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[Belindi]

Papus79 wrote:

----neurons, while special in certain kinds of potency, seem to be a difference in amount rather than a difference in kind.

Yes. There are several chemical psychoactive secretions in the brain each of which activates a different sort of consciousness, e.g. REM sleep, deep sleep: waking awareness. These psychoactive secretions become depleted by turns and then another secretion becomes dominant.

[SteveKlinko]

Yes exactly, some Magical property of the Neurons that nobody knows about. It's only a Speculation and not any kind of Scientific fact. Doesn't mean the Physicalist/Materialist proposition is wrong, but it sure has not been shown to be true.

In fact, the statement that Conscious Experience is Identical to Electrochemical Mechanisms in the Brain doesn't make sense at any level as an Explanation of anything. The statement is completely Incoherent on the face of it. The Experience of Redness for example stands as a Phenomenon that exists as a Thing-In-Itself. The Experience of Redness is in a different Category of Phenomenon than any Phenomenon of Electrochemical Neural Activity. You are expressing a pure Belief, without any Chain of Logic to explain it.

If I may interject, I personally believe that Conscious Experience is essentially identical to the enclosed system of the neurons' own dialectics that is created from neural interactions——where their languages within the dialectics are the sheer "facts" that electrochemical mechanisms work in a specific way within the neurons themselves and the meanings/each symbols of the languages are how exactly the electrochemical mechanisms work in certain areas. I'd like to hear your thoughts on this one.

It is fine to Speculate and Believe. You might be right. But there must be some Chain of Logic that starts with the Neural Activity you specified and shows how something like the Experience of Redness is produced.

I would say that sensory experiences such as the experience of seeing red is created when our neurons receive information in their own ways and try to process it in their own ways. As in, it happens during the process in which the neurons try to translate the impulse from light into the electrochemical languages that they operate on.

Basically, colors are what lightwaves mean to the overall dialectics between the biological components/neurons. Or how lightwaves affect their network.

Since colors are purely native to the mind and do not exist in the actual world, we can safely assume that colors arise from the interactions that involve what makes our mind, our mind. In this case, what makes our mind our mind, in the face of outside environmental impulse (lightwaves) that is not internal. To look into what neural interactions display this notion, we can look into how the neurons *unknowingly* solidify what makes the mind what it is—their own languages within the dialectic system, while they translate lightwaves into their own languages.

That's not a Chain of Logic.

[Papus79]

Oof, those are some big philosophical terms I haven't learned yet. (FYI English is not my first language) Could you dumb it down for me a little? Thanks a lot.

Youtube or Google Michael Levin. That's my TL/DR.

[Papus79]

Yes. There are several chemical psychoactive secretions in the brain each of which activates a different sort of consciousness, e.g. REM sleep, deep sleep: waking awareness. These psychoactive secretions become depleted by turns and then another secretion becomes dominant.

I meant something a bit more like neurons being more specialized for certain kinds of information relay and processing but most if not all other cells having some degree of that function.

[Consul]

No, just (certain combinations and interactions of) natural properties physicists and chemists know about!

"Que si vous me demandez, comment les premieres qualitez produisent les secondes, ie vous diray que quelques Atheurs enseignent, qu'elles les produisent comme causes effectives. Les autres disent qu'elles sont seulement leurs causes materielles, & que de leur meslange naissant les qualitez secondes. Et en cette opinion il est tres probable, que les secondes qualitez ne sont rien autre chose que les qualitez premieres diversement meslées."

(Dabillon, André. La physique des bons esprits, ou l'idée et abrégé d'une physique familière et solide. Paris, 1643. pp. 139-40)

"…it is very probable that the secondary qualities are nothing else but the primary qualities diversely mixed." (A. Dabillon)

—

"What of the secondaries? Think of secondary qualities as arrangements of the primaries."

(Heil, John. The Universe As We Find It. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. p. 82)

So the idea is that the secondary (experiential/phenomenal) qualities are nothing over and above certain mixtures or fusions of primary (physical/chemical) qualities (of the brain). When we are introspectively aware of the secondary qualities we experience, what we are actually aware of are groups of primary qualities in a holistic state of dynamic synthesis that isn't introspectively analyzable into discrete and distinct primary qualities. (But there are complex secondary qualities which are introspectively analyzable into secondary elements.) These holistic states of phenomenal consciousness are neurologically (physicochemically) intransparent and impenetrable from the first-person point of view of introspection. Introspective analysis cannot possibly reveal the real material essence or structure of qualia; and that is what misleads us into believing that they have no material essence or structure, no physicochemical composition or constitution.

[SteveKlinko]

No, just (certain combinations and interactions of) natural properties physicists and chemists know about!

"Que si vous me demandez, comment les premieres qualitez produisent les secondes, ie vous diray que quelques Atheurs enseignent, qu'elles les produisent comme causes effectives. Les autres disent qu'elles sont seulement leurs causes materielles, & que de leur meslange naissant les qualitez secondes. Et en cette opinion il est tres probable, que les secondes qualitez ne sont rien autre chose que les qualitez premieres diversement meslées."

(Dabillon, André. La physique des bons esprits, ou l'idée et abrégé d'une physique familière et solide. Paris, 1643. pp. 139-40)

"…it is very probable that the secondary qualities are nothing else but the primary qualities diversely mixed." (A. Dabillon)

—

"What of the secondaries? Think of secondary qualities as arrangements of the primaries."

(Heil, John. The Universe As We Find It. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. p. 82)

So the idea is that the secondary (experiential/phenomenal) qualities are nothing over and above certain mixtures or fusions of primary (physical/chemical) qualities (of the brain). When we are introspectively aware of the secondary qualities we experience, what we are actually aware of are groups of primary qualities in a holistic state of dynamic synthesis that isn't introspectively analyzable into discrete and distinct primary qualities. (But there are complex secondary qualities which are introspectively analyzable into secondary elements.) These holistic states of phenomenal consciousness are neurologically (physicochemically) intransparent and impenetrable from the first-person point of view of introspection. Introspective analysis cannot possibly reveal the real material essence or structure of qualia; and that is what misleads us into believing that they have no material essence or structure, no physicochemical composition or constitution.

Take any Conscious Experience you like (I like Redness) and show me how that Conscious Experience is the result of Neural Activity. It's the simplest question in the world. There's Neural Activity and then there's a Conscious Experience. How?

[The Beast]

I admit as true that there was a light spectrum plus x-rays and gamma rays. In addition, there was a substratum. In the beginning, a process of absorption of energy by the substratum included the lowest values of the light spectrum. The same as gravity, I speculate in a Universal process of self-calibration. As energy decreased by the filtering of the atmosphere the now self-calibrating molecules added a mechanism (existing in particles) to absorb the energy of other unsuspecting molecules. Offensive and defensive mechanisms evolved. If the idea is a covariance of a recalling mechanism of the executive function and only in the red spectra, then why not get more ideas. The least energetic process allows for less wear and tear of the supporting network by producing and absorbing waves in the red which correlates with the values measured so far. Low intensity and wider wavelength. It may be that the network is electrochemical responding only in the red spectrum.

[Papus79]

This is interesting (1:00:00), he's saying that gap junctions break autonomy in living systems, ie. combine organisms to become organisms, which is where he's suggesting that collective sense of self comes from:

Mindscape 132 | Michael Levin on Information, Form, Growth, and the Self:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gm7VDk8kxOw

[Belindi]

SteveKlinko wrote:

Take any Conscious Experience you like (I like Redness) and show me how that Conscious Experience is the result of Neural Activity. It's the simplest question in the world. There's Neural Activity and then there's a Conscious Experience. How?

Easy!

Take the conscious experience of walking upstairs.

Knee joints, hips joints, ankle joints , foot joints, and balance mechanisms send feedback via afferent nerves to the brain which sorts these distal impressions from organs of special sense so that they form a useful "wide screen image" of what is going on.

The above is description only and not a anatomical explanation which would be too much for a philosophy forum. But you can easily look it up.

[SteveKlinko]

SteveKlinko wrote:

Take any Conscious Experience you like (I like Redness) and show me how that Conscious Experience is the result of Neural Activity. It's the simplest question in the world. There's Neural Activity and then there's a Conscious Experience. How?

Easy!

Take the conscious experience of walking upstairs.

Knee joints, hips joints, ankle joints , foot joints, and balance mechanisms send feedback via afferent nerves to the brain which sorts these distal impressions from organs of special sense so that they form a useful "wide screen image" of what is going on.

The above is description only and not a anatomical explanation which would be too much for a philosophy forum. But you can easily look it up.

But how do you Experience all these Impressions? Think about the Impressions themselves. What are those Sensations of the Impressions? That's the Hard Problem.

[Belindi]

SteveKlinko wrote:

Take any Conscious Experience you like (I like Redness) and show me how that Conscious Experience is the result of Neural Activity. It's the simplest question in the world. There's Neural Activity and then there's a Conscious Experience. How?

Easy!

Take the conscious experience of walking upstairs.

Knee joints, hips joints, ankle joints , foot joints, and balance mechanisms send feedback via afferent nerves to the brain which sorts these distal impressions from organs of special sense so that they form a useful "wide screen image" of what is going on.

The above is description only and not a anatomical explanation which would be too much for a philosophy forum. But you can easily look it up.

But how do you Experience all these Impressions? Think about the Impressions themselves. What are those Sensations of the Impressions? That's the Hard Problem.

If all brains were the same great brain there would be no problem of consciousness. As it biologically is, qualia are mysterious because each subject of a quale has privileged access to it.

Trees,who together with fungi ,are being described in terms of one great nervous system have no problem with qualia.

[SteveKlinko]

SteveKlinko wrote:

Take any Conscious Experience you like (I like Redness) and show me how that Conscious Experience is the result of Neural Activity. It's the simplest question in the world. There's Neural Activity and then there's a Conscious Experience. How?

Easy!

Take the conscious experience of walking upstairs.

Knee joints, hips joints, ankle joints , foot joints, and balance mechanisms send feedback via afferent nerves to the brain which sorts these distal impressions from organs of special sense so that they form a useful "wide screen image" of what is going on.

The above is description only and not a anatomical explanation which would be too much for a philosophy forum. But you can easily look it up.

But how do you Experience all these Impressions? Think about the Impressions themselves. What are those Sensations of the Impressions? That's the Hard Problem.

If all brains were the same great brain there would be no problem of consciousness. As it biologically is, qualia are mysterious because each subject of a quale has privileged access to it.

Trees,who together with fungi ,are being described in terms of one great nervous system have no problem with qualia.

The Privileged Access is only part of the Problem. Even with some Great Brain there would be a Hard Problem. Because there is still the mystery of the Conscious Experience of the Standard A Tone, Taste of Salt, Smell of Bleach, etc. But mostly that Beautiful, High Def, Wide Screen, Visual Experience that is embedded in the front of our faces. What the heck is that? Contemplate your own Visual Experience. Do you have any idea what you are actually Seeing? Are you Seeing the Physical Objects you are Looking at, or are you Seeing some Surrogate Image Phenomenon suspended in front of your face?

[Pattern-chaser]

I meant something a bit more like neurons being more specialized...

I am no expert in neurochemistry, but I think the merit of neurons, and the way they work, is that they are NOT specialised...?

[Papus79]

I am no expert in neurochemistry, but I think the merit of neurons, and the way they work, is that they are NOT specialised...?

So axon, dendrites, and all of the gapped myelin is something every other cell has?

If they're not optimized for cross-system communication then I'm not sure I understand what I'm looking at.

[Pattern-chaser]

I am no expert in neurochemistry, but I think the merit of neurons, and the way they work, is that they are NOT specialised...?

So axon, dendrites, and all of the gapped myelin is something every other cell has?

If they're not optimized for cross-system communication then I'm not sure I understand what I'm looking at.

Ah. Ooops! I meant that neurons aren't specialised within themselves. Of course they do stuff that other cells don't do, using their 'tentacles' to connect to their fellows, and thus magically create ... a mind???