Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Steve3007]

Can you spell out what you mean?...

Sorry, I should have made it clearer that it was in relation to this post, which was itself in reply to a post by Terrapin Station:
viewtopic.php?p=350133#p350133

I had been saying (and have said before) to Terrapin Station that there is such a thing as an "objective proposition", and I think those are propositions about object. I also hold that objects are things that we propose to exist because they help to describe and predict the patterns in our observations. (That doesn't mean I'm an idealist; I'm not saying that objects don't exist, or are figments of our imagination or anything kooky like that.)

My points about other linguistic things, like transferred epithets, was a continued response to Terrapin's point about the grammatical problems in "objective proposition".

[Steve3007]

...and was also a bit of fun.

[Peter Holmes]

Can you spell out what you mean?...

Sorry, I should have made it clearer that it was in relation to this post, which was itself in reply to a post by Terrapin Station:
viewtopic.php?p=350133#p350133

I had been saying (and have said before) to Terrapin Station that there is such a thing as an "objective proposition", and I think those are propositions about object. I also hold that objects are things that we propose to exist because they help to describe and predict the patterns in our observations. (That doesn't mean I'm an idealist; I'm not saying that objects don't exist, or are figments of our imagination or anything kooky like that.)

My points about other linguistic things, like transferred epithets, was a continued response to Terrapin's point about the grammatical problems in "objective proposition".

Thanks - and sorry I didn't keep up with your discussion. We seem to have segued off in several different directions from my OP.

I think I agree with your approach. (I think propositions are misleading fictions - like all abstract things - so that there are only linguistic expressions. But anyway, it's what an assertion asserts that can be objective or subjective - independent from or dependent on opinion - and that's the issue with whether morality can be objective.)

[Terrapin Station]

Can you spell out what you mean?...

Sorry, I should have made it clearer that it was in relation to this post, which was itself in reply to a post by Terrapin Station:
viewtopic.php?p=350133#p350133

I had been saying (and have said before) to Terrapin Station that there is such a thing as an "objective proposition", and I think those are propositions about object. I also hold that objects are things that we propose to exist because they help to describe and predict the patterns in our observations. (That doesn't mean I'm an idealist; I'm not saying that objects don't exist, or are figments of our imagination or anything kooky like that.)

My points about other linguistic things, like transferred epithets, was a continued response to Terrapin's point about the grammatical problems in "objective proposition".

It's as important to read carefully as it is to write carefully. I wrote, " First, usually the 'adjective noun' form . . . "

[Terrapin Station]

At any rate, I agree with this: there are propositions about extramental objects (as long as one agrees that there are extramental objects, period).

I'm just not about to call that an "objective proposition."

[Terrapin Station]

Yeah, bringing it back on topic, on my view, there are no propositions about extramental moral assessments, because there's no such thing as an extramental moral assessment.

[Peter Holmes]

Terminology matters - as quite a few of our disagreements demonstrate. And that's one reason why it's useful to have these discussions, in my opinion.

[Peter Holmes]

Yeah, bringing it back on topic, on my view, there are no propositions about extramental moral assessments, because there's no such thing as an extramental moral assessment.

Spot on, given the distinction between 'mental' and 'extramental'.

[Steve3007]

It's as important to read carefully as it is to write carefully. I wrote, " First, usually the 'adjective noun' form . . . "

"Usually the "adjective noun" form suggests that the adjective is telling us a property of the noun as an existent."

Yes, I noticed the use of the word "usually" in that post. I generally read all of the words in your posts, if they are addressed at me, before considering how best to answer them. I don't see how that affects the relevance (or otherwise) of my point about your point about the grammar of the (unusual) term "objective proposition".

[Terrapin Station]

It's as important to read carefully as it is to write carefully. I wrote, " First, usually the 'adjective noun' form . . . "

"Usually the "adjective noun" form suggests that the adjective is telling us a property of the noun as an existent."

Yes, I noticed the use of the word "usually" in that post. I generally read all of the words in your posts, if they are addressed at me, before considering how best to answer them. I don't see how that affects the relevance (or otherwise) of my point about your point about the grammar of the (unusual) term "objective proposition".

You were noting some supposed exceptions. That doesn't affect anything I had said.

[GE Morton]

I'm sorry, but I find this explanation unconvincing. We make value-judgements about different things, for sure. But they remain value-judgements, and are therefore subjective - matters of opinion or belief. And because of this, there's no substantial difference between a moral value-judgement and, say, an aesthetic one; 'this action is morally good' and 'this painting is beautiful' are equally subjective, and they equally lack truth-value, because moral goodness and aesthetic beauty aren't objective properties of features of reality. Rather, we use these signs to express opinions about things.

You may be surprised, but I agree with every word of that. Moral value judgments are indeed as subjective as any other value judgments. But rational moral judgments are not value judgments. No valuation enters into them. They are strictly empirical. If I say, "What Alfie did was wrong," I'm not saying that I dislike what Alfie did, that I disagree with what he did, or that what he did was good or bad. I'm saying that his act violated some rule or principle or standard, which is an empirical claim. It makes no difference whether the act in question was hitting his little sister, running a red light, putting the wrong-sized breaker on an electrical circuit, or marking the wrong answer on a geography quiz. I may have some value-based opinions as to what he did --- I may think his act good or bad --- but that is not what I'm saying when I pronounce his act wrong.

To be sure, people often do pronounce acts morally wrong purely on the basis of their dislike or disapproval of the act, i.e., on their "values" --- i.e., on subjective, emotional grounds. They are not engaging in rational moral philosophy. Rational morality does not reduce to, "Do things that make me feel good, and don't do things that make me feel bad."

Perhaps a word about values is in order. A value is a pseudo-property applied to things by agents to indicate their desire for or approval of the thing. Things an agent seeks to acquire or retain are "goods;" things an agent seeks to avoid or be rid of are "evils." Values are not defined except by reference to an agent. Values, both positive (goods) and negative (evils) are quantifiable; different things have different values to a given agent; the measure of the value of a thing to an agent is given by what he is willing to give up --- time, effort, some other good --- to secure (or avoid) that thing.

One more thing. Both you and TP seem to think that opinions and judgments are per se subjective. That is not the case. Both can express factual states of affairs. When they do they are not subjective. They are sound judgments, valid opinions.

[Terrapin Station]

You may be surprised, but I agree with every word of that. Moral value judgments are indeed as subjective as any other value judgments. But rational moral judgments are not value judgments. No valuation enters into them. They are strictly empirical. If I say, "What Alfie did was wrong," I'm not saying that I dislike what Alfie did, that I disagree with what he did, or that what he did was good or bad. I'm saying that his act violated some rule or principle or standard, which is an empirical claim.

The rule or principle or standard is a statement of a value judgment--behavior that the people who were behind it becoming a rule or principle or standard liked/disliked, agreed/disagreed with, felt was good or bad.

Additionally, without acknowledging it, you're invoking the preference of "One should follows rules or principles or standards" by making moral judgments based on whether someone is doing so.

It makes no difference whether the act in question was hitting his little sister, running a red light, putting the wrong-sized breaker on an electrical circuit, or marking the wrong answer on a geography quiz. I may have some value-based opinions as to what he did --- I may think his act good or bad
--- but that is not what I'm saying when I pronounce his act wrong.

We can't get to "one should not hit other people," "One should not run a red light" etc. without people telling us about their preferences, without them telling us the behavior they like/dislike, etc.

And then beyond that, you're subscribing to, "One should follow 'One should not run a red light' if the people with the power to make that a rule have made it a rule." because you must prefer that people follow rules once they've been instituted. (Otherwise you're only asserting that you'd prefer they follow the rules that you prefer--so maybe "One should not run a red light" if you prefer that, as well, but not "One should report runaway slaves" if we're in Alabama in 1845, and you don't prefer that, even though it's a rule.)

One more thing. Both you and TP seem to think that opinions and judgments are per se subjective. That is not the case.

ALL that I'm saying in that is that opinions and judgments are mental phenomena. I'm saying that they do not occur in the world outside of minds.

Both can express factual states of affairs. When they do they are not subjective. They are sound judgments, valid opinions.

I don't use either "sound" or "valid" outside of their standard logical definitions.

[GE Morton]

I answered that question many posts back. The association between a word and a thing --- the thing that is its meaning --- is learned

Non-mentally?

Er, no, TP. We don't learn things "non-mentally." But most of the things we learn, such as the meanings of words and other facts about the world, are "non-mental."

You persist in conflating knowledge a thing or fact with the thing or fact known.

[GE Morton]

In all of the examples you're giving, the imputed properties are still properties of the object in question. The man is married. That's a property he has. The scrolls are from the Dead Sea. That's a property they have.

Using have/has doesn't obliterate the distinction between sensible properties and imputed properties. "Alfie has a bald head" is a sensible property, confirmable by examining Alfie. "Alfie has a degree in philosophy" is an imputed property. Confirming it requires examining some school records, not Alfie.

In the case of "objective proposition," "objective" is not a property the proposition itself has. It's a property, if we're realists, of what the proposition is about.

A proposition "has" (or does not have) the imputed property of being objective in the same sense that Alfie "has" a degree in philosophy. In both cases the proposition asserting the property is true if certain external facts involving the subject of the proposition are true.

[GE Morton]

PS: Another term for this difference is "local" and "non-local" properties.