Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Terrapin Station]

Well, so generally in science, things are different from different reference points or different frames of reference.

Yeah you got me.

So your point is that things seem different to us when we're immersed in them. The tricky part is explaining how that would pan out specifically in terms of the mind-body relationship.

On my view, properties are different from every different reference point.

A simple example that's a favorite in some philosophy discussions is to consider something like a coin. From one reference point it's going to be circular (ideally, at least--coins are actually not perfect circles, of course, especially not microscopically), and from other reference points it's going to be various oblong, elliptical, etc. shapes. Those different shapes are really properties of the coin from different reference points. There isn't a "correct" reference point. There are just different ones.

Another simple example is that light is red-shifted as something moves away from a particular reference point, whereas it's blue-shifted as it moves closer to a particular reference point. Again, these are really qualities of the reflected light (well, or the reflected light in conjunction with the particular dynamic relations between the object in question and the reference point in question), and there isn't a "correct" reference point to be had for the properties at hand. There are just different reference points.

So, again, this is the case for all sorts of properties of all sorts of things.

With consciousness, there are different properties from the reference point of being the brain in question than there are from observing the brain in question from any third-person reference point.

[Atla]

Trying to measure what about qualia, though?

It seems like you're thinking that what it would be to measure S's qualia (whatever we're measuring about them) would necessarily be for S to have the same qualia. But I don't know why that would be what measuring qualia would amount to.

Not sure what you mean. We measure qualia all the time indirectly as neural correlates. But neural correlates are always just description, no matter how accurate we get. (Your tricks with properties don't change this either.)

Since a description isn't "what it's like", eliminative materialists like Dennett can forewer claim that there is no qualia at all, there is only description. Description = reality.

[Terrapin Station]

Trying to measure what about qualia, though?

It seems like you're thinking that what it would be to measure S's qualia (whatever we're measuring about them) would necessarily be for S to have the same qualia. But I don't know why that would be what measuring qualia would amount to.

Not sure what you mean. We measure qualia all the time indirectly as neural correlates. But neural correlates are always just description, no matter how accurate we get. (Your tricks with properties don't change this either.)

Since a description isn't "what it's like", eliminative materialists like Dennett can forewer claim that there is no qualia at all, there is only description. Description = reality.

I was asking for clarification because I wasn't sure that you were talking about measuring. Maybe you weren't using "measure" that literally, but measurements are quantitative data about some aspect of something. For example, to use teeth, since that was something you brought up, we can measure the size of teeth, we could measure their density, we can measure bite force, etc.

So if we're talking about measuring qualia, presumably we're talking about quantifying some aspect of qualia, no?

[Atla]

Not sure what you mean. We measure qualia all the time indirectly as neural correlates. But neural correlates are always just description, no matter how accurate we get. (Your tricks with properties don't change this either.)

Since a description isn't "what it's like", eliminative materialists like Dennett can forewer claim that there is no qualia at all, there is only description. Description = reality.

I was asking for clarification because I wasn't sure that you were talking about measuring. Maybe you weren't using "measure" that literally, but measurements are quantitative data about some aspect of something. For example, to use teeth, since that was something you brought up, we can measure the size of teeth, we could measure their density, we can measure bite force, etc.

So if we're talking about measuring qualia, presumably we're talking about quantifying some aspect of qualia, no?

No, that is exactly not what measuring qualia directly would need to be.

We already "quantify" qualia all the time as neural correlates. We are getting better and better at it, but that's all we can do.

What we can't do is measure the "what it's like" experience as it is. And because we can't do that, people can claim that it doesn't even exist.

[Terrapin Station]

I was asking for clarification because I wasn't sure that you were talking about measuring. Maybe you weren't using "measure" that literally, but measurements are quantitative data about some aspect of something. For example, to use teeth, since that was something you brought up, we can measure the size of teeth, we could measure their density, we can measure bite force, etc.

So if we're talking about measuring qualia, presumably we're talking about quantifying some aspect of qualia, no?

No, that is exactly not what measuring qualia directly would need to be.

We already "quantify" qualia all the time as neural correlates. We are getting better and better at it, but that's all we can do.

What we can't do is measure the "what it's like" experience as it is. And because we can't do that, people can claim that it doesn't even exist.

So you're using "measure" in a non-quantitative sense?

[Atla]

So you're using "measure" in a non-quantitative sense?

That was the question, can qualia be measured in a quantitative sense or not? If it can't be, then can it possibly be real?

[Terrapin Station]

So you're using "measure" in a non-quantitative sense?

That was the question, can qualia be measured in a quantitative sense or not? If it can't be, then can it possibly be real?

Okay, but we need to clarify what we're talking about measuring in a quantitative sense--how many qualia we experience? Something about the qualia? Etc.

I don't think the question makes any sense without clarifying it.

It's like if someone said, "Can we measure music in a qualitative sense?" Well, what about music? How many songs we've got? Something about the songs? (Like intervallic relationships? Rhythmic relationships? How many instruments were used? Etc.) I don't think the question makes much sense without clarifying just what we're talking about measuring, because the term is too broad, there are too many different aspects we might be thinking about.

If you're making the comment because someone is suggesting this--"we can't measure this, therefore it doesn't exist," then what we should ask that person is what I'm asking you--what about it are you thinking about measuring?

[Atla]

That was the question, can qualia be measured in a quantitative sense or not? If it can't be, then can it possibly be real?

Okay, but we need to clarify what we're talking about measuring in a quantitative sense--how many qualia we experience? Something about the qualia? Etc.

I don't think the question makes any sense without clarifying it.

It's like if someone said, "Can we measure music in a qualitative sense?" Well, what about music? How many songs we've got? Something about the songs? (Like intervallic relationships? Rhythmic relationships? How many instruments were used? Etc.) I don't think the question makes much sense without clarifying just what we're talking about measuring, because the term is too broad, there are too many different aspects we might be thinking about.

If you're making the comment because someone is suggesting this--"we can't measure this, therefore it doesn't exist," then what we should ask that person is what I'm asking you--what about it are you thinking about measuring?

Okay there are more like two issues here.

We can quantify the neural correlates of qualia, that's an indirect method.

But we can't measure qualia directly in any way, as the "what's it like" experience. We can neither detect nor quantify it, we can't find it at all.

[Terrapin Station]

Okay, but we need to clarify what we're talking about measuring in a quantitative sense--how many qualia we experience? Something about the qualia? Etc.

I don't think the question makes any sense without clarifying it.

It's like if someone said, "Can we measure music in a qualitative sense?" Well, what about music? How many songs we've got? Something about the songs? (Like intervallic relationships? Rhythmic relationships? How many instruments were used? Etc.) I don't think the question makes much sense without clarifying just what we're talking about measuring, because the term is too broad, there are too many different aspects we might be thinking about.

If you're making the comment because someone is suggesting this--"we can't measure this, therefore it doesn't exist," then what we should ask that person is what I'm asking you--what about it are you thinking about measuring?

Okay there are more like two issues here.

We can quantify the neural correlates of qualia, that's an indirect method.

But we can't measure qualia directly in any way, as the "what's it like" experience. We can neither detect nor quantify it, we can't find it at all.

Even with the neural correlates of qualia, what are we measuring, exactly?

[Atla]

Okay there are more like two issues here.

We can quantify the neural correlates of qualia, that's an indirect method.

But we can't measure qualia directly in any way, as the "what's it like" experience. We can neither detect nor quantify it, we can't find it at all.

Even with the neural correlates of qualia, what are we measuring, exactly?

Brain matter, EM activity in the brain etc.

[Terrapin Station]

Even with the neural correlates of qualia, what are we measuring, exactly?

Brain matter, EM activity in the brain etc.

So the measurements would be like "5 grams"? "2 cubic millimeters"? "55 mA"?

[Gertie]

Yeah you got me.

So your point is that things seem different to us when we're immersed in them. The tricky part is explaining how that would pan out specifically in terms of the mind-body relationship.

On my view, properties are different from every different reference point.

A simple example that's a favorite in some philosophy discussions is to consider something like a coin. From one reference point it's going to be circular (ideally, at least--coins are actually not perfect circles, of course, especially not microscopically), and from other reference points it's going to be various oblong, elliptical, etc. shapes. Those different shapes are really properties of the coin from different reference points. There isn't a "correct" reference point. There are just different ones.

Another simple example is that light is red-shifted as something moves away from a particular reference point, whereas it's blue-shifted as it moves closer to a particular reference point. Again, these are really qualities of the reflected light (well, or the reflected light in conjunction with the particular dynamic relations between the object in question and the reference point in question), and there isn't a "correct" reference point to be had for the properties at hand. There are just different reference points.

So, again, this is the case for all sorts of properties of all sorts of things.

With consciousness, there are different properties from the reference point of being the brain in question than there are from observing the brain in question from any third-person reference point.

I'm OK with that in principle, but in terms of creating a consensus around a Theory of Consciousness, there are particular problems.


One popular way to try to reconcile the different, sometimes contradictory properties of working brains and correlated experiential states, is Identity Theory, which suggests they are exactly the same thing, but looked at from different perspectives, specifically your point.

Another idea is that physical brain processes have novel emergent properties, experiential states. I think of that as a form of property dualism, but Consul will probably correct me.

Panpsychists suggest it's because conscious experience is a fundamental substance property of the universe, perhaps even a property of all matter, and the particular configuration present in humans is how that particular combo 'feels'.

Some think that the representational aspect of information processing is significant.

All those approaches can resolve your in principle point in their own ways. And each has its own problems.

The bigger problem is, if any of these are on the right track, how do we pick the right one?


There's no shortage of such whole cloth explanations, but how do we test them, or one against another? Without being able to directly observe and measure experiential states, understanding it 'mechanistically', or even knowing the necessary and sufficient conditions.

[Terrapin Station]

On my view, properties are different from every different reference point.

A simple example that's a favorite in some philosophy discussions is to consider something like a coin. From one reference point it's going to be circular (ideally, at least--coins are actually not perfect circles, of course, especially not microscopically), and from other reference points it's going to be various oblong, elliptical, etc. shapes. Those different shapes are really properties of the coin from different reference points. There isn't a "correct" reference point. There are just different ones.

Another simple example is that light is red-shifted as something moves away from a particular reference point, whereas it's blue-shifted as it moves closer to a particular reference point. Again, these are really qualities of the reflected light (well, or the reflected light in conjunction with the particular dynamic relations between the object in question and the reference point in question), and there isn't a "correct" reference point to be had for the properties at hand. There are just different reference points.

So, again, this is the case for all sorts of properties of all sorts of things.

With consciousness, there are different properties from the reference point of being the brain in question than there are from observing the brain in question from any third-person reference point.

I'm OK with that in principle, but in terms of creating a consensus around a Theory of Consciousness, there are particular problems.


One popular way to try to reconcile the different, sometimes contradictory properties of working brains and correlated experiential states, is Identity Theory, which suggests they are exactly the same thing, but looked at from different perspectives, specifically your point.

Another idea is that physical brain processes have novel emergent properties, experiential states. I think of that as a form of property dualism, but Consul will probably correct me.

Panpsychists suggest it's because conscious experience is a fundamental substance property of the universe, perhaps even a property of all matter, and the particular configuration present in humans is how that particular combo 'feels'.

Some think that the representational aspect of information processing is significant.

All those approaches can resolve your in principle point in their own ways. And each has its own problems.

The bigger problem is, if any of these are on the right track, how do we pick the right one?


There's no shortage of such whole cloth explanations, but how do we test them, or one against another? Without being able to directly observe and measure experiential states, understanding it 'mechanistically', or even knowing the necessary and sufficient conditions.

I've brought this up literally hundreds of times over tens of years, but the first problem we need to solve if the aim is to come up with an explanation is to settle on criteria for explanations--a la settling "Just what are explanations?" "Just what do they do and how do they do it?" "Just what are the requirements for explanations?" "Why are those the requirements" etc. If we can't do that, we have no business debating whether there's an explanation for something or how to arrive at an explanation for something.

[Atla]

Brain matter, EM activity in the brain etc.

So the measurements would be like "5 grams"? "2 cubic millimeters"? "55 mA"?

I guess something like that. Just to give a random nonsensical example: this standing wave in the EM field between these and these groups of brain cells is the correlation of the experience of this shade of red.

[Gertie]

I'm OK with that in principle, but in terms of creating a consensus around a Theory of Consciousness, there are particular problems.


One popular way to try to reconcile the different, sometimes contradictory properties of working brains and correlated experiential states, is Identity Theory, which suggests they are exactly the same thing, but looked at from different perspectives, specifically your point.

Another idea is that physical brain processes have novel emergent properties, experiential states. I think of that as a form of property dualism, but Consul will probably correct me.

Panpsychists suggest it's because conscious experience is a fundamental substance property of the universe, perhaps even a property of all matter, and the particular configuration present in humans is how that particular combo 'feels'.

Some think that the representational aspect of information processing is significant.

All those approaches can resolve your in principle point in their own ways. And each has its own problems.

The bigger problem is, if any of these are on the right track, how do we pick the right one?


There's no shortage of such whole cloth explanations, but how do we test them, or one against another? Without being able to directly observe and measure experiential states, understanding it 'mechanistically', or even knowing the necessary and sufficient conditions.

I've brought this up literally hundreds of times over tens of years, but the first problem we need to solve if the aim is to come up with an explanation is to settle on criteria for explanations--a la settling "Just what are explanations?" "Just what do they do and how do they do it?" "Just what are the requirements for explanations?" "Why are those the requirements" etc. If we can't do that, we have no business debating whether there's an explanation for something or how to arrive at an explanation for something.

We have a scientific tradition which has its own way of marking the difference between speculative hypothesis and established theory, which I'm assuming builds on the current materialist model of how the world works in terms of stuff and forces.

But according to that model, experiential states wouldn't be predicted by brain processes, in fact consciousness isn't even part of the standard model.

So what criteria do you suggest are appropriate, when we have a bunch of whole cloth hypotheses which aren't a good fit with that?