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GE Morton wrote: ↑February 24th, 2020, 7:34 pmOn my view, by the way, there isn't anything that's not a process or event. Hence my question about whether there are real abstracts in your ontology. (And then we can try to figure out what the heck real abstracts in your ontology amount to exactly (well, where we try to pretend that it's not you simply reifying concepts).)
Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 24th, 2020, 7:43 pmThe English word "dog" has, and will have, a meaning whether any English speakers exist or any dogs exist (the word "dinosaur" has a meaning even though no dinosaurs now exist). If a word was assigned a meaning when coined, and used within a speech community with that meaning, then it will always have it.
Let's try this: It's the year 3157 CE and no people exist any longer. Do you believe that it's a fact that the word "dog" printed in a book has a meaning where it refers to a creature that still exists?
Presumably you'd say that the meaning is a "pseudo-property" of something at 3157 CE, correct? What, exactly is it a "pseudo-property" of?Explained before. A pseudo-property is a property imputed to things if some external fact about them is true. It is distinguished from a sensible property --- one confirmable by examining the thing. Confirming pseudo-properties requires examining something other than the subject, beyond the subject.
GE Morton wrote: ↑February 24th, 2020, 7:58 pmI hate to keep making posts . . . but that's one of the problems with not being able to edit.
GE Morton wrote: ↑February 24th, 2020, 8:24 pm Confirming pseudo-properties requires examining something other than the subject, beyond the subject. You can't look at at an unfamiliar word and determine whether it has a meaning, any more than you can examine Bruno and determine whether he has an uncle. You need some evidence beyond the subject. In the case of Bruno you need to determine whether one of his parents has a living male sibling. In the case of the word, you need to see whether it is (or was) used in a speech community to denote something. If those facts are true, respectively, then the subjects have those pseudo-properties.First off, when there are no people, are when our answer can't refer to anything mental, we can't do any examining or confirming or any evidence-gathering, etc. as such, right?
Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 24th, 2020, 8:33 pmYes we can, when the uninhabited universe is hypothetical and we are exploring that hypothesis. If the uninhabited universe was inhabited at one time, and those inhabitants assigned a meaning to the word "dog," then that is a permanent, unalterable historical fact. That group of letters still has that meaning, whether anyone is around to read it or not.
First off, when there are no people, are when our answer can't refer to anything mental, we can't do any examining or confirming or any evidence-gathering, etc. as such, right?
Secondly, the facts that you have in mind would be that people used the words in such and such way, but that's a fact about how people THOUGHT about the word.That is false on its face. How people use a word neither assumes nor implies anything about what they think about it. Their behavior alone constitutes their uses of it, and that behavior is empirically determinable. We may make conjectures about what is in their heads when they hear or speak the word, but those are speculative and are irrelevant to the observed uses they make of the words they speak or hear --- the responses they utter or the actions they take.
In other words, you presumably agree that I think that Wittgenstein sucked as a philosopher (I just said as much--that I thought that--in a post above). So there's a fact that that is (and once I'm gone, was) something I thought. Well, the mere fact that I think about Wittgenstein that way doesn't imply that Wittgenstein sucks mind-independently. It's a fact that I thought that, but it's not actually a fact about Wittgenstein.I certainly don't agree with your characterization of Wittgenstein. And the property you ascribe to him signifies nothing about him, only your disapproval of his work.
Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 24th, 2020, 7:37 pmAgain, I apologise for not taking up this point when you made it - particularly as I think it's important in our discussion. Mea culpa.Peter Holmes wrote: ↑February 24th, 2020, 7:13 pmI already explained my take on abstracts to you. I wrote this:
I apologise for failing to respond to what you said.
But what you say here is incoherent blather, and I don't think you know what you're talking about. You ignore my point about equivocating on 'thing' and 'exist' with regard to abstract things and events. And you seem to content to rehash metaphysical nonsense about the mind and mental things.
And that's fine. Let's leave it there.
"I'm also a nominalist in the senses that I think there are only unique particulars, and there are no real (extramental) abstracts. Abstraction is a mental phenomenon, and as such, it's a mental particular that like everything else, amounts to ((dynamic) relations of) matter."
As a physicalst and out-and-out nominalist, I think my position is the only rational one. There are only physical things, such as electrochemical processes in our brains, and signs, including abstract nouns. So it's a mistake to think abstract things and events exist - anywhere.
And twice I asked you just what sort of things you believe abstracts are. The first time I asked you, you had written this:
"What an extraordinary metaphysical delusion it is to think abstract nouns are the names of things of some kind that somehow exist somewhere, and that we can describe."
To which I responded: "how do you reconcile this with physicalism? Just what sort of physical things do you believe abstracts are?"
Once again, I apologise. I hope the goes some way to making amends.
You never responded to any of that. This is why I don't like doing long posts back and forth or posting too much too soon.
Yes we can, when the uninhabited universe is hypothetical and we are exploring that hypothesis. If the uninhabited universe was inhabited at one time, and those inhabitants assigned a meaning to the word "dog," then that is a permanent, unalterable historical fact. That group of letters still has that meaning, whether anyone is around to read it or not.History i.e. the story of man's past is a man- made story, or a set of man-made stories. Thought experiment: if there were an omniscient being then he would know the story of man's past and infinitely more.This being would know every thought and every aspect of temporal existence , plus every natural law if there are such as natural laws. This OB would know what men attribute to the concept 'dog' together with valencies of these attributes and the concept as a whole.
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑February 25th, 2020, 6:49 am
As a physicalst and out-and-out nominalist, I think my position is the only rational one. There are only physical things, such as electrochemical processes in our brains, and signs, including abstract nouns. So it's a mistake to think abstract things and events exist - anywhere.
You just said both that there are abstract nouns and that it's a mistake to think abstract things exist anywhere. So how would there be abstract nouns? What sorts of things are signs and abstract nouns on your view?
Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 25th, 2020, 7:36 am I'll get back to the questions (some of which you should know the answer to already because I keep giving my view on stuff you're asking) in a post after this, but I'm curious about this:
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑February 25th, 2020, 6:49 amFor some reason, your question wasn't copied here. I'll try again.
As a physicalst and out-and-out nominalist, I think my position is the only rational one. There are only physical things, such as electrochemical processes in our brains, and signs, including abstract nouns. So it's a mistake to think abstract things and events exist - anywhere.
Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 25th, 2020, 7:36 am I'll get back to the questions (some of which you should know the answer to already because I keep giving my view on stuff you're asking) in a post after this, but I'm curious about this:
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑February 25th, 2020, 6:49 amNo - it's done it again. I'll answer the question anyway.
As a physicalst and out-and-out nominalist, I think my position is the only rational one. There are only physical things, such as electrochemical processes in our brains, and signs, including abstract nouns. So it's a mistake to think abstract things and events exist - anywhere.
The expression 'abstract noun' is a grammatical misattribution, because words such as nouns are real things, so the modifier 'abstract' doesn't refer to 'noun'. It actually refers to the unspecified abstract thing that the noun supposedly names. So abstract reification - Platonism - is built into the phrase 'abstract noun'. Does that sort out the confusion?
Peter Holmes wrote: ↑February 25th, 2020, 8:06 am The expression 'abstract noun' is a grammatical misattribution, because words such as nouns are real things, so the modifier 'abstract' doesn't refer to 'noun'. It actually refers to the unspecified abstract thing that the noun supposedly names. So abstract reification - Platonism - is built into the phrase 'abstract noun'. Does that sort out the confusion?If you think that there's something abstract that we're reifying, then you'd think there's something abstract. We can't reify something that doesn't occur as a concept/idea/fantasy/etc.