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[Belindi]

There is a great need for morality to be objective and so I will not give up the notion that is can entail ought.

What do you see as that great need? It seems to me like it would be better to realize what morality really is and to deal with that sensibly.

Terrapin, don't you understand the saying "God is dead" ?

[Peter Holmes]

Peter Holmes wrote:

As you know, I think morality can't be objective, and that no 'is' entails an 'ought'. So facts about the human psyche - even if it exists and whatever it is - can't make moral assertions factual. Forms of that delusion go way back to at least Aristotle.

There is a great need for morality to be objective and so I will not give up the notion that is can entail ought.

In the end, is entails ought is like theism as it's based on faith in pre-existing order. Gods vary in their personalities and personhood, but orderedness and cause of itself is basic to all creator gods. Nature is ordered is more probable than nature is random.

Obviously humans are terribly disordered . Humans are not subject to natural selection any more as our behaviour is controlled by artificial cultures which take on inertias peculiar to themselves. Think of the religious fighting and grief in India at present as an example of unnatural behaviour. The natural reasoning man is a moral man.

There's a great need for morality to be rational and humane and non-discriminatory. Look at the contradiction in what you say.

'In the end, is entails ought is like theism as it's based on faith in pre-existing order.'

'Think of the religious fighting and grief in India at present as an example of unnatural behaviour.'

So much for the orderedness that belief in creator gods promotes.

[Sculptor1]

You're committing the sophomoric use/mention fallacy of conflating concepts and what they're concepts of or in response to.

Reporting to childish insults in not going do you any favours.
Were there no English speaking humans a table floating in space would not be a table.
This is inescapable.

[Terrapin Station]

Oh? Then to what is it referring? Among philosophers of mind since Descartes and Kant, "phenomena" generally denotes the subjective experience of sentient creatures.

Per common usage, phenomena are observable, but not necessarily observed, and it doesn't imply a mental perspective. Some conventional dictionary definitions of "phenomenon" include "a fact, occurrence, or circumstance observed or observable" (dictionary.com), "an observable fact or event" (Merriam-Webster), "In scientific usage, a phenomenon is any event that is observable, including the use of instrumentation to observe, record, or compile data" (Wikipedia), and synonyms, per thesaurus.com include simply "event." "fact," "happening," etc.

Of course, not that I'd have to be using the term in a particular conventional usage, but in this case I am.

Wow. Prime numbers do not exist? The square root of two does not exist? Those claims would have a chorus of mathematicians chuckling at how silly metaphysicians can be.

It would be weird that you try to come across as well-versed in philosophy yet you'd not be familiar with antirealism on mathematics. At any rate, despite you not answering earlier, this response shows that yes, you do believe that there are real (in the sense of extramental) abstracts.

I agree. And they exist. Right?

As something mental, yes. One popular usage of "exist" in philosophy historically would mean that they don't exist in this case, and they're not real. But contemporary, especially colloquial usages of "exist" have it that anything that occurs in any way, including mental phenomena, exist. It's still useful to avoid "real" for this, though, otherwise "antirealism" would be confusing. Antirealists on x often believe that x only occurs as mental phenomena--such as my view on mathematics. (And I'm also an antirealist on ethics, aesthetics, meaning, etc.)

Well, is it false? But you're not merely describing it in conceptual terms. You can't even think about it, much less understand it, except in those conceptual terms.

Perceiving something isn't the same thing as describing it, understanding it, etc. though. Re thought, I'm not someone who agrees with the view that all thought is linguistic or conceptual.

If you're speaking of "raw percepts," then that is true, of course (by definition). But if you are social human fluent in some language you will sort and organize those percepts per the conceptual scheme you've learned, whether you want to or not.

If you're alluding to the idea of "unconscious thought" or "subconsicous thought," I don't buy that there is unconscious mental content, and there would need to be unconscious mental content per se for concepts to be involved.

[Terrapin Station]

Reporting to childish insults in not going do you any favours.
Were there no English speaking humans a table floating in space would not be a table.
This is inescapable.

It wouldn't be any different if no humans existed. It would be the same exact thing.

[Sculptor1]

Reporting to childish insults in not going do you any favours.
Were there no English speaking humans a table floating in space would not be a table.
This is inescapable.

It wouldn't be any different if no humans existed. It would be the same exact thing.

It would not be a table.

[Terrapin Station]

It wouldn't be any different if no humans existed. It would be the same exact thing.

It would not be a table.

If you're talking about the concept, then you're doing the sophomoric thing of conflating concepts and what they're concepts of or in response to.

Otherwise, what would be different about it? It's a table. Humans disappear. What changes occur with the object in question?

[Sculptor1]

It would not be a table.

If you're talking about the concept, then you're doing the sophomoric thing of conflating concepts and what they're concepts of or in response to.

No you are making the childish mistake of thinking that because you call a thing by a name it has that meaning universally.

[Terrapin Station]

If you're talking about the concept, then you're doing the sophomoric thing of conflating concepts and what they're concepts of or in response to.

No you are making the childish mistake of thinking that because you call a thing by a name it has that meaning universally.

How would you think that I'm talking about meaning?

The object in the world isn't meaning. So what changes about the table once humans disappear? You're not answering that.

[GE Morton]

Just briefly, though, I think this is paradigmatic: 'For us, language and reality are inextricably intertwined.' It's that very intertwining - that mistaking what we say about things for the way things are - the description for the described - that accounts for metaphysical delusions, the myth of propositions, correspondence theories of truth, and truth-maker/truth-bearer lucubrations down the rabbit hole.

The only way we can communicate our thoughts as to "the way things" are" is by talking about them. And those thoughts themselves will consist of concepts and their relations and implications. There is no thinking, or speaking, of the "way things are" without concepts acquired via language. There is no "mistake," since there is no alternative.

[Terrapin Station]

Just briefly, though, I think this is paradigmatic: 'For us, language and reality are inextricably intertwined.' It's that very intertwining - that mistaking what we say about things for the way things are - the description for the described - that accounts for metaphysical delusions, the myth of propositions, correspondence theories of truth, and truth-maker/truth-bearer lucubrations down the rabbit hole.

The only way we can communicate our thoughts as to "the way things" are" is by talking about them. And those thoughts themselves will consist of concepts and their relations and implications. There is no thinking, or speaking, of the "way things are" without concepts acquired via language. There is no "mistake," since there is no alternative.

Concepts are constructed by each individual, not acquired from an external source. External sources will influence concept construction, but not literally supply the concept.

[GE Morton]

I think the cogito is up there with the most catastrophically wrong philosophical doctrines. So your reference to Descartes could also explain where and why we disagree. 'I think therefore I am' doesn't follow at all.

Well, that is a startling claim. Though many of the conclusions Descartes drew from it have been challenged, I'm quite sure I've never encountered a philosopher who challenged the cogito itself.

I'm especially interested in your claim that its conclusion doesn't follow from the premise. Are you suggesting that thought may exist, occur, without a thinking (sentient) being? If not, how could it not follow? I've always taken the cogito as an illuminating tautology.

[GE Morton]

The foundation beneath language is social.

Well, I'm not sure that "foundation" is quite the right word, but language certainly presupposes a social milieu, and is the product of a social process. I said in an earlier post that "reality" is defined per a common conceptual framework constructed and communicated with language. Without that framework the very concept of "real" would not exist; nor would debates, or even thoughts, about its meaning.

[GE Morton]

Concepts are constructed by each individual, not acquired from an external source.

Well, either you're concocted an idiosyncratic definition of "concept," or you're back to the reductio ad absurdum pointed out earlier.

[GE Morton]

As you know, I think morality can't be objective, and that no 'is' entails an 'ought'. So facts about the human psyche - even if it exists and whatever it is - can't make moral assertions factual. Forms of that delusion go way back to at least Aristotle.

There is a way around the is-ought gap, an uncontroversial, familiar one. "Ought" has another, even more common use: the instrumental "ought."
E.g., "If you want to drive a nail, you ought to get a hammer," or, "You ought to apply for that job. It's right up your alley." In this sense "ought" merely means that doing X is an effective, or perhaps necessary, means of accomplishing Y. Note that whether a particular X is an effective or necessary means of accomplishing a particular Y is an objective matter; it either is or is not, and that can be determined empirically.

When we begin to think of moral principles and rules as effective means of accomplishing a certain goal, then they become instrumental "oughts" and can be objective --- either they further that goal or they do not.