that issues of objectivity arise; your claims about it are what are objective or subjective --- which will be determined, not by you, but by third parties who investigate your claim.

That we should have a goal is an opinion, and it remains an opinion even if it's a universal goal. An instrumental 'ought' can't be a fact - and therefore objective - even if everyone agrees with it. If they did, the only fact would be that everyone has this goal.

You're correct that goals are subjective (but see response to Greta, above). But whether a certain act or rule advances or is consistent with a given goal is objective, a matter of fact. I may not share the goal, say, of colonizing Mars. But I can't deny that building a spaceship for that purpose advances that goal.

So you agree that moral goals - and therefore moral assertions - are subjective, rather than objective.

And the point about how to reach those goals - and the factual assertions involved - is irrelevant in this discussion. Those facts and assertions aren't about morality at all. Got there in the end.

[GE Morton]

Do you think there is such a given reality as human nature?

Yes. But it is not a very useful concept. Any property some person naturally possesses, and anything any person does, is embraced by "human nature," just as whatever a dog does is embraced by "canine nature."

Human nature, however, is so complex and so various , so adulterated with religious and other ideologies that we can only make educated guesses at what it is. Therefore the concept of 'real' applied to human nature largely a matter of faith in human nature or alternatively cynicism regarding human nature.

All of those beliefs and ideologies are themselves part of human nature --- or, more precisely, products of the human capacity for ideation and invention. You can't defend or reject any given ideology or theory or belief, or praise or condemn any human act, on the grounds that it is in keeping with or contrary to human nature. (That is a version of the "naturalistic fallacy").

You can only ascertain what is and is not "human nature" by observing humans and their behaviors. It is an empirical question. When you begin to add normative qualities to it you have an "ideal human nature," not real human nature. When you then cite this ideal human nature as grounds for normative precepts, you indulge in a circular argument.

We know the goodness in human nature when we see it and when we do it: or is that claim a subjective one?

Yes, it is subjective. All claims of the form, "X is good," are subjective (when "good" is used an evaluative; there are other uses).

[GE Morton]

So you agree that moral goals - and therefore moral assertions - are subjective, rather than objective.

Yes, goals are subjective. But moral assertions can be objective, given a goal. I've given what I take to the goal of moral philosophy, as understood by most philosophers historically. Like all goals it is subjective. There is no basis for fruitful discussion of morality with anyone who does not share that goal, just as there is no basis for fruitful discussions about physics among persons who don't share the goal of understanding the natural world.

[GE Morton]

A quick google is informative. I gather Bernard Williams' 'The Project of Pure Enquiry' is useful, though I haven't read it. Names I came across include Gassendi, Kierkegaard, Wiliams, Heidegger and Macmurray. They've all challenged the cogito. The main objection is that it assumes the 'I' that it purports to establish, so it begs the question.

Ah, yes. I was familiar with that objection, though I'd long forgotten the sources.

"Thinking" (and perceiving, imagining, dreaming, feeling, etc.) doesn't assume an "I," it implies one. Or, more precisely, it implies a subject. Those are all verbs --- action words --- and all action words imply an actor. The notion of an actorless action is incoherent. That objection is contrived and idle.

My objection is that there's no reason to think the malicious demon's tricks can't include deceiving me into thinking that I'm thinking.

There is no deception or thinking without someone who is deceived or who is thinks he is thinking. A subject is strictly implied by all of those terms.