Philosophy Discussion Forums

Atla wrote: ↑May 26th, 2020, 12:07 amLife would be so much easier if people wouldn't forever conflate "human/organism" consciousness with "the" consciousness. Will the West really need another 50-100 years for that?

There is no such thing as the consciousness, because there are many different consciousnesses (fields of consciousness) in many different brains.

Consul wrote: ↑May 26th, 2020, 2:27 pmThere is no such thing as the consciousness…

Of course, we can speak of the consciousness when we use this phrase generically, like in "The dodo is extinct" and "The human brain weighs ~3 pounds".

Gertie wrote: ↑May 25th, 2020, 7:20 pmI've repeatedly defined what I think a Sense of Self is - A sense of being a discrete, unified being with a first person pov, recognising correlation with a specific body moving through space and time, navigating an 'external'/third person pov world of objects, other subjects, stuff happening,etc.

That description could probably benefit from some tidying up, but it amounts to something I call Me. Which I can then introspect, be self-aware and reflect about.

(You can make a case that a moth which presumably has experiential states but doesn't have that sense of self is a Subject too, and I'd agree. But the difference is significant).

Hence I'd argue that it's the very nature of how experiential states manifest in complex creatures like humans, which introduces the existence of beings who think of themselves as Selves, as Mes, into the world.

To simply call the substrate/body Me, which misses the key role in identifying as a Me, which the nature of experiential states brings in the ways it manifests in humans.

What you call "a sense of self" is my holistic awareness/consciousness of myself, the perception and knowledge that I am an individual in space and time with physical and mental attributes. Self-awareness, self-consciousness, self-perception, and self-cognition come in different degrees or levels, with the personal self-consciousness we humans have being the top level—on Earth at least, since there might be creatures on other planets with a superhuman mind.

Being a subject of phenomenal consciousness aka subjective experience/sentience doesn't require having the capacity for introspective or reflective self-consciousness, let alone for self-referential linguistic thought.

QUOTE>
"[T]o find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive. When we see hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so."

(Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 1690. Book II, Ch. XXVII, §9)
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Consul wrote: ↑May 26th, 2020, 2:54 pm

Gertie wrote: ↑May 25th, 2020, 7:20 pmI've repeatedly defined what I think a Sense of Self is - A sense of being a discrete, unified being with a first person pov, recognising correlation with a specific body moving through space and time, navigating an 'external'/third person pov world of objects, other subjects, stuff happening,etc.

That description could probably benefit from some tidying up, but it amounts to something I call Me. Which I can then introspect, be self-aware and reflect about.

(You can make a case that a moth which presumably has experiential states but doesn't have that sense of self is a Subject too, and I'd agree. But the difference is significant).

Hence I'd argue that it's the very nature of how experiential states manifest in complex creatures like humans, which introduces the existence of beings who think of themselves as Selves, as Mes, into the world.

To simply call the substrate/body Me, which misses the key role in identifying as a Me, which the nature of experiential states brings in the ways it manifests in humans.

What you call "a sense of self" is my holistic awareness/consciousness of myself, the perception and knowledge that I am an individual in space and time with physical and mental attributes. Self-awareness, self-consciousness, self-perception, and self-cognition come in different degrees or levels, with the personal self-consciousness we humans have being the top level—on Earth at least, since there might be creatures on other planets with a superhuman mind.

Being a subject of phenomenal consciousness aka subjective experience/sentience doesn't require having the capacity for introspective or reflective self-consciousness, let alone for self-referential linguistic thought.

QUOTE>
"[T]o find wherein personal identity consists, we must consider what person stands for; which, I think, is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and as it seems to me essential to it: It being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving, that he does perceive. When we see hear, smell, taste, feel, meditate, or will any thing, we know that we do so."

(Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 1690. Book II, Ch. XXVII, §9)
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Sure.

So, back to whether you need an Experiencer to experience.

If you are simply defining the substrate as the Experiencer of the experiential states, then (Idealism aside) yeah you can say that.

But it seems like a thin definition which misses the point that a sense of being a discrete, unified Self, the sense of being an Experiencer, is a feature of the nature of experience (as it manifests in humans at least).

Greta wrote: ↑May 26th, 2020, 1:10 amIt's all still referring back to neurons, based on an assumption that consciousness can only possibly be the product of brains acting on entirely unconscious matter. I still think the assumption is premature and that, at least, co-dependencies with the primary body systems could be far deeper than expected in this area.

Not long ago we knew far less about the extent of the microbiome's influence. Today, researchers still see it as a fledgling field. BTW, I'm not trying to say that bacteria, fungi, archaea and viruses directly create consciousness, just that unknown factors can pop up in science - and researchers have been at am impasse with this issue for some time. Do you plough onwards, with faith that the "treasure" is in that spot? At what point does one extend one's search from the brain (which is, at the very least, the locus).

When there is substantial evidence that the NCC or PCC (Physiological Correlates of Consciousness) aren't (wholly) located in the brain.
If there were conscious organisms without brains, it would be trivially true that their NCC/PCC aren't located in their brains, since there would be no brains for them to be located in.

(The NCC or PCC are the minimal neurological or physiological mechanisms jointly sufficient for phenomenal consciousness.)

Greta wrote: ↑May 26th, 2020, 1:10 amThe search for that which generates consciousness is leading some pundits to claim that the "hard problem" is just a load of old cobblers embraced by closet theists, and not worth considering. Teir claim is that the wonder of being is unworthy of contemplation. Talk about pragmatic! It reminds me how arch-materialists used to scoff at anyone who asked what happened before the big bang, claiming that the question was meaningless. Today that attitude is seen for what it is, an objection based on technicalities that does not address reality. The elephant in the room for them was that measurability does not necessarily equal existence.

The hard problem is still there and it is still hard, but it's become a hard neuroscientific problem.

QUOTE>
"The specific problem I want to discuss concerns consciousness, the hard nut of the mind-body problem. How is it possible for conscious states to depend upon brain states? How can technicolour phenomenology arise from soggy grey matter? What makes the bodily organ we call the brain so radically different from other bodily organs, say the kidneys—the body parts without a trace of consciousness? How could the aggregation of millions of individually insentient neurons generate subjective awareness? We know that brains are the de facto causal basis of consciousness, but we have, it seems, no understanding whatever of how this can be so. It strikes us as miraculous, eerie, even faintly comic. Somehow, we feel, the water of the physical brain is turned into the wine of consciousness, but we draw a total blank on the nature of this conversion. Neural transmissions just seem like the wrong kind of materials with which to bring consciousness into the world, but it appears that in some way they perform this mysterious feat. The mind-body problem is the problem of understanding how the miracle is wrought, thus removing the sense of deep mystery. We want to take the magic out of the link between consciousness and the brain."

(McGinn, Colin. "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?" Mind 98, no. 391 (1989): 349-366. p. 349)
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Faustus5 wrote: ↑May 26th, 2020, 6:41 amTalk about lack of logic, your entire post is a complete non sequitur. Or maybe English is not your first language. Either way, it makes no sense as a response to the point of my post.

What I was reacting to was your suggestion that the scientific community has declared that it was on the verge of completely explaining consciousness since the 1990's. That suggestion is complete nonsense and has no basis in reality.

There is a consensus that any final theory of consciousness is going to fall within the outlines of the global neuronal workspace model, and that consensus has existed since the 1990's. But this approach is very open to additions and modifications. For instance, we recently discovered that such things as the bacteria in a person's gut can have measurable influences on their cognition.

But they have this effect because of the way they influence brain activity. Making the brain central to any theory of consciousness is the only approach that is justified by the evidence. If you have any scientific reasons to look elsewhere, please provide them.

Putting aside the slurs and misrepresentations above, the problem lies in your aggression, which lead you to basic errors in comprehension.

The statement of mine that you objected to was, 'Researchers have been "almost there" since the 1990s too'. That referred to their almost universal belief that brains must be the exclusive generator of consciousness. They have been poking around in there for decades trying to find how it happens.

After complaining about that, you replied, "... a consensus that any final theory of consciousness is going to fall within the outlines of the global neuronal workspace model, and that consensus has existed since the 1990's'.

It says the same thing! One does not need to have worked in a scientific institution for ten years as I have done to know that their views will vary based on new evidence (obvious). The fact is that researchers decided that the brain was the only possible generator of consciousness. QED

And they may be wrong.

Gertie wrote: ↑May 26th, 2020, 4:06 pmSo, back to whether you need an Experiencer to experience.

If you are simply defining the substrate as the Experiencer of the experiential states, then (Idealism aside) yeah you can say that.

But it seems like a thin definition which misses the point that a sense of being a discrete, unified Self, the sense of being an Experiencer, is a feature of the nature of experience (as it manifests in humans at least).

What about pathological distortions of self-awareness/self-consciousness? For example, the sense of being a "unified self" can get lost (dissociative identity disorder); and Foster seems to be wrong in stating that "the subject’s awareness of himself, and of his role as mental subject, is an essential element of his awareness of the item itself," and that "someone’s introspective awareness of a mental item includes the awareness of himself as its subject." For there are pathological states of mind where one is aware or conscious of a mental item without a sense of ownership ("mineness") and subjecthood. Thought insertion is an example, where schizophrenics don't innerly perceive their thoughts as their own ones.

QUOTE>
"When someone is introspectively aware of a mental item, he is not aware of it as an object presented to him. He is aware of it, more intimately, from the inside, as an instance of his own mentalizing—as an instance of his being in a certain mental state, or performing a certain kind of mental act, or engaging in a certain kind of mental activity. The subject’s awareness of himself, and of his role as mental subject, is an essential element of his awareness of the item itself.

There should be no issue, then, over the need for an ontology of mental subjects. One has only to focus on the nature of any type of mental item as our concept of that type reveals it—be it pain, visual experience, belief, decision making, desire, anger, or whatever—to be able to see quite plainly that that sort of thing can be realized only as an instance of mentalizing by a subject. And one has only to think about introspective awareness in the right way to see quite plainly that someone’s introspective awareness of a mental item includes the awareness of himself as its subject."

(Foster, John. "Subjects of Mentality." In After Physicalism, edited by Benedikt Paul Göcke, 72-103. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2012. pp. 72-4)
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Greta wrote: ↑May 26th, 2020, 5:44 pm
The statement of mine that you objected to was, 'Researchers have been "almost there" since the 1990s too'. That referred to their almost universal belief that brains must be the exclusive generator of consciousness. They have been poking around in there for decades trying to find how it happens.

After complaining about that, you replied, "... a consensus that any final theory of consciousness is going to fall within the outlines of the global neuronal workspace model, and that consensus has existed since the 1990's'.

It says the same thing!

It only says the same thing now that you have traveled back in time to make "almost there" identical with "brains must be the exclusive generator of consciousness." That's some incredible semantic acrobatics you have going there.

Focusing on the brain is one thing--an approach that has been near universal for much longer than the 1990's since it is completely justified by all available evidence and literally nothing else is. No one in the mainstream with any sense at all thinks this focus means we are "almost there". That is a gross distortion.

Now in the 1990's, this very sensible approach got us the global neuronal workspace model, a very broad, high level picture of the brain processes we now understand contribute to the generation of consciousness.

Despite the success of this model, again, no one in the mainstream with any sense at all thinks even this advancement means we are "almost there". There are too many unsolved questions and unresolved issues even within that model to think we are remotely close to having a complete model of consciousness. What about the binding problem, for instance? That's a huge hurdle that any complete model needs to solve, we aren't remotely close to solving it, and it is just one of many issues scientists are working on. (By the way, excitement over the neuronal architecture you referenced earlier was, in part, because it might play a role in solving the binding problem. But even then, that doesn't get you a solved model of consciousness and doesn't mean you're "almost there".

Greta wrote: ↑May 26th, 2020, 5:44 pmThe fact is that researchers decided that the brain was the only possible generator of consciousness. QED

And they may be wrong.

They might be wrong in the sense that maybe aliens created life on earth and maybe we're all living in a simulation. It just isn't a serious possibility, and that's why no one takes it seriously.

So if you go back to the oldest posts via his profile, here's a thread that Atla participated in where he tried to contribute some content in a useful manner rather than just being snarky and uncooperative:

viewtopic.php?f=2&t=15596

So, apparently his schtick is a particular understanding of zen or Hindu-styled enlightenment, nirvana or samadhi.

It's the old "all is one"/"there are no real distinctions, separations, different things" schtick.

Hence, I suppose why he won't answer whether he believes there are people and also things in the world that aren't people. The "all is one" schtick doesn't allow this, but he also doesn't want to be explicit any longer about believing this, because he's expecting "What do you mean you don't believe that?!?!" and the whole rigamarole that goes along with it.

I'm actually quite fond of zen in many aspects . . . although I'm not near as find of Hindu or more generally traditional Indian philosophy, and the "all is one" schtick doesn't make a heck of a lot of sense in my view, which I'm sure Atla knows and he just doesn't want to bother with it. But he should still attempt content and not just sniping.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 27th, 2020, 8:28 am So if you go back to the oldest posts via his profile, here's a thread that Atla participated in where he tried to contribute some content in a useful manner rather than just being snarky and uncooperative:

viewtopic.php?f=2&t=15596

So, apparently his schtick is a particular understanding of zen or Hindu-styled enlightenment, nirvana or samadhi.

It's the old "all is one"/"there are no real distinctions, separations, different things" schtick.

Hence, I suppose why he won't answer whether he believes there are people and also things in the world that aren't people. The "all is one" schtick doesn't allow this, but he also doesn't want to be explicit any longer about believing this, because he's expecting "What do you mean you don't believe that?!?!" and the whole rigamarole that goes along with it.

I'm actually quite fond of zen in many aspects . . . although I'm not near as find of Hindu or more generally traditional Indian philosophy, and the "all is one" schtick doesn't make a heck of a lot of sense in my view, which I'm sure Atla knows and he just doesn't want to bother with it. But he should still attempt content and not just sniping.

"All is one" and "there are no differences" is a superficial misunderstanding of nondualism. Just some pseudo-Advaita or other kinds of new age woo. Not worth bothering with it.

Something you wrote was "Dividing reality into distinct, separate 'things,' people, realms etc. is very practical, useful, simple, except now you know that that's not truly how things really are, while others are lost in the illusion."

So, in other words, "There are no real distinctions, separations, etc." on your view.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 27th, 2020, 8:57 am Something you wrote was "Dividing reality into distinct, separate 'things,' people, realms etc. is very practical, useful, simple, except now you know that that's not truly how things really are, while others are lost in the illusion."

So, in other words, "There are no real distinctions, separations, etc." on your view.

Not in the ontological sense. There are no known examples of actual separation. Now I didn't arrive at this via philosophy, since I've never been into philosophy, but via modern physics / all of science.

You work out the rest, now that I've corrected your daily lie about me, I'm going back to ignoring.

"Distinct" as in "separate" no, "distinction" as in "different" yes

Atla wrote: ↑May 27th, 2020, 9:07 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑May 27th, 2020, 8:57 am Something you wrote was "Dividing reality into distinct, separate 'things,' people, realms etc. is very practical, useful, simple, except now you know that that's not truly how things really are, while others are lost in the illusion."

So, in other words, "There are no real distinctions, separations, etc." on your view.

Not in the ontological sense. There are no known examples of actual separation. Now I didn't arrive at this via philosophy, since I've never been into philosophy, but via modern physics / all of science.

You work out the rest, now that I've corrected your daily lie about me, I'm going back to ignoring.

There can't really be an ontological sense versus other senses if there are no real distinctions or separations. So what would you be talking about?

Atla wrote: ↑May 27th, 2020, 9:08 am "Distinct" as in "separate" no, "distinction" as in "different" yes

You said there are no real distinctions.

Are you now saying that there are real distinctions re differences but no real distinctions re separation?