Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Consul]

What seems to be happening here is that Consul is making a fairly clear statement, though somewhat garbled (eg what is meant by patient?)…

In the sense in which I use the word here, a patient is the opposite of an agent: a subject of passions (passive affections); something/somebody which/who is acted upon, or to which/whom something is done.

[Consul]

OK, so you think the substrate is the Subject, the Self which does experiencing. To have a go at summarising -

You believe the self is located in the body, and when the body is having experiential states, becomes a Subject. (Noun doing Verb).

When in a dreamless asleep, the body is no longer a Subject, but a potential Subject, till it wakes up and starts experiencing again. But the body is still where the Self is located, even when asleep or dead, just not in Subject mode?

Hence you say you can't have an experience, without a Substrate-Self to experience it.

Are you a materialist who believes experiences are or aren't reducible to physical processes? And how does that tie in to the Experience-Experiencer dichotomy?

My position is that it is the inherent nature of experiential states which create A Sense of being a Self. So it's more like experiencing introduces 'a sense of self' to the substrate's processes.

Namely - A sense of being a discrete, unified being with a first person pov, recognising correlation with a specific body moving through space and time, navigating an 'external'/third person pov world of of objects, other subjects, stuff happening,etc.

In effect, locating 'Selfness' in the particular ways in which experiential states can manifest.

But not necessarily always. There might be less complex creatures, which don't possess the particular features of experiential states humans do, and I'd say they don't have A Sense of Self, of being a discrete, unified Subject in a world of Objects. For example a moth might (or might not) experience a difference between light and dark only, but not have this Sense of being a Self. But it would be a Subject-Self for you, because it has a body which is experiencing.

Would you roughly agree with that summary.?

* First of all, I don't like the awkward noun "self" (as opposed to the "likable" reflexive pronouns "myself", "yourself", etc.), so I prefer to use "subject" or "ego" instead.

QUOTE>
"Abstract: Because there is no agreed use of the term 'self', or characteristic features or even paradigm cases of selves, there is no idea of "the self" to figure in philosophical problems. The term leads to troubles otherwise avoidable; and because legitimate discussions under the heading of 'self' are really about other things, it is gratuitous. I propose that we stop speaking of selves."

Eric Olson: "There is no Problem of the Self" (PDF)
<QUOTE

* Put simply, in the psychological sense, a subject is an (actually or potentially) experiencing (sensing/feeling/imagining) object.
(Note that it is not part of this definition that subjects are material objects! Immaterial souls or spirits are experiencing objects too—or would be if they existed.)

* By being an animalist about "selves" or subjects, I'm a materialist about them, since animals are organisms, and organisms are a kind of bodies and thus a kind of material objects or substances.

* I'm a materialist about phenomenal consciousness/subjective experience too. That is, I believe that all experiences/experiencings are composed of/constituted by neural processes (involving nothing but chemical or physical properties).

* From my materialistic perspective, it is not the case that "the self is located in the body," because "selves" or subjects are bodily "selves" or subjects, which is to say that they are bodies themselves. (Being an animal organism entails being a body.)

QUOTE>
"The simplest view of what people are is that they are their bodies. That view has other attractions besides its simplicity. I feel inclined to think that this fleshy object (my body is what I refer to) isn’t something I merely currently inhabit: I feel inclined to think that it is me. This bony object (my left hand is what I refer to) – isn’t it literally part of me? Certainly we all, at least at times, feel inclined to think that we are not merely embodied, but that we just, all simply, are our bodies."

(Thomson, Judith Jarvis. "People and their Bodies." In Reading Parfit, edited by Jonathan Dancy, 202-229. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. p. 202)
<QUOTE

* Again, what exactly is "a sense of (being a) self"? The only intelligible answer I can give is that this phrase refers to self-awareness or self-consciousness, to awareness or consciousness of oneself. Subjects of mentality/experientiality are aware or conscious of themselves in different ways, and there are different cognitive-perceptual degrees or levels of self-awareness/self-consciousness, depending on the degree or level of evolutionary development of the animal mind/brain in question.

There is both physical, corporeal (bodily) self-awareness/self-consciousness, i.e. awareness/consciousness of oneself as an individual physical object, a body or organism in space and time, and mental self-awareness/self-consciousness, i.e. awareness/consciousness of oneself as an individual mental subject and of one's mind (mental states).

Most (or even nearly all) experiencing, phenomenally conscious animals lack mental self-consciousness (the capacity for introspection), but all of them have some form of physical, corporeal self-consciousness or self-perception.

By the way, the latter comes itself in different forms: Exteroceptive corporeal self-perception, i.e. external, outer perception of one's body by means of outer senses such as sight and smell, and interoceptive or proprioceptive corporeal self-perception, i.e. internal, inner perception of (physiological conditions or the spatial positions and motions of) one's body by means of inner senses.
(The interoception of one's body is not the same as and not to be confused with the introspection of one's mind!)

Bodily Awareness: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bodily-awareness/

[Sy Borg]

Researchers have been "almost there" since the 1990s too.

No one in the mainstream of science has ever made such a claim. Not sure what you think you gain by making this kind of stuff up.

If the researchers believed otherwise, then they would be open to possibility that consciousness is not exclusively generated by brains and broaden their searches.

This is known as logic. You should try it sometime. Do you have anything useful to add to the thread or is sniping all you have?

[Consul]

Researchers have been "almost there" since the 1990s too.

No one in the mainstream of science has ever made such a claim. Not sure what you think you gain by making this kind of stuff up.

How long did it take to crack the genetic code?! It may take hundreds of years of neuroscientific research to crack the neural code of consciousness. Is that a reason to give up trying right after the start? Certainly not!

[Consul]

If the researchers believed otherwise, then they would be open to possibility that consciousness is not exclusively generated by brains and broaden their searches.

Good scientists take any possibility seriously if it's more than a mere logical possibility. Is there any substantial scientific evidence for the view that the immediate neurophysiological mechanisms of consciousness aren't completely, totally part of the CNS?

[Sy Borg]

If the researchers believed otherwise, then they would be open to possibility that consciousness is not exclusively generated by brains and broaden their searches.

Good scientists take any possibility seriously if it's more than a mere logical possibility. Is there any substantial scientific evidence for the view that the immediate neurophysiological mechanisms of consciousness aren't completely, totally part of the CNS?

You are asking if I think neuronal activity is completely part of the CNS. Sure it is. Intestinal activity is completely part of the digestive system too. Do you see the circularity of your question and the assumption behind that circularity?

[Consul]

Good scientists take any possibility seriously if it's more than a mere logical possibility. Is there any substantial scientific evidence for the view that the immediate neurophysiological mechanisms of consciousness aren't completely, totally part of the CNS?

You are asking if I think neuronal activity is completely part of the CNS. Sure it is. Intestinal activity is completely part of the digestive system too. Do you see the circularity of your question and the assumption behind that circularity?

Of course, there is neural activity outside the CNS, since it is only a proper part of the whole NS. The question is: Are any neural processes in the NS–CNS part(s) of the immediate, constitutive neural mechanisms of consciousness?

[Gertie]

OK, so you think the substrate is the Subject, the Self which does experiencing. To have a go at summarising -

You believe the self is located in the body, and when the body is having experiential states, becomes a Subject. (Noun doing Verb).

When in a dreamless asleep, the body is no longer a Subject, but a potential Subject, till it wakes up and starts experiencing again. But the body is still where the Self is located, even when asleep or dead, just not in Subject mode?

Hence you say you can't have an experience, without a Substrate-Self to experience it.

Are you a materialist who believes experiences are or aren't reducible to physical processes? And how does that tie in to the Experience-Experiencer dichotomy?

My position is that it is the inherent nature of experiential states which create A Sense of being a Self. So it's more like experiencing introduces 'a sense of self' to the substrate's processes.

Namely - A sense of being a discrete, unified being with a first person pov, recognising correlation with a specific body moving through space and time, navigating an 'external'/third person pov world of of objects, other subjects, stuff happening,etc.

In effect, locating 'Selfness' in the particular ways in which experiential states can manifest.

But not necessarily always. There might be less complex creatures, which don't possess the particular features of experiential states humans do, and I'd say they don't have A Sense of Self, of being a discrete, unified Subject in a world of Objects. For example a moth might (or might not) experience a difference between light and dark only, but not have this Sense of being a Self. But it would be a Subject-Self for you, because it has a body which is experiencing.

Would you roughly agree with that summary.?

* First of all, I don't like the awkward noun "self" (as opposed to the "likable" reflexive pronouns "myself", "yourself", etc.), so I prefer to use "subject" or "ego" instead.

QUOTE>
"Abstract: Because there is no agreed use of the term 'self', or characteristic features or even paradigm cases of selves, there is no idea of "the self" to figure in philosophical problems. The term leads to troubles otherwise avoidable; and because legitimate discussions under the heading of 'self' are really about other things, it is gratuitous. I propose that we stop speaking of selves."

Eric Olson: "There is no Problem of the Self" (PDF)
<QUOTE

* Put simply, in the psychological sense, a subject is an (actually or potentially) experiencing (sensing/feeling/imagining) object.
(Note that it is not part of this definition that subjects are material objects! Immaterial souls or spirits are experiencing objects too—or would be if they existed.)

* By being an animalist about "selves" or subjects, I'm a materialist about them, since animals are organisms, and organisms are a kind of bodies and thus a kind of material objects or substances.

* I'm a materialist about phenomenal consciousness/subjective experience too. That is, I believe that all experiences/experiencings are composed of/constituted by neural processes (involving nothing but chemical or physical properties).

* From my materialistic perspective, it is not the case that "the self is located in the body," because "selves" or subjects are bodily "selves" or subjects, which is to say that they are bodies themselves. (Being an animal organism entails being a body.)

QUOTE>
"The simplest view of what people are is that they are their bodies. That view has other attractions besides its simplicity. I feel inclined to think that this fleshy object (my body is what I refer to) isn’t something I merely currently inhabit: I feel inclined to think that it is me. This bony object (my left hand is what I refer to) – isn’t it literally part of me? Certainly we all, at least at times, feel inclined to think that we are not merely embodied, but that we just, all simply, are our bodies."

(Thomson, Judith Jarvis. "People and their Bodies." In Reading Parfit, edited by Jonathan Dancy, 202-229. Oxford: Blackwell, 1997. p. 202)
<QUOTE

* Again, what exactly is "a sense of (being a) self"? The only intelligible answer I can give is that this phrase refers to self-awareness or self-consciousness, to awareness or consciousness of oneself. Subjects of mentality/experientiality are aware or conscious of themselves in different ways, and there are different cognitive-perceptual degrees or levels of self-awareness/self-consciousness, depending on the degree or level of evolutionary development of the animal mind/brain in question.

There is both physical, corporeal (bodily) self-awareness/self-consciousness, i.e. awareness/consciousness of oneself as an individual physical object, a body or organism in space and time, and mental self-awareness/self-consciousness, i.e. awareness/consciousness of oneself as an individual mental subject and of one's mind (mental states).

Most (or even nearly all) experiencing, phenomenally conscious animals lack mental self-consciousness (the capacity for introspection), but all of them have some form of physical, corporeal self-consciousness or self-perception.

By the way, the latter comes itself in different forms: Exteroceptive corporeal self-perception, i.e. external, outer perception of one's body by means of outer senses such as sight and smell, and interoceptive or proprioceptive corporeal self-perception, i.e. internal, inner perception of (physiological conditions or the spatial positions and motions of) one's body by means of inner senses.
(The interoception of one's body is not the same as and not to be confused with the introspection of one's mind!)

Bodily Awareness: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/bodily-awareness/

I've repeatedly defined what I think a Sense of Self is - A sense of being a discrete, unified being with a first person pov, recognising correlation with a specific body moving through space and time, navigating an 'external'/third person pov world of objects, other subjects, stuff happening,etc.

That description could probably benefit from some tidying up, but it amounts to something I call Me. Which I can then introspect, be self-aware and reflect about.


(You can make a case that a moth which presumably has experiential states but doesn't have that sense of self is a Subject too, and I'd agree. But the difference is significant).


Hence I'd argue that it's the very nature of how experiential states manifest in complex creatures like humans, which introduces the existence of beings who think of themselves as Selves, as Mes, into the world.

To simply call the substrate/body Me, which misses the key role in identifying as a Me, which the nature of experiential states brings in the ways it manifests in humans.

[Atla]

Life would be so much easier if people wouldn't forever conflate "human/organism" consciousness with "the" consciousness. Will the West really need another 50-100 years for that?

[Sy Borg]

You are asking if I think neuronal activity is completely part of the CNS. Sure it is. Intestinal activity is completely part of the digestive system too. Do you see the circularity of your question and the assumption behind that circularity?

Of course, there is neural activity outside the CNS, since it is only a proper part of the whole NS. The question is: Are any neural processes in the NS–CNS part(s) of the immediate, constitutive neural mechanisms of consciousness?

It's all still referring back to neurons, based on an assumption that consciousness can only possibly be the product of brains acting on entirely unconscious matter. I still think the assumption is premature and that, at least, co-dependencies with the primary body systems could be far deeper than expected in this area.

Not long ago we knew far less about the extent of the microbiome's influence. Today, researchers still see it as a fledgling field. BTW, I'm not trying to say that bacteria, fungi, archaea and viruses directly create consciousness, just that unknown factors can pop up in science - and researchers have been at am impasse with this issue for some time. Do you plough onwards, with faith that the "treasure" is in that spot? At what point does one extend one's search from the brain (which is, at the very least, the locus).

The search for that which generates consciousness is leading some pundits to claim that the "hard problem" is just a load of old cobblers embraced by closet theists, and not worth considering. Teir claim is that the wonder of being is unworthy of contemplation. Talk about pragmatic! It reminds me how arch-materialists used to scoff at anyone who asked what happened before the big bang, claiming that the question was meaningless. Today that attitude is seen for what it is, an objection based on technicalities that does not address reality. The elephant in the room for them was that measurability does not necessarily equal existence.

[Faustus5]

If the researchers believed otherwise, then they would be open to possibility that consciousness is not exclusively generated by brains and broaden their searches.

This is known as logic. You should try it sometime.
[/quote]

Talk about lack of logic, your entire post is a complete non sequitur. Or maybe English is not your first language. Either way, it makes no sense as a response to the point of my post.

What I was reacting to was your suggestion that the scientific community has declared that it was on the verge of completely explaining consciousness since the 1990's. That suggestion is complete nonsense and has no basis in reality.

There is a consensus that any final theory of consciousness is going to fall within the outlines of the global neuronal workspace model, and that consensus has existed since the 1990's. But this approach is very open to additions and modifications. For instance, we recently discovered that such things as the bacteria in a person's gut can have measurable influences on their cognition.

But they have this effect because of the way they influence brain activity. Making the brain central to any theory of consciousness is the only approach that is justified by the evidence. If you have any scientific reasons to look elsewhere, please provide them.

[Faustus5]

No one in the mainstream of science has ever made such a claim. Not sure what you think you gain by making this kind of stuff up.

How long did it take to crack the genetic code?! It may take hundreds of years of neuroscientific research to crack the neural code of consciousness. Is that a reason to give up trying right after the start? Certainly not!
[/quote]

I was not making the suggestion that anyone should give up, only refuting the suggestion that mainstream scientists have ever thought they were just about ready to close up the shop because a final theory of consciousness was coming any day now.

[Terrapin Station]

But they would not be being serious, really.
Have you met one?

I've certainly met many idealists.

Maybe they think that people don't actually exist, but things that aren't people exist (however that would work exactly for them). Maybe they think that neither exist (maybe they deny anything exists, however that would work for them, or maybe they don't classify anything as either people or things, or whatever).

I think you might be tilting at windmills here.

I've met people who believe all sorts of things that seem strange to me in the 45+ years that I've been talking to people about philosophy. I don't like to assume what views people have, or assume that they can't have some unusual view.

Usually people are happy to share what their views are if you ask them--at least that's what's always seemed to happen when I talk to folks in person rather than online.

So, Atla seems to be implying, rather than saying out right, that the subject/object dichotomy is made up (implying a myth or falsehood).

Right. Which is why I was asking him if he buys that there are both people in the world and things that aren't people in the world (things like coffee cups, trees, etc., where he doesn't believe that those things are people).

[Sculptor1]

But they would not be being serious, really.
Have you met one?

I've certainly met many idealists.

You have described a caricature of an idealist. I doubt there are any that extreme.
I'd probably consider myself an idealist. But I would never deny the actual existence of things of my perception. Far from it. I regard idealism as a valid methodology to understand what it means to conclude the existence of external things via the limits of my perception, thus avoiding the naivete of realism.

I think you might be tilting at windmills here.

I've met people who believe all sorts of things that seem strange to me in the 45+ years that I've been talking to people about philosophy. I don't like to assume what views people have, or assume that they can't have some unusual view.

Usually people are happy to share what their views are if you ask them--at least that's what's always seemed to happen when I talk to folks in person rather than online.

So, Atla seems to be implying, rather than saying out right, that the subject/object dichotomy is made up (implying a myth or falsehood).

Right. Which is why I was asking him if he buys that there are both people in the world and things that aren't people in the world (things like coffee cups, trees, etc., where he doesn't believe that those things are people).

Are we going to hold our breaths waiting for an answer?

[Sculptor1]

Life would be so much easier if people wouldn't forever conflate "human/organism" consciousness with "the" consciousness. Will the West really need another 50-100 years for that?

And what the F are you talking about here?
WTF is "the consciousness" when it is at home?