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Lagayscienza

If science cannot tell us whether these these things are material stuff or mental stuff, we can be sure Idealism cannot do so either.

I agree. I'd put it that when we consider the the question of whether the universe is experiential or material, science can't resolve the question.

Science is backed by a wealth of empirical evidence.

Same prob isn't it? ''Empirical evidence'' is experiential. It can't tell us whether we are experiening material or mental stuff.

For Idealism there is none.

Again, the experiential ''empirical evidence'' can work the same for both Idealism and Materialism, yes?

Even if we cannot know what things are in themselves (whatever that means) we know that there is real stuff out there that looks to us like apples, brains etc.

Right, Idealism and Materialism generally agree on that.

Moreover, even if Idealism cannot be disproved, we have no to believe the universe is all mindstuff and much evidence suggesting it is not.

What evidence is left? If science and empiricism can't tell us whether we're experiencing material or mental stuff when we look at an apple or brain or atom, what reliable evidence is there?

It is not clear to me what job you want Idealism to do?

I don't expect Idealism to do anything. I'm not arguing about utility, but the philosophical ontological claims.

What do you think it explains? How does it further our understanding of the universe?

Like materialism, Idealism is a possible explanation for the fundamental nature of the universe.

If everything is mind-stuff why does materialist science work?

I'm saying that calling science ''materialist'' is an assumption, one that's easy to slip into because we take materialism for granted all the time in our daily lives, as does science as a practice.

Idealism is a metaphysical challenge, or alternative, to the assumption that science studies material stuff.

My own position is that our experiential/empirical observations which science uses can be explained by both Idealism and Materialism. It's not a basis for deciding which is correct. I think you agreed with the gist of that when you said - ''If science cannot tell us whether these these things are material stuff or mental stuff, we can be sure Idealism cannot do so either''. ?

That's my point, empiricism and science can't exclude either Materialism or Idealism, or give more weight to one or the other.

Which leads leaves us with the question - if experiential/empirical observation (and science which extrapolates from observation) can't answer which theory is correct, how can we know? Or even assign probabilities?

That's the view which I'm defending - we can't know, or even assign probabilities, about whether Idealism or Materialism is correct. I don't see how either empiricism/science, or reason for that matter, can get us there, even a tool like Occam's Razor can cut both ways here.

Yes, but to what philosophical end? Where does Idealism get us? Isn't it a philosophical cul de sac. And do you not think that, say, the constant ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter (pi) is real and that it is a real property of actual circles in the physical world that exists, and would exist, even when we are not looking at it? I just don't see the point of denying the reality physical the universe. Even the sort of Idealism that says that, yes, there is a real physical world out there, but we cannot know what it is in itself, seems to not be of much philosophical, much less practical, utility.

Another typo. Apologies. Cataracts.

... denying the reality of the physical universe.

Lagayscienza wrote:Another typo. Apologies. Cataracts.

... denying the reality of the physical universe.

Lagayscienza wrote: ↑Today, 5:24 am Yes, but to what philosophical end? Where does Idealism get us? Isn't it a philosophical cul de sac. And do you not think that, say, the constant ratio of the circumference of a circle to its diameter (pi) is real and that it is a real property of actual circles in the physical world that exists, and would exist, even when we are not looking at it? I just don't see the point of denying the reality physical the universe. Even the sort of Idealism that says that, yes, there is a real physical world out there, but we cannot know what it is in itself, seems to not be of much philosophical, much less practical, utility.

I don't think it's useful, but philosophy is largely left dealing with the questions which are difficult to answer, we take care of the useful stuff regardless. Still, I find fundamental ontology interesting, and it's a major branch of philosophy. What actually exists, What is the true nature of reality, What am I - these are questions curious peeps have struggled with for aeons. It's humbling.

Some think Idealism would be significant if it meant our consciousness carries on in some form. I'm iffy about the significance of that myself, because from what we can tell the configuration of stuff correlates with its identity, so it wouldn't be as if gertie continues to exist when I reconfigure into dirt mind-stuff.

The type of Idealism a scientist like Koch might go for would be that science is dealing with mind-stuff in just the same way we thought we were dealing with material-stuff. Like-wise mathematical descriptions. (The same point can be made both ways of course, there's no utility in calling what maths and physics studies mind-stuff or material-stuff).

Re circles and maths, I don't see a prob. If a circular mind-stuff thing (say a frisbee) exists, it presumably has the same mathematical properties as a material-stuff frisbee. And exists whether some other mind-stuff like me or you is looking at it or not.

So... are you agreeing we can't know whether Materialism or Idealism is correct, or even which is more likely correct?

I give materialism the edge myself, partly because conscious experience is the source of all meaning, mattering and purpose, and when we look at the universe it's so petty and complex and mostly banal.

Phenomenologists and religionists imbue Idealism with great significance about Love, Joy, Suffering, Teleology and suchlike, the Big Important Stuff. But mostly the universe, and my conscious life, is so mundane and trivial. Why would a universe of mind-stuff come up with trivial annoying things like itchy toes and toothache, or drizzle, or gas bills, or eating other mind-stuff and pooping it out. It just seems so silly, compared to the grandiose hi-falutin philosophies of Phenomenology and Theology. Basically, I'd expect better of a mind-stuff universe!