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[Sy Borg]

Next, I would like to talk about the Computational Theory Of Mind (CTM) with respect to Conscious Experience. This is also called Computationalism. The basic premise here is that Computations are the basis for Consciousness, and therefore the Brain and Computers are Conscious merely because they both do their own kinds of Computations. But what is the chain of Logic that gets you from Computations to something like the Experience of Redness or the Salty Taste? The Theory is Incoherent without an answer to that question. There is no way this theory can Explain what the IM is within the theory. Again, I must ask please, will someone show me how this theory can Explain any Conscious Experience?

https://medium.com/curious/the-enduring ... c46d3e0db1

The hard problem, Chalmers and many others claim, arises because the subjective conscious experiences, qualia as some call these, are irreducible. An experience is more than the sum of its parts. It goes beyond function and reporting. Since, as Nagel pointed out, it is restricted to subjective or first person experience, it cannot comprehensively be studied or explored using the third person or objective analysis that is demanded by at least traditional science methodologies.

This understanding of consciousness seems to have generated two responses. First, is the recognition by many that the existence of consciousness undermines the physicalist belief system. It seems to have triggered a sort of sustained attack on physicalism coming from a number of philosophical and scientific luminaries (physicalist defenders might, however, see them as cranks rather than luminaries).

On the other hand, it seems to have triggered an almost frenetic burst of consciousness research focused on neuroscience. This has resulted in major progress in identifying brain activity associated with conscious experience. Progress in identifying the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC), initially with Francis Crick and Christof Koch, has led to one of the two favored quasi-physicalist explanations of consciousness, the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of Giulio Tononi and Koch. The other leading science-based idea developed by Bernard Baars and Stanislas Dehaene is called the Global Neural Workspace Theory (GNWT).

Who is right? At heart is the age-old mind-brain problem. Physicalist defenders, including those engaged in ground-breaking neuroscience claim that the strong advances in mapping brain activity to experience and the massive effort aimed at it are very close to revealing the physical nature of consciousness. The hard problem will then become just another easy one.

But, is this another example of “promissory materialism” in Sir Karl Popper’s term? Brian Greene is a foremost apologist for physicalism. Until the End of Time is perhaps the best current example of how committed physicalists defend this belief system and attempt (vainly in my view) to avoid the nihilism that many see is necessitated by this belief. Greene’s comment on the state of consciousness studies is a prime example of the still unkept promise of physicalism on this topic:

“I suspect that consciousness is less mysterious than it feels…I anticipate that we will one day explain consciousness with nothing more than a conventional understanding of the particles constituting matter and the physical laws that govern them.”

Perhaps, but it seems that those studying this hard problem are a bit overeager to claim that the proof is at hand. Christof Koch is one example. The neural correlates of consciousness studied initially with Francis Crick show brain activity associated with subjective experience. Some have claimed that this showed the brain generated this conscious experience. David Chalmers refutes this in The Character of Consciousness ...

... The Global Workspace Theory or Global Neural Workspace Theory seems to correspond to the computation theory of the mind, or CTM. Koch has strongly criticized CTM including in the subtitle of his book on consciousness: The Feeling of Life Itself: Why Consciousness is Widespread But Can’t Be Computed.

The theory may be very helpful in understanding the operations of cells in the brain related to consciousness but does not explain how the brain produces consciousness. The initiator of this idea is Bernard Baars, but he does not equate correlation with causation:

“Baars (1997) suggests that the global workspace ‘is closely related to conscious experience, though not identical to it.’”

I rather like IIT and take its panpsychic implications more seriously than committed materialists. The issue IMO is putting consciousness on a pedestal. For instance, based on the idea that relations and integration bring about consciousness, then the universe, galaxy, stars and planets are conscious to varying extents, as are cities and towns, ecosystems. Each reacts and responds, with varying and variable integration.

So, for me, the issue is not so much what is conscious, because I see myself as existing amongst all kinds of consciousnesses. Rather, it's about which instances of consciousness are significant as regards human-like consciousness, which appears to be restricted to animals in varying degrees.

It seems to me that we live in a young universe. Our impression at this stage is that evolution leads to this final, advanced state - human consciousness. However, early in the Earth's history, digestion was the most advanced process. The job of early nervous systems was only to protect metabolic organs. In time, the nerves bundled up into brains - a central organiser of signals pouring in via the senses. Still, if simple organisms could philosophise, they would say, "I eat, therefore I am".

At some point in evolutionary history, seemingly related to sexual reproduction, ever more complex brains usurped metabolisms as the primary body system. In the past, the job of brains was just to protect the metabolism. Now, the job of the metabolism is to feed brains. "I think therefore I am".

So we arrive at human consciousness, augmented by increasingly intelligent machines. I do not think this kind of consciousness is the end of matter's journey to ever greater awareness. It may be no more an end point than digestion was.

[Belindi]

Sy Borg wrote:

I rather like IIT and take its panpsychic implications more seriously than committed materialists. The issue IMO is putting consciousness on a pedestal. For instance, based on the idea that relations and integration bring about consciousness, then the universe, galaxy, stars and planets are conscious to varying extents, as are cities and towns, ecosystems. Each reacts and responds, with varying and variable integration.

I too like panspsychism but I also like Sartre's " in itself" and " for itself" . The difference between the two latter forms of being affect my idea of psyche.

In Sartrean existentialism, being-in-itself (être-en-soi) is also contrasted with the being of persons, which he describes as a combination of, or vacillation or tension between, being-for-itself (être-pour-soi) and being-for-others (I'être-pour-autrui).[citation needed]

Wikipedia. There are many other explanations of Sartrean existentialist theory of being if Wiki is not held to be appropriate.

Sartrean existentialism can be tacked on to panpsychism if panpsychism is taken to refer only to life forms. There is no need to stop admiring and even protecting inanimate forms such as Planet Earth , galaxies, and human artefacts despite that life forms are not their concern, nothing is their concern.

Sartrean existentialist theory of existence is too close for comfort to substance dualism. However if we understand conscious experience to be original, not emergent, then "things for themselves" (Etre-en-soi) are an undifferentiated shapeless , anomalous 'mass' until some living consciousness adds form to 'it'. This idea is of course idealist (immaterialist); the implication being that physicalist (materialist) explanations of existence are okay as far as they go and are subsumed under mind or consciousness.

[Consul]

I too like panspsychism…

Do you really like the idea of every mass of excrement being a colony of conscious beings?

[SteveKlinko]

I rather like IIT and take its panpsychic implications more seriously than committed materialists. The issue IMO is putting consciousness on a pedestal. For instance, based on the idea that relations and integration bring about consciousness, then the universe, galaxy, stars and planets are conscious to varying extents, as are cities and towns, ecosystems. Each reacts and responds, with varying and variable integration.

So, for me, the issue is not so much what is conscious, because I see myself as existing amongst all kinds of consciousnesses. Rather, it's about which instances of consciousness are significant as regards human-like consciousness, which appears to be restricted to animals in varying degrees.

It seems to me that we live in a young universe. Our impression at this stage is that evolution leads to this final, advanced state - human consciousness. However, early in the Earth's history, digestion was the most advanced process. The job of early nervous systems was only to protect metabolic organs. In time, the nerves bundled up into brains - a central organiser of signals pouring in via the senses. Still, if simple organisms could philosophise, they would say, "I eat, therefore I am".

At some point in evolutionary history, seemingly related to sexual reproduction, ever more complex brains usurped metabolisms as the primary body system. In the past, the job of brains was just to protect the metabolism. Now, the job of the metabolism is to feed brains. "I think therefore I am".

So we arrive at human consciousness, augmented by increasingly intelligent machines. I do not think this kind of consciousness is the end of matter's journey to ever greater awareness. It may be no more an end point than digestion was.

Interesting. However, all theories of Consciousness including IIT merely talk about some generic and ambiguous Consciousness. Since it is never defined, almost any theory can proclaim to explain it. A bunch of words to explain an ill defined concept gets Science into the dead end it is in. What we need are theories of Conscious Experience. Then specify it even further and talk about a theory of the Conscious Experience of Redness, or the Standard A Tone, or the Salty Taste. That would be a theory of Consciousness that I could accept. We need theories of Conscious Experience, where the Experience is part of the explanation. I have come to the place in my studies where I have realized that there is only Conscious Experience. There is in fact no Generalized Consciousness thing itself. All these theories are explaining a thing that doesn't even really exist. What is Consciousness if it is not Conscious Experience?

[Atla]

People still looking for consciousness in the physical world, even though the idea of the physical world is an expression of/in consciousness.

[Pattern-chaser]

I too like panpsychism…

Do you really like the idea of every mass of excrement being a colony of conscious beings?

Your use of ridicule might indicate that you have no clear argument to offer...?

[Belindi]

I too like panspsychism…

Do you really like the idea of every mass of excrement being a colony of conscious beings?

A mass of excrement is a mixture of dead and living individuals. The consciousness status of bacteria is such that a bacterium's experience is more limited than that of an being that can learn from experience such as a cow, or an oak tree.Viruses are perhaps not alive at all I understand the scientists are not sure.

You may have noticed from my earlier post that I suggested to Sy Borg that panpsychism applies to living things not dead , non-living things. It seems reasonable the clinical criterion for dead is brain dead. After brain dead or even before brain dead there is disintegration into various non-living chemicals.

[Sy Borg]

I have come to the place in my studies where I have realized that there is only Conscious Experience. There is in fact no Generalized Consciousness thing itself. All these theories are explaining a thing that doesn't even really exist. What is Consciousness if it is not Conscious Experience?

Consciousness is a small subset of reactivity, just as light is a small subset of electromagnetism. The boundaries between reactions, reflex actions and conscious experience are indistinct, although one of my forum sparring partners, Consul, will say there is a definite delineation between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, a point we have disagreed on for a long time, with each understanding the others' points but not being convinced by them.

I think that if we reduce the importance of consciousness, it becomes easier to apportion meagre amounts to slightly responsive entities.

Working out what might be conscious, even in the slightest, is akin to working out whom in a population might be a genius. We might see clear indications of genius - an accelerated education trajectory, unusual and imposing work ethic, possible social issues and so forth - and we will notice many who most definitely are not geniuses. So we might determine that two people in a group of one hundred may qualify as geniuses, while everyone else is a non-genius. A better classification, however, would be to deem all one hundred people intelligent, albeit in varying degrees.

Likewise, we can deem all responsiveness to be conscious (in IIT phi is the unit of integration of information) and determine just how flexibly responsive an entity is, and how much flexible responsiveness is needed to achieve vivid mammalian/human consciousness.

An analogy might be solidity. So the least conscious things are equivalent to sand grains, and then there's varying degrees of aggregation to produce ever larger rocks. At some stage in this process, there will be emergent properties, eg. once enough grains have accumulated, there will be an inside of the "pebble", which will be darker and denser, and it will also have an outside that will be exposed to light and other external conditions.

[Consul]

Consciousness is a small subset of reactivity, just as light is a small subset of electromagnetism. The boundaries between reactions, reflex actions and conscious experience are indistinct, although one of my forum sparring partners, Consul, will say there is a definite delineation between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, a point we have disagreed on for a long time, with each understanding the others' points but not being convinced by them.

I think I said there is a sharp boundary between the absence and the presence of phenomenal consciousness rather than "between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness."

[Sy Borg]

Consciousness is a small subset of reactivity, just as light is a small subset of electromagnetism. The boundaries between reactions, reflex actions and conscious experience are indistinct, although one of my forum sparring partners, Consul, will say there is a definite delineation between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, a point we have disagreed on for a long time, with each understanding the others' points but not being convinced by them.

I think I said there is a sharp boundary between the absence and the presence of phenomenal consciousness rather than "between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness."

That sounds right, sorry.

[SteveKlinko]

I have come to the place in my studies where I have realized that there is only Conscious Experience. There is in fact no Generalized Consciousness thing itself. All these theories are explaining a thing that doesn't even really exist. What is Consciousness if it is not Conscious Experience?

Consciousness is a small subset of reactivity, just as light is a small subset of electromagnetism. The boundaries between reactions, reflex actions and conscious experience are indistinct, although one of my forum sparring partners, Consul, will say there is a definite delineation between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, a point we have disagreed on for a long time, with each understanding the others' points but not being convinced by them.

I think that if we reduce the importance of consciousness, it becomes easier to apportion meagre amounts to slightly responsive entities.

Working out what might be conscious, even in the slightest, is akin to working out whom in a population might be a genius. We might see clear indications of genius - an accelerated education trajectory, unusual and imposing work ethic, possible social issues and so forth - and we will notice many who most definitely are not geniuses. So we might determine that two people in a group of one hundred may qualify as geniuses, while everyone else is a non-genius. A better classification, however, would be to deem all one hundred people intelligent, albeit in varying degrees.

Likewise, we can deem all responsiveness to be conscious (in IIT phi is the unit of integration of information) and determine just how flexibly responsive an entity is, and how much flexible responsiveness is needed to achieve vivid mammalian/human consciousness.

An analogy might be solidity. So the least conscious things are equivalent to sand grains, and then there's varying degrees of aggregation to produce ever larger rocks. At some stage in this process, there will be emergent properties, eg. once enough grains have accumulated, there will be an inside of the "pebble", which will be darker and denser, and it will also have an outside that will be exposed to light and other external conditions.

All your analogies may be true, but what is the Experience of Redness, or of the Standard A Tone, or of the Salty Taste, or of etc?

[Sy Borg]

I have come to the place in my studies where I have realized that there is only Conscious Experience. There is in fact no Generalized Consciousness thing itself. All these theories are explaining a thing that doesn't even really exist. What is Consciousness if it is not Conscious Experience?

Consciousness is a small subset of reactivity, just as light is a small subset of electromagnetism. The boundaries between reactions, reflex actions and conscious experience are indistinct, although one of my forum sparring partners, Consul, will say there is a definite delineation between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, a point we have disagreed on for a long time, with each understanding the others' points but not being convinced by them.

I think that if we reduce the importance of consciousness, it becomes easier to apportion meagre amounts to slightly responsive entities.

Working out what might be conscious, even in the slightest, is akin to working out whom in a population might be a genius. We might see clear indications of genius - an accelerated education trajectory, unusual and imposing work ethic, possible social issues and so forth - and we will notice many who most definitely are not geniuses. So we might determine that two people in a group of one hundred may qualify as geniuses, while everyone else is a non-genius. A better classification, however, would be to deem all one hundred people intelligent, albeit in varying degrees.

Likewise, we can deem all responsiveness to be conscious (in IIT phi is the unit of integration of information) and determine just how flexibly responsive an entity is, and how much flexible responsiveness is needed to achieve vivid mammalian/human consciousness.

An analogy might be solidity. So the least conscious things are equivalent to sand grains, and then there's varying degrees of aggregation to produce ever larger rocks. At some stage in this process, there will be emergent properties, eg. once enough grains have accumulated, there will be an inside of the "pebble", which will be darker and denser, and it will also have an outside that will be exposed to light and other external conditions.

All your analogies may be true, but what is the Experience of Redness, or of the Standard A Tone, or of the Salty Taste, or of etc?

Like everyone else, I don't know. It's a hard problem :)

Then again, we can ask what is energy? No one knows, beyond physicists defining it as "the ability to do work", which is about as superficial as "consciousness is awareness".

As I mused earlier, this line from geology to life to consciousness to intelligence may not be complete. It may even be in its early stages. Some would argue that evolution has no direction but I argue that evolution has very, very clearly indicated its direction.

Thus, expecting a conscious being to understand its consciousness is perhaps akin to pre-conscious life understanding that it is alive (as opposed to simply being alive). My guess is this will be a job for AI - with the benefit of distance - to provide us with a hopefully unbiased perspective.

[SteveKlinko]

I have come to the place in my studies where I have realized that there is only Conscious Experience. There is in fact no Generalized Consciousness thing itself. All these theories are explaining a thing that doesn't even really exist. What is Consciousness if it is not Conscious Experience?

Consciousness is a small subset of reactivity, just as light is a small subset of electromagnetism. The boundaries between reactions, reflex actions and conscious experience are indistinct, although one of my forum sparring partners, Consul, will say there is a definite delineation between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness, a point we have disagreed on for a long time, with each understanding the others' points but not being convinced by them.

I think that if we reduce the importance of consciousness, it becomes easier to apportion meagre amounts to slightly responsive entities.

Working out what might be conscious, even in the slightest, is akin to working out whom in a population might be a genius. We might see clear indications of genius - an accelerated education trajectory, unusual and imposing work ethic, possible social issues and so forth - and we will notice many who most definitely are not geniuses. So we might determine that two people in a group of one hundred may qualify as geniuses, while everyone else is a non-genius. A better classification, however, would be to deem all one hundred people intelligent, albeit in varying degrees.

Likewise, we can deem all responsiveness to be conscious (in IIT phi is the unit of integration of information) and determine just how flexibly responsive an entity is, and how much flexible responsiveness is needed to achieve vivid mammalian/human consciousness.

An analogy might be solidity. So the least conscious things are equivalent to sand grains, and then there's varying degrees of aggregation to produce ever larger rocks. At some stage in this process, there will be emergent properties, eg. once enough grains have accumulated, there will be an inside of the "pebble", which will be darker and denser, and it will also have an outside that will be exposed to light and other external conditions.

All your analogies may be true, but what is the Experience of Redness, or of the Standard A Tone, or of the Salty Taste, or of etc?

Like everyone else, I don't know. It's a hard problem

Then again, we can ask what is energy? No one knows, beyond physicists defining it as "the ability to do work", which is about as superficial as "consciousness is awareness".

As I mused earlier, this line from geology to life to consciousness to intelligence may not be complete. It may even be in its early stages. Some would argue that evolution has no direction but I argue that evolution has very, very clearly indicated its direction.

Thus, expecting a conscious being to understand its consciousness is perhaps akin to pre-conscious life understanding that it is alive (as opposed to simply being alive). My guess is this will be a job for AI - with the benefit of distance - to provide us with a hopefully unbiased perspective.

I agree that if you make an analogy between "Consciousness is Awareness" and "Energy is the ability to do Work" then it is vague. That is why I try to specify a particular Conscious Experience and study it. A particular Conscious Experience like the Experience of Redness could be compared to a particular kind of Energy like Kinetic Energy. Science can say volumes about Kinetic Energy, but Science has Zero to say about the Conscious Experience of Redness. The Scientific ignorance of Consciousness is Infinitely greater than the Scientific ignorance of Energy.

[Vita]

First, we are assuming that humans fit the definition of consciousness. But we are not conscious of who is conscious. So a neighbor, a friend, a pet, might not be conscious. They might simply be robotic creatures, elements of nature that function in nature and die in nature without being conscious. For all you know, I might not be conscious. Here I am talking about the philosophical, rather than the scientific, aspect of consciousness. Because, as SteveClinko says, everything is just a conscious experience, we do not need to know. So long as you are conscious, you might as well not waste your consciousness pondering consciousness, which we do not have the ability or need to determine.

[Belindi]

Because what I experience is stuff that is other than myself, and other than myself includes my experiencing the 'gaze" (Sartre) of others, there must be other centres of experience. I am a subject of experiences, and these experiences include other subjects of experience.