Philosophy Discussion Forums

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 21st, 2020, 7:23 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 20th, 2020, 4:25 pm

Non-mentally?

Er, no, TP. We don't learn things "non-mentally." But most of the things we learn, such as the meanings of words and other facts about the world, are "non-mental."

You persist in conflating knowledge a thing or fact with the thing or fact known.

This statement is INSANE.
All meaning is mental. Facts are mental. That an apple is red is only meaningful; it is only a fact because we are interested in the colour of apples.
Objectively. I mean properly objectively "red" and "apple" are not meaningful or factual, they just exist.
You are living in your own delusion to make a statement like this.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 20th, 2020, 4:38 pm

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 20th, 2020, 2:27 pm

What I was most interested in your addressing was something you completely ignored (though no surprise that you just ignored it:)

Let's say that we have "Paris is the capital of France" written or in sound (like a recording) or something.

Now, what exactly happens for the marks on the paper or the sound to have "true" or "false" assigned to it relative to non-mental things in the world.

Remember, if you say anything that involves people doing things where they need to be mentally active--making observations, making decisions, making judgments, etc. you're going to get a buzzer, because you're claiming that truth ascriptions have NOTHING to do with ANYTHING in people's heads.

Nope. That is not what I said. I said nothing about "truth ascriptions." I said that the truth or falsity of a proposition has nothing to do with what is in anyone's head. Again, you conflate knowledge of a fact with the fact known. The knowledge is in someone's head; the fact isn't. Knowledge of meanings is in people's heads; the meanings aren't. Ascribing a property to a thing requires a mental process in someone's head; the thing and the property ascribed to it are not in anyone's head. I need know nothing about what is in your head to know what meaning you attach to "dog." I need only hear your words and observe your behavior.

Sculptor1 wrote: ↑February 21st, 2020, 7:44 pm
All meaning is mental. Facts are mental. That an apple is red is only meaningful; it is only a fact because we are interested in the colour of apples.
Objectively. I mean properly objectively "red" and "apple" are not meaningful or factual, they just exist.

"Properly" objectively? Please spell out what that means.

If "all meanings are mental," "things in people's heads," then I can't possibly know what you mean by the words you just wrote, since I cannot read your mind. Hence we cannot possibly communicate productively.

You've gotten yourself impaled on the same reductio ad absurdum that haunts TP's similar claims.

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 21st, 2020, 7:49 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 20th, 2020, 4:38 pm

What I was most interested in your addressing was something you completely ignored (though no surprise that you just ignored it:)

Let's say that we have "Paris is the capital of France" written or in sound (like a recording) or something.

Now, what exactly happens for the marks on the paper or the sound to have "true" or "false" assigned to it relative to non-mental things in the world.

Remember, if you say anything that involves people doing things where they need to be mentally active--making observations, making decisions, making judgments, etc. you're going to get a buzzer, because you're claiming that truth ascriptions have NOTHING to do with ANYTHING in people's heads.

Nope. That is not what I said. I said nothing about "truth ascriptions." I said that the truth or falsity of a proposition has nothing to do with what is in anyone's head. Again, you conflate knowledge of a fact with the fact known. The knowledge is in someone's head; the fact isn't. Knowledge of meanings is in people's heads; the meanings aren't. Ascribing a property to a thing requires a mental process in someone's head; the thing and the property ascribed to it are not in anyone's head. I need know nothing about what is in your head to know what meaning you attach to "dog." I need only hear your words and observe your behavior.

Instead of futzing about and stalling over the word "ascription," let's get down to how this works in your view.

So we have ""Paris is the capital of France" written or in sound (like a recording) or something.

What happens next for "true" to be attached to the writing or sound in question?

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 21st, 2020, 7:23 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 20th, 2020, 4:25 pm

Non-mentally?

Er, no, TP. We don't learn things "non-mentally." But most of the things we learn, such as the meanings of words and other facts about the world, are "non-mental."

You persist in conflating knowledge a thing or fact with the thing or fact known.

Right, so the non-mental association obtains how, exactly? Pick an example and let's examine exactly how it works.

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 21st, 2020, 7:32 pm Using have/has doesn't obliterate the distinction between sensible properties and imputed properties. "Alfie has a bald head" is a sensible property, confirmable by examining Alfie. "Alfie has a degree in philosophy" is an imputed property. Confirming it requires examining some school records, not Alfie.

I'm not disagreeing with this. I'm pointing out that it's irrelevant. Whether it's a "sensible" or "imputed" property doesn't change the fact that the properties in those examples are properties the "item" in question possesses. That's not the case with "objective proposition." The proposition doesn't possess the property of being non-mental, whether you say that it's a sensible or an imputed property.

A proposition "has" (or does not have) the imputed property of being objective in the same sense that Alfie "has" a degree in philosophy. In both cases the proposition asserting the property is true if certain external facts involving the subject of the proposition are true.

What it is to have a property is nothing about a proposition being true. What it is to have a property is a physical fact about the item in question. Alfie having the property of having a degree in philosophy means that Alfie did certain things, was awarded certain things, etc.

A proposition, however, can't do something extramental, can't be awarded something extramental, etc.

The proposition can be ABOUT something extramental, but that doesn't make the proposition itself extramental in any regard. That's a use/mention confusion.

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 21st, 2020, 7:33 pm PS: Another term for this difference is "local" and "non-local" properties.

Nothing has "non-local properties" period.

Sculptor1 wrote: ↑February 21st, 2020, 7:44 pm

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 21st, 2020, 7:23 pm

Er, no, TP. We don't learn things "non-mentally." But most of the things we learn, such as the meanings of words and other facts about the world, are "non-mental."

You persist in conflating knowledge a thing or fact with the thing or fact known.

This statement is INSANE.
All meaning is mental. Facts are mental. That an apple is red is only meaningful; it is only a fact because we are interested in the colour of apples.
Objectively. I mean properly objectively "red" and "apple" are not meaningful or factual, they just exist.
You are living in your own delusion to make a statement like this.

I don't agree that (all) facts are mental. I'm using "fact" as "state of affairs" (with an understanding that states of affairs are actually dynamic, by the way). Or in other words, I'm using "fact" as a term for "just existing." I'm NOT using "fact" as a term for something like "true proposition."

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 21st, 2020, 7:58 pm
So we have ""Paris is the capital of France" written or in sound (like a recording) or something.

What happens next for "true" to be attached to the writing or sound in question?

I answered that question many posts back, TP. What happens next is that someone who hears that proposition travels to Paris and observes whether the French Assembly regularly meets there, whether most government departments have their headquarters there, whether the official residence of the President is there, etc. If those facts are confirmed then the proposition above is "true."

Now, whether that someone (say, Alfie) "attaches" that predicate to the proposition is a different question. People can always be deluded, lying, or just confused. But if you doubt Alfie's report you can travel there and confirm them yourself. Those truth conditions are public.

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 21st, 2020, 7:57 pm If "all meanings are mental," "things in people's heads," then I can't possibly know what you mean by the words you just wrote

You can't know-by-acquaintance whether the meanings you assign are the "same" as the meanings I assign. That's correct.

Hence we cannot possibly communicate productively.

This is not correct.

We communicate "productively" just in case we both assign meanings to observables (such as what we type) so that the meanings are coherent and consistent to each of us, in the context of present, past and future utterances and behavior. It's irrelevant whether we actually assign the "same" meanings to anything (they're never going to be literally the same, because nominalism has things right.)

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 21st, 2020, 8:10 pm So we have ""Paris is the capital of France" written or in sound (like a recording) or something.

What happens next for "true" to be attached to the writing or sound in question?

I answered that question many posts back, TP. What happens next is that someone who hears that proposition travels to Paris and observes[/quote]

BZZZZZZT!

Your answer can't involve anyone's mind if you're claiming that truth obtains without involving minds.

Someone traveling to Paris and observing something is involving someone's mind.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 21st, 2020, 7:59 pm
Right, so the non-mental association obtains how, exactly? Pick an example and let's examine exactly how it works.

You seem to be asking how learning occurs. That is a question for neurophysiology, and well beyond my expertise and the scope of this thread.

If you're requiring people observing things, then this can't be the case:

2020: we send an unmanned ship, the Rocinante, into interstellar space containing many books, including chemistry textbooks, physics textbooks, etc.
2022: the Earth is destroyed so that no humans are left, and it turns out to be the case that we were the only creatures in the universe with minds.
2023: the books on the Rocinante contain sentences that are true or false in 2023.

Which makes it clear that you require something mental for truth value.

Otherwise, you need to explain how, in 2023, the books on the Rocinante contain sentences that are true or false in 2023.

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 21st, 2020, 8:16 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 21st, 2020, 7:59 pm
Right, so the non-mental association obtains how, exactly? Pick an example and let's examine exactly how it works.

You seem to be asking how learning occurs. That is a question for neurophysiology, and well beyond my expertise and the scope of this thread.

Neurophysiology would be an answer claiming that we're talking about mental associations, not non-mental associations.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 21st, 2020, 8:11 pm

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 21st, 2020, 7:57 pm If "all meanings are mental," "things in people's heads," then I can't possibly know what you mean by the words you just wrote

You can't know-by-acquaintance whether the meanings you assign are the "same" as the meanings I assign. That's correct.

Of course I can. If I ask you to point out the dog in a photo, and and you point to the dachshund (not to the elm tree or the lamppost or the pigeon, then I know you attach the same meaning to that word I do. To rule out chance I may present several other photos containing dogs. If you consistently finger the dogs, then we attach the same meaning to that word. I need know nothing about what is in your head to know that.

We communicate "productively" just in case we both assign meanings to observables (such as what we type) so that the meanings are coherent and consistent to each of us, in the context of present, past and future utterances and behavior. It's irrelevant whether we actually assign the "same" meanings to anything (they're never going to be literally the same, because nominalism has things right.)

Now you seem to be contradicting yourself. Yes, the way you will know whether Alfie's meanings are consistent with yours are by observing his behavior, including his uses of words. You need know nothing about what is in his head. Then you need to explain how such consistency can happen, how meanings can be so readily shared, if meanings are things in people's heads. After all, the number of possible meanings people could attach to any given word is infinite. Absent some common source for your understanding of the meaning of "dog" and Alfie's, consistency between you would be miraculous.