Philosophy Discussion Forums | A Humans-Only Club for Open-Minded Discussion & Debate

[Consul]

"But Simard and her colleagues continue to challenge our preconceptions of how plants interact. Among other things, their research shows that the wood wide web is like a brain and can communicate information throughout the entire forest, that trees recognise their offspring and nurture them and that lessons learned from past experiences can be transmitted from old trees to young ones."
Source: https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg ... -of-trees/

It is highly doubtful that the information in question here is semantic information rather than mere signal-information. A genuine language essentially has a semantic dimension (meaning & reference).

A crucial point:

"Information processing does not equal cognition."

"[T]he mere fact that a metabolic process or type of behavior is information-driven is not sufficient for it to be cognitive."

(Adams, Fred. "Cognition Wars." Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 30 (2017): 1–11. pp. 8+9)

"If just any sort of information processing is cognitive processing, then it is not hard to find cognitive processing in notebooks, computers, and other tools. The problem is that this theory of the cognitive is wildly implausible and evidently not what cognitive psychologists intend. A wristwatch is an information processor, but not a cognitive agent. While it is plausible that information processing is necessary for cognition, it is outlandish to suppose that such a notion of the cognitive is sufficient to describe the kinds of processing that cognitive psychologists typically care about."

(Adams, Frederick, and Kenneth Aizawa. The Bounds of Cognition. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010. p. 11)

Where there is no cognitive mind and no cognition, there are no semiotic processes and no meaningful signs either.

[Consul]

QUOTE>
"The process in which something functions as a sign may be called semiosis. This process, in a tradition which goes back to the Greeks, has commonly been regarded as involving three (or four) factors: that which acts as a sign, that which the sign refers to, and that effect on some interpreter in virtue of which the thing in question is a sign to that interpreter. These three components in semiosis may be called, respectively, the sign vehicle, the designatum, and the interpretant; the interpreter may be included as a fourth factor. These terms make explicit the factors left undesignated in the common statement that a sign refers to something for someone."

(Morris, Charles W. Foundations of the Theory of Signs. 1938. Reprinted in Writings on the General Theory of Signs, edited by Thomas A. Sebeok, 17-74. The Hague: Mouton, 1971. p. 19)

"Interpretant. The disposition in an interpreter to respond, because of a sign, by response-sequences of some behavior-family.
Interpreter. An organism for which something is a sign."

(Morris, Charles W. Signs, Language, and Behavior. 1946. Reprinted in Writings on the General Theory of Signs, edited by Thomas A. Sebeok, 75-400. The Hague: Mouton, 1971. p. 363)
<QUOTE

Plants are organisms, but not ones for which something is a sign. They aren't semiotic interpreters, because they aren't cognizers. Plants lack the cognitive ability to interpret signals or stimuli (sensory data) as signs (representations) of something else; and they also lack the cognitive ability to create stimulus-independent internal representations that can be stored in and retrieved from memory. They certainly respond nonrandomly and in various adaptive ways to certain physical/chemical signals or stimuli, but mere physiological reaction is not the same as semiotic interpretation.

Anyway, if I'm wrong and plants are equipped with a mind or cognitive system, what and where is it in them? Note that they do not have any nervous system, let alone a central one (brain)!

[Consul]

Ideas (in Locke's psychologial sense of the term) or concepts are paradigmatic mental representations; and no organism can cognize or perceive something as a representation (sign) of something else unless it has an idea or concept of what the representation represents (is interpreted as representing), of what the sign is (taken to be) a sign of. For example, no organism can become aware of smoke being a sign of fire unless it has a concept of fire.
Does it make any sense to say that brainless plants have and use concepts (ideas) of things?

[Sy Borg]

"But Simard and her colleagues continue to challenge our preconceptions of how plants interact. Among other things, their research shows that the wood wide web is like a brain and can communicate information throughout the entire forest, that trees recognise their offspring and nurture them and that lessons learned from past experiences can be transmitted from old trees to young ones."
Source: https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg ... -of-trees/

It is highly doubtful that the information in question here is semantic information rather than mere signal-information. A genuine language essentially has a semantic dimension (meaning & reference).

A crucial point:

"Information processing does not equal cognition."

Assumptions in that statement include:

1. That consciousness is not fundamental. When the laws of physics can show how consciousness comes about, then the idea will no longer be an assumption. The jury remains out, even for some eminent secular scientists.

2. That IIT is correct. Its broad principles at least appear to be correct but the rest is a work in progress.

3. That our means of testing consciousness are foolproof. Time and again we underestimate the sentience of other organisms. Not so long ago it would thought that birds lacked the brain structure to be highly intelligent (and "bird brain" was considered to be an insult, as if birds were the epitome of stupidity). Then it was found that the pallium of a bird's brain performs similar functions to a mammalian neocortex. That will not be the end of such realisations.

[Pattern-chaser]

Where there is no cognitive mind and no cognition, there are no semiotic processes and no meaningful signs either.

In the sense of "what is it like to be a bat?", I wonder if what you write is necessary for sentience/consciousness/cognition/etc?

N.B. I only wonder; I assert nothing.

[Pattern-chaser]

3. That our means of testing consciousness are foolproof. Time and again we underestimate the sentience of other organisms.

Yes, during this investigation and discussion, we have considered only our own, human, conceptions of what a living thing must be/have/do if it is to be considered (by us humans) to be sentient/conscious/cognitive/insert-your-favourite-term-here.

[Consul]

"Information processing does not equal cognition."

Assumptions in that statement include:

1. That consciousness is not fundamental. When the laws of physics can show how consciousness comes about, then the idea will no longer be an assumption. The jury remains out, even for some eminent secular scientists.

2. That IIT is correct. Its broad principles at least appear to be correct but the rest is a work in progress.

3. That our means of testing consciousness are foolproof. Time and again we underestimate the sentience of other organisms. Not so long ago it would thought that birds lacked the brain structure to be highly intelligent (and "bird brain" was considered to be an insult, as if birds were the epitome of stupidity). Then it was found that the pallium of a bird's brain performs similar functions to a mammalian neocortex. That will not be the end of such realisations.

No, 1-3 are not "assumptions in that statement", especially as it's about cognition rather than about consciousness.
What is assumed is that information processing is necessary but not sufficient for cognition (as understood by cognitive psychologists).
The information processing we find in plants is pre-cognitive and thus pre-semiotic.

[Consul]

Where there is no cognitive mind and no cognition, there are no semiotic processes and no meaningful signs either.

In the sense of "what is it like to be a bat?", I wonder if what you write is necessary for sentience/consciousness/cognition/etc?
N.B. I only wonder; I assert nothing.

No, I'm not talking about phenomenal consciousness (or the phenomenal character of subjective experience) here, which is another issue.
But, generally, neither cognition nor P-consciousness can appear out of nothing and exist in nothing; so there are necessary conditions for their becoming and being in nature.

[Pattern-chaser]

Where there is no cognitive mind and no cognition, there are no semiotic processes and no meaningful signs either.

In the sense of "what is it like to be a bat?", I wonder if what you write is necessary for sentience/consciousness/cognition/etc?
N.B. I only wonder; I assert nothing.

No, I'm not talking about phenomenal consciousness (or the phenomenal character of subjective experience) here, which is another issue.
But, generally, neither cognition nor P-consciousness can appear out of nothing and exist in nothing; so there are necessary conditions for their becoming and being in nature.

You misunderstand, I think. I refer to bats only to indicate that sentience/consciousness/etc may not be found if we only look for the things that make it possible for humans. Plants are very different, and it seems very possible, if not likely (?), that we are looking for the wrong things.

[Consul]

You misunderstand, I think. I refer to bats only to indicate that sentience/consciousness/etc may not be found if we only look for the things that make it possible for humans. Plants are very different, and it seems very possible, if not likely (?), that we are looking for the wrong things.

If you're looking for mind or consciousness in nature, (central) nervous systems are the right things to look for. Whatever it is like to be a bat, there would be nothing it is like to be a bat if bats hadn't brains making them phenomenally conscious.

[Sy Borg]

"Information processing does not equal cognition."

Assumptions in that statement include:

1. That consciousness is not fundamental. When the laws of physics can show how consciousness comes about, then the idea will no longer be an assumption. The jury remains out, even for some eminent secular scientists.

2. That IIT is correct. Its broad principles at least appear to be correct but the rest is a work in progress.

3. That our means of testing consciousness are foolproof. Time and again we underestimate the sentience of other organisms. Not so long ago it would thought that birds lacked the brain structure to be highly intelligent (and "bird brain" was considered to be an insult, as if birds were the epitome of stupidity). Then it was found that the pallium of a bird's brain performs similar functions to a mammalian neocortex. That will not be the end of such realisations.

No, 1-3 are not "assumptions in that statement", especially as it's about cognition rather than about consciousness.
What is assumed is that information processing is necessary but not sufficient for cognition (as understood by cognitive psychologists).
The information processing we find in plants is pre-cognitive and thus pre-semiotic.

You have presented a brief statement based on current scientific orthodoxy. That is, based on current beliefs based on current evidence. Trouble is, the evidence has multiple holes.

If there were models with peer-reviewed evidence that follow seamlessly from quantum physics to relativistic physics to abiogenesis to consciousness, then I will agree that your statement is not based on the above assumptions. Until then, there are multiple gaps in our knowledge that require assumptions to be made in physics, biology and psychology. That's fine, but our ideas are far from bulletproof. Our failure to work it out over such a long period is suggestive of perspective errors.

[Sy Borg]

3. That our means of testing consciousness are foolproof. Time and again we underestimate the sentience of other organisms.

Yes, during this investigation and discussion, we have considered only our own, human, conceptions of what a living thing must be/have/do if it is to be considered (by us humans) to be sentient/conscious/cognitive/insert-your-favourite-term-here.

In the end, humans often treat each other harshly, let alone how we treat other animals, plants or fungi. Everything eats, displaces or steals from others in order to survive, so the ethics is necessarily a matter of degree, usually relating to the use of minimum or proportionate force to achieve our nds. To that end, we at least know enough to consider the states of animals that can cry or writhe in pain to render the ethics of this debate moot. However, it's interesting to consider the fuzzy boundary between the most complex reflexes and the simplest perceptions.

[Pattern-chaser]

You misunderstand, I think. I refer to bats only to indicate that sentience/consciousness/etc may not be found if we only look for the things that make it possible for humans. Plants are very different, and it seems very possible, if not likely (?), that we are looking for the wrong things.

If you're looking for mind or consciousness in nature, (central) nervous systems are the right things to look for.

How do you know? Serious question. We know that a CNS offers one possible platform for sentience/consciousness/etc, but we have no clue at all about other platforms, if there are other platforms. So we would be foolish, I think, to conclude that the platform that works in humans is the only possible platform.

[Consul]

How do you know? Serious question. We know that a CNS offers one possible platform for sentience/consciousness/etc, but we have no clue at all about other platforms, if there are other platforms. So we would be foolish, I think, to conclude that the platform that works in humans is the only possible platform.

We know that central nervous systems can realize cognition and consciousness, and science hasn't discovered any other natural/physical systems (or subsystems of physical systems) outside the animal kingdom which are plausibly alternative realizers of cognition and consciousness.

For example, octopuses are extremely non-human-like creatures; but there is still something we have in common, viz. brains. The brain-dependence hypothesis is highly generous, because it is compatible with all sorts of alien brains and all sorts of alien minds (on Earth or any other planet in the universe). All it claims is that brains are nature's exclusive "platforms" of mind and consciousness, and that natural minds and consciousnesses are exclusively zoological phenomena.

QUOTE>
"Why do we have complex brains at all if they are so dispensable in the functioning of our minds? Why does brain damage obliterate mental faculties if minds do not owe their existence to brains? Why were there not minds floating about before brains ever evolved? Why are all mental changes actually accompanied by brain changes? The fact is that minds have their deep roots in brains. They are not just temporary residents of brains, like wandering nomads in the desert. Deracinate them and they lose their handle on reality. Minds don't merely occupy brains, they are somehow constituted by brains. That is why the minds of different species vary, why minds develop in concert with brains, why the health of your brain makes all the difference to the life of your mind. Minds and brains are not ships that pass in the night; the brain is the very lifeblood of the mind."

(McGinn, Colin. The Mysterious Flame: Conscious Minds in a Material World. New York: Basic Books, 1999. pp. 27-8)
<QUOTE

[Consul]

The brain-dependence hypothesis is highly generous, because it is compatible with all sorts of alien brains and all sorts of alien minds (on Earth or any other planet in the universe). All it claims is that brains are nature's exclusive "platforms" of mind and consciousness, and that natural minds and consciousnesses are exclusively zoological phenomena.

Note that it is not part of the brain-dependence hypothesis that information-processing is a brain-dependent and exclusively zoological phenomenon! It by no means denies the occurrence of signaling processes in and between plants. However, there is nothing genuinely mental or psychological about the phytophysiological processing of asemantic information carried by physical or chemical signals or stimuli.