Philosophy Discussion Forums

Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 10:06 am

Consul wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 9:12 am Of course, the only (phenomenal) consciousness that is directly accessible to me is my own human one; so the meaning of my concept of consciousness is fixed with reference to (the contents of) my own human consciousness.

Therefore, you cannot - i.e. are not able to - carry out a formal scientific or philosophical investigation into plant consciousness, can you? So what do you propose? Should we abandon this quest, or is there a way we can proceed?

We can , however, surmise that whatever we might think of consciousness, plants have nothing whatever like it.
There is more responsiveness in a dead frog than the entire plant kingdom.

Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 10:06 am

Consul wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 9:12 am Of course, the only (phenomenal) consciousness that is directly accessible to me is my own human one; so the meaning of my concept of consciousness is fixed with reference to (the contents of) my own human consciousness.

Therefore, you cannot - i.e. are not able to - carry out a formal scientific or philosophical investigation into plant consciousness, can you? So what do you propose? Should we abandon this quest, or is there a way we can proceed?

I certainly cannot carry out any introspective investigation into nonhuman consciousnesses, since in order to have introspective access to the consciousness of e.g. a cat, I would have to be a cat capable of introspection. No human can directly perceive or observe any nonhuman consciousness from the inner, first-person perspective. But, again, it doesn't follow that our introspection-based concept of consciousness and our corresponding classification of its experiential contents cannot be meaningfully applied to nonhuman beings. Nor does it follow that a science of nonhuman consciousness is impossible in principle. Of course, introspective reports made by nonhuman beings aren't available to this science, which means that conclusions about the distribution of consciousness in nonhuman nature must be inferred from our external, third-person observations (especially of structural and functional analogies or similarities between human organisms and nonhuman ones) without the help of introspective reports made by the nonhuman organisms in question.

Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 10:02 am

Consul wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 9:12 am Sensations are the evolutionarily basic and original kind of subjective experiences; so plants would have to have...

You're doing it again. You are pursuing plant consciousness without having laid out the knowledge and understanding that we both agree is needed before we start: "a universal(ly applicable) concept of consciousness". Without this we cannot know what plants "would have to have", can we?

Consciousness qua phenomenal consciousness is subjective experience; and there seems to be a consensus that sensation, emotion (feelings, moods), and imagination (including cogitation = conscious thought) are the three main kinds of subjective experience: sensing – feeling – imagining/thinking.
If you tell me that plants are subjects of experience, but that the kinds of experiences they have aren't subsumable under any of those three main kinds, then I just don't know what you're talking about—and I suspect you don't know either what you're talking about.

Sculptor1 wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 10:34 amWe can, however, surmise that whatever we might think of consciousness, plants have nothing whatever like it.

Why do most of us think that? Because there are good reasons to believe that the physiology of plants doesn't satisfy the necessary physiological or physical conditions for consciousness.
What makes panpsychism utterly incredible is its implicit claim that there aren't any necessary physiological or physical conditions for consciousness: Everything whatever—be it material or immaterial—can be and is a subject of consciousness.
Moreover, what is also utterly incredible is panpsychism's implication that no structural or functional complexity of any sort and degree is required for consciousness: A simple (noncomposite and thus structureless) elementary particle can be conscious, and a simple immaterial soul can be conscious as well. How is that possible? The panpsychists have failed to give any plausible answer!

Consul wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 11:24 am

Sculptor1 wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 10:34 amWe can, however, surmise that whatever we might think of consciousness, plants have nothing whatever like it.

Why do most of us think that? Because there are good reasons to believe that the physiology of plants doesn't satisfy the necessary physiological or physical conditions for consciousness.

What makes panpsychism utterly incredible is its implicit claim that there aren't any necessary physiological or physical conditions for consciousness: Everything whatever—be it material or immaterial—can be and is a subject of consciousness.
Moreover, what is also utterly incredible is panpsychism's implication that no structural or functional complexity of any sort and degree is required for consciousness: A simple (noncomposite and thus structureless) elementary particle can be conscious, and a simple immaterial soul can be conscious as well. How is that possible? The panpsychists have failed to give any plausible answer!

Panpsychism would give equal status to a atom of hydrogen and the brain of Einstein. Where's the merit in it?

Consul wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 9:12 amQUOTE>
"[H]ow do you distinguish an unaccessed state of phenomenal consciousness of which you are not aware from a nonconscious state of which you are not aware? Awareness in each case depends on access. So what is unaccessed phenomenal consciousness?"

(LeDoux, Joseph. Anxious: Using the Brain to Understand and Treat Fear and Anxiety. New York: Viking, 2015. p. 164)
<QUOTE

The epistemic dilemma for first-person theorists is that nobody can empirically find out and know whether there is a difference between a had but unknown experience and an unhad experience, since by becoming known an unknown experience would cease to be unknown. Obviously, as soon as you become aware of an experience, it's no longer an experience of which you are not aware; so you cannot know whether there ever was an experience of which you weren't aware, and which is independent of your awareness of it. So it may well be that the higher-theorists are right, and that in the case of consciousness esse est percipi.

However, if experience depends on cognitive awareness of it, I don't think the latter must occur in the form of deliberate reflection: An experience needn't be thought to be had in order to be had. But I do think that cognitive awareness in the form of some nonzero degree of inner attention or concentration is necessary for subjective experiencing, i.e. for a mental/neural state to become a phenomenally conscious one. So, arguably, no organism is phenomenally conscious unless it is equipped with a neurocognitive mechanism enabling introspective attention.
For example, what is it like for you to feel a pain to which you pay no attention at all? I think there is nothing it is like for you; and if that's the case, you don't really feel any pain. It seems an unattended and thus unnoticed pain is an unfelt and thus unhad pain.

Sculptor1 wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 11:56 am Panpsychism would give equal status to a atom of hydrogen and the brain of Einstein. Where's the merit in it?

A panpsychist would reply that brainless atoms have only very primitive subhuman minds.

Anyway, if nervous systems and especially central ones (brains) are unnecessary for cognition and consciousness, why did they evolve when minds are independent of them? Of course, a panpsychist can reply that some kinds of minds need brains and others don't; but this reply seems ad hoc, because the panpsychists cannot give any non-arbitrary, principled reasons why mind-type x is brain-dependent and mind-type y is not.

Consul wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 12:32 pm

Sculptor1 wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 11:56 am Panpsychism would give equal status to a atom of hydrogen and the brain of Einstein. Where's the merit in it?

A panpsychist would reply that brainless atoms have only very primitive subhuman minds.

Anyway, if nervous systems and especially central ones (brains) are unnecessary for cognition and consciousness, why did they evolve when minds are independent of them? Of course, a panpsychist can reply that some kinds of minds need brains and others don't; but this reply seems ad hoc, because the panpsychists cannot give any non-arbitrary, principled reasons why mind-type x is brain-dependent and mind-type y is not.

There big argument seems to revolve about the fact that no one can adequately explain the phenomenon of consciousness therefore it justifies their theory of magic.
Like no one can say how matter is created so it must have been god.
Or no one knows how many alien species there are in the galaxy so that proves I was anally probed.

Pattern-chaser wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 10:06 am

Consul wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 9:12 am Of course, the only (phenomenal) consciousness that is directly accessible to me is my own human one; so the meaning of my concept of consciousness is fixed with reference to (the contents of) my own human consciousness.

Therefore, you cannot - i.e. are not able to - carry out a formal scientific or philosophical investigation into plant consciousness, can you? So what do you propose? Should we abandon this quest, or is there a way we can proceed?

What would matter is solely the meaning of the discovered sensations in plants, to provide a basis to demand a base level of respect for plants (applicability of moral consideration by the human).

At question is of course not whether plants have a similar conscious experience as animals, as if that would be a ground to determine whether plants should be provided with moral consideration (respect) or to decide whether plants should be seen as meaningless machine like automata.

When meaning is the foundation (the start point of consideration), then the spectrum of meaningful notions of the concept consciousness would be braodenend beyond the scope of the animal one.

With regard the importance of a potential recognition of meaningfulness of 'plant experience'. If plants are to posses of meaningful experience, whatever that may entail on an individual level (e.g. a blade of grass vs a 1,000 year old tree), then they are to be considered meaningful within a context that can be denoted as 'vitality of Nature' or Nature's bigger whole (Gaia Philosophy), of which the human is a part and of which the human intends to be a prosperous part.

From that perspective, a base level of respect (moral consideration) for plants may be essential for successful long term evolution.

My primary concern and motive to address the subject is synthetic biology (eugenics on Nature) in which plants and animals are reduced to meaningless beyond the value that a company (a short term self-interest perspective) can see in them.

If plants are sentient and have certain interests to be happy, synthetic biology may be one of the worst disasters possible for them. Synthetic biology may destroy what is required for Nature to prosper.

I'm having a real problem deciding what to eat. I was going to have a salad, I've got lots of nice fresh tomatoes, cucumber, radishes, olives and so on, but I'm now worried that they may all be conscious. I mean, the tomatoes aren't attached to the mother plant any more, but maybe it's just like they've gone off to uni, you know?

So I'm thinking I'll leave the salad veg in peace, and eat some vegetables out of a tin - or, as I'm now thinking of it, a little metal coffin. Because even if they were conscious when they were put in there, they've been in there for long time, so they're probably dead by now, don't you think? But still, I'm not sure. Maybe they're just asleep.......

I've got some fresh mushrooms. Are fungi safe to eat? Or are fungi just very slow plants?

I did think of having a slice of bread, but then I thought of all those wheat plants brutally cut down and having their ears cut off, and I couldn't face it.

Earlier today I caught my dog eating soil from one of the tubs in the garden. I told him off, because for all I know, soil may be conscious.

I'm getting really hungry. Can anyone help?

CIN wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 7:07 pm I'm having a real problem deciding what to eat. I was going to have a salad, I've got lots of nice fresh tomatoes, cucumber, radishes, olives and so on, but I'm now worried that they may all be conscious. I mean, the tomatoes aren't attached to the mother plant any more, but maybe it's just like they've gone off to uni, you know?

Think of the noise a lettuce makes when you rip it apart!!
Crunsshshshshsh. Poo thing.

So I'm thinking I'll leave the salad veg in peace, and eat some vegetables out of a tin - or, as I'm now thinking of it, a little metal coffin. Because even if they were conscious when they were put in there, they've been in there for long time, so they're probably dead by now, don't you think? But still, I'm not sure. Maybe they're just asleep.......

I've got some fresh mushrooms. Are fungi safe to eat? Or are fungi just very slow plants?

I did think of having a slice of bread, but then I thought of all those wheat plants brutally cut down and having their ears cut off, and I couldn't face it.

Just because it is processes does not mean it is not STILL suffering. Pan psychism means even a rock is conscious.

Earlier today I caught my dog eating soil from one of the tubs in the garden. I told him off, because for all I know, soil may be conscious.

THink of all the bacteria, and single celled organisms.

I'm getting really hungry. Can anyone help?

All those bacteria in your gut are also hungry, how are you going to stop their suffering?

Sculptor1 wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 11:56 am

Consul wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 11:24 am

Sculptor1 wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 10:34 amWe can, however, surmise that whatever we might think of consciousness, plants have nothing whatever like it.

Why do most of us think that? Because there are good reasons to believe that the physiology of plants doesn't satisfy the necessary physiological or physical conditions for consciousness.

What makes panpsychism utterly incredible is its implicit claim that there aren't any necessary physiological or physical conditions for consciousness: Everything whatever—be it material or immaterial—can be and is a subject of consciousness.
Moreover, what is also utterly incredible is panpsychism's implication that no structural or functional complexity of any sort and degree is required for consciousness: A simple (noncomposite and thus structureless) elementary particle can be conscious, and a simple immaterial soul can be conscious as well. How is that possible? The panpsychists have failed to give any plausible answer!

Panpsychism would give equal status to a atom of hydrogen and the brain of Einstein. Where's the merit in it?

That is not panpsychism as I've heard it described. That's just the flakiest end of the new age movement. Read my aura, Dora, it's real angora. By the same token, most Christians do not believe in the Big Man in the Sky, but have more subtle beliefs.

As far as I can tell, panpsychism, unlike materialism, does not treat "automatic" reactions and reflexes as entirely unconscious but as proto-consciousness, that is part of a continuum. At least that's the case with "soft panpsychism".

An analogy would be panvitalism, which does not think of evolution as being a purely biological phenomenon, but part of a larger process that includes the atomic and chemical changes that lead up to abiogenesis. The line from exploding plasma to mammals is not a smooth one. There are "jumps", key pivot points - a star's ignition, planetary formation, volcanism, abiogenesis, lucid consciousness. All of these processes are treated by panvitalists as a continuum. I suspect that the case of consciousness has a similar dynamic. In each case, it's just a matter of perspective rather than a challenge to the scientific status quo, a greater focus on commonalities than differences.

Consider the difference between the first life form and the most complex non-living metabolism that preceded it. Or the difference between the first (recognisably) conscious, brained animal and its (ostensibly) non-conscious parents. My guess is that the differences would be small.

I have just joined this discussion if I may do so without having read previous arguments.

I am sure unless we very soon grant rights to plants we will not eat.

Sy Borg wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 9:13 pm

Sculptor1 wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 11:56 am

Consul wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 11:24 am

Sculptor1 wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 10:34 amWe can, however, surmise that whatever we might think of consciousness, plants have nothing whatever like it.

Why do most of us think that? Because there are good reasons to believe that the physiology of plants doesn't satisfy the necessary physiological or physical conditions for consciousness.

What makes panpsychism utterly incredible is its implicit claim that there aren't any necessary physiological or physical conditions for consciousness: Everything whatever—be it material or immaterial—can be and is a subject of consciousness.
Moreover, what is also utterly incredible is panpsychism's implication that no structural or functional complexity of any sort and degree is required for consciousness: A simple (noncomposite and thus structureless) elementary particle can be conscious, and a simple immaterial soul can be conscious as well. How is that possible? The panpsychists have failed to give any plausible answer!

Panpsychism would give equal status to a atom of hydrogen and the brain of Einstein. Where's the merit in it?

That is not panpsychism as I've heard it described. That's just the flakiest end of the new age movement. Read my aura, Dora, it's real angora. By the same token, most Christians do not believe in the Big Man in the Sky, but have more subtle beliefs.

As far as I can tell, panpsychism, unlike materialism, does not treat "automatic" reactions and reflexes as entirely unconscious but as proto-consciousness, that is part of a continuum. At least that's the case with "soft panpsychism".

An analogy would be panvitalism, which does not think of evolution as being a purely biological phenomenon, but part of a larger process that includes the atomic and chemical changes that lead up to abiogenesis. The line from exploding plasma to mammals is not a smooth one. There are "jumps", key pivot points - a star's ignition, planetary formation, volcanism, abiogenesis, lucid consciousness. All of these processes are treated by panvitalists as a continuum. I suspect that the case of consciousness has a similar dynamic. In each case, it's just a matter of perspective rather than a challenge to the scientific status quo, a greater focus on commonalities than differences.

Consider the difference between the first life form and the most complex non-living metabolism that preceded it. Or the difference between the first (recognisably) conscious, brained animal and its (ostensibly) non-conscious parents. My guess is that the differences would be small.

This does not make your case at all.
As for talk of this sort of panpsychism and that sort of pan vitalism i have this to say:
There is fudge and then there is synthetic fudge sauce. You can also get re-constituted fudge based protein flavoured shake. Still all tastes like fudge. And BTW, none of these confections are moral agents.

No one is ever going to give a mosquito moral status for any reason, but there is every reason to assess a mosquito's ability in the consciousness department as being greater than all plants of any kind.
If consciousness is the key to morality then plants do not have it.

Consul wrote: ↑May 22nd, 2021, 11:09 am ...I just don't know what you're talking about—and I suspect you don't know either what you're talking about.

Correct. Plant consciousness, if there is such a thing, is an unknown area for all of us. I am responding to the apparent certainty of some posters. Once we get past that, we could perhaps begin to speculate on what plant consciousness might be, and how it might look to us. But first I think we must ditch our preconceptions; it is surely obvious to all of us that human and plant consciousness must differ considerably, and lessons learned from one probably can't be applied to the other.