Gertie wrote: ↑September 5th, 2021, 4:41 am
This is what I have so far. You have a set of criteria for which sentient beings are/aren't due moral consideration -
* Those who understand right and wrong and can act on it (moral agents).
* Those who understand right and wrong but can't act on it [b](moral subjects)[/b]
Those who can act on it, but don't understand right and wrong. (not included for moral consideration in your foundational axiom)
Those who can't act on it, but do understand right and wrong. (not included for moral consideration in your foundational axiom).
Yikes. Where did you get those? They are not the criteria I gave. For example, a "moral agent" (again), was,
A Moral Agent is a sentient creature who
a) has interests and some capacity for pursuing them, and
b) is capable of recognizing other qualifying creatures as moral agents who likewise have interests, which may differ from his own, and
c) is capable of understanding and formulating moral principles and rules and acknowledges the need for them in a moral field.
Your 3rd one, "Those who can act on it, but don't understand right and wrong" is incoherent -- how can someone act on something he can't understand, other than by accident?
Also, you're 2nd and 4th seem to be identical. ??
Your axiom, from which moral rules and principles are to be derived, only covers the first two categories.
It only addresses moral agents (as I defined them), because only they, by definition, can understand those rules and principles. That doesn't imply that those agents have no moral obligations to (sentient) non-agents, however. I agree agents may have some obligations to sentient non-agents. Deriving those would require an additional postulate.
BTW, I prefer "sentient" to "conscious" creature, because the latter is ambiguous. "Conscious" has two senses in English, one distinguishing an awake animal from a sleeping one, and the other distinguishing a sentient creature, i.e., many animals, from non-sentient things like rocks and plants.
Of course there are sentient beings, including millions of people, who don't fit in any of these four categories, nevermind the first two, and so aren't granted any moral consideration in your axiom. Including a drowning toddler.
They may not all fit in any of your categories, but they all fit in one of mine.
Your definition of ''Equal Agency'' just means the rules you derive from your axiom apply equally to all moral agents, not that they actually have equal agency. Their actual capacity for agency is irrelevant, they just have to be defined as having it. This is plain and simple a recipe for the more privileged/powerful to take advantage of the less privileged/powerful, further widening the gap. An exploiters' charter.
It is not a recipe for anything. Either someone satisfies the criteria for agency or he doesn't. There is no "capacity for agency" beyond those criteria. Equal Agency does not mean or entail material equality, i.e., equality of strengths, talents, motivations, goods, or circumstances. Those factors are all widely variable among agents, but none of those variations have any bearing on agency.
You seem to want to build some obligation to reduce those inequalities into the axioms of moral theory. That is question-begging --- if such obligations exist, they have to be derived from axioms and postulates that are self-evident and morally neutral. Otherwise you're merely reaching pre-conceived conclusions via a circular argument.
And the foundational axiom itself, the generator of rules and principles which apply to the first two of the above categories, is that Moral Agents ought to allow each other and Moral Subjects to maximise their interests. There is no ought to help them do so, merely to allow it, and not impede it.
That's correct. As I said, if there is to be such an "ought" it has to be derived from the axioms and postulates, as do all other "oughts." That is what a moral theory (or any theory) is --- a set of axioms from which conclusions can be logically derived. It can't be assumed in the axiom; that would be question-begging.
Your moral Principle of Freedom clearly derives from your axiomatic foundation, it's almost a tortology. And to impede another moral agent or subject maximising their own wellbeing is the clearly derivable Moral Wrong.
Well, I've never asserted a "Principle of Freedom," but such a principle is certainly derivable from the axiom and postulates. And, yes, the "do no harm" principle is also derivable from them. So must be any principle commanding charity.
You also have a Duty to Aid, but that doesn't derive from your axiom. That's an ungrounded add-on.
No, it is not. As I said before, to the extent such a duty is honored it will reduce the
risks of loss of welfare for all agents. Hence it is consistent with and entailed by the axiom. That will be the case with all moral duties, BTW --- they will only advance or preserve welfare to the extent they are honored.
Re: the Duty to Aid:
So lets apply this to a few homeless peeps you might pass on the street.
- An able bodied and able-minded adult who lost their job. (moral agent)
- A severely physically disabled person who can't support themselves. (moral subject)
- An abandoned baby left on a doorstep. (neither/not included for moral consideration).
Your axiom gives provides no moral obligation to help any of them based on their circumstances or needs, only to allow them to maximise their own welfare in the first two cases. The third case of the abandoned baby isn't covered by your categories for moral consideration.
The axiom asserts
no moral obligations, other than, "Devise principles and rules which allow all agents to maximize their welfare." So if there is to be an obligation to help anyone, some rule to that effect, it has to be derived from that axiom, via some showing that it furthers the aim stated in the axiom and is consistent with the other postulates, such as the Equal Agency postulate.
Let's see if your so far ungrounded ''Duty to Aid'' add-on makes a difference.
Well the most vulnerable, the baby and severely physically disabled woman, can't offer much in return, but maybe it isn't their fault they're homeless, maybe the woman is disabled through no fault of her own, so they qualify for a bit of help if it isn't too onerous on you. At your discretion once you've run through your checklist.
But not by the state, only by someone who qualifies as a moral agent who might pass by. And once they've offered that bit of help, which obviously isn't going to be a long term solution, the baby and severely disabled woman are no better off. But pooling our bits of aid communally as a society (via taxes) to offer long term help to actually allow them to flourish, is immoral. It goes against the very foundation of your morality which is to be allowed to maximise your own welfare without interference.
That's largely correct, but don't forget that the benefit of the doubt as to whether the conditions on the duty are satisfied goes to the victim. The Duty to Aid must be discretionary, due to the subjectivity and idiosycrasy of values. And of course, there is nothing wrong with "pooling our bits" to aid others --- as long participation in that pool is voluntary. That is what charities are for and what they do. If it becomes mandatory under the threat of government guns then some agents will be imposing their subjective values on others by force, an egregious violation of the Equal Agency postulate and the axiom.
You seem to be inclined to grant to the State prerogatives and powers I doubt you would grant to any individual, an assumption, as I've mentioned before, reminiscent of the "divine right of Kings." But if the state is a creature of a citizenry, their agent, as Western liberalism assumes, then it can have no powers or prerogatives those citizens don't possess themselves, and the State itself must be bound by the same moral constraints that bind them individually. To consider your abandoned baby case --- I doubt you would argue that anyone may force someone who finds an abandoned baby to adopt it and raise it as their own. If no individual (morally speaking) has such a power, then how can the State have it? The Duty to Aid would only require that the person who finds it tend to its immediate needs, then deliver it to a charity devoted to caring for orphans and finding willing adoptive parents.
A couple of other assumptions I see as unwarranted and inaccurate seem to underlie your arguments. First, that we all have
a priori moral obligations --- obligations we bring with us into the world, that are inherent and inescapable, and which must be acknowledged and serve as the starting point --- the axioms --- of any moral theory. Such obligations would be extra-theoretical, arising
ex nihilo, and utterly without rational justification, i.e., arbitrary. Such an assumption renders philosophical moral theorizing moot.
You also mention "communally as a society" (the other unwarranted assumption). Modern civilized socities are not communes, not "big happy families," not collectives of any kind. Anyone who expects them to behave as though they is wandering in the weeds and is doomed to disappointment.
What kind of morality is this GE? What's it for except letting the more advantaged further flourish at the expense of those less so?
Well, that second sentence is inaccurate. The theory certainly does NOT let the more advantaged flourish "at the expense" of anyone. That is explicitly ruled out by the theory. If Alfie spends $10 he's earned for a meal, it is not "at the expense" of Bruno. It would only be at Bruno's expense if Alfie had
taken the $10 from Bruno. That is a sophistry frequently encountered in leftist rhetoric --- equating refusing to give someone something with taking something from him.
As for what kind of morality this is: It is a rational morality derived from readily confirmable features of modern civilized societies and the relationships among their members, and from an axiom that tries to capture the aim of most moral systems proposed over the centuries. It is not a morality for a regious community, a commune, or a kinship-based tribe.
Gertie --- though we disagree on important issues, I enjoy your comments. They are cogent, on-point, and sometimes challenging.
