Philosophy Discussion Forums

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 18th, 2020, 7:20 pm

Greta wrote: ↑February 18th, 2020, 7:17 pm There is only one way to make morality objective, and that is to know every single knock-on effect of every event. Each "good" claimed by any person or group simply refers to a geographical and temporal span. If you know what will ultimately bring the greatest good, not in 10 years' time or 100 years' time, but a thousand or a million years' time.

Even if you could do that, how would you get past the fact that whether anything is "good" is still a mental assessment that individuals have to make?

There's no way to get past that fact.

Couldn't agree more. And I wonder why this glaringly obvious fact is so hard for many people to grasp.

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 19th, 2020, 11:10 pm Yes, it does. The truth conditions for a proposition

The proposition isn't public. Propositions are meanings. Meanings are not public.

are the observable states-of-affairs-in-the-world which, if they obtain, make the proposition true.

You're completely ignoring the need to make a judgment about correspondence, because you're not actually analyzing how the marks I'm producing by typing, the sounds I'd make via uttering speech, etc. both (a) amount to meaning rather than simply being marks or sounds, and (b) obtain any sort of relations to things that aren't the marks or sounds in question.

The only way that both (a) and (b) work are by an individual thinking about such things. But thinking isn't public.

You're also probably projecting language, as that seems to be a common thing to do when talking about truth theory a la disquotational truth theory and other versions of correspondence especially. It's common to say things like "'The cat is on the mat' (is true) iff the cat is on the mat"--as if the second occurrence of "the cat is on the mat," the one not in extra quotation marks, is something that obtains more or less linguistically, so that it simply matches the first "the cat is on the mat," the one in extra quotation marks, the one that represents the proposition.

The problem with this is that a cat being on a mat is nothing like language, and it's nothing like meaning. In order to say that the extramental cat on the mat matches a proposition, it's necessary to make a judgment about the way the observed extramental facts "connect" to the proposition, from a particular individual's perspective--because we're talking about their meaning, their observations, from their unique spatio-temporal perspective, with their perceptual faculties working as they do, per their view of what it is for the observed facts to "match" the proposition. Those are the truth conditions for a proposition.

Nope.

Yep.

The truth of a proposition has nothing to do with anything "in people's heads." "Paris is the capital of France" is true no matter what anyone thinks

Okay, so instead of going over and over this, let's get down to the brass tacks of your view. Let's say that we have "Paris is the capital of France" written or in sound (like a recording) or something.

Now, what exactly happens for the marks on the paper or the sound to have "true" or "false" assigned to it relative to non-mental things in the world.

Remember, if you say anything that involves people doing things where they need to be mentally active--making observations, making decisions, making judgments, etc. you're going to get a buzzer, because you're claiming that truth ascriptions have NOTHING to do with ANYTHING in people's heads.

So we've got the marks on paper or a computer screen or a sound recording of "Paris is the capital of France." What happens next so that we have a truth-value ascription on your view?

I will address this, too, at the moment, because I'm going to bet my house that you'll not do the "getting down to brass tacks" bit about how this is supposed to work, exactly, in detail, on your view so that is has nothing to do with anything going on in anyone's heads (which would mean that we're not going to get back to this otherwise:)

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 19th, 2020, 11:10 pm

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 19th, 2020, 8:02 pm "Suitably situated" in whose judgment?"

No one's. No judgment is involved. Either Alfie is or is not in a position to make the required observation

So we say that "That rock is shale" is an "objective proposition" because it's "verifiable by any suitably situated person." (I'm not using "Paris is the capital of France" as the example because I think that's a horrible example to use for your goals for reasons I won't detail here. It would be far better to stick to a simple example like "That rock is shale.")

So then we take 50 geologists and ask them, "Is that rock shale?"

10 say "No, that rock isn't shale." 40 say, "Yes, that rock is is shale."

We ask the 10 to look at it better, do further research, etc., but no matter what, they come back and say, "No, that rock isn't shale."

Now, presumably either the proposition isn't objective after all, because not everyone verified it, or we need to say that the 10 people in question weren't "suitably situated" after all.

You're saying that whether they're "suitably situated" isn't a judgment. Well, what decides whether the people in question are "suitably situated" then? Simply whether they verify the proposition? "For any proposition, P, you're suitably situated if you verify it, otherwise you're not suitably situated." That can't be right, can it?

And certainly we wouldn't say that any proposition's objectivity hinges on their being unanimous verification of it, right?

So how do we wind up with "suitably situated" without making a judgment? What determines "suitably situated" exactly?

Oops, typo: "And certainly we wouldn't say that any proposition's objectivity hinges on there being unanimous verification of it, right?"

Terrapin Station wrote:So we say that "That rock is shale" is an "objective proposition" because it's "verifiable by any suitably situated person." (I'm not using "Paris is the capital of France" as the example because I think that's a horrible example to use for your goals for reasons I won't detail here. It would be far better to stick to a simple example like "That rock is shale.")

Neither of them seem to me to be good examples to use to illustrate GE Morton's point about truth conditions being public. Something like "it is raining" seems better to me.

Steve3007 wrote: ↑February 20th, 2020, 9:30 am

Terrapin Station wrote:So we say that "That rock is shale" is an "objective proposition" because it's "verifiable by any suitably situated person." (I'm not using "Paris is the capital of France" as the example because I think that's a horrible example to use for your goals for reasons I won't detail here. It would be far better to stick to a simple example like "That rock is shale.")

Neither of them seem to me to be good examples to use to illustrate GE Morton's point about truth conditions being public. Something like "it is raining" seems better to me.

That would work fine, too.

So you ask 50 people, and at least a few of them say "It is not raining."

Is that no longer an objective proposition then?

Terrapin Station wrote:So you ask 50 people, and at least a few of them say "It is not raining."

Is that no longer an objective proposition then?

I'd say it's still an objective proposition because it's a proposition about objects - about a proposed state of affairs in a proposed real world. If two objective propositions contradict each other that doesn't mean that they're not both objective propositions.

Steve3007 wrote: ↑February 20th, 2020, 10:03 am

Terrapin Station wrote:So you ask 50 people, and at least a few of them say "It is not raining."

Is that no longer an objective proposition then?

I'd say it's still an objective proposition because it's a proposition about objects - about a proposed state of affairs in a proposed real world. If two objective propositions contradict each other that doesn't mean that they're not both objective propositions.

"Objective proposition" is a bad term for that, though, for a number of reasons. First, usually the "adjective noun" form suggests that the adjective is telling us a property of the noun as an existent. For example, "red ball," "tall man," "reticulated python." In those cases, "red," "tall," and "reticulated" are properties that the noun they modify "possesses." But with "objective proposition," the proposition itself isn't an object or objective. The way you and others are attempting to use this term is akin to saying, "Red book" when the book itself is in no way red, but is rather a book about the color red. If you were to say, "That's a red book" to someone, you shouldn't be surprised when they say, "Red? What are you talking about. My copy of the book has no red. The cover is black with white lettering. The pages are white with black ink."

Or once again, this is an example of use/mention confusion.

Another reason it's a bad term is that it knocks (at least ontological) idealists out of the conversation. Ontological idealists don't think that anything is an object in the relevant, mind-independent sense. So they'd disagree that "It is raining" or "That rock is shale" is an objective proposition in the way you're using the term, because a fortiori, they'd say that nothing can be an objective proposition in that sense.

Now, if we're realists, we're going to believe that propositions can be ABOUT objective things, but that doesn't make the proposition itself objective (avoiding use/mention confusion).

And on my view, propositions are ABOUT objective things only subjectively. That's because ALL aboutness is a subjective phenomenon--it's one of the unique things our minds do. There is no extramental aboutness to be had. Aboutness is a way we think. Hence the infamous slogan, "Intentionality is the mark of the mental." ("Intentionality," in this philosophical usage, being another term for aboutness.)

Oh, and I forgot to add, since propositions are about objective things only subjectively, there's not going to be any universal agreement on (and it's certainly not an objective fact) whether a given proposition is about an objective thing or not.

Terrapin Station wrote:"Objective proposition" is a bad term for that, though, for a number of reasons. First, usually the "adjective noun" form suggests that the adjective is telling us a property of the noun as an existent. For example, "red ball," "tall man," "reticulated python." In those cases, "red," "tall," and "reticulated" are properties that the noun they modify "possesses." But with "objective proposition," the proposition itself isn't an object or objective. The way you and others are attempting to use this term is akin to saying, "Red book" when the book itself is in no way red, but is rather a book about the color red. If you were to say, "That's a red book" to someone, you shouldn't be surprised when they say, "Red? What are you talking about. My copy of the book has no red. The cover is black with white lettering. The pages are white with black ink."

OK, I see your grammatical point. So the solution to that problem could be to make it clear that the term "objective proposition" is shorthand for "proposition about object(s)". Just as "Red book" could be shorthand for "Book about the colour red". Yes, when the nature of the shorthand is not made clear it might be misleading but that's shorthand for you. Shorthands are often misleading if not explained. But there's nothing wrong with using them. If somebody on the News says "The Whitehouse has released a statement", we don't all say "Huh?!? How can a house, whatever its colour, release a statement?". We understand what that shorthand means.

Or once again, this is an example of use/mention confusion.

Or, that phrase that has been used many times "mistaking the map for the territory". But that can easily be cleared up. If I point to a map and say "Look! That's Africa!" and you say "No it's not. It's a map of Africa" the misunderstanding can easily be cleared up.

Another reason it's a bad term is that it knocks (at least ontological) idealists out of the conversation. Ontological idealists don't think that anything is an object in the relevant, mind-independent sense. So they'd disagree that "It is raining" or "That rock is shale" is an objective proposition in the way you're using the term, because a fortiori, they'd say that nothing can be an objective proposition in that sense.

I don't think that those idealists have to take the position that nothing can be an objective proposition in that sense. They can just take the position that people who make objective propositions are delusional (and in my experience that is what they do). Even if we take the view that no objects exist, we can still make propositions about objects. I and others can make propositions about unicorns even though I don't believe they exist.

Now, if we're realists, we're going to believe that propositions can be ABOUT objective things, but that doesn't make the proposition itself objective (avoiding use/mention confusion).

So, as above, we can take "objective proposition" to be shorthand for "proposition about object(s)"

And on my view, propositions are ABOUT objective things only subjectively. That's because ALL aboutness is a subjective phenomenon--it's one of the unique things our minds do. There is no extramental aboutness to be had. Aboutness is a way we think. Hence the infamous slogan, "Intentionality is the mark of the mental." ("Intentionality," in this philosophical usage, being another term for aboutness.)

I agree to the extent that when I make a proposition like "it is raining" or "there is a chair" I am doing so as a result of my subjective sensations. In that sense, they are about objective things subjectively. If I said "there is a chair" and everyone else in the room disagreed, and then I reached out to touch the chair and my hand "disagreed" with my eyes, I would doubt the soundness of that proposition about that object.

Oh, and I forgot to add, since propositions are about objective things only subjectively, there's not going to be any universal agreement on (and it's certainly not an objective fact) whether a given proposition is about an objective thing or not.

I agree.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑February 20th, 2020, 6:17 am GE Morton wrote:

'Morality is objective to the extent propositions asserting moral principles have public truth conditions, just as for any other category of propositions.'

What are the public truth conditions for the assertion 'slavery is morally wrong'? What, independent from opinion, would make that true, the absence of which would make it false?

Moral propositions are true or false depending upon whether or not they further an agreed-upon goal. Whether they do or do not further that goal is (usually) publicly determinable. If so, then they are objective.

"Slavery is wrong" is true and objective if one conceives the aim, or goal, of a moral theory to be establishing rules of conduct which allow all agents within its universe to maximize their welfare. The welfare of a person enslaved is greatly reduced, thwarting that goal. Hence "slavery is wrong" is true and objective.

Of course, the choice of a goal is subjective. But someone who proposes a different goal will be obliged to defend it.

Greta wrote: ↑February 20th, 2020, 5:02 am
What I said had nothing whatsoever to do with metaphysics. Please try again, and reply to what I wrote, not what you wished I had written.

What you said was, "Actually, objective morality does require omniscience."

Sorry Greta, but omniscience does invoke metaphysics. Only transcendental beings can be omniscient. My response was directly on point.

That's what you said, not me. I just refuted the idea that any person or groups of people can determine an objective morality. It will always be skewed, always subjective.

Well, you denied it, but hardly refuted it. A refutation requires an argument, not a mere repetition of the claim.

Objectivity has nothing to do with omniscience or anything else transcendental. It merely means that the truth conditions are public. A proposition asserting a moral rule is objective if its truth conditions are public. Moral principles and rules assume no values; they are indifferent to values. They only assume that people do value various things, and that their welfare is measured by the extent to which they secure the things they value, whatever those may be.

Peter Holmes wrote: ↑February 20th, 2020, 7:19 am

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 18th, 2020, 7:20 pm

Even if you could do that, how would you get past the fact that whether anything is "good" is still a mental assessment that individuals have to make?

There's no way to get past that fact.

Couldn't agree more. And I wonder why this glaringly obvious fact is so hard for many people to grasp.

I agree too. But what is "good" is a question for axiology, not morality.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 20th, 2020, 9:09 am
The proposition isn't public. Propositions are meanings. Meanings are not public.

To persist with that claim you need to deal with the reductio outlined earlier.

You're completely ignoring the need to make a judgment about correspondence, because you're not actually analyzing how the marks I'm producing by typing, the sounds I'd make via uttering speech, etc. both (a) amount to meaning rather than simply being marks or sounds, and (b) obtain any sort of relations to things that aren't the marks or sounds in question.

I answered that question many posts back. The association between a word and a thing --- the thing that is its meaning --- is learned, initially via ostensive definition (by pointing to something). That is how all young children learn language.

We're going in circles, TP. Deal with the reductio.

Terrapin Station wrote: ↑February 20th, 2020, 9:27 am I will address this, too, at the moment, because I'm going to bet my house that you'll not do the "getting down to brass tacks" bit about how this is supposed to work, exactly, in detail, on your view so that is has nothing to do with anything going on in anyone's heads (which would mean that we're not going to get back to this otherwise:)

GE Morton wrote: ↑February 19th, 2020, 11:10 pm
No one's. No judgment is involved. Either Alfie is or is not in a position to make the required observation

So we say that "That rock is shale" is an "objective proposition" because it's "verifiable by any suitably situated person." (I'm not using "Paris is the capital of France" as the example because I think that's a horrible example to use for your goals for reasons I won't detail here. It would be far better to stick to a simple example like "That rock is shale.")

Please set forth those reasons.

So then we take 50 geologists and ask them, "Is that rock shale?"

10 say "No, that rock isn't shale." 40 say, "Yes, that rock is is shale."

We ask the 10 to look at it better, do further research, etc., but no matter what, they come back and say, "No, that rock isn't shale."

Now, presumably either the proposition isn't objective after all, because not everyone verified it, or we need to say that the 10 people in question weren't "suitably situated" after all.

Whether they agree or not is irrelevant. What makes the proposition objective is the mere fact that they are all basing their verdicts on examination of the rock. That they can't agree merely means they need to examine it more carefully. A proposition is objective if its truth conditions are public, which they are in this case. There is no requirement that all observers agree. A subjective proposition, in contrast, would be, "This rock is beautiful."

You're saying that whether they're "suitably situated" isn't a judgment. Well, what decides whether the people in question are "suitably situated" then? Simply whether they verify the proposition? "For any proposition, P, you're suitably situated if you verify it, otherwise you're not suitably situated." That can't be right, can it?

A person is suitably situated if he is in a position to examine the rock --- to inspect it, run tests on it, etc. You're being obtuse, TP.